

EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY PEACE SUPPORT INTERVENTIONS IN STABILIZATION OF SOMALIA (1992-2022)

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Abstract. Military interventions are often conducted in the context of peace restoration, stabilization and humanitarian assistance. These are set out in the mandate objectives which guide the planning and conduct of peace support operations. However, there have been mixed outcomes and have often been characterized as ineffective. This paper examined the military interventions in Somalia since 1992 as well as the transition in conflicts in Somalia. The objective was to determine the effectiveness of the military interventions in stabilizing Somalia and restoring long-lasting peace. Quantitative data and qualitative data were collected and analysed to answer the objective. The findings indicated that despite marginal successes, previous military interventions were not effective in the stabilization of Somalia due to a lack of understanding of the operating environment. The plans and strategies were singled out as being responsible for the failures rather than successes. Furthermore, AMISOM largely attained the mandate objectives, more so the degradation of Al Shabaab, thereby significantly contributing to stabilization efforts in Somalia. The paper concluded that the lack of proper understanding of the operating environment leads to the misalignment of strategies in the employment of resources, thus leading to dismal outcomes. Therefore, the paper recommended that stakeholders should continue to engage in shaping the Somalia transition plan in order to ensure that all pitfalls are mitigated so as to guarantee proper stabilization.

Keywords: Military interventions, Peace Support Operations, Stabilization, Mandate, Strategy, Transition

Introduction

Military interventions and Peace Support Operations (PSO) have been undertaken to attain set objectives for the operations. In the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the United States of America (USA) and its allied forces

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intervened in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's regime on the unsubstantiated claims of developing or possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (KANAT, 2019). It was codenamed Operation Iraqi Freedom and conducted between 2003 and 2011. However, due to the urgency to intervene, there seems to have been no clear transition and exit strategy to guide the stabilisation and post-conflict stages. Notably, Operation Iraqi Freedom paid little attention to post-Saddam stability, the state of Iraq, and the regional and international implications of Iraq's destruction. This lack of a proper transition and exit strategy is affirmed by sentiments attributed to the then USA's Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, that there was no exit strategy but a victory strategy (KANAT, 2019). A victory strategy is a subjective idea based on the USA's interests and conditions on the ground that are dynamic and prolong operations. The prolonged presence of an intervention force is inimical to public perception and support, jeopardises prospects of a post-facto transition strategy, and thus endangers state, regional, and international security.

As part of the GWOT engagement, there is noted hypocrisy of the USA in pursuing global hegemony (OKOTH, 20003). The eminent scholar observed that the government of the USA unilaterally invaded Iraq under the pretext of curtailing WMD, although none was found. The debacle is noted as a biased approach by USA intelligence agencies to effect regime changes in the Middle East and to cover up their apparent failures to forestall the 9/11 Al Qaeda attack (OKOTH, 2003, pp. 16-20). In the case of the USA in Iraq, the bungled intervention and subsequent exit led to protracted civil wars between Shia and Sunni Muslim sects and the collapse of the post-conflict Iraqi administration, leaving Iraq under the grip of Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIS/L).

CROCKER (2021) observed that in Afghanistan, GWOT similarly motivated USA-led allied intervention to rout out the Taliban regime that was said to harbour Al Qaeda. As in Iraq, the USA did not have a proper exit plan from Afghanistan except on the condition of vanquishing the Al Qaeda-friendly Taliban regime (CROCKER, 2021). Similarly, JONEGÅRD (2019) interrogated the implications of the USA withdrawal from Afghanistan by examining four scenarios. The study used a 2 x 2 matrix as a framework to analyse possible consequences of an American troop withdrawal and as a tool for thinking strategically about the future.

The possible scenarios-outcomes combinations included Civil war and chaos (precipitant US withdrawal + No peace deal), Counter Terrorism (CT) and reversal of gains (precipitant US withdrawal + peace deal), the rule of warlords, (timely US withdrawal + no peace deal) and Fragile peace (timely US withdrawal + peace deal) (JONEGÅRD, 2019). The USA had four options to guide an ex-post facto exit from Afghanistan. Whereas scenario four was desirable, the turn of events in 2021 indicates that scenario two played out. The implications are the continued instability in Afghanistan, Taliban rule and the return of religious

fundamentalism and insecurity spill-overs to other countries such as Pakistan. While JONEGÅRD's (2019) analysis was good, it concluded pessimistically without offering a clear way forward. JONEGÅRD (2019) recommended different approaches to the exit, which is unclear to strategists. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ought to have taken a similar approach to consideration of possible exit scenarios so as to inform strategy.

In Africa, Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and unilateral military interventions have been undertaken under UN, AU or regional mechanisms. FELTER AND RENWICK (2021) reviewed the role of UN missions in Africa. They noted that about half of the dozen UN peacekeeping missions are in Africa; including the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); United Nations Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); and United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in Western Sahara. Additionally, several peacekeeping or security missions are under the auspices of the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and other regional blocs. Notable ones include AMISOM in Somalia, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, and the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) Joint Force (FELTER AND RENWICK, 2021).

Regarding PKO effectiveness, Felter and Renwick (2021) concede that many PKOs deployed in Africa have had mixed outcomes. Those who were deployed in countries such as Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone were generally considered to have successfully attained their objectives of bringing stability to those countries even post-PKO. However, UNMISS in South Sudan ended without bringing stability to the country, characterised by fights between political factions and their allied militia (VAN-DER LIJN, 2010). Whereas the successes of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) cannot be readily attributed to its transition and exit strategy, the same could be inferred from the fact that there is stability post-UNAMSIL.

Among many other factors, the many dismal outcomes of PKOs have to do with a lack of clear transitions in-built into the mandates and plans, besides the fluid PKO environment that negates PKO principles (SALAÜN, 2019). It was a fact that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) admitted in 2002, when it discussed the need for a UN PKO exit strategy (UNITED NATIONS, 2000). Besides the affected state(s), immediate neighbouring countries withstand the worst of botched PKO exits that lead to a resumption of hostilities and spillover of conflicts.

As evident in the few PSO examples reviewed, transition plans are usually not built-in, but retrofitted. It is in response to the 'need to exit due' to the threat environment, the protracted nature of conflicts, the resource burden, and waning support for the operations. The lack of adequately executed exits has led to more instabilities that extend into neighbouring states, more so the immediate neighbours (GOLDMANN, 2005). It thus requires that military strategists for AMISOM and respective TCCs ensure that despite not having a clear transition and exit plan, the post-facto plans need to ensure more stability for Somalia Post-AMISOM PSO. It is then instructive that the proceeding sections highlight the nature of the Somali conflict and be put in perspective, including the attempted PSO interventions to contextualise the possible transition strategies.

Empirical Review of Literature

Transitions in Somalia conflict

Scholarly analysis indicates that the Somalia conflict has been through three distinct phases viz phase of the war, the phase of war and peace and the phase of extremism (KAGWANJA ET AL., 2020, pp. 23-45). The phase of war lasted from 1963 to 1989 and was marked by a frosty relationship between Kenya and Somalia. It is because Kenya accused Somalia of inciting secessionist movements in the then Kenya Northeastern Province (NEP) from 1963 to 1967 as part of the latter's 'Greater Somalia' expansionist ideology. The 'Greater Somalia' ideology aimed at uniting all Somali-speaking people found in Kenya's NEP, Southeastern Ethiopia and Djibouti (CHONKA & HEALY, 2021; KAGWANJA ET AL., 2020, p. 41). The phase of war and peace spanned from 1989 to 2004 and was characterised by the toppling of Siaad Barre's regime, followed by the warlords, civil wars and eventual collapse of the state of Somalia, including failed foreign interventions. During this period, Kenya was instrumental in searching for peace in Somalia by participating in and hosting peace meetings. The phase of extremism began in post-2004, corresponding with the rise of various Islamist extremist groups culminating with the rise of Al Shabaab in 2007.

The above phases can be construed as transitions in developing conflicts in Somalia. The stages shift from post-colonialism through nationalism and secularism to religious fundamentalism. All these Somalia conflict transitions have had implications for Kenya's national security, including the Shifta secessionist insurrections, banditry, and currently, Al Shabaab terrorist attacks.

Transitions in Military Intervention Efforts

JESS (2018) submitted that the Somali civil war flared from 1988 through the 1990s. The conflict pitted the ruling military junta led by Siad Barre and a mix of opposition-armed groups such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). All these groups used violence to challenge the junta.

KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020, p. 28), and CHONKA AND HEALY, (2021) noted the presence of other non-violent groups, which included the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG). It is the USC, led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed and businessperson Ali Mahdi Mohamed, which eventually toppled Siad Barre in January 1991. The ensuing instability saw a ruthless reign of warlords along clan lines and a counterattack by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) to dislodge the warlords from Mogadishu, eventually leading to Ethiopia National Defence Force (ENDF) intervention in 2006 against the ICU.

During these phases of the Somalia Conflict evolution, several interventions were attempted by regional and international countries. According to WILLIAMS ET AL. (2018), five international military interventions were organised between 1992 and 2011. The first intervention was the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), which deployed between April to December 1992, comprising a multinational contingent of 54 military observers and 893 military personnel from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Notably, UNOSOM aimed to provide security to Humanitarian agencies for relief aid distribution, which was being hampered by the activities of various warlords. However, UNOSOM I failed to fulfil its objectives and ended prematurely.

The second intervention was launched in 1992 following the creation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to replace UNOSOM I. UNITAF aimed to prepare for the return to peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. It comprised about 37,000 personnel from 40 countries, with the bulk (approximately 25,000 personnel) from the USA (OLUOCH, 2018). While UNITAF was instrumental in creating an enabling environment for the negotiation and signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in early 1993, it failed to create sustainable peace. Thus, the civil war continued. Besides, OLUOCH (2018) noted that the lack of a robust mandate hampered the work of UNITAF and as such, UNITAF was short-lived and transited to UNOSOM II in March 1993

The third intervention by UNOSOM II comprised approximately 28,000 military personnel from 40 countries ALI AND MATTHEWS (2004, p. 253). The mission was mandated to secure continued humanitarian relief efforts, restore

peace, and rebuild the Somali state and economy. However, the mission suffered setbacks in implementing its mandate to the hostile activities by warlords such as Farah Aideed. The last straw in the string of setbacks was during the 'black hawk down' incident, where about 18 American Rangers Quick Reaction Force (QRF) were killed during a mission to capture Aideed. It is estimated that 150 UN personnel died during UNOSOM II. ALI AND MATHEWS (2004) surmised that the mission exited Somalia in March of 1995 and abandoned Somalia to local warlords and terrorists, thereby threatening the security of Somalia and neighbouring states such as Kenya. The implications to Kenya included incursions by bandits and criminal elements, the smuggling of contraband goods and refugee influx.

The fourth intervention took place in June 2006 when ICU militia defeated Western-backed warlords and captured the Capital city, Mogadishu, toppling the interim government of President Ali Mahdi (LIGAWA, 2018, p. 54). In December of the same year, Ethiopia sent troops to protect the interim government in Mogadishu. ENDF managed to route out ICU before officially withdrawing in January 2009. Consequently, the intervention by ENDF sparked off the Somali nationalism wave in which Al Shabaab, an offshoot of ICU, rode to power. Kenya was instrumental in participating in peace talks and hosting key peace conferences. The critical peace conference was the 2004 Nairobi peace conference that saw the formation of the Transition Federal Government (TFG). Kenya also played a significant role in forming the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012.

The centrality of the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) and AU characterised the fifth intervention as regional and continental bodies with the duty to bring about peace, security and stability in the spirit of "Responsibility-to-Protect". As de CONING, (2019) observed, the 1990s failures by foreign interventions in Somalia left the country to its own devices. As such, the Somali conflict gradually morphed into jihadism. Therefore, IGAD member states mooted the idea of deploying African forces to restore peace and order in Somalia.

The AU Peace and Security Council authorised IGAD to deploy a peace mission in 2005. However, the deployment did not occur due to policy differences between the IGAD and AU on the one hand and the UN on the other, mainly along the lines of the UN arms embargo and opposition to deployment by immediate neighbours (WILLIAMS, 2012). Eventually, AU assumed responsibilities from IGAD and contingents from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, and Ethiopia deployed in 2007 under AMISOM. Kenya joined in 2012 after the initial pursuit of Al Shabaab into Somalia during Operation Linda Nchi in October 2011. AMISOM mandate ended on 30 April 2022 and ushered the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is planned to gradually hand over security responsibilities to SSF in a phased manner until it exits at the end of 2024.

The preceding account of the various interventions is critical for this study as it indicates the transition markers for the intervention missions. Scholars such as KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020) did not explicitly refer to the shift to successive interventions as a 'transition'. Thus, they were not able to properly analyse the circumstances around the transitions and security implications to Somalia and neighbouring states such as Kenya. Having examined the intervention phases, a review of the conceptual aspects of the transition strategy is helpful for the study to contextualise the strategies employed by AMISOM, or the lack thereof, to appreciate the implications to Kenya's National Security.

AMISOM Peace Support Operations

Examining the challenges to AMISOM's exit from Somalia, WILLIAM AND HASHI (2016) submitted that it would be irresponsible for AMISOM to exit Somalia without leaving behind capable, legitimate and inclusive Somalia Security Forces. It was often underscored that AMISOM was not an occupation force and must eventually exit Somalia. However, such a governance and security responsibilities transition can happen in a well-formulated transition strategy that looks beyond post-AMISOM stability in Somalia and the national security implications on immediate neighbours.

According to MUSOMA (2021), military strategists often underscore the need for a transition plan built into Concepts of Operation (CONOP) for military operations in order to avoid falling into the hastiness of the 'need to intervene' in conflicts, which often entails retrofitting transition strategies. However, caution against having rigid transition strategies is crucial because conflict environments such as the Horn of Africa (HoA) are often unpredictable and thus require plans that can be adapted to unforeseen circumstances (MUSOMA, 2021). Despite this realisation, many military operations do not emphasise the transition plans but develop them as the operations continue. Where such are developed, they tend to be inadequate in considering all the possibilities that could affect the outcomes.

There have been plans mooted for AMISOM exit since 2017. The earlier plan was to have the mission by the end of 2020 on the condition that the SSF would have sufficient capacity to assume security responsibilities. The strategy emphasised territorial recovery and consolidation by AMISOM and Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) until October 2018 and a subsequent drawdown and transfer of security responsibilities to the SNSF from 2018 to December 2020 (AFRICAN UNION, 2016). However, the planned transition did not materialise at the projected timeline; an indication of gaps in planning and strategic considerations.

The then AU Special Representative for the Secretary-General (SRSG), Ambassador Francisco Caetano José Madeira, articulated the identified challenges that could have hampered this transition. He highlighted the challenges as being; the enhancement of the 'AMISOM Model' to suit a transition Mission engaged in asymmetric warfighting, provision of the appropriate level of enablers and multipliers to enhance the operational efficiency of the new mission, and the importance of force generation (MADEIRA, 2022). However, whereas they may be expert observations, the challenges need scientific verification through research data to inform policy and academia.

Cognizant of the complex nature of the Somali conflict environment, the last challenge is significant for planners of AMISOM transitions as it hinges on the security aspects of solving the other two challenges as identified by Madeira (2022). Issues of force generation go beyond manpower provision. It entails capacity building and professionalization of the force to assume security responsibilities, albeit adequately graduated. Some scholars took note of the inadequacies of this initial transition plan. They aver that AMISOM [transition] and exit strategy should consider its ramifications for the security of Somalia's neighbours (KAGWANJA ET AL., 2020, p. 122). Observing that the future of Somalia will not rest on militarism but civilian rule in a law and order framework, they suggest that the AMISOM exit (and transition) strategy must be comprehensive, with clear timelines considering two key factors, viz, transition of AMISOM operations to Somali-led operations and transition from military to police led operations. These sentiments echo the line of thought by WILLIAM AND HASHI (2016), who submitted that the AMISOM transition must have two major distinct phases, i.e., a transition from operations led by foreign forces to Somali-led operations and second, a transition from military-led operations to police-led operations. However, such transition ought to be conditioned on the attainment of credible stability and governance, a matter not adequately appreciated by scholars.

This study notes the apparent arguments by military experts and scholars on the need for an AMISOM transition/exit strategy. CHUMBA (2016, p. 743) found that Kenya's interventionist Operations in Somalia attracted mixed perceptions, with the majority noting that it was a short-term strategy to a long-term problem. Moreover, the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) strategy in Somalia was unclear from the outset. However, it was noted that during the incipient stages, AMISOM was conceptualised to have four phases: an Initial Deployment phase, an expansion of deployment phase, a consolidation phase, and, finally, a redeployment/exit phase (WILLIAMS AND HASHI, 2016, p. 24). The confusion arose from the need to have AMISOM give way to a UN-led mission six months after its inception. The hurried need for transition failed to appreciate the complexities of the Somali operating environment and geopolitical imperatives. The

outcome has been constant extensions of AMISOM mandates due to the impracticalities of having a UN-led operation. The UN was relegated to logistics support through the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), while the EU provided funding through the Africa Peace Facility (APF).

Post-AMISOM transition to ATMIS

As earlier noted, various PSO efforts in Somalia and their transitions did little to resolve the Somali conflict. However, BLYTH (2019) noted that AMISOM has had some commendable contributions to the stabilisation of Somalia according to its mandate, which evolved from protecting the Somali authorities and facilitating a political process to warfighting and counter-insurgency and stabilisation with a mixture of state building. Ultimately, the governance and security responsibilities have to be assumed by Somalia. Such a transition has to be cognizant of previous pitfalls. Given this, any AMISOM transition plan should consider Somalia's post-AMISOM stability and regional peace and security. It would imply more time allocation for a phased handover, accelerated training of SSF, and the building of institutions; further weakening Al Shabaab (BLYTH, 2019).

Over time, the UNSC has been renewing AMISOM mandates for six months. In 2019 through UNSCR 2472(2019), redeployments and drawdowns of forces were initiated to conform to a possible exit in 2021. The last mandate extension was in 2020 through UNSCR 2614/2021, extending AMISOM's stay by three months as stakeholders agreed upon a transition plan per the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) (UNITED NATIONS, 2021). The STP to be implemented by ATMIS was developed in 2018 and revised in 2021 to transfer security responsibilities from AMISOM to the country's security forces over the next three years to 2024. However, LIGAWA (2018) pointed out that the frequent changes in mandate within short periods militated against Somalia's peacebuilding efforts. The PSO mandates are not given adequate time to realise any significant impact towards peacebuilding.

ATMIS effectively took over from AMISOM on 01 April 2022, in line with the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) during its 1068th meeting on 08 March 2022. It inherited AMISOM's 18,000 troops, 1,000 police and 70 civilian staff (DESSU, 2022). The AU PSC mandated ATMIS to support the Federal Government of Somalia in implementing the STP and to transfer security responsibilities to the Somali security forces and institutions by 31 December 2024. The mandate included activities to: degrade Al Shabaab and other terrorist groups; provide security to population centres and open the main supply routes; develop the capacity of the Somali Security Forces to enable them to take over security responsibilities by the end of the transition period; support peace and reconciliation efforts of the Federal Government Somalia (FGS); and help

develop the capacity of the security, justice and local authority institutions of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States. As observed by DESSU (2022), there is pessimism that the ATMIS mandate does not significantly depart from its predecessor. The new mission will likely face political and funding challenges that hamper AMISOM. Whereas inferences can be drawn from AMISOM and preceding PSOs, it may be premature to dismiss ATMIS potential, hoping that past lessons informed STP CONOP.

The STP CONOP was designed into four phases (AFRICAN UNION, 2022). The first phase entailed reconfiguration to include redeployments of Forward Operating Base (FOB), downsizing, and reconfiguring forces to a mobile offensive posture. It was envisaged to take the initial nine months ending in December 2022. The second phase entailed joint shaping and clearing operations and the handing over some FOBs to SSF, while the third phase was to be decisive operations and handing over of the remaining FOBs. The two phases were to take nine months each up to October 2024. The last phase will be the withdrawal and liquidation of ATMIS by 31 December 2024.

This phasing of operations partly alleviates the concerns that hurried exit will repeat experiences like those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The consequences of a hasty exit from Somalia would be more instability and a threat to Kenya's national security. However, concerns remain regarding the state of FGS and Somalia Security Force (SSF) to credibly assume governance and security functions. The political wrangles and the Somali question (clannish political dynamics) have not been adequately resolved (NZAU, 2018, pp. 544-546). The capacity of SSF is not yet convincing for added security responsibility or independent operations. The lack of consideration of federal states' security forces as part of SSF in the STP is likely to inflame the situation, cause animosity, defections as well fighting between forces considered under SSF (SNA, SNP and Prison services) and federal state forces such as Jubaland Security Forces (JSF), Ras Kiamboni Brigade (RKB), among others. These are some of the outstanding pitfalls that ATMIS will have to contend with and address if they are to operate within the timelines envisaged by STP.

Analysis of Findings

Pre-AMISOM military intervention and recovery of Somalia's stability

Military interventions in the context of multilateral PSO are aimed at stabilizing the security and socio-political situation of the affected states. It was born from the need to ensure global peace and security as espoused in the UN Charter of

1948. In 2005, R2P was developed to implement lessons learnt from atrocities in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Despite the noble intentions of PSO deployments, the results have been mixed. Scholars have noted that certain PSOs have failed in achieving the desired end state, for instance, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, among others (CROCKER, 2021; GOMPERT, BINNENDIJK & LIN, 2014). It has left more instabilities than the state of affairs in the pre-PSO period.

Some PSOs have been adjudged as being successful such as those conducted in Sierra Leone (GOLDMANN, 2014). Failure by PSOs to stabilize conflict situations has been attributed to a myriad of factors, such as what LIGAWA (2018) cites as a lack of understanding of Cultural Intelligence. It infers the understanding of the Communities within which PSOs are conducted. Other scholars have attributed the failures to a lack of local mission support, an understanding of Somalia clan dynamics by peacekeepers, and poor operation planning (KAREITHI & KARIITHI, 2008; Hersi, 2015; LIGAWA, 2018). Furthermore, SALAÜN (2019) attributed such dismal PSO outcomes to a lack of clear transition plans and the fluid PSO environment. In the context of Somalia, Pre-AMISOM interventions could be assessed as having failed to owe to takeover by warlords and the eventual collapse of Somalia. This assertion was supported by sentiments by a Senior AMISOM commander when he observed that:


Since colonial times, Somalia was divided into spheres of influence between the Italians and the British. After independence, the Somalia clannist dynamics influenced the governance and social aspects of the Country, eventually leading to conflicts. The earlier military interventions by the UN and IGAD did not adequately understand the operating environment regarding clan dynamics and cultural and religious sensitivities. It largely contributed to the resentment of the local community, which turned against the peacekeepers to the advantage of warlords. In essence, the peace missions worsened the situation as witnessed by the protracted instability in the Country (Interview with a Senior ATMIS Commander in Dhobley, on 26 November 2022).

The assertion by the key informant affirms the argument by LIGAWA (2018) that cultural intelligence is critical in stabilization and peacebuilding efforts; which UNOSOM, UNITAF and IGASOM did not factor. Besides, these earlier PSOs did not have comprehensive CONOPs to cater for post-PSO Somalia and the failure of peace agreements such as the Addis Ababa agreement of 1993 (CHONKA & HEALY, 2021; OLUOCH, 2018). Moreover, MWASI (2022) noted that peace agreements, such as the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), have failed to end conflicts since they did not adequately address the root causes. The findings in Figure 1 indicate that the pre-AMISOM PSO interventions are assessed as having failed to stabilize the state of Somalia. Most respondents (73%) affirmed that pre-AMISOM military interventions and PSOs did help recover Somalia's stability. In comparison, 27%

affirmed that pre-AMISOM military interventions and PSOs did not help recover Somalia's stability.

Scholars have attributed the failure of pre-AMISOM PSO and strategies interventions to various factors, viz; lack of understanding of the operating environment (cultural intelligence), lack of local support, poor planning and exit strategies, and lack of sufficient resources, among others (CHONKA & HEALLY, 2021; KAREITHI & KARIITHI, 2008). Additionally, the findings lend to the argument by William and Hashi (2016) that the aftermath of interventions in Somalia has been a deterioration in the Country's stability and the rise of fundamentalist extremists such as Al Shabaab and ISIL. Similarly, a study by MWASI (2022) established that the South Sudan peace agreements failed due to; a limited number of mechanisms to address impediments to the agreement, little agreement on the ownership of natural resources, inadequate modalities of navigating the interests of external actors, and poor handling of different political interests. However, despite the failures of pre-AMISOM PSOs, they helped set conditions and lessons upon which subsequent interventions were improved.

Figure 1: Whether pre-AMISOM Military interventions and PSOs were helpful in the stabilization of Somalia




Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings further corroborate CHUMBA'S (2018) submission that purely militaristic PSO approaches are ineffective in the face of changing nature of contemporary threats to peace. Earlier PSOs in Somalia attempted to synergize efforts between the military and humanitarian agencies. However, they did not sufficiently engage the community by understanding clan and cultural dynamics within the Somali community. It failed in what LIGAWA (2018) called 'cultural intelligence'. Without the critical support of the community, UNOSOM I and II,

and UNITAF, eventually failed. IGASOM did not even deploy and had to change to AMISOM. To expound further on the issue, Figure 2 presents respondents' aggregated explanations on the issue of pre-AMISOM PSOs' usefulness regarding the stabilization of Somalia:

Figure 2: Aggregated respondents' explanations on the effectiveness of pre-AMISOM PSO in restoring the stability of Somalia



Source: Field data, 2022.

From the findings, the dominant opinion revolved around the fact that the guerilla (asymmetric) tactics of the Somali militia defeated superior conventional armies (24.2%) and the fact that stability was achieved by a minimal margin (24.2%). Notably, 9.1% of the respondents believed there was little attempt to build the capacity of SSF. In comparison, a paltry 3% assessed that the pre-AMISOM PSOs created an environment that enabled peace processes (future PSOs) to commence. Interestingly, the aggregated respondents' explanations converged around the notion that despite marginal successes, the pre-AMISOM military interventions and PSOs were largely unsuccessful in restoring Somalia's Stability.

According to ANGELL (2015), the failure of operational commanders to adapt their strategies to the unconventional nature of the Vietnam conflict

contributed to the failure of USA military operations. The assertion supports the respondents' view in Figure 2 that guerrilla tactics employed by the insurgent groups in Somalia defeated conventional militaries. This notion was conveyed by 24.2% of the respondents. The changing nature of conflicts has moved away from the trenches and fixed battle formations that characterized warfare during the world wars. Weaker entities (mostly non-state) have sought ways to offset the tactical advantages by targeting weaknesses (gaps) of a superior conventional adversary while minimizing losses on their part. Often state militaries have been slow to adjust to the unorthodox strategies of insurgent and militia groups (GOMPERT, BINNENDIJK & LIN, 2014). It was true of the experiences of UNOSOM, UNITAF and later IGASOM forces. A Key Informant noted that;

Subsequent operations in Somalia by AMISOM had to learn from previous operations' shortcomings and adjust to the threat environment. Al Shabaab does not conform to the laws of armed conflict and employs asymmetric tactics to offset the AMISOM military advantage. In addition, the contingents must engage the community, win their support and deny Al Shabaab the civilian terrain to hide and perpetrate atrocities. Compared to earlier operations, AMISOM has mainly been effective by learning from the failures of pre-AMISOM deployments (Interview with a Military Staff Officer in Dhobley, on 14 November 2022).

This view underscores the need to use failures in military operations as learning opportunities for subsequent deployments. Where repeat PSO deployments occur, such as in Somalia, comprehensive after-action reviews are crucial to the operational activities that should inform adjustments in ongoing and upcoming operations. It is in the form of lessons learnt that must be constantly updated since asymmetric threat environments are fluid. However, lessons learnt should not cause operational paralysis using the risk-averse approach (PATMAN, 2015). LIGAWA (2018) advised that tactical dispositions of AMISOM troops are essential in ensuring success in peacebuilding. Tactical dispositions are critical adjustments in deployments to ensure maximum operational effectiveness and achievement, which, according to LIGAWA (2018), is a strategic attack to achieve the end state. One Key informant observed that:

With the evolving nature of threats, continuous adjustments of plans are essential to ensure that we are better placed to address not only the enemy threats but also the community needs that enable more significant support for AMISOM operations. We can achieve our mandate only through plan flexibility (Interview with ATMIS Operations Officer in Kolbiyow, 20 November 2022).

The notion by the key informant reflects the need for flexible plans that can adjust to the threat environment. This view supports the argument by Luft (2020), who posited that critical military strategic planning models require a comprehensive appreciation of all possibilities, including a possible forecast of

outcomes to enable the development of branches and sequels. In essence, the notion advocates for flexibility in plans to address what Oluoch (2018) viewed as the 'what next' and 'what ifs' of PSOs. Pre-AMISOM intervention strategies lacked flexibility in adjusting to the operational environment and planning for the post-exit situation. It left the post-intervention Somalia cascading through decades of instability as a failed state (William & Hashi, 2016; Masese, 2012).

KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020, p. 121) made a similar observation regarding Operation Iraqi Freedom between 2003 and 2011. They noted that Operation Iraqi Freedom failed to factor in post-Saddam stability, the existence of the state of Iraq, and regional as well as international implications. As aptly noted by KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020), failed PSO interventions not only negatively affect the security of the primary state but also have negative implications regionally and internationally. The affirmation that pre-AMISOM PSO interventions failed to contain the security instabilities in Somalia meant that the spillovers were felt in Kenya and the IGAD region.

Influence of Plans and Strategies on pre-AMISOM PSO Outcomes

The strategic theory requires that a good plan be detailed enough to take care of all possibilities whilst remaining flexible enough to respond to the unforeseen (Shelling, 1984). Plans draw from strategies that should span the entire spectrum of the operation from the preliminaries, execution, termination and post-operation situation (DURCH, 2010). Scholars have often advised that responsible PSOs should operate to stabilize a conflict zone and exit after setting favourable conditions for capable, legitimate and inclusive governance and security institutions (KAGWANJA ET AL., 2020; WILLIAM & HASHI, 2016). It is upon a well-established security and governance platform that other state institutions can be rebuilt for national stability. Security and governance create a conducive environment for other socioeconomic processes. It hinges on an adequately planned PSO whose strategies, branches and sequels the established conducive environment. One Key informant aptly summed as follows:

Often we are told that failing to plan is planning to fail. However, the lack of proper and comprehensive plans for military operations is as disastrous as not having a plan. Half-baked plans give false hope for operations only to realize that many gaps exist, often too late. Unfortunately, military failures occasion costs in terms of time and resources; and, most tragically, human lives and livelihoods. More is demanded of comprehensiveness in military plans and operations since success depends on how thorough planners can be to avert tragedy (Interview with a Military Officer in Bojigaras, on 10 November 2022).

EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY PEACE SUPPORT INTERVENTIONS IN STABILIZATION OF SOMALIA (1992-2022)

While it is humanly impossible to achieve a perfect plan, the Key informant's observations call for thorough planning and strategizing. The entire spectrum of operations must be adequately considered, no matter the level of operations or its attendant complexity. Poorly planned PSOs result in security, socio-political and economic turmoil that transcend the confines of the subject state (DESSU, 2022; KAGWANJA ET AL., 2020).

Pre-AMISOM PSOs are noted to have failed due to poor considerations of the operating environment, population support, cultural intelligence and exit plan (SALAÜN, 2019; LIGAWA, OKOTH & MATANGA, 2017; KAREITHI & KARIITHI, 2008). Military plans and strategies should be predicated on these primary planning considerations. At the crack of bullets, military operations tend to suffer what LIGAWA (2018) calls the 'contact dilemma', characterized by hostility, uncertainty and disorder, violence and danger, and human stress. Essentially, the simple becomes difficult, and the difficult becomes seemingly impossible. The situation gets disastrous when plans are poor. The hasty withdrawals of USA forces in Somalia and subsequent instabilities attest to this fact. The assertion was reflected in the sentiments of a Key Informant who pointed out:


The initial interventions by the UN in Somalia under UNOSOM and UNITAF failed to consider Somalia's human terrain. The clan dynamics of Somalis are so entrenched and dictate even the most mundane of social affairs. Within the clans, some sub-clans equally antagonize other sub-clans within the same more prominent clan. Those inadvertently left outside automatically view engaging one clan or sub-clan with suspicion. It is a recipe for trouble for a foreign entity; the community can easily label that as a non-believer (kuffar) to rally opposition. Those UN missions' simplistic and rigidly structured approach underestimated the antagonism of ignoring such planning factors (Interview with a Senior Military Officer in Wajir, 02 December 2022).

The response by the respondents supported the argument that proper planning and having comprehensive strategies are critical in PSOs; and any military engagements in pursuit of national security. Besides, the sentiment conforms to HERSI'S (2015) observation that clan dynamics are central to Somali reconciliation efforts and thus require proper understanding by conflict management actors. Indeed, the peculiar nature of Somali Clannism indicates a strong leaning towards clan loyalty over nationalism.

Depicted in Figure 3 are responses by the respondents on whether the pre-AMISOM plans and strategies were responsible for their outcomes viz success or failure. Most respondents (75.8%) indicated that pre-AMISOM plans and strategies were not responsible for successes, and 60.6% affirmed that the plans and strategies influenced pre-AMISOM failures. The findings point to deficiencies in the outcome of the pre-AMISOM PSOs the respondents used to infer the

guiding plans and strategies, thus concluding that they were also deficient. It is because the plans and strategies write-ups are classified and likely not accessible to the respondents. Notwithstanding this analysis, the findings point wherein the problem lay resulting in failed outcomes of pre-AMISOM PSOs viz as plans and strategies as depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Pre-AMISOM PSO outcomes influenced by plans and strategies



Source: Field data, 2022.

NZAU (2018) submitted that any typical military venture must have a clear objective based on a sound plan to attain the assigned mandate. LUFT (2020) further averred that critical military strategic planning models require a comprehensive appreciation of all possibilities, including a forecast of outcomes to enable the timely development of branches and sequels. Furthermore, OPONDO (2018, p. 382) noted the need to adapt strategies of yesteryears to prevailing operational situations, thus underscoring the need for flexibility and adaptability of plans. The initial submissions by the scholars underscore the central argument of strategic theory for comprehensive planning and the need for adaptable plans that can ride the waves of a fluid asymmetric threat environment. As a Key Informant indicated:

Plans are guides and sensors for military operations. Therefore, they need to feel the threat environment and adjust to them to guide operations. Otherwise, operations will be executed blindly. Plans that lack this quality are even worse as they waste time and lead to otherwise avoidable pitfalls (Interview with ATMIS Staff Officer in Dhobley, on 15 November 2022).

The assessed failures of UNOSOM and UNITAF are attributed to poor planning. While the effect within Somalia was the collapse of the state, the security

implications spread to the Horn of Africa and continue to shape the geopolitical and security landscape. KAREITHI AND KARIITHI (2008) observed that Kenya's North-eastern parts continue to experience instabilities that, inter alia, are linked to the failed state of Somalia, ranging from attacks by militias, illegal trade, banditry, and refugee problems, among others. In light of the failed outcomes of pre-AMISOM stabilization efforts and their implications for Kenya's national security, a community elder opined that:

For a long time, the community has experienced insecurity and environmental hardships affecting human beings and livestock - problems coming from the other side of the border (Somalia). The area is also remote, most places do not get essential services such as security, and people have to arm themselves to protect themselves (Interview with a Community elder interviewed in Damasa, Mandera County, on 16 December 2022).

The Key informant's sentiment represents the broader problem facing the NFD, where the instability in Somalia coupled with harsh climatic conditions burden the inhabitants, thus reinforcing the notion of marginalisation. The indication that the community has to arm itself for its security portrays the resignation to fate due to long periods of persecution at the hands of militia from Somalia. The sentiment is also relevant to the assessment of pre-AMISOM PSO in that what the NFD communities are experiencing is essentially a ripple effect of bungled stabilization efforts in Somalia. Had the pre-AMISOM PSO been adequate to guarantee the stability of the state of Somalia, the situation of the people in Somalia and Kenya's NFD would have been different regarding security. The focus could be addressing economic development and the effects of climatic conditions, such as drought, rather than insecurity.


Achievements by AMISOM PSO

This paper argues that the assessment of AMISOM mandate achievements has been spasmodic at best without proper statistical indicators. As such, the section takes a cue from the findings by KAMAIS, OKOTH AND KIMOKOTI (2024, p. 270 – 276), which established that AMISOM had significantly attained its successive mandates over the years as periodically amended and extended. Furthermore, the critical strategic objective of degrading Al-Shabaab had been attained to a larger extent, while the creation of a conducive environment for stability and development had been attained to a lesser extent. This creates a conundrum on whether it was the ripe moment for the transition since the two aspects are crucial for the stability of Somalia since they hinge on the security and governance of Somalia post-AMISOM (KAMAIS, OKOTH & KIMOKOTI, 2024, p. 273).

Supportive of the positive appraisal of the achievement of the AMISOM mandate, a study by KAMAIS, OKOTH AND KIMOKOTI (2024) established that

AMISOM had achieved its mandate since inception until the transition to the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in April 2022. The findings presented in Figure 4 depict respondents' perception of the achievement of the AMISOM mandate of degrading Al Shabaab and stabilizing Somalia. Most respondents (52%) affirmed that AMISOM had achieved its mandate, while 48% indicated that it had not. A split opinion on a question should attract a definitive opinion about success or failure. It indicates that while AMISOM has done well in attempts to stabilize Somalia, a significant portion of the population still feels that more has to be done. This onus has to fall on ATMIS as the shepherded transfer of responsibilities to FGS and SSF.

Figure 4: Achievement of AMISOM mandate



Source: KAMAIIS, OKOTH AND KIMOKOTI, (2024, p. 272).

The findings indicate an almost equal split in respondents' perceptions of the achievement of the AMISOM mandate. AMISOM has liberated large swathes of territory under Al Shabaab's control, including capturing the strategic port city of Kismayu, Marka, and control of Mogadishu (LIGAWA, 2018: 281; KAGWANJA ET AL., 2020). Piracy along the Indian Ocean has been vanquished, thus saving Kenya's tourism sector and the economy. Other critical areas liberated from Al Shabaab include the coastal towns of Quday, Burgaabo, and Ras Kiamboni (WILLIAMS ET AL., 2018). These were the revenue bases for Al Shabaab, and their capture denied Al Shabaab finances to fund their activities. However, by the time of AMISOM's transition to ATMIS, critical areas such as Jilib, Jamaame, Buale, and Sakoow, among others, remained under Al Shabaab's control.

AMISOM transition and exit strategies

AMISOM PSO took over responsibilities from IGASOM in April 2007 (WILLIAMS, 2012). Deployed under APSA, AMISOM had operated in Somalia for

approximately fifteen years before transiting to ATMIS on 01 April 2022. As in any PSO and military operation, exit is an inevitable part of AMISOM's operational strategy. It is premised on the notion presented by KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020) that AMISOM was not an occupation force. WILLIAM AND NGUYEN (2018) observed that AMISOM had been mooted exit from Somalia since 2017, with various exit plans being broached for implementation. The standard in the plans was that the exit was conditioned on AMISOM, having created a stable environment in Somalia for the resumption of security and governance functions. However, the plans by AMISOM to exit Somalia were often delayed owing to non-attainment of desirable stability conditions for exit. A Key Informant concurred with this analysis, noting that;

Since Kenya crossed into Somalia in October 2011 and later re-hatted to AMISOM in August 2012, it has taken over ten years in the operation theatre. We have heard of plans to draw down and exit from Somalia since sometime in 2017, but there has not been any significant progress. Kenya Contingent forces exited from areas such as Busaar, Fafadun, Bardheere and Ceel Adde, but they only redeployed to other locations within Somalia proximal to the shared border. Al Shabaab immediately took control of the abandoned bases and areas (Interview with a Military Officer deployed in Gherille, on 15 November 2022).


The sentiment expressed by the Key Informant affirms the existence of plans for an exit from Somalia. However, the Key Informant notes that the effectiveness of the plans has been questionable since implementation led to the recapture of territory by Al Shabaab. In a rebuttal to the argument on the lack of an AMISOM exit strategy, WILLIAM AND HASHI (2016) pointed out that AMISOM PSO plans included an exit strategy. The scholars pointed out that during the incipient stages, AMISOM PSO was conceptualized into four phases viz, initial deployment, deployment expansion, consolidation and finally, redeployment. The redeployment phase entails exit, conditioned on setting conditions favourable for stability in Somalia. However, the phase took five years to materialize (2017-2022), begging the question of whether AMISOM was adequately prepared for exit and whether it was the right moment for AMISOM to transit to ATMIS and eventually exit.

On the first concern, KAMAIS, OKOTH AND KIMOKOTI (2024) posited that, in contrast, the AMISOM mandate and attendant objectives were met mainly to warrant an assessment of mission success; crucial factors relating to security and governance still leave much to be desired. On the second question of whether it is the right time for AMISOM, including the Kenyan contingent, to exit Somalia, the finding in Figure 5 presents the respondents' view on the issue. Most (70%) respondents indicated it was not the right time for AMISOM to exit Somalia. In comparison, 24% indicated it was the right time for AMISOM to exit Somalia.

Only 6% of the respondents noted that it was not yet the right time for AMISOM to exit from Somalia but should do so soon.

The findings in Figure 5 present a paradox for AMISOM PSO. While it was noted to have been successful in mandate achievement (52% in Figures 4.9 and 4.11), the prevailing notion is that it is not the right time for the PSO to exit Somalia. It is ironic since an assessed success in mandate achievement should invite the triggering of subsequent phases to either exploit the successes or conclude the operations while offering support to the post-PSO dispensation. This paradox lends itself to the analysis that the critical security and governance AMISOM mandate objectives have not been sufficiently attained. The doubts expressed by KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020) and LIGAWA (2018) on the capacity of FGS and SSF to assume security and governance functions persist. Therefore, the finding that it is not the right time to exit Somalia is apt, notwithstanding the assessed success in mandate achievement.

Figure 5: Whether it is the right time for AMISOM to transit and exit Somalia



Source: Field data, 2022.

This study agrees with the argument posed by scholars that, ultimately, the future of Somalia is the responsibility of its people and government, thus requiring that such responsibilities be handed over in a gradual and measured manner (KAGWANJA ET AL., 2020; WILLIAMS & HASHI, 2016; NZAU, 2018). As in any PSO, KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020) reassured that AMISOM was not an occupation force in Somalia, refuting the propagandist line of argument hitherto employed by Al Shabaab. Whereas the AMISOM exit was delayed, the eventual exit plan did not consider the exit pitfalls of predecessor PSOs such as UNOSOM I and II, UNITAF and IGASOM.

EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY PEACE SUPPORT INTERVENTIONS IN STABILIZATION OF SOMALIA (1992-2022)

The examples of protracted PSOs in Iraq and Afghanistan ended in exits that worsened the post-intervention state of affairs (JACKSON & AMIRI, 2021; CROCKER, 2021; KANAT, 2019). Besides poor alignment of ends and means, operational fatigue and the urge to exit were prompted by the threat environment, protracted conflicts, resource burden, and waning support for the operations (SOPKO, 2021). Furthermore, JONEGÅRD (2019) observed that the agreement between the USA and the Taliban contributed to the reversal of gains in Afghanistan. Some of these factors could have informed the transition of AMISOM despite favourable conditions for Somalia's stability having not been established adequately. A Key Informant opined that:

Even if the Kenya Defence forces have been in Somalia for over ten years, their exit will make Kenya vulnerable. It is not the appropriate time for KDF to exit from Somalia. If they do, they must deploy within the immediate vicinity of the common border on the homeland side. As for the Somali, they will be back under the control of Al Shabaab the very minute we [KDF/AMISOM] exit. Their security forces will likely join Al Shabaab or flee into Kenya, especially those deployed close to our border areas. Somalia will likely experience what happened in Afghanistan when USA forces exited (Interview with a Military Commander in El Wak, on 15 December 2022).

The sentiments conveyed by the Key Informants corroborated the responses provided by the respondents. In essence, they portray the fears that the exit of KDF from AMISOM will likely lead to a deteriorated security situation. Before the transition of AMISOM in April 2022, scholars had observed that while the FGS and SSF had been created through the efforts of AU and AMISOM, the institutions only had weak influence in Mogadishu. WILLIAMS ET AL. (2018) placed this assertion into perspective by noting that Somalia was mainly under the mercy of Al Shabaab, save for a few cantonments secured by AMISOM troops and SSF.

However, there were more gains by AMISOM during Operation Juba Valley Corridor involving KDF, ENDF and SNA. The operation was collaboratively conducted in 2015 to flush out Al Shabaab in part of Jubaland, i.e. Gedo, as well as areas of Bay and Bakool (KAGWANJA ET AL., 2020, p. 99). Most of the gains by AMISOM were later reversed through draw-down [downsizing] and redeployments, leading to Al Shabaab's re-occupation of critical areas such as El Ade, Busaar, Fafadun, Bardheere, among others, thereby bringing the threat even closer to the shared border with Kenya. This trend creates the perception that the gains made by AMISOM, more so the Kenyan contingent would be reversed immediately upon exit since FGS and SSF cannot maintain the Country. Therefore, the finding that it was not the right moment for AMISOM to transition and exit finds grounds for justification.

The aggregated respondents' views depicted in Figure 6 further provides corroboration to the preceding finding and analysis. In elaborating their responses as to


whether it was the right time for AMISOM to transition and exit Somalia, a majority (48.4%) of the respondents held that it was not the right time since Somalia had not fully achieved stability and that skirmishes [with Al Shabaab] were still being experienced. Similarly, 27.3% of the respondents explained that, SSF was not ready enough to take over security responsibilities and that they could not fight Al Shabaab. More explanations aggregated around the fact that suitable conditions for long-term stability and development of Somalia had not been attained, as held by 6.2% of the respondents. These explanations tend to support concerns over the security and governance capacity of SSF/FGS, as expressed by NZAU (2018), LIGAWA (2018) and KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020).

Those who concurred that it was the right time for AMISOM to transition held that; high cost and funding requirements for AMISOM coupled with high losses (9.2%), AMISOM has created conditions for stability of SSF/FGS(3%), AMISOM exit will enable Somalia to build a stable and working government (3%) and that AMISOM exit was long overdue (3%). To a marginal extent, the optimistic assessment by Williams et al. (2018) is echoed in the respondents' views that there has been significant attainment of AMISOM mandate objectives. KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020) held a similar assessment when they highlighted that large swathes of territory had been liberated from Al Shabaab and some economic activities restored through CIMIC. However, the achievements stated are not solid enough to allow for the immediate exit of AMISOM without reversion to instability. This is due to the persistent lack of capacity of SSF and FGS as guarantors of a conducive environment for stability and development.

The critical explanations in Figure 6, as held by most respondents, revolve around the capacity of SSF and FGS to assume security and governance of Somalia post-AMISOM PSO and create suitable conditions for Somalia's long-term stability and development. This study holds that the security and governance functions are core mandate aspects for AMISOM. They ought to form the bedrock upon which the future of Somalia's stability is predicated.

For a proper assessment of successful mandate achievements, more weightage ought to be given to the security and governance criteria. Only then can the fears expressed by KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020) and WILLIAM AND HASHI (2016) be allayed. The scholars cautioned that it would be irresponsible for AMISOM to exit Somalia before the Country attains good capacities to assume governance and security responsibilities. Furthermore, LIGAWA, OKOTH, AND MATANGA (2017) posited a need to realign AMISOM PSO activities to support the development of peace and stability in Somalia. Besides, Williams et al. (2018) point out that without a successful political process, AMISOM would not have a practical pathway out of Somalia. Therefore, transition and exit for AMISOM ought to have hinged, inter alia, on the complete stabilization of Somalia's governance and security and vanquishing or reformation of extremist groups such as Al Shabaab.

Figure 6: Aggregated explanation on whether it is time for AMISOM to transition/exit



Source: Field Data, 2022.

Whereas protracted engagements in PSOs are costly in terms of financial, human and other resources, once launched, the only way out is the mission strategy as espoused by GILPIN (1997). It requires that achieving an operation's mission form the basis for subsequent operational developments, including exits. Therefore, a determination for the appropriate time to transition or exit ought to be dictated by mission achievement. In this case, the mission of AMISOM is derived from its mandate, which consequently drives the strategy.

Hurried PSO exit endeavours urged by factors other than the mission will only work against the mandate and strategy. Interestingly, KAGWANJA ET AL. (2020) noted that IGAD member states are cautious that premature withdrawal from Somalia will repeat earlier experiences in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, CRISIS GROUP (2022) is critical of the hurried need for transition

in Somalia that failed to appreciate the complexities of the Somali operating environment and geopolitical imperatives.

AMISOM transition and exit strategy

Military operations are guided by, and executed in line with, laid-out strategy. The strategy informs the mission, objectives and end states, forces to task, resource requirements, and roles of engagement, success criteria, and timelines from launch to termination of operations. The strategic theory requires that to optimize outcomes, all the possibilities and forces at play, including costs, risks, decisions and consequences, should be considered against those of the adversary (SCHELLING, 1984). Essentially, strategising is an endeavour to correlate ends and means (SMITH, 2008). To enable such an endeavour, Military planning processes are customarily cyclical, beginning from; observation (identifying the threat/problem), orientation (Securitisation as well as mental and positional adjustments relative to the threat), the decision on the action to take after due consideration of planning factors, taking appropriate action to neutralize the threat; then the process begins all over again (LUFT, 2020). The model is often called the OODA loop and considers the entire operational continuum from launch to exit.

Since PSOs are deployed for specific objectives, they cannot operate in theatre indefinitely. Therefore, an exit strategy is critical and essential to any PSO planning process. GILPIN (1997) and DURCH (2010) advocated for immediate military operation transition strategies to be built into the plans. However, scholars of military strategy have noted the ambiguities around the issue of the exit strategy for military operations, which eventually are left to the imagination, creativity, originality, and, indeed, initiative of individual planners augmented by case studies and experiences (WILLIAM & NGUYEN, 2018; YAGER, 2006). Despite such planning ambiguities, NZAU (2018, p. 538) observed that there are no straightforward theoretical models for military PSO strategies, and thus they should be adapted to the prevailing situation. This notion infers the flexibility of plans that must be adaptable to the threat environment through sequels and branches.

From 2017 onwards, AMISOM started having clear timelines for projected transition and exit, albeit conditioned. The observation by the Key Informant on missing set transition timelines is thus explainable in the context of the various extensions. The complex Somali politics and clan dynamics mean that creating consensus around governance and security issues will be arduous. The issue of aligning ends and means to set suitable conditions for the exit, funding, capacity building, post-conflict peacebuilding, and reconstruction is not straightforward


and is complicated by a multiplicity of actors and interests (SOPKO, 2021; LIGAWA, 2018; CLARK, 2006).

Furthermore, MADEIRA (2022) attempts to explain that the transition could have been hampered by the failure to enhance the 'AMISOM Model' to suit a transition mission engaged in asymmetric warfighting, provision of the appropriate level of enablers and force multipliers, and force generation. Indeed, the explication by MADEIRA (2022) considers the need to adjust to an asymmetric threat environment (ANGELL, 2015) and have strong mission forces and Somali Security and Governance institutions. A Key informant explained that:

The question of AMISOM and the Kenyan Contingent exit from Somalia is not straightforward. There are many factors at play, mainly along the line of interests. There are internal interests around clannism, power struggles and the need for resource control. External interests entail issues around the business in contrabands, arms proliferation, and access to resources in the Indian Ocean. The Somali forces are weak, and the governance structures are still fragile for them to assume responsibility for Somalia. On the other hand, there is an urge to have the Country return to normalcy after the protracted instability. We hope that this urge prevails for the sake of regional stability. Considering these factors, it is obvious why the set transition deadlines are not attained, necessitating extensions. Exiting Somalia may take a while (Interview with a planning Officer at Sector 2 headquarters, Dhobley, on 03 January 2022).

Despite the explanations provided by scholars and analysts as to the extensions to AMISOM PSO, the views by the Key Informant reinforce the prevailing perception that AMISOM transition and exit may not be concluded soon. Despite the AMISOM having changed into ATMIS according to UNSCR 2628(2022), the conditions within the theatre of operations remain significantly unchanged. In the transition to ATMIS, it is yet to be apparent if it will be effective or just a designation change as was with UNOSOM, UNITAF and IGASOM, which according to Nzau (2018), did little to address the Somali problem. To this end, it would be of interest to establish the form of exit strategy that the AMISOM PSO activities espoused based on the estimation of respondents. The respondents were asked to characterize the AMISOM PSO along the military operation transition/exit typology by GILPIN (1997) viz event-oriented strategy, mission-oriented strategy, time-oriented strategy or hybrid strategy. The findings were as depicted in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Transition Strategy adopted by the AMISOM PSO



Source: Field data, 2022.

Depicted in Figure 7, the 41% of the respondents viewed that AMISOM transition strategy could be characterised as mission oriented. Comparatively, 40% of the respondents thought that AMISOM has a time oriented transition strategy. On the other hand, 13% of the respondents felt that AMISOM transition strategy was event oriented and 6% viewed that AMISOM has a hybrid transition strategy. The characterization of the exit strategy by the majority 41% of the respondents affirms that assertion by MUSOMA (2021) that, AMISOM PSO ought to achieve its mission as outlined in the mandate before exiting Somalia. As propounded by GILPIN (1997), a mission-oriented exit strategy is pegged on the achievement of the mission irrespective of the length of time. In essence, the desired end state of the mission ought to be achieved before considerations to windup the PSO either at a go or in a graduated and phased manner.

In contrast, a time-oriented exit strategy focuses on operations within a specified timeline, irrespective of whether the mission is attained. This was the characterization of 40% of the respondents based on the six-month mandate extension interval. However, the mandate extension did not lead to termination of the mission at the lapse of assigned timelines. In fact, the extensions were conditioned on the establishment of suitable conditions for long-term stability and development of Somalia. Therefore, this would indicate a hybrid transition strategy that encapsulated both time and mission indicators for transition as characterized by 6% of the respondents. AMISOM PSO seems not to be event-orientated since deadly attacks such as in El Adde, Kolbiyow, Jannaale, Miido, Ceel Baraaf, among others, did not prompt exit from Somalia. In contrast, UNSOM II PSO withdrew following the 'black hawk down incident and therefore it could be characterised as event oriented (Bass & Zimmerman, 2013; Patman, 2015). After characterising the AMISOM PSO transition

strategy, an issue of interest would be the sufficiency of the AMISOM transition and exit strategy for the long-term stability of Somalia, a matter forming the focus of the following sub-section.

Consideration of the long-term stability of Somalia in the AMISOM transition strategy

Scholars have long argued that Military PSO transition and exit strategies should sufficiently consider the long-term stability of the post-PSO Country (KAGWANJA ET AL., 2020; WILLIAMS ET AL., 2018; WILLIAMS & HASHI, 2016). In essence, the PSO transition strategy's nature and formulation should sufficiently factor in the key aim of ensuring a long-term post-PSO state. In the regional context, the post-intervention stability of the subject Country ensures that the security of the immediate neighbours is not adversely affected.


As guided in the functionalist theory, the society (in this case, HoA in the macro sense) is a sum of its constituent parts (states) performing interdependent functions and dysfunction in one or more of the constituent parts functionally affects the rest of the system. It has to be adjusted to remedy the anomie (LEVIN, 2021). MIGUE ET AL. (2012) and KAGWANJA Et Al. (2020) alluded to the functionalist notion when they argued that Kenya had to intervene in Somalia over the concern for her security. Therefore, security and stability needed to be restored in Somalia to guarantee the security of Kenya.

The question that begs, therefore, is whether the PSO transition strategy was adequate for the desired long-term stability and development of concerned countries and their neighbours. The observations made, and conclusions arrived at, from the cases of interventions in Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, DRC, and Sudan, among others, indicate that the military interventions and PSOs did not sufficiently cater for the post-intervention situation (SALAÜN, 2019; CROKER, 2021; FELTER & RENWICK, 2021). Where the PSO outcome was assessed to have been successful, such as in UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, the exit plan sufficiently considered pertinent issues relating to the post-PSO state of the Country (GOLDMANN, 2005). It underscores the importance of having a proper exit strategy that accounts for post-exit stability, not only of the subject state but also of the neighbours and the particular region. The adequacy of PSO transition and exit plans should be evaluated based on the degree to which they account for factors that would ensure long-term stability and development of the post-intervention period.

Concerning the AMISOM transition and exit plan, their adequacy is assessed in the findings depicted in Figure 8. A majority (70%) of the respondents held the view that AMISOM transition and exit plans were not sufficient for

the long-term stability of Somalia, 15% indicated that AMISOM transition and exit plans were sufficient for the long-term stability of Somalia, while 15% were not sure.

Figure 8: Adequacy of AMISOM transition and exit strategy for the long-term stability of Somalia



Source: Field data, 2022.

The issues around the adequacy of AMISOM transition and exit plans call into question whether lessons were learnt from previous PSOs. Scholars have noted the critical failures of pre-AMISOM PSOs. WILLIAMS ET AL. (2018) indicated that while UNOSOM I was meant to provide security and humanitarian agencies for relief aid distribution, it failed to contain the activities of saboteur warlords in Somalia and ended prematurely. UNITAF was to prepare for the return of peace-keeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in Somalia. However, due to a lack of robust mandate, it failed to create sustainable peace despite creating an enabling environment for negotiating and signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in early 1993 (MATHEWS, 2004: 253; OLUOCH, 2018; JESS, 2018, pp. 142-143;). UNOSOM II had a similar mandate to UNOSOM I but ignominiously ended shortly after the infamous 'black hawk down' incident (Adam, 2004; Oluoch, 2018). It left local warlords and terrorists to riot in Somalia, thus threatening the Security of Kenya and HoA.

In 2005, IGASOM deployed in the context of the 'African Solutions to African problems' philosophy, but there were disagreements by TCCs over issues of Arms embargo between IGAD and AU on the one hand and UN on the other (OCHA, 2005; WILLIAM & NGUYEN, 2018; DE CONING, 2019). These rafts of pre-AMISOM PSOs and their premature exits left Somalia at the mercy of warlordism that gradually morphed into Jihadism. After over fifteen years in Somalia, it is concerning that AMISOM PSO, though assessed to be successful, it is viewed to

have not catered sufficiently for the long-term stability and development of Somalia in its transition and exit strategy. It is reflected in the view of a Key Informant, that:

When KDF [and AMISOM] exit Somalia, the Country will be back under the control of Al Shabaab. Another problem may arise on top of the Al Shabaab threat. Community defence militia known as Maacawisley are organizing to repel Al Shabaab in areas without AMISOM and Somali forces. These Maacawisley will eventually engage in rivalry over control of territory and resources, thereby creating warlord-controlled areas. Since they are not regulated and do not operate under any rules, they will become a security threat in themselves or form alliances of convenience with other Maacawisley or even Al Shabaab. If not addressed, AMISOM operations and exit will not have helped. The threat to Kenya will continue, and the affected communities along the border will continue suffering (Interview with a Planning Officer at Sector 2 headquarter, Dhobley, 06 January 2022).

While novel and innovative in tackling the complex Somalia security situation, clan militia may precipitate warlordism after Al Shabaab is vanquished. There will likely be no well-coordinated measures to include a post-operation dispersal plan for the Maacawisley. The apprehension that AMISOM transition and exit will not necessarily leave a stable Somalia is sobering, especially for a protracted PSO in the Country for over fifteen years. Post-AMISOM stability factors majorly revolve around security and governance, a fact established by the findings of this study as having insufficiently been addressed. As NZAU (2018, pp. 544-546) analysed, the Somali question must be adequately addressed to ensure it does not continue destabilizing. This aspect appears to be ignored in the conceptualization of 'the AMISOM Model' by MADEIRA (2022). The 'AMISOM model' to be adopted for transition emphasizes the need to suit operations to asymmetric warfighting, provision of operational enablers and force generation.

The overemphasizing of a militaristic approach, when the focus should be on gradual handover to SSF and FGS, indicates a deficiency in the AMISOM operational strategy and its transition and exit strategy. It is an inadvertent admission by planners that by the time of transition, the suitable conditions were not set and, therefore, the need to fast track through the robustness of military operations that may run the risk of overshadowing and even precluding political processes.

Conclusion

The study concludes that concluded that the lack of proper understanding of the operating environment leads to misalignment of strategies in employment of resources thus leading to dismal outcomes. AMISOM transition strategies have

not adequately addressed the governance and security aspects of Somalia's stabilization, posing a threat to Kenya's national security. Whereas the overall AMISOM stabilization efforts can be adjudged as successful, the crucial mandate objective of creating suitable conditions for Somalia's long-term stability and development has not been adequately attained. The capacity of SSF and FGS remains weak and thus will be unable to credibly assume security and governance of the country in the post-AMISOM era. It poses a threat of failed stabilization and threatening to Kenya's National Security.

As part of the transition strategy, the study concludes that the STP does not adequately factor in the cohesion of Somalia with due consideration of the clan dynamics, more so in the security architecture. The transition CONOPs risk failing due to such omissions besides short transition timelines, lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure the attainment of critical transition targets and lack of a coherent transition programme of action, among others. The apprehension that it is not the ripe moment for AMISOM/ATMIS to exit Somalia is informed to a large extent by the inadequacy in achieving sufficient socio-political stability. This militates the crucial mandate objective of creating a conducive environment for long-term stability and development of Somalia.

As established by the study, the study concludes that preferred model is a transition to AU-UN hybrid mission focusing on peacebuilding with the ability to muster sufficient resources. Such a model is best encapsulated within a mission-oriented exit strategy as established by this study. Gradual capacity development of the Somalia political and security architecture is necessary in ensuring long-term stability. This is achievable through concerted efforts that draws from broad-based legitimacy and resource support and thus the preference for a hybrid mission. In sum, owing to the inadequacies, Somalia's PSO transition strategies (including AMISOM) have a significant negative correlation and influence on Kenya's national security.

Recommendation

The study recommends that stakeholders should continue to engage in shaping the Somalia transition plan in order to ensure that all pitfalls are mitigated to guarantee proper stabilization. Government of Kenya need engage AMISOM to review the transition strategy as reflected in the STP and ATMIS CONOPs to cater for the security forces of federal member states such as JSF and RKB, among others. The SSF and FGS capacity must be developed sufficiently before the transition is finalized. Additionally, allocate sufficient timelines for the transition shepherded by an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism to ensure transition targets are attained and resources are utilized effectively. A mission

oriented exit strategy should be adopted within the context of AU-UN hybrid mission. This should be explored with the view of developing a strong FGS with sufficient capacity to secure Somalia's peace and stability.

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