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Is soft power an effective strategy? Libya and North Korea offer a study in contrasts

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Abstract: Soft power can be effective as a standalone strategy, but such efforts only succeed when consistent with the sponsoring state's underlying culture and characteristics. Historically, soft power initiatives have not received the focus, priority, or resources that hard power initiatives have, largely because it is more difficult to see and measure how effective soft power strategies are. To understand how well soft power strategies can work, it is necessary to see how they have been executed – successfully and otherwise. The soft power strategies enacted by North Korea and Libya offer the necessary study in contrasts, with the former's Arirang festival a strong case in how to use soft power effectively and the latter's hopes of becoming a tourism destination illustrating the flaws of building a soft power strategy on a weak foundation. Hard power will always be a staple of security strategy, but fighting is expensive. Integrating soft power into the strategic mix can make security more cost effective and more reliable.

Introduction

STRATEGY HAS EVOLVED WELL BEYOND ITS MARTIAL ROOTS. The discipline's broader role continues to include measures used to prevent or avoid conflict, and it has expanded to address the wide range of other risks that states face. Soft power represents part how the discipline of strategy has expanded, and in fact, soft power has become a strategy in its own right. The potential for greater direct physical, social, economic impacts from hard power strategies requires that states develop, cultivate, and employ alternatives to threats, coercion, and deterrence. War is expensive, and it has only become more so

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(Hartung 2021 2). Soft power strategy can mitigate the costs and risks associated with the exercising of power in the global anarchic environment, particularly when force is a suboptimal solution.

Soft power offers a continuum of measures from those closer to hard power (such as deterrence) to cultural investments designed to make a state seem more favourable to potential allies and adversaries. Sun Tzu's belief that "the best way is to avoid what is strong and strike at what is weak," provides a starting point for understanding soft power as a strategy, but the observation sits at the end of the soft power spectrum adjacent to hard power (Sun Tzu VI:30). Deterrence comes next, as a manifestation of a reliance on hard power without using the tools of hard power for their intended purpose. The gaps in deterrence as a strategy reinforce the continued growing importance of soft power, which can obviate the need (at least partially) for conflict and even provide a platform for prosperity and peace.

Where soft power stands alone, not as an extension of or response to specific hard power shortcomings, it represents a range of strategic opportunities for states to engage with each other through attraction for the purposes of mutual benefit as well as conflict avoidance. India is arguably better known for Bollywood than its nuclear arsenal (Sasikumar 2018), and Norway's reputation for environmental responsibility makes it easy to forget that its sovereign wealth fund, with $1.37 trillion[1] in assets under management, is filled with fossil fuel revenues (Norges Bank Investment Management 2021). Soft power can redefine not just how a state engages with others, but how others engage with that state.

While soft power strategies can be incredibly important, relying on them exclusively is as unrealistic as relying on hard power exclusively. The time, effort, and imprecision involved in the application of soft power strategies can leave gaps, particularly because absent the immediate, flawless, and hermetic implementation of all-protective soft power bubble, states will continue to need hard power capabilities. Sometimes efforts fuelled by soft power to prevent or deter conflict will be unsuccessful, requiring a broader view of strategy that includes access to hard power – and possibly the need to deploy it.

Soft power efforts by Libya and North Korea offer a study in contrasts. The former saw an attempt to develop a robust tourism business in order to reshape world perception of the country fall apart as a result of a wave of revolutions that swept through the region. Ultimately, the failure of Libya's soft power strategy came down to a fundamental misalignment between the strategy itself and the nature of the underlying state – similar to the outcome associated with a corroded foundation below an otherwise secure house. North Korea, on the

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[1] Norges Bank Investment Management reports the fund's value at approximately NOK12 trillion on January 17, 2022, with an exchange rate of US$1 to NOK8.738 (OANDA).

other hand, has deftly used its Arirang cultural event as a soft power mechanism. In addition to highlighting the characteristics of which the state is most proud, it offers an opportunity for worldwide engagement – and in a way that still offers outlets for diplomatic surprises, as described later in this article.

Ultimately, states need both soft power and hard power strategies, and the more they interact with each other the better. After all, "[s]trategic narrative is soft power in the 21st century," which means that nations have to be able to communicate who they are to the international community, and what that means for how they plan to interact (Roselle, Miskimmon, and O'Laughlin 2014: 71). Executing on that, of course, has become exceptionally difficult. Almost from the instant a narrative is proposed, it can be opposed, and in a competitive international environment, in which soft power is a staple, such competition is to be expected – and best countered through soft power strategies.

How soft power is a strategy

Soft power strategy, as an idea, requires a specific examination of its three components: power, what constitutes the soft variation of it, and strategy. By stripping the concept to its fundamental elements and subsequently reconstructing them, the extent to which soft power can exist as a standalone strategy becomes evident, and its utility is highlighted in an examination of how the components interact with each other. Power, according to Lake, "is the ability of one state to get another to do something it would not otherwise do" (2007: 51). Gompert and Binnendijk explain that power "spans a spectrum, from offensive military force at one end to routine diplomacy at the other" (2016: 2). Within that spectrum, soft power is "the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one prefers," which can be accomplished via "coercion, payment, or attraction and persuasion" (Nye 2017), although coercion does lead toward the harder end of the power spectrum. Fusing elements along the spectrum, from coercion to attraction, soft power platforms can be used to pivot to hard power execution.

Like power, strategy can be difficult to define, which makes the digest of definitions that Baylis and Wirtz offer particularly useful. Of the nine definitions they curated, five refer to some variation of war, military, force, or "armed coercion," with the remainder sufficiently flexible to to accommodate Nye's notion of soft power, which consists of "attraction and persuasion" (2016: 4; 2017) above, along with other shades of power along the hard/soft spectrum. Foster's thoughts about "effectively exercising power" are open to interpretation beyond use of force, and Wylie's view is wider still, discussing the use of a plan to accomplish something in particular, which in turn resonates with Osgood's thoughts on planning and Murray's and Grimslay's on "process" (2016: 4).

Freedman, further, states that strategy is "about getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest" (2016: 4).

Fusing Nye's definition of soft power with the examples gathered by Baylis and Wirtz shows that soft power is indeed a strategy. However, there are limits to it. Soft power can be difficult to initiate and subsequently control. The basic challenge is that the tools of soft power – "culture, values, and policies," according to Roselle, Miskimmon, and O'Laughlin – are not the sole (or even primary) domain of the state (2014: 73). Unlike hard power, the state does not have a monopoly on soft power, forcing it often to have to compete with nonstate actors, including its own citizens, in attempting to use the resources of soft power to define and communicate its narrative, shape global perception, and influence state-level relationships (including those with non-state actors).

The savvy needed to develop and implement soft power strategies has become a crucial element in a state's overall strategic posture, with Roselle, Miskimmon, and O'Laughlin observing that over the past decade that "a major state without a soft power strategy, in practice if not in name, has become the exception" (2014: 71). To operate without one is to revert to a "might makes right" philosophy, which as the underpinning of strategy, can be expensive and risky, and evolving beyond the Hobbesian "state of nature" requires strategies for prevention or avoidance of conflict to make security more stable and threats less imminent (Curley 1991: 100).

Soft power offers two advantages – one defensive/ preventive and the other accretive. For the former, soft power can prevent the risk of conflict and destruction by shaping the environment. A state can position itself as non-threatening to other states, and perhaps even make itself attractive (in the sense offered by Nye) to other states as a partner, be it in trade relationships, alliances, or other matters. Alternatively, a state could use soft power to show strength, essentially feeding a deterrence approach to avoid conflict, "showing a presumed enemy that he is better off by not taking inimical action" (Gray 1990: 4). In both defensive and accretive scenarios, the state invests in being seen in a way that makes it less likely to become engaged in conflict. The fact that soft power has both defensive and accretive benefits is reflective of the continuum of soft power, from concepts adjacent to hard power out to those that are purely reliant on Nye's "attraction and persuasion" (Nye 2017). Deterrence, one step further away from hard power than the decision to avoid a fight, takes a preventive posture regarding conflict, in which soft power resources can be engaged for strategic use.

Soft power: from deterrence to accretion

Deterrence involves the accumulation and positioning of hard power assets to prevent the need for their active use (Davis 2009: 96). While deterrence may seem to focus mostly on hard power, the importance of positioning and persuasion should not be overlooked. In fact, according to Gray, "deterrence works only because a policy maker … decides that it is deterred" (2000: 256). That decision to be deterred requires some amount of persuasion (coming in the form of either attraction or coercion), which is where deterrence can take on soft power or hard power characteristics. Gray observes that the choice to be deterred results from coercion, but that presupposes a deterrence relationship in which coercion is the means of persuasion.

Deterrence, therefore, is at least a limited manifestation of a soft power strategy. It requires the use of coercion and persuasion in a way that the positioning of hard power resources to bolster the credibility of the message that such resource would be used if necessary. Rather than simply demonstrating the "political will to have to resort to effective force," the increased use of soft power resources in deterrence would shape the conditions and perception around a state's investment in hard power tools, convincing other states of the situations in which they would be used (Lake 1990: 13; Gompert and Binnendijk 2016: 3). Hard power tools can fit into a soft power strategy, provided they are used to attract instead of attack.

The dual characteristics of deterrence provide an important starting point from which to understand soft power as a strategy. Deterrence requires a hard power investment and the readiness to act on it, not to mention the role of coercion in securing the compliance of the deterred. However, even coercion requires credibility, and coercion could be seen as the basest form of persuasion (Honig 2013: 27). Deterrence's soft power elements are further noted in recognizing that "you cannot buy it directly" (Gray 2000 257). Spending requires attendant effort to develop credibility. Ultimately, to be effective, deterrence requires total commitment. As Gray explains, "If one wishes to derive a single lesson from the arms race experience of the 1930s, it would be that the half-hearted conduct of a race against a wholehearted adversary is a prescription for disaster" (1977: 27). The greatest risk regarding deterrence is that it could "break down and active use may ensue" (Davis 2009: 94). Partial measures can leave openings for escalation, and once that begins, the value of a deterrence plan collapses quickly.

Because it at least appears to include elements of soft power strategy – namely persuasion and credibility – deterrence offers an important conceptual bridge between hard and soft power. If credibility is breached – i.e., if the soft

power component fails – then deterrence has failed, because the situation would default to the use of hard power strategies and resources. The effectiveness of soft power as a strategy is easier to realize in more evolved approaches than deterrence. Instead of using soft power merely to convince other states of its ability to defend or attack, a state could take an approach to soft power that is value-accretive by convincing other states that it could become a reliable trading partner, or simply that it is not a threat and thus could easily be left alone.

Simply, if likability is too lofty an objective, perhaps showing that a state is not planning to cause any trouble is good enough.

The preventive and non-escalatory nature of soft power contributes to its benefits for cost and risk reduction, as well as in support of economic growth and prosperity. The effective use of soft power can help a state show that it does not intend to be a threat or otherwise disruptive force in the matters of other states, which forms part of the process of advancing beyond the state-of-nature environment in which monitoring for and defending against existential threats is nearly all-consuming. The simple benefit of such a message (i.e., of not being a threat), if conveyed effectively and genuinely, is that other states would not have to invest in extensive defense capabilities relative to that particular state, freeing resources for other purposes. As a corollary, soft power obviates the risk of escalation and subsequent conflict, in that offers an alternative to the threat-and-response loop that constitutes escalation.

If preventive and non-escalatory positioning offers the mildest benefit to a state investing in soft power, and sufficient results from soft power efforts result in even greater savings from reduced hard power spending, then a soft power strategy that is value-accretive represents further advancement along this spectrum. When states develop and implement soft power strategies, they position themselves for opportunities involving economic growth, redeployment of state financial resources into peaceful domestic initiatives (such as infrastructure and public welfare), and improved relationships with other states, to further such value-accretive initiatives.

Soft power has been conveyed as a way for a state to improve its "brand," shore up its "reputation," or otherwise shape a narrative (Haigh 2020: 10; Yun 2018: 3). Ultimately, all that comes down to how a state can shape how others perceive it in a positive (or at least non-negative) way. Further investments in soft power could yield tangible returns from attaining political stability to driving economic growth and prosperity. States benefit from commitments to soft power strategies because they can be preventive and non-escalatory, as well as cost- and risk-reductive by limiting the need to invest in or resort to hard power and even value-accretive, both through the freer and broader conduct of trade and through the redeployment of financial resources originally intended for hard power use.

Libya and North Korea: A study in contrasts

The notion that soft power strategies are slow and imprecise has some merit. However, the skill with which soft power is wielded, and the planning that goes into it, can profoundly affect the success a state achieves. Soft power requires a considerable amount of self-awareness, and states that align soft power strategies with their cultures and characteristics are more likely to realize faster and greater results. A state that aspires to a soft power strategy inconsistent with its own political stability or genuine objectives runs the risk of failing quickly. Meanwhile, a state that is culturally attuned to its preferred soft power strategy and has objectives aligned with it could realize considerable success. Soft power, like hard power, conforms to Sun Tzu's belief that "[i]f you know the enemy and you know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles (III:18).

Below are two examples of soft power strategies with vastly different outcomes. Libya sought to position itself as a safe and welcoming tourist destination, which would have been value-accretive and helped the state shed its authoritarian reputation (at least a bit), but it suffered from salient misalignment between the plan and the state's characteristics. North Korea, on the other hand, has turned a cultural platform into a delivery mechanism for global messages regarding strength and capability, mixing soft power with deterrence, while using the military (in this context) as an input into soft power capabilities. By contrasting the two cases, it is possible to see how soft power can be used as a strategy to significant effect, as long as it aligns with the reality on the ground.

Libya: Soft power strategy misalignment

The slow and imprecise nature of some soft power strategies means that near-term challenges faced by a state can derail even the most thoroughly planned and resourced of strategies. To succeed, such strategies must be aligned with the characteristics of the state sponsoring them. Failing to do so can lead to degraded results at best and abject failure at worst. Libya experienced the latter in 2011, when it sought to position itself as a tourist destination, safe and welcoming of outside visitors. However, underlying political instability conflicted with the state's ambitions. Just as its efforts to become a tourist destination were gaining momentum, the Arab Spring cost Libya its plan.

Libya's efforts to position itself as a travel/tourism destination were evident with flight arrivals increasing from 2007 to 2008 – the first increase since 2003 (World Bank 2021). Moreover, that development signaled a change in what had been a downward trend going back to 1995. By 2011, Libya was chosen by Conde Nast Traveler as one of "15 places whose time is now" (Payne 2011). Such a prestigious recognition would offer the opportunity for revenue inflows and

an upgraded perception of a nation that struggled with an image led by dictator Colonel Moammar Al-Qaddafi and was tied to such global atrocities as the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 (Simms 2010; Ghannam 2000: 18).

The timing, unfortunately, was neither right nor now. While ostensibly showing progress relative to its reputation as a state sponsor of terrorism, Libya suffered sufficient underlying political instability to become vulnerable to the spread of regional instability, as well (House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 2019: 9). The "Arab Spring" reached Libya shortly before Conde Nast Traveler published the article (Sehgal 2011). Libya quickly saw its soft power effort evaporate in a manner that would have been embarrassing, if not for the greater crisis the state faced. The fact that Libya "collapsed into a protracted civil war" demonstrates the salient misalignment of the state's ambitions with its own stability internally, let alone that of the region (Anderson 2001: 6).

Libya sought to exercise soft power in a way similar to many other states that aspire to outside tourism revenue, not to mention the implication that tourism implies safety and stability. Efforts to shape Libya's perception around the world were headed in the right direction, but the realities of political stability manifested sooner as a result of the mismatch between Libya's objectives and current circumstances. The lesson on the use of soft power from this case is that the exercise of soft power strategies requires not just investment and a desired end state but a realistic assessment of the risks that could threaten such a progression. There is no substitute for the combination of self-knowledge and respect for the constraints within which a state operates. A soft power strategy that is all ambition for the future with no links to the present could collapse under its own weight.

North Korea: Targeted results from cultural platforms

North Korea demonstrated that an ongoing investment in cultural activities could be directed in focused manner as needed to turn soft power from attraction and persuasion to something a bit sharper, although still short of coercion. In 2000, only a few weeks before what would become one of the closest U.S. presidential elections in history, North Korea used the Mass Games to influence (and embarrass) U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, sending a message to the international community and perhaps specifically to U.S. voters. In doing so, North Korea showed how an established soft power platform could be wielded in a specific way to achieve near-term objectives. While it could be difficult to develop and implement a soft power program for such purposes, using one that is already in place can be highly effective.

The Mass Games is a cultural display and soft power tool, clearly aligned with North Korea's culture, ethos, and regime ambitions. Yet it is also a genuine and impressive form of art in its own right. The event is often called "Arirang" or the "Arirang Festival," although that refers to a specific story (based on a folk song) that was conveyed via some of the Mass Games, and it goes back as far as 1946 (Jung 2013: 96; UNESCO, Koryo Tours 2018). North Korea's premier cultural event, the Mass Games "*is* North Korea at its highest moment [emphasis in the original]," according to Jung, and it "displays the contours of the state by way of arranging and appropriating a mass of bodies for calisthenic and performative arts representing the leader as the Father" (2013: 96).

With such a clinical description, it is important to note the scale of the performance, which involves more than 100,000 performers and has been described as perhaps "the most spectacular artistic performance in human history" (Abrahamian 2018). The Games can go on for two months and feature "a distillation of the country's narrative and is meant to awe and inspire" (Abrahamian 2018). However, what U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright attended with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in October 2000 was also clearly intended to nakedly advance a specific state agenda (Perlez 2020).

Coming only a few weeks before the Bush/Gore election that would come down to "dimpled chads" in Florida (Borger 2000), the 2000 Games offered the Kim regime the opportunity to prepare the environment for future U.S./North Korea negotiations – ostensibly making it a strong display of diplomacy through cultural engagement. North Korea seized the moment, projecting the ongoing soft power investment in Arirang into a message to both U.S. presidential candidates. According to Perlez, "[T]here were some images in the show that must have unnerved Dr. Albright, including one depicting the launch of a long-range ballistic missile, superimposed on the wall of the stadium in front of her" (Perlez 2020). Of course, that display featured the weapon that was the subject of the negotiations for which Secretary Albright flew to Pyongyang.

Although the Mass Games has its roots in something much deeper than cultural diplomacy, the alignment among the event, the message North Korea wants to send to the rest of the world, and the underlying nature of the state itself is strong. This stands in stark contrast to the case of Libya, in which political instability undermined its ambitions. North Korea's maintenance of the Arirang cultural platform provides ongoing value while also offering the opportunity for specific, targeted use to achieve specific outcomes, as demonstrated by the performance Secretary Albright witnessed.

Successful soft power integration requires a right fit

Soft power strategies can be highly effective, as long as they are developed and executed in a manner that is consistent with the aims, culture, and characteristics of the state involved. North Korea shows how the savvy development of soft power capabilities can make significant ongoing security contributions while also offering a platform for broader strategic activities (to include coercion). The to the effective development and use of soft power, though, clearly lies in alignment with a state's underlying culture and characteristics. The need for cultural alignment for soft power strategies is no different from the need for cultural alignment in any other form of strategy. Hoffman, for example, makes clear, "The notion of strategic culture as a frame of reference for beginning to understand one's adversary and the distinctive … approaches to conducting war clearly has some analytical value" (2017: 138). A state cannot plan and execute what is not in its culture to conceive.

Conclusion

Soft power has become a staple among major states, smaller states, and even non-state actors, signalling an end to the era when military might alone offered sufficient narrative. While it is easy to try to shorthand the role of soft power as something akin to brand-building, the reality is far more nuanced. Soft power strategies serve states along a broad spectrum – from bolstering deterrence postures through attracting alliances, trading partnerships, and other positive state-level interactions and relationships. The finesse necessary even to affect seemingly blunt efforts at soft power – such as those in which North Korea engages – is considerable. "Under the new conditions of the information age, more than ever," Nye writes, "the soft sell may prove more effective than the hard sell" (2008: 101).

Simply pushing out a narrative without tethering it to the values and characteristics of the sponsoring state, as evidenced by Libya's attempt to portray itself as a friendly tourist destination, does not guarantee results – and may, in fact, guarantee the opposite. Preaching at foreigners is not the best way to convert them," Nye explains, despite the fact that some states communicate from a belief that, "if [the audience] simply knew what we know, they would see things our way" (2008: 103). The alignment of words (or content), deeds, purpose, and culture ultimately make soft power strategies successful, although soft power alone will struggle without dovetailing into an overarching strategic framework that includes both hard and soft power elements (Wilson 2008: 115).

Soft power requires more than careful planning and deft execution. Such strategies can only be effective if they are aligned with the states plying them. Libya found it could not sell an image to the rest of the world that did not exist at home, regardless of how savvy and coordinated the messaging was. It is not possible to apply a misaligned message on a long-term soft power strategy and expect success, just as a military campaign cannot persist beyond a state's abilities to secure equipment, ammunition, and personnel. Sun Tzu was right: "He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks" (III:17). With Libya, the spirit was not the same at home as it was in the view of itself the country hoped to portray in the rest of the world.

North Korea, on the other hand, far more successfully adhered to its underlying culture in developing its soft power strategy, as regards the Arirang Festival. The performances showed discipline, structure, order, and commitment. Those characteristics are consistent with the "Juche" ethos of North Korea (Byman and Lind 2010: 52), which loosely translates to "self-reliance," and they perhaps counterintuitively align with an autocrat's expectations, which effectively shines a positive light on a regime that otherwise is highly criticized worldwide (Freedom House 2021). As a result, North Korea has demonstrated that lockstep alignment with its culture could yield powerful results, a consistency no doubt embodied by the Arirang Festival itself. Soft power is indeed a strategy and is at its best when integrated with hard power strategies in a manner that reflects the state as closely as possible.

Hard power will likely always remain an important part of most states' overarching strategies, but soft power's long-term efficiency (particularly for cost) and potential for value accretion make the process of attraction more attractive. After all, fighting is expensive. Deterrence is less so, but still costly. Soft power can reduce the expense of defence while fuelling prosperity, or at least buying a state a little more breathing room among adversaries. After all, years of Arirang Festival productions likely fall far short of the $36.6 billion it would cost North Korea to upgrade its 4,300 first- and second-generation Soviet T-class tanks (Dangwal 2021; Kim 2020)

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Chinese Soft Power: A Case Study of Panda Diplomacy

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Abstract This paper examines China's public relations strategy of "panda diplomacy." The research used secondary sources to examine the role of panda diplomacy in Chinese public diplomacy. China's panda diplomacy is a unique tool for public diplomacy that may be used to spread Chinese culture to a global audience and create friendly bilateral relations between the nations where it is implemented. Compared to Confucius institutes or student exchanges, it has a greater impact on the perception of China in the international community. Panda diplomacy can assist China achieve its public diplomacy aims, demonstrating its efficacy as a tool for public diplomacy. As a result of this study, a better understanding of China's soft power and public diplomacy can be gained by studying the relationship between panda diplomacy and political ties.

Keywords: Soft Power, Public Diplomacy, Panda Diplomacy, Foreign Policy of China, Conflict Resolution

Introduction

CHINA'S ECONOMY WAS BOOSTED BY DENG XIAOPENG'S ECONOMIC reforms of 1978 (Denmark, 2018). With foreign investment and multinational corporations flooding into China, it grew at a faster rate than any other economy in the world over the next few decades (Hu & Khan, 1997). After the reforms, China had to find new ways to connect with the world. Chinese soft power and public diplomacy grew in importance as the country's international influence expanded (Jinwei & Zhou, 2012). As China rises to prominence in the twenty-first century, it must make the most of its soft power (Jinwei & Zhou, 2012).

Soft power can help China increase its appeal to other countries and foreign audiences, build trusting relationships and encourage other

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nations and audiences to listen more attentively to China's views. When used effectively, public diplomacy is a key soft power tool for interacting with other countries. Chinese soft power resources based on culture, tradition, and ideology must be promoted through public diplomacy (Gill & Huang, 2006). Confucius Institutes, language and cultural exchanges, education, and Chinese celebrities abroad have long been debated as the foundation of China's soft power in the international community. Many people, on the other hand, missed China's most potent soft power asset of all time: the giant panda (Wei, 2019).

Gigantic pandas are among the most beloved animals in the world (Deamer, 2016). Known as "panda diplomacy," China has been lending pandas to other countries since 1957 (China Daily, 2013). Panda loans are a tool used by Chinese public diplomacy to turn soft power into tangible results. Even though panda diplomacy has been widely discussed in the media, academics have not given it much attention. Although the paucity of academic discussion may lead one to conclude that panda diplomacy has little substance, there are numerous layers of understanding that could link panda diplomacy to China's public diplomacy.

Literature Review

China is home to the world's largest pandas (Zhou, 2018). The Chinese government recognizes the significance of its giant pandas and has long included them into its foreign policy objectives (Pacher, 2017). In 685, the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD) presented a pair of pandas to the Japanese emperor (Xing, 2010). China is sending pandas to other countries as a goodwill gesture in the goal of strengthening ideological and diplomatic connections (Xing, 2010). Chinese panda diplomacy is a way for China to gain leverage in gaining the attention of the target audience, making it simpler for China to achieve its diplomatic objectives. As a public diplomacy instrument, Xing argues it presents an approachable image of China that encourages positive perceptions of China among its target audiences.

Research into why the giant panda is an ideal candidate for animal diplomacy is a hot topic of debate in the academic world. Hartig argues that China's panda diplomacy is successful for two reasons: the panda's global appeal and the fact that it is only found in China. The panda, according to Hartig Mullan and Marvin, has "near worldwide appeal" (Mullan & Marvin, 1999). In terms of appearance, the panda can be described as adorably cuddly, naive, and playful. According to Ramona and

Desmond Morris, the panda is defined by its cuddly, friendly, and sexless demeanour (Morris & Morris, 1982). In animal diplomacy, pandas provide as an excellent illustration of neoteny or kindschenschema. As a result of its youthful features, it evokes feelings of care and protectiveness, as well as cuteness (Hartig 2013).

Innocence and cuddliness are evoked by the panda's cuddly, awkward appearance, which has a round, flat face and huge black eye patches (Schaller, 1993). Because they can only be found in China, pandas become excellent ambassadors for their country through their unique position as an endangered species (Xing, 2010). The western mountainous region of China is home to all of the planet's pandas. According to Xing, China's "uniqueness has made China the only country to identify its national emblem with the panda" (Xing, 2010).

Animated diplomacy is more effective when the animal is identified with its original country, such as the panda and China (Cushing & Markwell, 2009). The visual identity of the panda is essential to its international appeal, but the fact that it can only be found in China means that it is an effective tool for Chinese foreign policy. The panda is "China's major cultural icon"; furthermore, it sends out all the correct signals of kindness. According to Hartig, the panda's message for China is quite clear. China's gentle, traditional, and peaceful values are represented by the panda since the gigantic panda is linked with China (Hartig, 2013). In contrast to other forms of Chinese diplomacy, such as classrooms, museums, or exchanges, the panda's placement in zoos increases its potency as a public diplomacy tool.

Xing sees zoos as a fun, diverse place where visitors may learn and have fun. Contrary to popular belief, most people view schools, museums, and other places of learning as a source of stress or anxiety (Xing, 2010). Due to its enormous size and the fact that it is not constrained by social class, China's giant panda is a more effective tool for public diplomacy. In addition to other public diplomacy approaches, China uses panda diplomacy to bridge language and cultural hurdles. The giant panda's global appeal, exclusivity in China, media attention, and the zoo's capacity to reach larger audiences regardless of social hierarchy make panda diplomacy a unique and strong, albeit mostly overlooked use of soft power.

Joseph Nye maintains that China does not fit the usual soft power mould, and therefore, panda diplomacy is not a standard soft power research or public diplomacy tool. Panda diplomacy gives China a prominent profile in selected countries and makes global audiences interested in China. According to Xing, China's public diplomacy aims are met by

panda diplomacy because it increases China's visibility overseas and draws attention, making it easier to fulfil its diplomatic goals. In his perspective, using panda diplomacy gives the impression that China is approachable and kind, and that this will have a positive effect on overseas audiences' perceptions of China.

Public diplomacy is an important part of China's panda diplomacy, as evidenced by the fees paid by zoos that house pandas to Chinese conservation institutes. Hartig writes, "Giant pandas are a public diplomacy bonanza given the media excitement and mainly positive coverage." Hartig argues that public diplomacy may be measured in part by the number of people it reaches, and with this in mind, China's panda diplomacy is a very successful tool because it is "without any doubt a major crowd puller" and generates "enormous media attention," he says (Hartig, 2013). Panda diplomacy, according to Buckingham et al. (2013), is more than just a scientific interchange. They suggest that "panda conservation occurs in a complex, dynamic interplay between politics, markets, and conservation strategy."

Lin's description of the panda's soft power reflects that of other scholars. This charming creature has the power to captivate the hearts of foreigners and gain favour for China. Chinese public diplomacy and soft power can be strengthened through the use of panda diplomacy, which has been shown to be more than just a conservation effort (Lin, 2009). According to Xing, "valuable but long-overlooked power assets" like Panda Diplomacy can help China achieve its public diplomacy aims. Panda diplomacy may throw light on China's present public diplomacy techniques and show where it is effective in the current global atmosphere because it is a rapidly emerging world power.

Theoretical Framework

As a public diplomacy tool, the giant panda serves as a soft power resource and a model for understanding the panda's role in China's public diplomacy. The methodology developed by Gilboa to study public diplomacy will be applied to the study of panda diplomacy as a tool of public diplomacy. As a public diplomacy technique, panda diplomacy can benefit from animal diplomacy concepts.

Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" in 1990. The United States attempted to reposition itself without the threat of war following the end of the Cold War. Military strength alone was not enough, and it

had to discover other means of influencing countries (Nye, 1990). As identified by Nye, soft power is comprised of three elements: an appealing culture, consistent political ideas, as well as a country's credibility and moral authority in international affairs (Nye, 1990). In the words of Nye, soft power is a sophisticated strategy that aims to captivate and co-opt the target population (2013). He argues that you don't need as many carrots and sticks when other people share your ideals and desire what you want. Coercion is always defeated by seduction.

It is more beneficial for a nation to gain legitimacy and attract other nations through its culture, politics, and foreign policy than through brute force. Although soft power has received a lot of attention from international relations experts since its creation in 1990, it has also received some criticism. Public diplomacy, according to Nye, may be able to transform soft power into desirable policy outcomes (Nye, 2009). Any discussion of soft power must include public diplomacy, which helps states see the real benefits of their resources.

Public diplomacy was defined by Edmund Gullion in 1965. Foreign policy decisions can be influenced by a variety of means, one of which is public diplomacy (Gullion, 1965). A public diplomacy strategy is "the cultivation of public opinion by governments in other nations," according to Gullion. The phrase "state-centred communication with abroad audiences" was coined by Gullion in 1965 and has been used ever since. It emphasizes the interchange of knowledge, ideas, and education.

A nation can achieve its objectives and policies through public diplomacy, according to Hans Tuch, who sees it as a vehicle to communicate its values, beliefs, institutions and culture to international audiences (Tuch, 1990). It is the goal of public diplomacy to make other countries aware of its culture, political principles, and public diplomacy through mutual understanding. Through its culture, political beliefs, and programs, the United States can exert soft power (Melissen, 2005). According to Melissen, "public diplomacy is an important soft power tactic." The deployment of soft power by states is made possible by public diplomacy, which promotes the flow of information, participation, and understanding.

Governments can use public diplomacy to plan their approach to other countries and how they want to present their country's image to them. Using public diplomacy tools like cultural and educational exchanges, a government can nurture its relationship with the public. Soft power can be turned into foreign policy success through public diplomacy policies. Diplomatic relations between animals Panda diplomacy

can be better understood via the lens of animal diplomacy (Cushing & Markwell, 2009). Animal diplomacy can be used by states to achieve their public diplomacy objectives, such as attracting overseas audiences and negotiating with other countries. Using animals in public diplomacy is possible through animal diplomacy.

The practice of giving gifts has been around for a very long time. For millennia, countries have used animal gifts to strengthen international ties. states are free to swap their animals with one another (Hartig, 2013). In 1943, Konrad Lorenz invented the word "Kinderschema" to describe an adult animal's display of childlike characteristics. In Lorenz's view, a baby-like animal incites a natural desire in humans to care for and protect them, as well as a want to be cuddled (Lorenz, 1943). A high, slightly bulging forehead, a large brain case relative to the face, saucer eyes, round cheeks, and short stubby limbs are only a few of Lorenz's list of character-istics that elicit sweetness and sympathy (Lorenz, 1943). These juvenile characteristics make them adorable, such as kittens, puppies, and pandas. Media coverage of animals is fuelled by the general public's infatuation with their cuteness or oddity (Cushing & Markwell, 2009). The animal's nationality should be tied only to the country of donation, as is the case with the panda in China. This enables the animal to represent its donor country and encourages people to learn more about the country.

Chinese Soft Power

China is researching and putting into practice soft power and popular diplomacy. It is clear that China's strength is unquestionable, given the country's rise from poverty to economic powerhouse, well-run society, and enormous military. However, there is some debate about its soft power (Los, 2018). The demand for soft power rises when a country's hard power is used to intimidate another country. A member of the Pol-itburo Standing Committee, Wang Huning, first introduced Joseph Nye's writings to China in 1993 (Xiao, 2017). Soft power, as defined by Nye, includes cultural diplomacy as a key tool (Nye, 2008). According to Wang Huning, China's soft power relies heavily on culture (Huning, 1993).

Chinese culture and ideology, according to Huning, are the source of China's soft power (Huning, 1993). As a result, China's soft power strategy and public diplomacy are heavily influenced by the country's cultural values, according to Guozuo Zhang, a prominent Chinese scholar (Zhang, 2016). With regard to public diplomacy, cultural

diplomacy is a critical component that differs greatly from the rest of the world (Zhang, 2016). Cultural exchanges are an important part of China's soft power strategy. In order to build a strong foundation for China's soft power, President Xi Jinping says that China must deepen cultural system reform, promote socialist fundamental principles, and advance the cultural industry.

Public diplomacy and soft power are concepts that Nye emphasizes, but many academics argue that he doesn't go into enough detail about how culture can be used as a form of soft power. For Chinese academics and policymakers, culture is a significant source of soft power (Kong, 2015). As Breslin (2011) argues, it is important to understand China's history and customs in order to establish its soft power. Chinese soft power strategies are heavily influenced by cultural factors. In his address to the 17th National Congress, former CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao used the phrase "enhance [Chinese] cultural soft power". The phrase has come to represent China's soft power strategy (Jintao, 2007). According to him, the "enormous rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation will be followed by the "blooming" of the Chinese culture.

Culture is an important part of the soft power. As of the time of Xi Jinping, this method has been widened and improved. It was said in 2014 by China's current General Secretary that "we should expand China's soft power, portray a proper Chinese narrative, and better relay China's message to the world." Currently, China's soft power and popular diplomacy are based on these fundamentals. China's public diplomacy strategies are based on the country's cultural soft power assets. The Chinese film industry, Chinese museums abroad that can inform visitors about ancient Chinese culture and history, cultural attractions within China such as the Forbidden City and the Great Wall, and panda diplomacy are all part of the curriculum at Confucius Institutes.

Chinese diplomacy relies heavily on these culturally diverse and distinctly Chinese means of reaching out to the world. "Strict political structure," according to Gill and Huang, makes it difficult for China to use soft power since it can scare other publics with whom they are trying to build connections (Gill & Huang, 2006). When it comes to soft power, China's political system may be difficult for Westerners to relate to because of its high level of political control and system structure. The "China Threat" is a hotly discussed topic in the United States. There is apprehension among Asian nations that China's growing economic and military power may lead to Chinese dominance of Asia. In Europe and Africa, a growing Chinese presence has raised concerns about China's true motives (Wei, 2019).

Bringing China to the world's attention and aiding foreigners in their understanding of China are the primary objectives of Chinese public diplomacy (Zhao, 2007). Public diplomacy goals of China are summarized as follows: "China seeks understanding for its political system and policies; it wants to be seen as a stable and reliable and responsible economic partner; it wants to be seen as a trustworthy and responsible member of the international political community; and it wants to be recognized as an ancient, but vibrant civilization". Through public diplomacy, China aims to promote its image, raise understanding of its system and initiatives, and exert influence on other governments. An important part of a country's public diplomacy strategy is the development of soft power tools.

As a result of the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, the distribution of pandas in China was dramatically altered (Buckingham, Neil, David, & Jepson, 2013). As a form of public diplomacy, China sent pandas as gifts to other countries. A pair of panda cubs were sent to the USSR by China in 1957 and 1959 (Hartig, 2013). Japan and North Korea were the recipients of panda gifts from China. Five pandas were sent to North Korea. After China joined the United Nations in 1971, it began sending gifts of pandas to the West. During Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China, China sent the United States two huge pandas as a gift (MacMillan, 2008). As China's prime minister at the time, Zhou Enlai entrusted Western countries with the first panda. China transferred 16 pandas to seven Western countries between 1972 and 1982, including the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Mexico, and Spain. By 1982, China had shipped 23 giant panda cubs.

Pandas: An Instrument of Chinese Soft Power

Huge pandas' economic strength was found in 1982, just as China was beginning economic reforms and refocusing on economic growth (Schaller, 1993). China concluded in 1982 that distributing pandas would be a breach of international law and convention (CITES, 1982). Since then, China has been renting pandas to other countries for exhibitions, where they would spend between 100 and 200 days in each location. For the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, pandas were loaned out. After the games, they were returned to San Francisco. Another pair was exhibited and transferred to New Zealand in 1988 in Australia (Hartig, 2013).

Each panda couple hired by zoos cost zoos between $300,000 and $500,000, while China received a cut of the souvenir sales (Hartig, 2013). There were many benefits to renting pandas, such as gaining publicity and money. Pandas cannot be exported unless both China and the other country are satisfied the transaction will aid in conserving the species, as stipulated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora in 1996 (CITES, 1996). China's conservation initiatives necessitated a shift in China's panda diplomacy practices. At this stage, China imposed restrictions on panda deals.

The following are the guidelines: Zoos lease pandas from China for ten years, which can be extended by mutual agreement. The annual budget for China's environmental protection efforts must be $1 million (Xing, 2010). In order to keep their pandas for an additional five years, China negotiated agreements with San Diego Zoo, Zoo Atlanta, and the National Zoo in Washington DC (Hartig, 2013). Some zoos may charge additional fees, depending on the location. All zoos must be able to afford bamboo, which costs around $200,000 per year to feed the pandas (Fekete, 2012). Every zoo that gets a panda must have a zookeeper who is an expert in pandas (Xing, 2010). It's important for each zoo acquiring pandas to balance publicity, revenue, and costs. Due to the panda's status on the IUCN Red List and the fact that efforts are being made to increase panda reproduction, zoos must ensure that their pandas are properly cared for.

In order to preserve good business connections with trading partners, China employs panda diplomacy to target areas where it sees commercial prospects (Kozlowska, 2020). Academia and the media frequently report on Confucius institutes, linguistic and cultural exchanges, museums, student exchanges, and more (Wei, 2019). Panda diplomacy is largely disregarded in China's public diplomacy debates. Academics and the media have paid little attention to China's long-established diplomatic tactic of "panda diplomacy." China's more conventional public diplomacy tools may be to blame for this. Compared to other countries, China is one of the few that uses animal diplomacy on such a large scale.

Panda Diplomacy: An Effective Means of Serving China's Grand Strategy

Cushing and Markwell's criteria for animal diplomacy are met by panda diplomacy. An appealing visual identity for the panda is essential; it must be a natural fit for the recipient country. Pandas are visually appealing because of their Kindschenschema or neoteny. Humans find a high

forehead, a big brain case, saucer eyes, rounded cheeks, and short stubby limbs charming (Lorenz, 1943). For all of these reasons and more, the giant panda is an excellent choice for animal diplomacy.

First and foremost, "the creatures involved must be distinct and indigenous to the donor country" (Cushing & Markwell, 2009). There are only 1,864 wild giant pandas, panda diplomacy shines in this demand because of its uniqueness (WWF, 2020). The panda was just moved from "endangered" to "vulnerable" by the IUCN in 2016, panda conservation is still a subject that is very much on the minds of the worldwide public (Swaisgood, Wang, & Wei, 2016). Many people around the world have the opportunity to see pandas up close and personal through the use of zoo webcams and media reports. China has excelled at incorporating this component of animal diplomacy into its panda diplomacy through annual fees, high standards of panda cages and feeding, and require-ments requiring professional giant panda zookeepers.

Panda diplomacy has enormous power as an efficient animal di-plomacy instrument due to its high standards in all prerequisites and guiding principles. In animal diplomacy, panda diplomacy is one of the most important tools. The panda is an ideal candidate for animal diplo-macy because of its international appeal, attractiveness, rarity, and long-term connection to China. Its public diplomacy effectiveness must be discussed. Public diplomacy is how states communicate with abroad audiences and is a primary instrument of information sharing and com-munication that allows soft power resources to take root.

Giant Panda Diplomacy is China's public diplomacy technique that uses the soft power of the Chinese government's panda to influence foreign policy. China places a high value on cultural diplomacy as a means of en-hancing its soft power. Film and literature have been used as examples of soft power by Nye, but he hasn't mentioned animal diplomacy or the panda in this context. Ancient Chinese traditions and culture are part of China's cultural supremacy, and the huge panda fits perfectly in. The panda is a cul-tural icon in China because of its historical ties. The panda is a symbol of China's history and culture because of its status as a national hero.

This type of diplomacy involves the public and conveys a message of trust and friendship to other countries. As a result of panda diplo-macy, governments are eager to expand their bilateral ties with China. States having tense relations with China must modify their behaviour to receive more pandas after China withdraws them or refuses to give more. When relations between China and Japan were tense, no pandas

were sent, but President Xi and Prime Minister Abe agreed to resume panda diplomacy after things returned to "normal."

Panda loans are strongly associated with policy agreements. Panda diplomacy is a potent public diplomacy method that can change policy outcomes and China's bilateral relations with other nations, according to timelines of relations. Panda diplomacy can also be evaluated by comparing it to China's public diplomacy objectives. For China's public diplomacy, the goal is to be understood for its political system and policies, to be seen as a stable, reliable and responsible economic partner, to be seen as a trustworthy and responsible member of the international community, and to be respected as an ancient, but vibrant culture."

China's goodwill and desire for political and economic cooperation are shown through the use of panda diplomacy. Panda deals are for countries that accept and understand China's political structure and policies, and it is also for countries that contradict with Chinese policies, in order to reconsider their policies towards China. It similarly encourages countries to view China as a stable, reliable and responsible economic partner through entering into panda diplomacy with countries it maintains a strong trade and investment relationship with, with panda diplomacy showing China's commitment to a long-term partnership with these countries.

Gifting pandas serves as a symbol of trust and support, establishing strong connections with a seal of Chinese friendliness. Pandas reflect old Chinese history and culture; they serve to bridge the gap between cultures and generate interest in China as a historical cultural force. Even though panda diplomacy initially appears to have a simple goal of extending goodwill to other countries, it is actually a very successful way of supporting China's public diplomacy objectives, making it an enormously strong tool for public diplomacy. China's panda diplomacy has had an impact on China's public diplomacy, based on higher levels of bilateral ties and collaboration following the signing of panda diplomacy accords. Panda diplomacy is a successful public diplomacy instrument that fits animal diplomacy standards. In terms of public diplomacy, panda diplomacy aligns well with China's strategic objectives.

Tools of Chinese Public Diplomacy

Media, internet, events, cultural and educational exchanges, and celebrities are some of China's soft power tools. A well-known Chinese public diplomacy tool is the use of Confucius institutes. 530 Confucius

institutes operate worldwide, with 126 in Asia, 184 in Europe, 141 in North and Latin America, 59 in Africa, and 20 in Oceania (Jahar, 2019). The goal of Confucius Institutes is to foster goodwill and worldwide understanding by instructing students in the Chinese language and culture. Cultural exchange and language instruction are among the many services provided by Confucius Institutes.

Confucius institutes are viewed as problematic by some. Confusion has arisen in nations where there are Confucius Institutes over China's true intentions behind the institutions, despite their stated purpose of promoting international understanding and cooperation (Wang & Adamson, 2015). Between 2013 and 2020 a total of 46 universities, 2 governments and 1 school board around the world have dissolved their Confucius Institutes. In addition to Confucius Institutes, student-to-student and language exchanges are other forms of educational diplomacy. Outside of China, the number of Chinese students studying abroad is increasing. Students are influenced by their surroundings and might represent their native culture overseas, which helps promote cultural understanding.

As a cultural ambassador, not every child is enthusiastic or receptive to the role because of their age, education, and social class. China exploits worldwide personalities like NBA player Yao Ming for public diplomacy (Cull, 2008). Yao is pleasant, strong, confident without being arrogant, and focused on achieving (Ding, 2008). Yao is a potent public diplomacy figure for China, positively representing his country and garnering public attention to it. However, despite Yao's charm and effectiveness at engaging foreign publics, the long-term benefits of relying on the beauty of superstars are few. It is not a viable long-term strategy to rely solely on the presence of these types of celebrities for news and media coverage (Xing, 2010).

In another illustration of China's public diplomacy, the Chinese film industry has been improved and Chinese film studios have received a slew of new investments (Becard & Filho, 2019). Non-Chinese moviegoers may be unable to fully appreciate Chinese movies if they cannot communicate in the language. When it comes to Chinese public diplomacy, academics rarely address how Chinese celebrities and Confucius Institutes work together in harmony, but that's exactly what Panda diplomacy does. Using the huge panda as a public diplomacy tool is a smart move. Panda diplomacy is a unique public diplomacy tool with unique features. It has the capacity to reach a broad audience and is unique to China as the most effective form of animal diplomacy.

Panda diplomacy offers various advantages over other Chinese popular diplomacy tactics. It's not limited by age/ethnicity/occupation/religion or interest in learning, culture exchange, or athletics. Panda diplomacy can appeal to a wide range of people, regardless of their age, education level, or social status. Furthermore, panda diplomacy does not require a dedication to learning or culture, to visit a panda in a zoo or read about pandas in the media is a pleasurable activity that can build favourable associations in the viewer. As a public diplomacy instrument, panda diplomacy enjoys a wide audience thanks to widespread media coverage and panda-cams that can be viewed from anywhere in the world.

Discussion

As an unconventional kind of public diplomacy, panda diplomacy has a dearth of academic research to fill the void. Many good things can be learned from studying panda diplomacy. If China wants to strengthen its soft power, international awareness of China, and positive policy outcomes with other countries, it must assess its public diplomacy techniques. Panda diplomacy must be studied in depth to understand its effectiveness, Chinese design, and the possible impact that it has on China's public diplomacy.

As a special bonus, the first ladies of China and the United States were on hand to witness the ceremony of naming a panda. China has not sent a panda to the United States in 59 years because of the trade conflict and Trump's erratic behaviour toward China. The pandas in San Diego Zoo were immediately removed when Trump imposed huge tariffs on Chinese goods. The temporary agreement to bring pandas to Yagiyama Zoological Park was signed in 2011, when Japan-China ties were at their best. China stated its intentions to send more pandas to Japan at the time. Japan and China's panda agreement was cancelled following the Diayou Islands territorial dispute, and no pandas have been transferred to Japan since. A panda agreement was signed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping following the normalization of relations between the two nations, Japan's backing for China in the trade war, and Abe's first visit to Beijing in seven years.

Ueno Zoo has been granted an extension on China's loan of the Xiang Xiang cub. China's choice of countries is influenced by commerce. Trading is a part of every case. US-China ties have not always been friendly, although the US accounts for 16.8 percent of China's exports.

US panda diplomacy took off after Nixon's 1972 visit to China. For decades, China and the United States have maintained panda diplomacy. In the wake of the trade war, panda diplomacy has come to an end in the United States, and San Diego Zoo has had to withdraw its pandas. A trade-based connection between China and its neighbour may be a factor in its choice to relocate pandas to the other side. Aside from China, Japan is home to the most pandas outside of the country.

Chinese panda diplomacy is not surprising given the country's preference for countries with good relations and trade. Choosing a country should be based on both trust and kindness, as panda diplomacy is a symbol of goodwill. After the panda diplomacy accords, China is wise to invest public diplomacy tools in nations that are more likely to be open to partnership and trade. China's top 15 trading partners all have pandas, so the conclusion that trade is another basis for panda diplomacy makes logical. China's trade partners should use public diplomacy to maintain good relations with China.

International publics of any age, education, interest, social status, or income can benefit from panda diplomacy. Unlike Confucius Institutes or student exchanges, Panda diplomacy does not entail education or learning. There is no linguistic or cultural barrier when comparing panda diplomacy to a Chinese star or film. Such type of diplomacy removes language, culture, interests and other demographic barriers. Pandas were given as presents, then commercial loans, and now panda conservation loans are in the panda's best interest. Foreign audiences, foreign governments, and the media all play a role in the successful implementation of panda diplomacy.

Chinese culture and history are promoted, interest in Chinese culture and history is stimulated, governments are encouraged to treat China with respect, and China may show its discontent with countries who treat it badly through this method. A year after the panda agreement was announced, the China-Denmark Joint Work Programme was introduced, and President Xi Jinping and Barack Obama increased cooperation on joint programs after holding a ceremony in the United States to give the panda its name. This is because panda diplomacy encourages mutual trust and co-operation.

An effective public diplomacy tool, panda diplomacy promotes China's system to other countries and helps them become more open to it. China wants its political system and policies to be understood; it wants to be seen as a stable and reliable and responsible economic

partner; it wants to be seen as a trustworthy member of the international political community; and it wants to be seen as a trustworthy and responsible member of the international political community."

Panda diplomacy addresses all of these objectives. Additionally, it can be an effective instrument for persuading others who don't to change their views on China. China seeks to establish itself as a long-term economic partner by signing panda deals with reputable trading partners, since the panda is a sign of trust and kindness. This diplomacy demonstrates China's rich cultural heritage by adopting the panda as an emblem of its diverse history. China's public diplomacy strategy, according to Xing (2010), relies heavily on panda diplomacy. In order to meet China's public diplomacy objectives, Panda diplomacy is able to do so.

China's unique panda diplomacy makes use of the huge panda, which can be seen on webcams and in the media in 21 countries. A loan of 10 pandas from China to zoos for $1,000,000 in panda conservation funding is made in exchange. Visitors to zoos flock to see pandas, which increases both the number of people and the amount of money they spend. With good connections and trade, China selects panda countries, which typically improves their bilateral relations. Chinese soft power is bolstered through the deployment of the gigantic panda as a public diplomacy tool known as panda diplomacy.

The public and governments of other countries can be influenced by China's panda diplomacy. It is possible to see the impact of panda diplomacy in how countries respond to receiving pandas, in the global popularity of pandas, and in their position as a Chinese cultural icon. In China, the employment of panda diplomacy is a powerful tool for public diplomacy. It's a successful kind of cultural diplomacy since President Xi Jinping promotes the panda's role as a cultural representative of China. Animal diplomacy is something it does exceptionally well. More effective than China's other public diplomacy methods in reaching a large audience and erasing linguistic and cultural barriers.

In academic research, the importance of panda diplomacy cannot be overestimated. When other countries feel threatened by China's rapid rise to economic and global dominance, China may continue to grow its soft power and popular diplomacy by understanding how it works. In Panda diplomacy, China is shown as a friendly and dependable country. Panda diplomacy is a long-term political instrument in which the government selects who gets a panda and how they obtain one.

Conclusions

Through panda diplomacy, China makes use of the giant panda, an emblem of Chinese soft power. Soft power and public diplomacy theories were used to investigate and evaluate the role of panda diplomacy as a public diplomacy tool. China's public diplomacy is based on the giant panda, which satisfies the criteria for animal diplomacy. The panda's visual appeal, originality, and exclusivity to China make it a superb tool for public diplomacy. Only 19 nations outside of China now have pandas. Positive ties between China and the receiving country, as well as countries with promising trade prospects, play a role in the selection process.

The use of panda diplomacy to encourage bilateral cooperation on critical policy issues can appeal to foreign publics and governments in the name of people diplomacy. Diplomacy using pandas is an expression of goodwill and potential future policy cooperation between China and the country that receives the gift. When relations between China and a country are strained, China can remove pandas from that country. Chinese public diplomacy does not exclusively rely on panda diplomacy, although it may reach a wider audience and achieve more results than other methods.

In terms of China's four main public diplomacy goals, panda diplomacy could be a good fit. Understanding China's panda diplomacy is crucial at a time when Western countries and world leaders are increasing their hostility towards China. It may look to some as a simple gesture, but it is part of a long-term strategy to expand China's worldwide appeal and influence foreign governments. By realizing the significance and potential influence of panda diplomacy, China may improve its public diplomacy and encourage the international public and bilateral partners to understand the Chinese system.

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War And Peace: Decoding the Complex Relationship Between India And Pakistan Since 1947

Abhirup BHATTACHARYA[3]

ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the Indo-Pak relationship through the lens of structural realism explaining the conflicting situation which has been going on between them for the past seventy years and has affected their relationship ever since the time of their independence in 1947. Though, sharing the same border, tensions have often risen between these two South Asian super powers at times relating to several changing factors from time to time which have escalated their dispute. The sole motive of this paper has been to closely focus upon these major factors and analyse them through various qualitative approaches in order to explain this complex relationship and how it has deteriorated over these years. As a matter of fact, the paper finally draws upon certain conclusions of instability, armed hostility, vested interests of various international actors and lack of commitment as reasons to prove a sense of suspicion upon one another eventually causing this troubled relationship.

Keywords: Security Crisis, Anarchy, Armed Hostility, Nuclearization, Diplomacy, Powedynamics.

Introduction

THE INDO-PAK SECURITY CRISIS IS A LONG-LASTING IDEOLOGICAL and confrontational dilemma that started after the partition in August 1947. In the past 74 years, the two countries have not only had a troubled relationship but have also at times engaged in several military conflicts with each other. The main inception of their troubled relations began when the two territories were divided based on two particular religious identities with people from both sides of the territory failing to accept this division given their natural emotions. These two nations have often been at loggerheads with one another and have escalated their conflict to four full-scale wars on various accounts from the year 1947 – 1999. However, if we analyse this conflict then it is to be found

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that the first and the second confrontation in the year 1947 and 1964 was mainly due to the border dispute related to the Kashmir region which is the root cause or the main inception of these two countries engaging into a direct clash. From there onwards, both these nations have never backed down from challenging one other at several platforms which has further escalated their fear of insecurity to that of the level of acquiring and testing their nuclear missiles which has eventually brought them into the limelight of being two potential nuclear-powered states who have in a way instilled in a sense of fear among the world that even the smaller nations were very much capable of producing nuclear weapons at a large scale.

Since then, both these nations have been useful strategic allies of the superpowers of the world and have often taken sides on several occasions to balance their support which has further increased the level of security paradox in South Asia affecting their relationship in the long run.

According to the nature of international politics, the whole crisis starts when one state misinterprets the interest and notion of the other state and acts accordingly to protect its interests which creates a sense of fear or insecurity for its counterparts. Similarly, the situation was the same when India successfully started to increase its military arsenal, Pakistan also thought of doing the same so that it can match up to the level of India. This whole concept of security and insecurity from both these nations has kept this dilemma going with time eventually creating an issue of global importance which has ultimately formulated an ongoing power crisis in South Asia. Though the issue of Kashmir and border dispute stands to be the most commonly talked about factor which has significantly played a role in degrading the Indo-Pak relations over these years, there are also several contemporary factors which have equally made it challenging for both these countries to mend their relations such as the issues on terrorism, refugee crisis, water sharing and proxy wars which continue to be a bottleneck until a date for both these territories where most of it remains unsolved even after several rounds of discussion at the highest level of diplomacy eventually creating a mistrust for one another and continuing to further complicate the situation. India and Pakistan are hence today, two highly discussed states in the global scenario where tensions are rising at a rapid rate just like a ticking time bomb which is ready to explode at any point in time. (Dixit, 2002)

Analysing the state of anarchy through the lens of structural realism

The concept of this paper is mainly based upon the theory of structural realism which holds one of the most important and established forms of theories in the area of international relations and international politics in this global contemporary scenario. This concept of neorealism or structural realism was mainly formulated by the neo-realist thinker Kenneth Waltz in his book 'Theory of International Politics' which explains the nature of the international politics through the lens of anarchy and defines that there is a clear absence of a proper centralized structure right at the top which in a way doesn't guarantee that one state wouldn't be attacked by another one.

Hence, due to this absence of a centralized structure, it has now become an inherent feature of international politics where, if one state is attacked by another it is the only remedy for the other state to take measures by increasing its capability to protect itself from getting invaded. Structural realists are hence of the opinion that the only way left for the states to secure their survival by attaining as much power as they can which will ultimately result in a state of anarchy.

In the theory of structural realism, it has been seen that there are specifically three elements which majorly form the sphere of international politics i.e., "the organising principle, differentiation of units and the distribution of capabilities" which not only explains the nature of the international politics but it's the way of functioning. (Dunne and Schmidt, 2014)

Among these three above-mentioned elements, the organising principle mainly explains the hierarchy and anarchy related to the domestic operation of the state due to the absence of any appellate authority whereas the second element explains that all states function in the same way as they all are equal units irrespective of their nature.

However, the third and final element defines the ranking order and the strength of the nations in the truest possible sense in determining the structure of the state.

According to structural realists, it has been argued that for states to survive foreign aggression, various forms of strategies and confidence-building measures are adopted and hence they form various alliances to maintain the balance of power which not only helps them to protect themselves from the wrath of other states but periodically

increase their military, economic and social capabilities to the highest possible extent.

Structural realism can further be divided into two spheres which are offensive realism and defensive realism. Offensive realists are of the view that states due to their anarchic nature tend to accumulate as much power as they can to survive and overpower other states as they are often uncertain about the intention of these states and hence try to compete by gaining control over their counterparts to attain ultimate hegemon. However, defensive realists believe that due to the anarchic nature of international politics, defensive or preventive measures are really helpful as they help to protect the state from any external threats by balancing its powers with that of other states and not simply maximising its capabilities based on an aggressive expansion. (Mearsheimer, 2001)

Hence, while analysing through the lens of neorealism, it can practically be defined that there is a sense of anarchy between both the states of India and Pakistan ever since the time of their inception, where one state is always trying to build pressure upon another through various acts of aggression in order to gain complete supremacy in the South Asian region. Various neorealists have often discussed this through their literature about the several instances that happen to be the possible factors which have significantly implicated upon the declining nature of the relationship between these two super powers.

Choudhury (1971) in his book has discussed the various factors of the Kashmir dispute, water sharing problem, territorial claims, and minority rights issues which have highlighted the political and foreign relations of India and Pakistan from 1947-65. It is mainly explained from the historical perspective which has engraved a deep sense of mistrust between the two nations eventually leading to a military conflict due to the lack of proper governance and mutual distrust. The Kashmir dispute has therefore been a central figure held at the core of the India Pakistan issue as discussed by (Koithara, 2008) which explains that this issue has prevailed over these years not only due to the unresolved emotional perspective and minority resentment but the deep political powerplay and territorial competition between India and Pakistan which is often taken as leverage to downplay each other.

Another interesting factor that has changed the conventional war tactics as explained by (Dixit, 2002) is the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan and its effective road towards nuclearization which has changed the status of both these nations in the South Asian dynamics by making them active nuclear warheads. Asserting this perspective, it

has been mentioned in the work of (Basrur, 2008) that due to this competition between the two arms race there has been a significant rise in the level of insurgency and terrorism with the introduction of newer tactics of pressure building upon each other which has further affected the relationship between them. Eventually, the bilateral peacebuilding process has been discussed with the help of the Tashkent Agreement and the Shimla Peace Accord which had initially proven to be successful for both nations but had afterwards backfired adding more to the suspicion among them which in the later years created a sense of non-cooperation with each other. The viewpoint of the various international organizations and specifically the major powers of the world have been discussed by Chopra (1971) which has explained the critical intervention of the United Nations in the Indo-Pak dispute and the closeness of the United States and the Soviet Union with that of South Asian regional powers including its rearrangements from time to time.

Though this literature has significantly contributed to the various factors explaining the nature of the relationship between India and Pakistan over these years, it still holds much ambiguity to explain this complex bonding with the help of the modern contemporary tactics that have played a significant role in becoming a roadblock to the maintenance of the peacebuilding process affecting the overall relationship between these two nations.

A continuous situation of armed hostility since 1947

War of 1947

India and Pakistan 1947 were divided into two states which created an uproar among the natural sentiment of the common people. It had not only created a sense of division among the two states but had also put a strain on their mutual ties which were starting to suffer over time. Since the time these two nations were separated, they started to have two distinct identities which eventually led to the First Kashmir War or the first military conflict with Pakistan. If we look at the conflict between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir valley has always been a sight of a dispute between these two states where both the states have had their distinctive interests, which eventually escalated the conflict back in 1947. Though both these states were two independent nations by then,

Kashmir was still under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh who did not ally with any of them.

The issue however escalated when a local tribal militant group had captured a portion of Kashmir as per planned by Pakistan and had laid their eyes on the whole region which would have eventually benefitted them to have their grip over India. However, after realising the difficulty of the situation, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir back then Maharaja Hari Singh made his plea to the Indian government and eventually signed the Treaty of Accession to save his kingdom and the region of Kashmir from the hands of Pakistan. The Indian forces immediately after the accession took guard and bravely defended the territory with the help of their military strength. Finally, the Line of Control was also created as a measure to defend against any form of external threat and encroachment from the neighbouring country which still exists to date for the safeguarding of the respective territories and land.

The most important element to cause this dispute was the separation of identities based on religious views. India has always been a Hindu-governed state and Pakistan is a Muslim-dominated one which has often put the two nations at loggerheads due to their difference in idealism and their standpoint. Hence, the Kashmir valley having a majority of its population in their demography consisting of Muslims was a keen constituent of Pakistan. However, to save its territory and protect the idea of secularism India also had to counter the attack from Pakistan and gave a befitting reply accordingly. This issue had indeed given an initial message to India about Pakistan's ambitious movements and irregular activities which later on helped them to stay cautious about their actions.

War of 1965

The conflict of 1965 proves to be one of the most classic examples of the difference in opinion over the issue of border dispute mainly in the Kashmir region by India and Pakistan and forms to be one of the key factors in their declining relationship over these years. It had not only by then seen the interest of Pakistan in integrating the valley of Kashmir along with its territory but had also managed to gather the attention of the United Nations due to their previous clash in 1947-48. (Ganguly, 2001). The high command of Pakistan at that time very well knew that India was in no state of getting into another military confrontation mainly after its encounter with China in 1962 which eventually drained the former state to take the biggest advantage of grabbing the opportunity of conducting 'Operation Gibraltar'.

Pakistan has always believed that the region of Kashmir belongs to them due to the demographic structure over there with the majority of the population being Muslims governed in a Hindu-ruled state which has been their biggest weapon of instigation against the local people so that they can strategically counter India by lighting the flame of separation within the territory eventually benefiting them to possess their attack.

Though even after using these tactics the Pakistani troops were unsuccessful in their efforts mainly due to two reasons one being the up gradation of the military ammunitions by India mainly after the 1962 war with China and the second one being the emergence of the international actors such as the United States, United Kingdom and the USSR (back then) who wanted to maintain a balance of power during that Cold War era and tried to avoid another security crisis mainly after the aftermath of the World War II and had come up with the plan of the Tashkent Agreement. It was calculated that due to this costly war both the countries had lost over 8600 soldiers combined due to their over ambitious attitude in containing one another with the help of their military forces to show their actual capabilities putting the lives of millions of people as bait. The significance of this war was hence bound by the emergence of two dominant neighbouring forces who had formally declared their mutual disliking towards each other escalating their conflict to the highest possible level signifying the start of a security crisis in the coming years which was perceived as a threat to the bigger powers compelling them to ultimately intervene and act as a mediator between the states.

War of 1971

The Indo-Pak war of 1971 happens to have a great significance in the history of conflicts between India and Pakistan. Though it is said that this military conflict had lasted near about thirteen days but the real truth according to many theorists is that this was a conflict that had started way before between both these countries who had already engaged in two previous conflicts with each other which had more intensified the hostility by acting as a catalyst. Though this war had ultimately liberated the territory of East Pakistan to become the state of Bangladesh in what it is now, it had also brought along with it the deaths of thousands of people who were not only on the forefront but those who had taken part in the liberation which included extreme human rights violations like mass rapes and severe torture by the Pakistan armed forces upon the common people and women.

This war not only signified the creation of Bangladesh and the disintegration of East Pakistan but had successfully made the Pakistan regime weaker strategically which was utilised by India tactfully. Pakistan, since its inception, has always had several changes in their governments which had proven weaker with time and had drastically failed to create any significant development for the region of East Pakistan which mainly caused the revolt. The general mass of East Pakistan which largely comprised of the people from the Bengali speaking community were not only neglected but was never given their due share of fair governance which caused a huge economic and social void between East and West Pakistan. This sense of disagreement between the common people and the government slowly turned into chaos which was further complicated by the deployment of the armed forces which ultimately led to the creation of the 'Mukti Bahini' who were supported by the Indian government and their military forces.

The government of Pakistan had criticised this move of the Indian government of meddling in their internal matters to which the Indian government stated and defended by mentioning the urgency to intervene in the situation to protect the sovereign rights of the common people of East Pakistan who were dominated by the inhumane atrocities and treatment by the Pakistani forces which further fuelled the war. Finally, on 16th December 1971 after thirteen days of war Bangladesh got liberated with the help of the Indian forces and Pakistan was defeated. This war was not only won by India due to the large military assistance arriving from Moscow by the former USSR under the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation but was also due to the geostrategic advantage of the war location. Pakistan was not only further divided but had received a severe setback due to this war which many in their government considered as an insult, resulting in a deep closeness and proximity towards China in the distant future, which also led to a common agenda of building a troubled relationship with India due to its border dispute and conquest for supremacy in the South Asian region eventually leading to a military standoff in 1962. (Jaffrelot, 2016)

War of 1999

The state of Pakistan has always secretively wanted their share of control over the territory of Kashmir which got more triggered with their back to back losses in the war of 1965 and 1971 causing a great deal of embarrassment for the government. Although, in 1999 after a brief period of peace Pakistan managed to find its way to unlawfully capture

certain territories that belonged to India to possess some effective strategic benefit to attack the other territories which would have eventually led down to the main pathway from Leh to Kashmir ultimately fulfilling their motive. By this time, India and Pakistan were both active nuclear states who had already started to raise the tension among each other through their ambitious nuclear abilities which had not only shocked the world but had started to evolve a security dilemma for the other international actors.

Raising these concerns, Pakistan attacked India in 1999 which came to be known as the famous 'Kargil War' eventually named after the territory upon which this war was fought. The Line of Control (LOC) which was mutually created after discussions between both these nations to maintain its border control was violated and crossed by the Pakistani forces illegally under the garb of militants to capture these areas. The Indian forces in retaliation to this act fought back bravely keeping no stone unturned in taking back the territories that were captured with the help of their efficient soldiers and effective military capabilities mainly by air and on land. (Abbas and Stern, 2015)

Both these countries eventually lost hundreds of soldiers apart from the many thousands wounded due to this violent conflict. This war was also ultimately somewhat subdued with the help of certain diplomatic interventions by the international actors whose main aim was to maintain the balance of power in the world since this military conflict was between two states who now had nuclear weapons which could have been a potential threat to the society then as the world had already seen the after-effects of the Second World War. Along with this, many defence and strategic experts have also mentioned that since this war was fought at such a high altitude having such extreme climatic conditions, it was difficult for both these nations to continue this battle for long which would have plunged their economies. Even after several wars and military conflicts, Pakistan still believes in integrating itself into the region of Kashmir by gaining the sympathy of the Muslim majority by supporting the militants who voice their opinions by planning their insurgency against India has primarily maintained the mistrust and the hostile situation between both these countries along with various newer factors of the contemporary scenario that further contributes to the dilemma affecting their overall association. (Lavoy, 2009)

Though this literature has significantly contributed to the various factors explaining the nature of the relationship between India and Pakistan over these years, it still holds much ambiguity to explain this

complex bonding with the help of the modern contemporary tactics that have played a significant role in becoming a roadblock to the maintenance of the peacebuilding process affecting the overall relationship between these two nations.

The emergence of modern warfare tactics and nuclearization

Nuclear experiments

Due to the system of anarchy in international politics, it is somewhat inevitable for both these nations to refrain from acquiring more and more power to match up to each other's standards which formed one of the primary reasons for uplifting their military abilities. India had declined to sign the non-proliferation treaty earlier which had helped them to formally test their nuclear capabilities in 1974 for the first time which was directed as a measure that was taken after its war with Pakistan in 1971.

After its successful test in May 1974, India named this nuclear missile 'Smiling Buddha' which was conducted as a part of its Nuclear Weapons Programme. India treated this as a great success for the development of its scientific research and considered this a breakthrough that would further secure its territory against any form of external threat. Though, this wasn't perceived in the best of its interests by several international actors who were not only in opposition to it but had started questioning this peaceful programme as a violation of certain agreements with them. However, putting this aside India managed to successfully experiment with its second nuclear test in 1998 at the Pokhran Test range. This mission was carried out secretively as it was under the lens of the United States intelligence agencies who kept a close watch on the situation. India was even warned by the United States that it does not conduct any further nuclear experiments but the pressure was already mounting upon the government as the general elections were near and the common people wanted some strict measures to contain Pakistan and its attacks that had been going on for a very long period of time.

Pakistan on the other hand took this act as a serious challenge and conducted its nuclear experiments by the code name Chagai-I and Chagai -II just after two weeks as a measure to counter its neighbouring state. It didn't take much time to understand that it was a stringent

response to India whereas Pakistan was also keeping itself well prepared to fight back in any difficult situation. These nuclear tests of 1998 weren't taken well by the international sphere where there were various sanctions imposed upon India and both these nations eventually had to face the wrath of the United Nations as a consequence of their move. Various experts started to raise their concern over the South Asian region which was now a battlefield for these two developing states who were emerging strong and were starting to match up to the level of the superpowers. Some were even upon the notion of assuming a potential security crisis that was slowly developing between these two emerging powers who were now the dominant players of this region giving some serious competition not only to each other but to the other states as well. (Ahmed, 1999)

Terrorism and insurgency

Terrorism and insurgency had started to grow their roots during the 1990's period in India which showed the change in warfare tactics and the emergence of the state sponsored terrorism by Pakistan through its various incidents. It was not unknown to the world about the 1993 Bombay blasts (now Mumbai) which had shaken the city with 12 bombing attacks killing 257 people and making 1400 injuries. Following this incident in 2008 Mumbai was again under attack and was hit by the terrorist activities where several important locations were targeted by these insurgents carrying out their activity killing 174 people and making hundreds injured. This incident was widely condemned by the whole world which had extended its support to India to fight the battle against terrorism and insurgency.

India also had to go through the 2001 Parliament attacks which proved how terrorism was a threat to society and how India as a state was being the soft target. This incident demonstrated that a place even as safe as the Parliament House was at risk and could be targeted if not protected properly. Even in the Kashmir valley mainly after 1989, insurgent activities had taken a rapid toll where these militants were suspected of being supported by the state of Pakistan to carry out these activities inside the territory of India for their larger benefit that would have eventually helped them to build their consensus in Kashmir.

Not only it was in India but countries like the United States had also had to go through the aftermath of terrorism which incurred a huge pain after the 9/11 incident proving how terrorism could affect the lives

of the common people and how it should be stopped at once by the efficient use of proper resources and forming of confidence-building measures to counter the external and internal threats which put the security of a nation at risk. It is therefore extremely important for every government to safeguard its territory and its national interest by putting its military and intelligence agencies into good use.

Terrorism is a new age warfare strategy of the militants which has no face and is in full force whenever it finds a territory vulnerable and unprotected putting even the most powerful countries at risk. India hence had to eventually take stricter measures after these incidents against Pakistan at the borders to safeguard its security. It had to further develop an initiative through the various diplomatic communications and negotiations with other countries to bring back the perpetrators who had carried out these terrorist activities upon the Indian soil.

The level of insurgency in India had taken a toll after the 2001 and 2008 attacks and kept on rising from time to time. It was nothing unusual for the citizens at one point in time to switch on their television sets and not receive any news of insurgency and militant activities mainly in the Kashmir region which has always been a sensitive topic for both nations of India and Pakistan.

It was also not unknown that there were various allegations against Pakistan of supporting the several insurgent groups economically and socially right from the back so that it is easier for them to put pressure on the Indian government on the issue of Kashmir. However, in 2016, the Indian government decided to take a strong step against the insurgent groups after their militant activities in the regions of Gurdaspur and Pathankot in Punjab which caused a huge uproar. But the main incident that devastated and triggered the Indian government was the insurgent activity in the army base camp of Uri, where four militants had entered and killed 19 soldiers which directly challenged the law and order of the state. The whole nation not only mourned this incident but every citizen and news channel wanted a clarification from the government which was under tremendous pressure and looking for the right opportunity to retaliate back.

Finally, on 28th September 2016, the Indian forces launched their retaliatory attacks in the form of surgical strikes upon these insurgents in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) which is believed to be a breeding ground for these insurgents. This was also backed by the cancellation of the Indian government's participation at the SAARC summit that year

which had sent a strong signal not only to the insurgent groups but to Pakistan and its state-sponsored terrorist activities.

The Indian forces had also been able to eliminate the Hizbul leader, Burhan Wani in 2016 which was a great success to counter terrorist activities in the region of Kashmir. However, it was a short-lived moment of peace as the militant group, JeM had launched their suicide bombing attack on a car in Pulwama, carrying the Indian armed forces taking more than 40 lives of these soldiers who were in charge of protecting their nation. The Indian government retaliated back with the help of the Indian Air Force by conducting the airstrikes in the Balakot region which was presumed to be a hiding base for these militants. Pakistan on the other hand denied any claims of its involvement with the Pulwama incident and condemned the attacks of India which were carried out on its territory violating the LOC. Though these incidents have further soured the complicated relationship between India and Pakistan, India has somehow managed to show the latter its changing stance of stronger retaliation against any form of state-sponsored terrorism and insurgent activities.

Water sharing dispute and proximity towards Afghanistan

The dispute between India and Pakistan has not only been kept limited to the conventional warfare techniques but explored to the point of the non-conventional techniques as well through their competition in the Afghanistan region and their water sharing dispute regarding the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). This treaty signed in 1960 was mainly supported by the World Bank suggesting that the sharing of this water of a set of rivers is to be divided between India and Pakistan would eventually benefit both the countries and their livelihoods. However, right from the time of partition, there was a disagreement between both these nations regarding the distribution of the sharing of the water which eventually took the worst possible turn when the Indian government threatened to take stringent measures against Pakistan with the sanctions on the water projects which showed an act of protest against the terrorist attacks upon the brave soldiers of India in Uri. The Pakistan government had even approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stating that it was a clear violation of the Treaty regulations and that they were ready for a bilateral settlement with India. But in 2019, the Indian government decided to take even stricter measures by changing the routes

and diverting the flow of water towards the Indian states as a response to the Pulwama attacks limiting the use of water for Pakistan.

Also, in this changing course of power dynamics in the South Asian region with the increase in the rate of insurgency and Pakistan's involvement in the Kashmir region has compelled India to lay its support to the state of Afghanistan by expanding its strategic ties. This has come as an opportunity for India to corner Pakistan which has a huge stake in Afghanistan considering it to be its strategic base and volatile relationship with the Taliban after 2001. India has eventually built an extensive rapport with Afghanistan after the establishment of its military base in Tajikistan which has not only helped them in back channelling with the adversaries of Pakistan but has also helped in providing a subsequent amount of pressure on them through various strategic measures. Along with this, it has also helped India in increasing its stake in Baluchistan which happens to be a soft target for Pakistan. Although, Pakistan is currently trying to regain the trust of Afghanistan with the help of China so that it can counter India and its growing dominance over the region along with its friendship with the United States. India, on the other hand, has established a great network in Afghanistan contributing to its economic and social status over the past decade which it refuses to let go off.

A new act of diplomacy towards peacebuilding

Though there have been four full-scale military conflicts that have taken place between India and Pakistan over more than 70 years there have been instances where both the countries have at times tried to resolve their issue with some peaceful dialogues and agreements when they could understand that it was the only option left to reduce the tension between them even at times with the mitigation of other international actors.

In, 1966 the famous Tashkent Agreement was not only signed but was declared as a mark of a peaceful settlement between the two nations who had engaged in a major military conflict back then with the rising issue of the territorial dispute in Kashmir. Matters were going out of hand at that time for both the nations when the Soviet Union along with the US mediated and urged both the countries to engage in a dialogue and look for a permanent solution at the conference in Uzbekistan under the supervision of the United Nations. Though, the agreement was signed it was still unclear about the actual intentions of both the nations where they failed to reach a permanent solution to the Kashmir

issue and the dialogue remained open-ended with a sense of rigidity from Pakistan and its government. (Rawat, 2015)

A similar situation happened in 1971 when India appeared to the rescue of East Pakistan that later on formed the state of Bangladesh and was under the dominance of West Pakistan. In this war of 1971, India intervened and helped the Mukti Bahini to fight against the atrocities and rampant human rights violations of the Pakistani military forces. However, a peace settlement in Shimla in 1972 was finally negotiated between India and Pakistan which not only gave rise to Bangladesh but also agreed upon the fact that both these countries would try to resolve the issue of Kashmir through the means of bilateral negotiations and without the intervention of any external actors. However, the United Nations and Amnesty International remain in close touch with the Indian government and keep a record of the happenings in Kashmir due to the various allegations of mistreatment towards the Kashmiri residents by the armed forces and the increasing rate of insurgency in the region.

India and Pakistan also witnessed a cold rivalry between them in the year 1998 which shook the international sphere to its core when both the countries tested their nuclear arsenals which gave a signal to each other about their intentions of becoming nuclear active states. This was seen as a strong message to counter each other through nuclear missiles to protect its territories from any external invasions. It was very much clear that the stage was set for another clash between these two countries who were then two powerful nuclear entities but eventually settled for an agreement and signed the Lahore Declaration in 1999 forming a great development in the bilateral relationship between them. However, this agreement hadn't lived up to its expectations as, after a few months of its signing the military forces of Pakistan invaded the territory of India with the sole objective of capturing its territory by having a passage to Leh and the valley of Kashmir.

Though India and Pakistan have relied upon each other in various instances and have tried to resolve their issues through the mutual process of various bilateral agreements and confidence-building measures, their shared disagreements and distrust of each other have always put an obstruction in their relationship with one nation not knowing the clear intension of another which in turn has eventually diluted the scope for mutual settlement and peaceful resolution creating a huge division.

Changing power dynamics in South Asia

India and Pakistan till date happen to share a common border which reminds us of the importance of these two global powers in the present time where we must not forget about how these two nations had started right from the scratches after their independence and are now at loggerheads with one another for the past seventy years due to their sheer mistrust and insecurities upon several issues which have escalated their conflict. This has now soared up to a situation where both these states are extremely suspicious about each other's capabilities and have left no stone unturned to compete at every possible level.

It has been viewed that the relationship between India and Pakistan has never been that cordial ever since their independence which has given rise to various sets of factors that have further deteriorated their relationship from time to time. These factors include the involvement of the various military, strategic and diplomatic conflicts which have eventually led to the mistrust of both the governments upon one other.

One of the prime elements of focus on this affecting relationship has been the outbreak of the four major full-scale wars fought since 1947 between these two nations which not only gave rise to the competing tendencies but had encouraged both the states in acquiring more and more power by evolving themselves into nuclear-powered states in 1998 and eventually attracting the attention of the bigger powers of the world who then formed strategic alliances to maintain the balance of power in the region.

It is also needless to say that the power dynamics in context to the regional politics in South Asia have been volatile as states are often fighting over their place where everyone wants to rise to the top by toppling one another. This happens to be one of the primary reasons that even if India and Pakistan would want to settle their disputes mutually there are other global forces behind them having their share of common interests who would eventually want this to continue for their vested self-interests.

This love-hate relationship between India and Pakistan however took an ugly turn after the 2008 Mumbai attacks with the increasing level of insurgencies and with the rise of terrorism which involved other non-combatant factors strategically encouraged by Pakistan ultimately forcing India to take some stern actions of retaliation after the several blows on its soil. However, even after the exchange of various diplomatic initiatives to date, the situation still keeps on deteriorating

between these two powers with the involvement of various contemporary factors which have further complexed the situation between the two governments with more rigidity towards each other.

It is also imperative to say that this issue involves two states having a total population of about 1.7 billion people which constitutes nearly one-fourth of the whole population of the world putting each one of them at risk with a major threat to the peace of the whole world.

However, given the current circumstances when the stakes are so high involving two prominent powers in South Asia having such valuable resources, it is almost inevitable for them not to collide anymore.

Also, acknowledging the fact that due to the state of anarchy in today's global politics where there is a devoid of a clear definite system in the world, most of the countries seek to gain as much power as they can and having said that India and Pakistan are no different states who are continuing to doing the same and keeping their conflict alive till date.

Final Remarks

It cannot be denied that the use and stockpiling of arms and weaponry including nuclear artilleries can damage the basic human security of any state but at the same point of time it is also a harsh reality in the context of the nature of international politics where nations need to defend their borders from any kind of external threats which is why there is a basic conflict of ideas. However, it is now required more than ever that states put aside their own political and personal vendettas and fight against issues that affect humanity in the larger perspective in this twenty-first century such as poverty, terrorism, gender biases, political instability, and corruption, etc. It is to be understood by both of these nations that we already have had two costly World Wars where nuclear weapons were used which had already caused a huge loss of human lives eventually bringing in the chaos and human suffering that has been going on to date. Hence keeping that in mind to maintain peace and prosperity around the globe these two nuclear warheads must be much more accountable. Even from the global perspective, there is a good scope for India and Pakistan to negotiate among themselves in creating a strong framework for the ASEAN countries which can stress uplifting policies like 'PANCHSHEEL' and 'NAM' to guide the whole world towards a new path of peaceful coexistence by promoting peace and prosperity.

It is also a duty of the various international watchdogs to prevent this sort of situation from happening who are known to be free from any form of political pressure and are the flag bearers of peace and stability around the globe and not just mere observers. The world today as it is said by these international institutions needs newer actors and players who would show the right path towards greater contribution towards development with the minimum amount of destruction and loss of lives.

It can also be understood that the insecurity between both the nations has escalated due to the factors of regime change and political instability in Pakistan which has created a lot of tension between the governments ultimately creating an imbalance in their relationship and mutual trust in one another. Their fights also at the various diplomatic conclaves and international platforms have gone in vain as both the nations haven't been able to focus upon their present with their share of history and insecurity with each other. However, it is high time now for India and Pakistan to keep aside their past and regain their long-awaited mutual trust with the emergence of various newer issues that have now posed greater threats to society.

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Applying International Law on Frozen Conflicts. Case Study: Nagorno-Karabakh

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Abstract: Identity and the need for autonomy or independence are recurrent in international relations. Numerous times, the impossibility to achieve sovereignty leads to conflicts, many of them manifesting from time to time as a new political agenda. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh determined over time new political and legal positions on international arena, by evaluating the principles of international law regarding different dimensions of the conflict. This paper aims to answer some of the questions regarding frozen conflicts based on the claim of the right to self-determination and secession of residents, focusing on the frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh and the application of international law.

Keywords: self-determination, secessionism, frozen conflicts, international law

Overview

Frozen conflicts are various, found in many secessionist situations formed in the last decades. They are the result of debates regarding the possibility of a community to obtain the same privileges of self-determination or even secession as others, as an internal incentive, and eventually, of course, recognition, as an external purpose. This desire of autonomy and independence is strongly linked to the concept of liberty itself, most of the times in opposition to the security dimension of another entity, and thus remaining in many situations without a precise answer. The purpose of this article is to emphasize the international law can be applicable to frozen conflicts. Scholars are defining frozen conflicts as situations where groups failed to gain the main conditions for self-determination or secession and thus, for a better understanding of a frozen conflict we need to emphasize its moral and legal legitimacy. In order to explain this, I've chosen the situation of Nagorno-Karabakh, mainly because the military dispute in 2020 projected the idea that the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is far from being over, placing it as a best-case study in which we can analyse the conditions for self-determination, and how the international law can be applied to such case. For a better understanding of the topic, this paper will briefly try to

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establish the moral foundation of self-determination and what are the conditions for secession, based on political or legal grounds, and how these conditions can be related to the situation of the frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Background

The frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh has many security implications, mainly geopolitical, diplomatic or military, but considering the topic chosen, this article will depict only the legal aspects of the conflict in order to project a possible evolution of the conflict from the perspective of international law. Moreover, for a better understanding on applying the international law to the conflict of 2020 and the future situation of the region, the main implications and legal effect of the political and military history of the region should be mentioned.

The region Nagorno-Karabakh has a very complex and, in some cases, confusing situation of a political legacy, dealing with a strong ethnic mixture of migrant population within the region in the past century. The independence of the two states, Armenia and Azerbaijan, after the fall of the Russian Empire created tensional viewpoints regarding historical territories, minorities and ethnical rights etc. With a majority of Armenians, during the Soviet Union the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh was placed under the political leadership of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic as Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).

From a national law perspective, the fall of the Soviet Union could have established new political dynamics, but unfortunately the constitution of the USSR and the Soviet Secession Law were not very clear regarding the possibility that an autonomous region (*oblast*) could invoke the secession. An *oblast* was part of a Union Republic (in this case Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic), and any self-determination without the consent of the Union Republic would have represented a violation of the USSR Constitution. The turmoil of the fall of the USSR left no many options for self-determination for an *oblast*. (Kruger 2014: 241)

Nowadays, most of the territories of the former NKAO are controlled by the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh established after a referendum from 1991, being the main source of the conflicts, as considered by some an internationally recognized Azerbaijan territory, but behaving like an Armenian enclave. The military conflict that began in 1991 ended with Armenia's victory on several aspects, a situation unrecognized or accepted by Azerbaijan. The Minsk Group within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has failed to mediate a peace agreement. In 2011, a *document on basic principles* was prepared, taking *into account a reasonable compromise based on the principles of the*

Helsinki Final Act on the non-use of force, territorial integrity and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The main features of the document, as understood by the OSCE, are the following (OSCE Minks Group):

- the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control;

- an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance;

- a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh;

- future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will;

- the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and

- international security guarantees that would include a peace-keeping operation.

Although some of these criteria tried to identify legal international principles upon which the conflict should end, neither of the parties agreed, leaving occasionally challenges for the security and international arena and a projection of a failed international law. However, what are actually the principles of international law regarding self-determination and which are the main criteria to establish the possibility of secession? There is a different approach when it comes to justify morally the right to secession or how the instruments of international law allow secession or even the recognition for such an event. In the following this paper analyses which of the theories on the moral foundation of secession can be applied to Nagorno-Karabakh and after that, what could be the instruments of international law applicable to this frozen conflict.

Moral justification

Lie in very secessionist situation, an analysis on the moral ground's secessionist claim should be approached. Nagorno-Karabakh is no exception, having a complex dynamic. Being a territory that historically and politically belonged to a state, with an ethnic group that proclaim independence based on a referendum internationally not recognized. This frozen conflict projects the moral claims and legal basis that each party invokes: the right to self-determination vs the right to territorial integrity. In this case how self-determinism is seen could explain how international law can be applied.

Being a debate between liberalism and nationalism, these three stages of independence: self-determination, secessionism and recognition, must answer

three main questions: *who* is entitled to invoke self-determinism? *Where* is entitled to have this claim? And *what* is the purpose and effects of this action? Regarding the first question, based on historical analysis, the two world wars resolute that "the people", entitled to self-determination, were selected on ethnic and post-colonial terms focusing on linguistic and cultural boundaries. That lead to the more confusing aspect regarding territory, because there is no perfect match between homogenous ethnical groups and territories they claim to have. Also, the prerogative for self-determination can destabilize political security and international arena if there are no legitimate foundations on the claim. Some of the theories are emphasizing the conditions and criteria to be taken into consideration.

At first glance, self-determination and secession are similar, probably identical when it comes to effects. There are national events that require or claim at some point international recognition. Self-determination is based on a moral force that people have in order to establish their rights. (Tomuschat 2009: 23) And, as Christian Tomuschat analysed de the concept of self-determination represents "people by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (Declaration *on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*) (United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV). It may seem that the right to secession comes after establishing a right to self-determination. In this sense, secession reaches the concrete form of autonomy, opening the path for sovereignty.

Scholars have classified the right to secession based on three main categories of theories: (1) choice theories; (2) just-cause theories; and (3) national self-determination theories. The first category of theories promotes secessionism based on the ethnical concentration of people on a certain territory, having common features and are entitled to secession. In this sense, the people must organize a plebiscite or a referendum in order to secede. Another important aspect is that the group was not victim of oppression, but in this perspective, all must agree on the cause, and should be an almost match between the people and the territory (Moore 1998: 5)

The second category, the just-cause theories, "argue that the right to secede is only legitimate if it is necessary to remedy an injustice: prior occupation and seizure of territory; some on serious violations of human rights, including genocide; others view discriminatory injustice as sufficient to legitimate secession." The problem with these theories is that they do not take into consideration the main cultural and linguistical links among the group. And finally, the third category of theories, on national self-determination, fails to explain the situation where there isn't a direct

desire by the individual to secede as long there is a state that protects his/her rights. So self-determinism is just a concept for the nations, and it is too large to always reach the individual (Moore 1998: 7).

These different categories of theories establish criteria on how to evaluate claims to secede. The first one is referring to minimal realism in which a proposal for secession should have a progressive moral ground, projecting the idea that it can be eventually adopted. The second kind of criteria is consistency with well-entrenched, morally progressive principles of international law that can be adopted contextually. The third one is absence of perverse incentives in which any proposal should "not encourage behaviour that undermines morally sound principles of international law or of morality". And the fourth is about moral accessibility, in which the proposal or the claim should "not require acceptance of a particular religious ethic or of ethical principles that are not shared by a wide range of secular and religious viewpoints" (Buchanan, 1997: 31).

In a more briefly analysis on the right to secede, Alex Buchanan raises two major ethical questions: What are the conditions for o group to have the moral right to secede and what are the conditions that a group can be recognized? So, the first question claims a more moral approach on the answer, but the last one is seeking legal basis. Thus, in order to answer these questions, Buchanan proposes the analysis of two main theories: Remedial Right Only Theories envisage that the right to secede belongs to that group who suffered many injuries and Primary Right Theories in which no injuries are needed in order to have a general right to secede (Buchanan, 1997: 38). So in the first case there is a necessity of wrongdoings towards a certain group and in the case of the second type of theories, the right to secede exists even when the group benefits from the state they wish to secede.

Few of these theories manage to create links to international law, and "appear unaware of the gap between their arguments concerning the justification and scope of a moral right to secede and the requirements of a sound proposal for reforming international law" (Philpott 1995: 354). Self-determination having a moral foundation became an *erga omnes* norm being considered an international *jus cogens* norm, limiting the right to territorial integrity, but taking into consideration the necessity for the people with clear identity to have the desire to secede. This will to secede needs to have a moral political purpose (Espinosa 2017: 45).

Applying international law

From the perspective of international law several legal points need to be analysed. First of all, the concept of *frozen conflict* attributed mainly to situations that appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union, does not have a clear legal ground in the international law. Frozen conflicts are mainly defined in political or diplomatic terms, or by international relations scholars (Grant: 2017). There

are many definitions given to frozen conflicts but in general, they are to be considered as a static state of war in which the opponents maintain their original claims in *an interim* situation. A frozen conflict still needs to respect all the provisions of international law on every level, but maintains the possibility of outbreak occasionally, like Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, without being bound by legal consequences of a treaty or an accord. A frozen conflict remains in different stages of de-escalation when there is no resolution of the war. Incompatibilities of conflicts between a central government and sub-state actor are determined either by ideological differences or ethnical ties (Coyle 2018:9).

The second legal aspect is regarding self-determination through the instrument referendum as used in 1991 by the majority of Armenian ethnic group from the region. Self-determination is affirmed by the United Nations Charter in article 1(2) and (55) which establishes the possibility of people to pursue freely their cultural, economic and political determination (UN Charter). These rights are emphasized also by the General Assembly in several Resolutions (General Assembly Resolutions 1514, 2625 and 37/43) or other international treaties (International Covenant of political and economic rights). Indeed, these treaties guarantee the possibility of self-determination, but they do not lead immediately to the right to secede. As the International Court of Justice pointed out in Kosovo Advisory opinion "*is not required by the question it has been asked to take a position on whether international law conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence or, a fortiori, on whether international law generally confers an entitlement on entities situated within a State unilaterally to break away from it*" (International Court of Justice, Kosovo Advisory Opinion). This means that international law recognizes the right to self-determination, but that doesn't mean that independence and recognition will be gained. The referendum does not lead immediately to self-determination or secession in the lack of other conditions.

The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) establishes that a state must possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (Montevideo Convention). However, a self-determination process inevitable affects the territorial integrity of another state, and it may be considered an act of aggression as established by the UN Charter in article 73. Azerbaijan may claim that the self-proclamation of independence by the Republic of Artsakh is an act against its territorial integrity. The Republic of Artsakh may claim that the resolution for independence and the referendum for self-determination is prior to the resolution and independence of Azerbaijan from the USSR, having the same legitimacy to seek self-determination and further independence. Yet, the

secession of the USSR is in relation to its member states, or self-determination and independence by *autonomous oblast* do not have the same legitimacy since it was not a signatory member of the USSR. The request for self-determination is against Azerbaijan, and not USSR, so in this situation, Nagorno-Karabakh fail to achieve all the Montevideo conditions.

In this case of self-determination against the principle of territorial integrity, both the parties, Azerbaijan and Armenia, are accusing each other of violating international law regarding war crimes and occupation. In such cases, different international regulations, such as the 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration or the 1975 Helsinki Final Act urge parties to seek a peaceful solution according to UN Charter (Buchanan, 1997: 43). It appears that in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the right to territorial integrity, assumed by the state of Azerbaijan prevails in the light of international law against the right to secession. When it comes to emphasizing the right based on a systematic violation of human rights, scholars are reserved in supporting such a hypothesis because of the lack of evidence of repression by another group. Indeed, there were victims of the war, internally displaced persons but these are the results of mutual battle confrontation and not unilateral strategic domination and tyranny of an ethnic group against another (Popjanevski 2017: 30).

Frozen conflicts, especially those created after the fall of the Soviet Union, have a sensitive side. A good example is Nagorno-Karabakh. Though international law fails to foresee all the situations, it cannot find applicability, where not even moral grounds are not well established. Most scholars recognize that the claim of self-determination based on the referendum and the presence of the Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh does not fulfil all the requirements of international law for self-determination or even secession of this territory.

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The Romanian Revolution of 1989. Disinformation and Manipulation

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Abstract. This article aims to provide a different perspective of interpretation of the events of December 1989, which led to the overthrow of the communist regime in Romania. Known as the "Romanian Revolution", these events continue to remain at the centre of political, sociological, journalistic, legal, and historical debates. Based on the analysis of the existing historiography at this moment, this article highlights the main elements of misinformation and manipulation through the narrative offered by the provisional leadership that tried to dimension these events.

Keywords. Romanian Revolution, disinformation, manipulation, Romanian Television.

Most of those who study the past, know that throughout history, some events have been presented to the public opinion as more or less different from reality. Many events have been used with the intention to mislead, to justify political decisions, wars, to denigrate or promote personalities, countries, or peoples. Depending on interests manifested in different periods, some events were made public taken out of the context or not fully described. On the contrary, facts that did not exist were added to them. Thus, many events were used for disinformation and manipulation. Although disinformation and manipulation are strategies quite common in human history, in the twentieth century they were used much more frequently than before by leaders, institutions, and secret services, at the national and international levels. (Breton 2006: 55)

In the case of Romania, during the communist regime, the media had mainly ideological and propaganda functions and the informative programs were censored so that everything that was to be transmitted to the public would not defame the regime. Television, radio, and newspapers were subordinated to the communist authorities. In that situation, the population, in order to be able to obtain information from sources independent of the communist regime, turned its interest in the television programs of the neighbouring countries (which, however, were more accessible only to the inhabitants near the borders), and from the foreign radio stations, especially Free Europe and Voice of

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America. The programs of these two radio stations had remarkably high ratings and credibility. Then, as in many other parts of the world, there were direct interpersonal accounts of participants or witnesses to various events, but this way of informing was done in a small setting, between people who knew each other. However, by transmitting various information orally, from one person to another, gradually, even if unintentionally, the place of true information was taken by less correct information, characterized by exaggerations or omissions.

In the mid-December 1989, when the first protests against the Ceausescu regime broke out in Timisoara, the country's population heard about what happened on the radio stations Free Europe and Voice of America, as well as on the Yugoslav and Hungarian radio and television, which were important sources of information for the Romanian people until December 22. The country's media did not report anything about the popular demonstrations in Timisoara, nor about the brutal reaction of the authorities. Instead, foreign news agencies were full of information and reports about Romania. (Badea 2014: 119)

However, not all information they provided was always correct. Thus, the disinformation and manipulation existing in Romania in the last two weeks of December 1989 cannot be attributed only to the internal media and internal authorities. Right after the fall of the Ceausescu regime, the new free Romanian media took a huge amount of information from foreign news agencies, without always being able to check it. The best-known example is some fake news and images of the atrocities in Timisoara, which had a wide circulation at that time. Regarding this subject, some authors claim that: a) – Radio Free Europe is the one that misinformed the international public opinion and the Romanian one about the situation in Timisoara; b) – the invocation of common pits, massacre and mutilated bodies in Timisoara, is the symbol of the biggest lies in the entire history of television, etc (Badea 2014: 63)

As the revolt in Timisoara spread over several days, and the access to the city and the telephone connection with the inhabitants were blocked, rumours began to be part of everyday life. Fear and insecurity were established throughout the country after Radio Free Europe announced that a genocide had taken place in Timisoara; that there were tens of thousands of dead, mutilated bodies, common pits, etc. The situation has become even more worrying on December 21, when, at the mass meeting organized in Bucharest by Ceausescu, the participants shouted slogans against the Romanian communist leader and refused to leave the central streets, leading the authorities to start repression against them. Then, the authorities began the bloody repression in Bucharest. (Scurtu 2009: 224-225; Pop 2010: 334-340)

The next day (December 22), demonstrations against Ceausescu started in many towns across the country. In Bucharest, after an unsuccessful attempt to have another public speech, Nicolae Ceausescu was forced to leave. At noon, at 12.55 PM, Romanian Television renamed Free Romanian Television, announced the fall of Nicolae Ceausescu, and until the evening, the new leaders of the country appeared on TV. (Duțu 2006: 191-195) It was the moment when the disinformation and manipulation, already present in the case of Timisoara, increased considerably.

Starting on December 22, the events followed one another quickly in Romania, and the drama in the images and messages on television was unprecedented. For the first time in Romania's history, the citizens followed their revolution live on television and radio. (Ute Gabanyi 1999: 146) The Romanian people received images and messages that have been inoculated in their collective minds for a long time. As at that time social interactions between people were much more frequent than are today, everything that was broadcast on TV, was amplified by the discussions between people. The rumours were easy to believe, and everything broadcast on TV became certainty: *it was shown on TV, the whole country saw it, it couldn't be otherwise.*

The way in which this tele-revolution took place in front of the public was unique. The broadcast studio No.4 of the Romanian Television became the place where the actions of those days seemed to be coordinated. Together with the representatives of the television staff and the new authorities, well-known writers, artists, athletes, etc, addressed to the public. The representatives of the Army were also present. Generals, officers, even young soldiers, on television, requested for both a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the troops from the streets to the military bases, but at the same time, they asked soldiers to respond to the actions of terrorists. On TV, usually from various piece of paper, were read information and messages; the leaders of the new power structures and their first decisions were presented to the population from all over the country, but there was also misinformation. (Ute Gabanyi 1999: 146-147). Also, studio No.4 was symbolically transformed into a court, and those present there became judges, especially of the relatives of the Ceausescu couple, but also of other his collaborators, or of any other person who was considered a suspect.

From the national television station, but also on the radio and in the press, were presented and transmitted false information, which had as negative heroes the Ceausescu family, the Security forces, and the terrorists. A real psychosis was created, to which the media, fully contributed. (Bucur 2008: 159)

For example: a) – it is said that there were tens of thousands of dead; b) – that fierce fighting between the Army and Security forces took place in different parts of the country; c) – that there were horrible tortures and mass murders; d)

– the blood supply from a hospital in Bucharest was destroyed by terrorists; e) – that the citizens of a rural area transmitted that there is a secret airport where the Ceausescu couple was ready to leave the country; f) – buildings of strategic importance were threatened by terrorist attacks; g) – that drinking water from the public distribution system is poisoned in Bucharest and in other important cities in the country, etc. Regarding the last example, at one point there was an episode that today could be considered amusing: an army officer, present on television in the studio no.4, asked the new authorities that the stores be well supplied with mineral water, beer, and wine, so that the population does not have to drink water from the public system of distribution, because it was believed that water was poisoned. (Manipularea din decembrie '89 2021)

In addition to television, what was written in the newspapers appeared after December 22 was also credible for the population. In the first 24 hours after the fall of Ceausescu, most newspapers changed their name. For example, *Scînteia* (daily official newspaper of the Romanian Communist Party), on December 23 was *Scînteia poporului (Scîntenia/Spark of the People),* later rename *Adevărul (The Truth). Scînteia tineretului, (Scînteia/Spark of Youth)* changed its name in *Tineretul Liber (Free Youth); Informatia Bucurestiului (Bucharest information)* became *Libertatea (Liberty),* etc. Many false information and diversions were published in the press. The best known were: a) – articles by which Ceausescu was accused of killing 60.000 people, as a result of the repression he ordered; b) – articles which reported the existence of common pits with a large number of bodies of the revolutionaries killed; c) – that terrorists entered in various hospitals, maternity hospitals and shot innocent people, and even new-borns (ex: the article "Criminals fighting with the babies", in *Tineretul Liber*, December 26 – in articles it is mentioned that the babies were shot in the night of December 23, at the Steaua maternity hospital, district Grivita, Bucharest), etc. (Stoenescu 2006: 25-30; Bucur 2008: 160)

Also, there were many hostile articles about the members of the Ceusescu family, especially about his youngest son, Nicu, etc. Most of the news from the newspapers were also transmitted on TV. There was no question of checking who transmitted one information or another, whether it was true or false.

The messages sent to the public through Romanian Television (1989 Lovitura de stat 2021) and media (in general), aimed to obtain the following results:

1) – awareness of the fact that the main enemy of the Romanian people was the couple Elena and Nicolae Ceaușescu;

2) – exploiting the departure of the Ceaușescu couple from Bucharest, in order to induce in the public opinion feelings of hatred towards the Ceausescu

family, as well as the desire for revenge. Regarding the departure of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu in December 22, in the media (especially on TV) it was said that they left when they had to be judged by the Romanian people,

3)- accusing Security forces as the enemy of the people. Since December 16, until December 22, both foreign radio broadcasts and rumours circulating throughout the country, wrongly indicated that the author of the repression is the Security (Securitatea), although, as later demonstrated, the primary sources of this false information were the news agencies TASS, TANIUG and MTI, which knew that the units involved in the repression in Timișoara, Bucharest and other city, belonged to the Army. (Stoenescu 2006: 26-27)

4) –through television, the Security units and its generals were asked to abandon Ceausescu and other traitors, without specifying exactly who were the others traitors. At the same time, Security was accused of numerous crimes.

5) – the presence and threat of terrorist has always been invoked, but terrorists have never been shown. The expression *terrorist diversion* was used a lot. It is interesting that Security was replaced by terrorists after December 22. Terrorist were described as being more dangerous than security troops. The terrorists were presented as either fanatical Romanians (willing to commit the worst crimes to bring Ceausescu back to power), or Arabs (especially Libyans), who had trained in Romania and were devoted to Nicolae Ceausescu. (Bucur, 2008: 159-160)

6) – the presentation of the chaos created by the fall of the Ceausescu regime, wanting to induce the feeling of panic in the collective mentality.

The main topics on the speech of those who appeared on TV to address the population were:

1) – blaming the former leader and his family. Nicolae Ceausescu was presented as: a) – guilty of horrible crimes against the Romanian people; b) – a man without heart and without soul; c) – a fanatic; d) – a country traitor, etc.

2) – presentation and amplification the conflict between the terrorists, Army, and civilians.

3) – the appeal to the national feelings of the Romanians, and the need to establish and defend democracy and public order.

4) – glorification of the Romanian Army.

In those days, soldiers were considered heroes because, at one point, they sided with the people protesting against Nicolae Ceausescu. *The Army is with us,* was for a few days one of the most popular slogans in the whole country. TV messages of the Army's representatives were considered true, although over time they were also proved fake and manipulators. (*Manipularea din decembrie '89* 2021);In fact, the misleading created confusion and panic among the

soldiers, and there were situations when, following disinformation, the soldiers opened fire on the false targets, with tragic results. For example: b) – the drama at Otopeni (Henri Coanda) airport is known throughout the country, where 37 young soldiers were killed by other soldiers at the airport because were confused with the terrorists; c) – armed attack on some cultural institutions (ex: Central University Library from Bucharest, the National Museum of Art, etc), based on the fake information that there were terrorists in those institutions. After Army's attack, heritage work were destroyed and, of course, there were no terrorists. And the examples could go on.

The language used especially on TV was an important factor in the success of disinformation and manipulation. For example, the most frequent expressions in December 22 were:

1) - Ceausescu's clique pushed us into chaos and disorder.

2) – during this day we will form a national salvation committee to start putting everything in order (those present in the Nr.4 TV studio began to clap).

3) – the citizens of this country live exceptional moments.

4) – we must organize ourselves into a national salvation committee.

5) – to organize ourselves on a democratic basis, etc. (Revoluția română 2021)

Interesting and justifiable at the same time is the fact that in the speeches on television and radio, but also in newspaper articles, there were also addressing formulas specific to the communist regime. The most common expressions were *comrade, dear comrades,* formulas that in December 1989 did not bother too much the large mass of the population. But such expressions have been condemned since January 1990, with the entry into the political life of the old interwar political elites, and the beginning of their conflicts with National Salvation Front and Ion Iliescu.

Looking back, any researcher was able to realize that the images transmitted through the media, primarily through television, formed the picture of the Romanian revolution. A simple picture, but full of drama and emotions, which still exists in the memory of the contemporaries of those events. A picture in which there are two types of images: *revolutionaries* and *enemy.*

Disinformation and manipulation did not stop with the withdrawal of the population and the soldiers from the streets. As it formed, the political opposition, in turn, was author of some opinions about events of December 1989 and which, together with the numerous video recording made those days, were sometimes used by the new political class for needs dictated by various political interests. (Ute Gabanyi 1999: 147) On the other hand, due to the role played by

television, radio, and press in December 1989, and especially the audience and credibility of the media recorded then, in the 1990 presidential and parliamentary elections, Ion Iliescu and National Salvation Front were able to benefit from the popularity of the *tele-revolution* of December 1989, which almost 100% of the country's population watched on TV, listened on the radio or read in the newspapers. (Ute Gabanyi 1999: 144)

And perhaps not coincidentally, in 1990, but not only, the phrase most often used against those who took power in December 1989 was *you lied to the people with the television.*

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