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Global and European Politics
Context, strategies and negotiation methods in the European Union Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe

Mihai ALEXANDRESCU, PhD

Abstract

After almost a decade since the enlargement of the European Union to Central and Eastern Europe, history can be read with the clarity that time offers. The context, strategies and negotiation methods of 1997-2004 can be analysed more carefully now, because the consequences of those negotiations are felt even today. Covering under the mask of enlargement, we notice the fear of the westerners towards the new Member States which brought in a different history and risked disturbing a system that has been painfully set up since the 1950s. But at the same time, we notice the desire for moral revenge of the candidate countries towards the old EU members. In this study, I analyse the merit of Günter Verheugen, the technocrat who found the right language and strategy to reconcile these two perspectives and who adapted to the present interests of the two parties.

Keywords: enlargement, European Union, Günter Verheugen, negotiations, Central and Eastern Europe

The preliminaries of some complicated negotiations

The battle of interests among the major actors of the international system at the end of the Second World War generated an essential transformation of the map of the Old Continent. States were being split into two major ideological groups: the old democracies and the “people’s” democracies. Beyond the semantics of these concepts, there was an arbitrary division which did not respect the generous Wilsonian principles of democracy in the international system or the elementary principles of international law. As from 1945, Central and Eastern Europe realized that the centre of its interests had shifted to the East. From now on, it would belong to a different world. W. Churchill’s speech in spring 1946 drew the final conclusions of the war, without leaving a crumb of hope to the former leaders of the newly converted communist states.

In the meantime, time was playing against the countries of Western Europe who were
searching for resources to recover from the war and to regain the path to democracy. They had learned from the serious errors of the interwar period. Solidarity and welfare were beginning to be considered as common goals by the states that were once champions of discord and warfare. Step by step, the project of European unity took shape more pragmatically and more realistically than ever before.

Almost four decades later, the world seemed to be recovering. The communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe were brought down and the slogan of the newborn democracies was: “Back to Europe!” Similar to some abandoned brothers, these countries pretended to regain their seats at the same table of history from where they had been cast away. But the world was different now. Europe was functioning according to new and well tested rules. These were created so that past mistakes could not be repeated and that European unity would not be undermined from within once again.

Before the new century, Europe was beginning the end journey of a long transition period. It was a transition from one continent divided by two contrary ideologies to unification around a common project. It might be argued that Europe was never united over the past centuries. It is true. But the iron curtain that Churchill lamented about in 1946, separated the common history of the nations of this continent; a history that Central and Eastern European nations wanted to catch up after the fall of communism.

Forty years of communism left many countries in a transitional period from command to free market economies. In order to prepare these countries for future EU membership, the European Union developed some aid schemes and imposed some conditionality frameworks. The reason of these measures was to make economic transformations possible, to enclose the democratic gains, to reduce the scenarios of national conflicts and cross-border security threats, and to further support the strengthening of democracy in the region. (Grzegorz, 2008: 1-28).

Beyond the geopolitical reasons of this enlargement, what we are pursuing in this article is to identify mechanisms for dialogue and the behaviour of two important actors: the European Commission and the candidate State.

### New members, new rules

The European Union enlargement to the East began in 1990, when the European Commission proposed that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), jointly with Malta and Cyprus, sign the so-called Europe Agreements, which represented a special kind of association agreements. The goal was to establish a closer cooperation and a free trade area between the European Union and these countries, but also to prepare the
ground for their full EU membership. However, the main element of the pre-accession strategy is the Accession Partnership. This document establishes the priorities and objectives to be pursued by the candidate country before accession.

After approving the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the European Union, the applications that the European Council considered were those of Cyprus and Malta. The Central and Eastern Europe countries were not on the earliest European Council agenda. In this logic should be read the recommendations from Copenhagen (June 1993), some of which then become true “criteria” or more correctly “conditionalities” to start the accession negotiations. In June 1993, the Heads of State and Government of the EU recognized for the first time the opportunity of a European Union enlarged to the East and “welcomed the courageous efforts undertaken by the associated countries to modernize their economies, which have been weakened by 40 years of central planning, and to ensure a rapid transition to a market economy. The Community and its Member States pledge[d] their support to this reform process. Peace and security in Europe depend[ed] on the success of those efforts.” (Copenhagen 1993). In the same time, the leaders of the EU stated that the “membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”

A pre-accession strategy set out in the European Council in Essen (1994) when the Heads of State and Government decided to constitute a single group of countries signatories of a Europe agreement with the European Community. As observed by H. Grabbe, this pre-accession strategy required detailed legislative action that the CEE states had to adopt, but in a limited number of policy fields. It started the making process of the accession conditions with regard to specific requirements, but only in a selective manner, putting first only a part of the acquis communautaire. The content of the Essen strategy took into account especially the liberalization of foreign economic relations and the creation of a framework for the free movement of industrial goods, services and, to some extent, capital. Nevertheless, it left out the fourth factor of production, labour, and also agricultural policy, the remaining acquis governing the single market was given less attention and the calendar for a decision in this regard was left vague, introducing the principle of gradual adoption of EU norms. (Grabbe, 1999: 11).

Applications for membership of the EC were formally presented by the associated states beginning with 1991. Romania presented its application in 1995, along with the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Bulgaria.

In that year, the Cannes European Council admitted the importance of preparing the EU for a new enlargement. For this reason, the EU needed to adopt “any other measure deemed necessary to facilitate the work of the institutions and guarantee their effective
operation with a view to enlargement.” (Cannes, 1995). In other words, it was time for the EU to start its own preparation for new members and to consider “the lessons which [could] be learnt more than a year and a half after the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union. (Cannes, 1995).

The simple statement of intention to apply for EU membership was not a sufficient condition for starting accession negotiations. The fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria was completed by a new conditionality inserted by the Madrid European Council: “the adjustment of their administrative structures”. (Madrid, 1995).

Due to major differences between the candidate countries, initially, the EU enlargement was seen achievable in two waves: (a) 2003–2006 included Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia; and (b) 2005–2010 for Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and the Slovak Republic.

Finally, the enlargement process was opened at the Luxembourg European Council (12-13 December 1997), and in March 1998 the accession negotiations began with Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

### Enlargement premises

After the previous failure to join NATO (Madrid Summit, 1997), Romania and other states from Central and Eastern Europe received in the same year from the European Union the same promise that “the door was left open” and that the remaining states had to demonstrate substantial progress in the process of harmonizing their political, economic and legal systems with the EU standards.

The context of the decision of December 1999 to start the accession negotiations with the second wave of the fifth enlargement of the EU was created by the crisis in the Balkans. German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, said at the Bundestag that this decision had been taken as an acknowledgment of the important role played by some states in the stability of the Balkans.

“Just like the Commission, the German government did not come to an essentially more favourable assessment of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s progress in adapting to the acquis. However, the government wanted to repay the two countries’ loyalty throughout the NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia and the Kosovo crisis. Moreover, the step towards negotiations – whenever they may be concluded – signals the Union’s concern for stability and that Romania and Bulgaria belong to the Europe of integration.” (Institut für Europäische Politik, 1999: 29).
On these grounds, the recommendation of the European Commission, from the 13th of October 1999, became clearer. The European Executive noted among other things that “the negotiations with the candidate countries should follow a differentiated approach, allowing each candidate to progress through the negotiations as quickly as is warranted by its own efforts to prepare accession. This means that, instead of opening an equal number of chapters (total is 31) for all candidates the EU would decide to start negotiat-ing on a particular chapter after an assessment of the progress made by the candidate in the relevant field in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria. One of the advantages of this new procedure will be that each country will be able to proceed on merit, including the possibility for those who join the negotiations from 2000 to catch up with the others.” (European Commission Delegation, Washington, 1999).

This working method of “catching up” proposed by Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, opened the possibility to a particular negotiations map, and the chance to a rapid evolution in the negotiation process, taking into account that “progress in negotiations must go hand in hand with progress in incorporating the acquis into legislation and actually implementing and enforcing it” (Helsinki, 1999).

Regarding Member States’ positions on the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in the second wave of this enlargement, we notice the Dutch observations arguing that “partial membership should never become a permanent alternative for real accession. It should only be a last solution in order to prevent a division in Europe or to keep the enlargement process going. Transitional periods for candidates in certain policy fields might be necessary, but should be as short and exceptional as possible and should never be introduced in the field of the internal market.” (Institut für Europäische Politik, 1999: 31). This was the most explicit position of a Member State, which announced difficulty of the negotiation process for some states of the second wave.

**European and National Frameworks of Accession Negotiations**

Regarding the form taken by the new institutional structure to conduct negotiations on behalf of the EU, we retain the guidelines made by Neil Kinnock, commissioner responsible for reform. (Europolitics 1999). The Enlargement DG had a Director-General, four Directors “(one responsible for pre-accession coordination and three responsible for negotiating teams)”, and 15 Units. It is subsumed the Task Force on Accession Negotiations, the Directorate for Central and Eastern Europe in DG IA, and a “strengthened” TAIX (the Technical Assistance Information Exchange – which channels the practical assistance to candidate countries). The territory covered by the new DG included the
ten candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. The European Commission was still planning to publish its regular reports on the candidates in mid-October 1999.

Finally, the new Romano Prodi Commission modified the institutional structure. A new “Directorate General Enlargement” was set up to deal with the overall enlargement process. The former Commission services “Task Force Enlargement” and DG I A thus became part of DG Enlargement. The head of the new DG Enlargement was Eneko Landaburu, former Director-General of DG Regional Policy. The accession negotiations were led at several levels: ministers, officials and informal meetings. In this scheme, DG Enlargement should work as mediator between the parties involved. The Directorate General came under the coordination of a Commissioner, whose portfolio included the enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy. The new Commissioner appointed was Günter Verheugen, former German deputy foreign minister.

In 1999, one question posed by Institut für Europäische Politik to officials from Member State governments was: “How does your government assess the incoming Commissioner for enlargement G. Verheugen and the new administrative arrangements inside the Commission in the light of the enlargement and the negotiation process?” Many of those asked have described Commissioner G. Verheugen in a favourable light: “has taken a pro-active high-profile approach to enlargement and the negotiation process” (Finland), “more appreciated by French leaders” (France), “a concentration of competencies and management capacity” (Germany), “an able person” (Spain), “a very experienced and strong person who is backed up by a big Member State. […] is a master of the details and has a strategic view” (Sweden). (Institut für Europäische Politik, 1999: 18-23).

Internally, each candidate country established its own institutional structure designed to prepare the accession negotiations. Most candidate countries and their negotiating teams were under the prime minister’s authority or any other institutions created for this purpose and which belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In some applicant states, the chief negotiator for European Affairs is the vice-prime minister, while in other states it is the vice foreign minister. The candidate states chose between one of these variants. Thus, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Hungary have created bodies subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia the negotiating teams were subordinated directly to the Prime Minister. (Brussis, 2000, p. 12-13). Romania’s case is different from any other candidate country. Within the Romanian government there were a Ministry of European Integration and a National Delegation attached to it. The accession negotiations were led by a deputy minister, chief negotiator with the EU.

The institutional system for preparation of negotiations within each candidate state...
reflects certain features that are specific for the national or political environment or are necessary to ensure better preparedness to fulfil the accession criteria. The closest examples we can provide are those of Bulgaria and Romania, two countries remaining in the second wave of EU enlargement.

Bulgaria's Negotiating Delegation was under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its work was supervised by the Council for European Integration, body acting under the Prime Minister’s coordination. Romania created a Ministry of European Integration, which had a subordinated Negotiation Delegation, headed by a deputy minister, chief negotiator. Following a change in the government structure, in March 2004, the government was divided into three main sections, each of them being subordinated to a Minister of State with the rank of the Deputy Prime Minister. Thus, the Ministry of European Integration, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice are subordinated each to one of the three deputy prime ministers. The modification of the government structure led to a closer collaboration between the ministries responsible for the remaining negotiation chapters in question.

A notable fact also was the bureaucracy that characterized these institutional structures. For example, the staff of the Government Office for European Integration of Slovenia had about 90 people, while State Secretary for European Integration of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs comprised about 100 people. It was driven by the need to prepare the state's legislative and institutional EU accession.

In preparing the EU accession negotiations, each state had to set up advisory committees made up of politicians, ministers, academics, civil society representatives and employers’ representatives. All this shows the importance attached by officials to the negotiating process.

Enlargement logic in the view of the new commissioner

In 1999, Günter Verheugen had some interventions on the future of EU enlargement. For the beginning, I chose here to analyze two speeches of that year. The first is from the period when he was Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office and the second was held two months after his investment as Commissioner for Enlargement.

In the beginning of 1999, Günter Verheugen, Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office, published an article in which he analyzed the German agenda during the European Council Presidency. According to him, 1999 was not a historic year due to the introduction of the euro, but because of the European Parliament elections at the turn of the century in view of which the main goals were: peace in the outside world, and sta-
bility, security and economic prosperity within, combined with high employment levels. Which were the expectations of European citizens, after the failure of Jacques Santer Commission because of corruption allegations, but also in face of the growing challenges of globalization and global interdependencies?

Günter Verheugen listed some of them:

• “They want a European Union which takes the fight against unemployment seriously.
• They want a European Union which can hold its own in global competition.
• They want an effective and capable European Union which sets about the necessary internal political and institutional reform.
• And they want a European Union which guarantees peace in the whole of Europe and which shows unity and determination in foreign policy matters.” (Verheugen, 1999: 4).

Starting from these expectations, the future commissioner proposed some solutions, such as:

• a European Employment Pact:
  — the extension of the Trans-European Networks and projects to promote growth in the telecommunications and information technology sectors.
• the internal strengthening and development of the EU, focusing on Agenda 2000:
  — adoption of Agenda 2000;
  — implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
• enhance and further develop the European Union’s international profile:
  — the need of a strategic vision for the enlargement process, but also a sense of realism (“ability to enlarge and ability to accede must go hand in hand.”);
  — EU-Russia cooperation;

During this discourse, we can identify the elements of a pragmatic approach that comes from a specific analysis made by a state actor capable of determining the general behaviour of other state actors and, finally, of the organization itself. In the spring of 1999, Günter Verheugen expressed himself on behalf of the German state. The same individual actor will change his discourse while performing a function that represented exclusively the European Union. At the same time, we see now a change of content in his discourse, but also a change of perspective in its implementation.

In his speech at the conference “The Second Decade towards a New and Integrated Europe” in The Hague (4th of November 1999), Verheugen spoke as Commissioner for Enlargement, and the topic of his discourse was “Enlargement: Speed and Quality”. One month before the European Council in Helsinki, the Commissioner for Enlargement
said: “the Commission proposes that negotiations should now be opened with all other candidate countries that meet the political criteria”. (Verheugen, 4th of November 1999). In this respect, the new Commissioner proposed a change of method:

“Opening negotiations with six candidate countries that still differ in their state of preparations demands that the negotiating process be clearly differentiated from the very outset. This clear differentiation is central to what the Commission is proposing. [...] negotiations on a particular area should be opened on a country-by-country basis, taking account of each country’s state of preparation. Negotiations should proceed on the basis of merit, not on the basis of compassion. That is why the monitoring of the preparations by the candidates will be intensified.” (Verheugen, 4th of November 1999)

It could be observed a new method concerning the dialogue between the Commission and the applicant countries. If beforehand all candidate states began the negotiations for the same chapters simultaneously, in the autumn of 1999, the Commissioner for Enlargement proposed a negotiation “on a country-by-country basis”, allowing each applicant to choose its own speed for preparation.

- Arguments, methods and techniques in G. Verheugen’s negotiation strategy

Verheugen’s mandate in charge of Enlargement could be shaped into six phases, some of them with an interchangeable relation: (a) Promoting the new method of negotiation (1999-2000); (b) Preparing the European Environment (2000-2002); (c) Full negotiations (2001-2002) – with all 12 candidate countries; (d) Follow-up negotiations (2003-2004) – with Bulgaria and Romania; (e) Consolidation of results of negotiation (2003-1st half of 2004) – in the 10 newcomers; (f) Finalizing the accession negotiations (2004).

Enlargement had to be justified before the European public. The European Union citizens were confronted with a large-scale process which offered to Eurosceptics a wide expression against this approach. The European Union proposed to enter into a global competition, and this meant strengthening its own position.

Commissioner Verheugen’s arguments brought this approach on political-economic, and moral-historical levels. In his speech from October 2000, Verheugen spoke to the European citizens about the enlargement as a guarantee for the peace between the peoples of Europe, which could provide stability and new opportunities. Faced with the fear of the “new”, the Commissioner assured that “Enlargement is not a shot in the dark. It is being prepared as thoroughly as possible.” (Verheugen, 3rd of October 2000). In the
same speech in Parliament, he emphasized the historical and moral value of this process towards the new democracies of Central, Eastern and South Europe. Hence the belief that “without the prospect of European integration, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could not have managed the process of transformation so rapidly or so successfully” (Verheugen, 3rd of October 2000). This speech was criticized by Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro, in an article that compares enlargement with a new form of colonialism. For this author “[t]his administrative and institutional transposition is reinforced by capital flows. Settler colonialism is much less brutal than Enlightenment in «safe» Eastern Europe countries (as occurred in Spain, Italy, and Greece earlier) and the migration of EU capital to exploit cheaper labour-power and purchase property in Eastern Europe.” (Engel-Di Mauro, 2001). This critique was a characteristic feature of the first decade of this millennium, when an increasing number of authors expressed anti-globalist views.

However, the Commissioner’s optimism remained high. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, arguments became increasingly more pragmatic: “Enlargement is the instrument for preventing political and economic conflicts and tensions before they arise. It is the instrument for ensuring that differences are resolved without violence and by means of consensus. It will therefore serve to make Europe a safer place for its citizens than ever before.” (Verheugen, 27th of November 2001).

On the other side, Verheugen brought into discussion - increasingly often - the two dimensions of the European enlargement process. This is a process that involves two aspects: deepening and widening. The context of this analysis was created by the adoption of the Treaty of Nice, which came to prepare the EU for the integration of 12 new Member States. The complexity of this process and the mosaic of interests of the actors involved prove nothing more but the fact that “living in Europe means to live with compromises.” In fact, as the Commissioner remarked, the European Union enlargement and deepening are processes that must take place at the same time in order to avoid imbalances. (Verheugen, 11th of April 2002).

The innovation of Günter Verheugen in 1999 was the change of the method of negotiation. In April 2000, the new Commissioner laid down the three principles of the negotiations:

- The first of these principles was: each country will be judged according to the actual progress it has made. No country must wait for another;
- The second principle is: each country has its own separate negotiating process in accordance with its needs and abilities;
- The third principle is: the countries which have only been negotiating since the beginning of 2001 should have a fair chance of catching the others up.
“There are no political rebates on accession, so I am against forming any groups of applicant countries for political reasons or devising any purely political accession scenarios. The pace of the negotiations the Commission deems necessary will not impair their quality or the actual membership preparations. So at the moment there is no need to discuss dates. We should stick to the principles which have proved their worth.”

(Verheugen, 2nd of April 2000).

The principle of evaluating the individual performance of each candidate country in the preparedness for accession was triggered by the earlier experience with the countries from the first wave. They were simultaneously engaged in the same negotiation and the chapters were simultaneously closed with all states. This negotiation style, specific to the multilateral GATT rounds, would give little chances for the new applicant states to catch up the frontrunners and to close negotiations simultaneously.

Verheugen often tried to explain this method of negotiation. “Catch up” is an approach that offers an equal framework to candidate countries for progress. The distinction between “Luxembourg Group” and “Helsinki Group” is purely technical, without any geographical or political connotation. Membership is conditioned by the full satisfaction of the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria. The method of “catch up” strengthens the principle that chapters are opened and closed according to the degree of preparedness and actual progress of the negotiation. Verheugen said: “we cannot help them catch up by slowing negotiations with the frontrunners. We can help them, but not by leaving their neighbours in the waiting room.” (Verheugen, 3rd of October 2000).

Arguments have been developed by the Commissioner for Enlargement also in the implementation of the new Reform Treaty of Nice. In mid-January 2001, the European leader considered the “catch up” method as a tool to stimulate the states of the second wave to accelerate domestic reforms and preparation for accession negotiations. (Verheugen, 10th of March 2004).

During the entire preparations for EU accession, Günter Verheugen was Enlargement Professor and Advocate. Professor as a European bureaucrat who has proven professionalism, competence, tenacity, and openness to dialogue with the candidate countries. Advocate as a dialogue partner with the candidate countries. For five years, Verheugen always found relevant arguments to support his own optimism toward increasing the preparation capacity of candidate countries. The European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council recognized Verheugen’s competence, so that his arguments were in the end resonant among European decision makers.

The negotiations had a different dynamic from country to country, but the stipulation of the accession conditions and negotiation principles determined the creation of a clear
framework for dialogue, and the candidate countries could evaluate their progress. If in April 2000, the Commissioner Verheugen stated that it was not yet time to discuss the accession dates, as the negotiations progressed the date became increasingly certain for most candidates. A year later, Verheugen said that the year 2002 had become a realistic goal for the completion of negotiations “with those countries that have met all the conditions by that date, thus enabling them, as first announced in Nice, to take part in the European elections of 2004.” (Verheugen, 3rd of June 2001). In June 2001 the commissioner could not say whether the states will have completed the negotiations by 2002, but he was certain along with the other European leaders that for Bulgaria and Romania a later date for the conclusion of negotiations was more realistic.

The complexity of the negotiating framework involves the participation of many decision makers: the Commission, the European Parliament, Member States, public opinion, the candidate state. In such a puzzle of interests, the pieces were hard to match, the difficulty coming also from the quality of communication. For example, in the case of Romania, the rapporteur of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament tried to influence the MEPs decision by always criticizing and giving severe evaluations of the progress achieved by the candidate state in meeting the requirements for membership. In fact, this was the game arena of political interests. In his speech before the EP in Strasbourg on 12th of June 2002, Commissioner Verheugen explained to the MEPs the importance of the signal that they should send to Bulgaria and Romania in the context in which they remained the only members of the group of 12 who were not able to complete the negotiations in late 2002: “Both countries therefore need to receive a clear signal that enlargement train has not left Copenhagen without then. The signals are still at green.” (Verheugen, 12th of June 2002). His quality of negotiation strategist came to light again when he assumed certain proposals for improving and enhancing a pre-negotiation strategy for the two countries and providing additional assistance. In a subsequent intervention before the European Parliament, the Commissioner took into account that Romania and Bulgaria [had] set 2007 as their indicative date for their accession: “The Commission will strongly support the two countries in achieving this objective. In the meantime, we propose a gradual but substantial increase in pre-accession assistance for those countries.” (Verheugen, 9th of October 2002).

However, the completion of the negotiations did not mean for the European Commission the completion of the preparations for membership. First, it was necessary to ratify the Treaty of Nice. Verheugen’s appeal was addressing Irish voters because the future of the new EU Member States depended on their vote. On the other hand, there remained to be solved the “financial package” and “the institutional questions”, especially those
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Concerning representation in the EP. Finally, the preparation assumed that the candidates had to honour the commitments that made to the EU during the negotiations.

A comprehensive analysis of the state of preparedness of the two countries' accession was made in the debate on the Monitoring Reports and Regular Reports at the EP plenary session on 10th of March 2004. It was reaffirmed the principle that “each country is judged on its own performance.” In this respect, both Bulgaria and Romania had to bring their administrative and legal systems up to the EU standards.

Final remarks

We can observe in all public speeches made by Günter Verheugen that he used an optimistic and realistic approach within a framework which became more political. The Commissioner presented always the advantages of enlargement for all the parts involved. It is his genius to feel the sense of the European future.

The arguments of Verheugen for a wider enlargement were historical, geographical, social and political. Had Europe prepared for this process? Absolutely: NO! The desire of the central-eastern European countries to come back in Europe was an idealistic approach. Europe was substantially changed between 1946 and 1991. Economically, the 15 countries were implied in a different logic of development and in a different working system. Psychologically, the old member states were not prepared to open their labour markets to the newcomers. The four freedoms were designed for the old states rather than to these newcomers. The enlargement negotiations were like a puzzle of national interests. The main approach was an intergovernmental one.

During this game, the main player was the European Commission, which has managed to become the vehicle for this extensive process.

In his approach as European Commissioner for Enlargement for a five-year term, Günter Verheugen has helped countries in Central and Eastern Europe to complete their transfer from the status of communist states to the real qualities of democratic countries with market economies. Beyond the criticisms that were made during his mandate, Verheugen continued Helmut Kohl’s, François Mitterrand’s and Jacques Delors’ reunification of Europe by repairing an “accident” of history from the middle of last century, which led W. Churchill, yet too late, to remain surprised in front of an iron curtain which divided the continent. Verheugen realized the historical value of his mandate, and a careful analysis of all his speeches and activities of 1999-2004 reflects the ability to become a man of his time.

Once these issues have been defined and assumed by both sides, negotiations were
held in their technical dimension. The remaining issues will be identified, selected and
examined when the diplomatic archives will be available to historians.

The geopolitical interests of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe are pretty
clear judging from the point of view of the crises experienced by the continent at the end
of the 1990s. The new EU Member States can interpret this enlargement as compensation
for laying off the course of history on a napkin near a cup of coffee and a cigar.

At the same time, the perspective of joining the European Community determined
the candidate states from Central and Eastern Europe to assume their role as members of
the European space and to bridge some of the gap that separated them from the former
victorious states of the Second World War. The road is still in its beginning and the pro-
cess involves a degree of transformation in the internal organization of the new Member
States which calls for the full participation of the future generations as long as the Euro-
pean Union will last.

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Social Policy Legitimacy and Active Citizenship. The social Model of the European Union: national and supranational aspects

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Abstract

In recent years we have been witnessing a growing interest in social policy at the supranational level and in the process of creating a “European Social Model”. This paper analyses the dilemma between supranational wishes for a European social policy and nation state willingness to transfer national capacities. National social protection has been exposed to regime competition between European Union Member States with different levels of incomes, taxes, wages and social security contributions and a supranational response need to find viable solutions in this direction. But every social policy finds its legitimacy in citizen’s attitude towards the social interventions.

Key words: European Union, supranationalism, social policy, active citizenship

Introduction

Social policy is at the crossroads of the different dimensions of reality: political, economic, institutional and of values. In other words, the model is a clear embodiment of the interdisciplinary academic practice which had become a vital condition in the past decades. Current professional literature devoted to social policy was marked by a series of specific debates such as the role of the state in individual and collective welfare, social policy legitimacy, their sources of legitimacy and, more recently, the national and supranational social policy, and whether or not we can speak about a social model of the European Union (EU).

This approach aims to analyse the changes that occur at national and European levels in order to address social policy in the context of profound social change: migration, discrimination, social exclusion. The social dimension of the EU lies in the social harmonization (this concept was gradually replaced by other concepts such as cohesion, convergence, cooperation etc.) of the integral parts of social policy, such as: security, aid...
and universal transfers, improving working conditions, equal opportunities for men and women, the implementation of freedom of movement, promoting education and training etc. Also, this study aims to investigate a series of theoretical dimensions which define social policy at macro level and is based on a series of interrogations: What role does or should the state have in ensuring individual and collective wellbeing? How does globalization affect social policies? What is the role of active citizenship in the EU social model?

The vastness of the phenomena involved in social policy is that much of the specialised literature focuses mainly on the social policy sector and not on social policy in general. Since the purpose of this paper is to determine the national and European dimensions of social systems, we will be referring to the general concept of social policies/politics. The concept of social policy legitimacy is relatively new among the scientific approaches in the social sciences, often started from the premise that social policy must exist in order to ensure social and collective welfare. This was widely accepted as a final goal and social policy was represented at the public opinion level as a precondition for the existence of the state.

The literature on EU social policy is generally a fragmented one, starting with the focus and conclusions only on a particular theme, but emphasizing mostly on the field and the theoretical approach it belongs to (Leibfried, 1993; Pierson, 1996). These writings can be grouped into three areas: The first one suggests that there is at least one social dimension in the EU and that the social policy is discontinuous and limited. These assumptions are based primarily on a series of harsh judgments in relation to EU’s failure in achieving systemic changes in national social policies and the convergence towards a supranational social policy model. A second such perspective is the starting point of a lack of institutional coherence in EU social policy. It is either missing a clear social policy institution or it gets the recognition only in particular sectors (e.g. worker’s protection, workplace health and safety, equal opportunities for women). A third direction consists of the sociological literature which argues that we should look beyond what specifically social policy is, paying particular attention to issues such as social identity, institutions and social relations in the Member States and the social sphere that transcends national borders. But each time it came to the conclusion that the EU social model is different, if not unique. There is a clear distinction between national and supranational social policy: social policy is almost absent in some areas recognized as being the preservation of national policy, such as social protection and the redistribution of incomes.
National, supranational and active citizenship in social policy

Social policy confronts itself today with a series of challenges older or newer, but which produce a series of negative effects: demographic aging, the high rate of unemployment amongst youth, the rise of costs in the medical domain, the defrauding attempts of the benefits system etc. At a supra-national level, the EU comes to meet those needs, supporting states in their recovery measures. Some states have tightened the conditions of giving social benefits, for some services more and more the private system is called upon and from time to time new forms of requalification and professional reconversion are introduced. A new concept has been initiated to mark the fact that the relationship between the state and citizen is starting to change – active citizenship. This term signifies a high degree of implication of the citizen in the measures regarding individual and collective welfare. The citizen is no longer in an expectative state regarding social services, but is actively involving in taking the decisions that concern him.

The welfare states which have reached maturity are permanently receptive to social needs and modify strategy in front of social risks not by reducing expenses, but by means of an efficient and adequate administration of funds and by restructuring some of these funds through public-private partnerships. One of the differentiating criteria of welfare states is the support of the citizens for social policies, expressed through their attitudes and values. It is an essential legitimization criterion of social policies.

Given these particular debates among national and supranational regulations in social policy, sometimes kept in academic fields or in European bureaucracy, we can ask ourselves what about the European citizens? How do they legitimate these policies? From the point of view of citizen perceptions of public policies, many of these depend on potential individual risks. In short, the advocates of these policies are either the direct beneficiaries of some social programs, or either the individual perceives a future major risk where there is the possibility of needing social services (Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003). On the other side, there are the adepts of the rational choice theory who state that man is preoccupied with personal gain. But from a socio-logical perspective, the individual can have a series of options which don't necessarily raise personal gains, but have as basis the social dimension of inter-human relationships. When an individual is better positioned on the social scale, his adhesion to social policy advocacy diminishes exponentially, preferring that the state be less or not at all involved in redistributing social services (Gelissen, 2000; Kangas, 1997). In other words, the position of contributor or beneficiary determines a positive or negative attitude regarding social policies.

Positive reference is in its turn divided, taking into consideration the risks and is likely
combined with the personal interest thesis. The first risk that enjoys the highest trust rate is aging, also being one with a high rate of probability (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003). It is followed by childhood risks and the risks of the persons with disabilities which have the compassion of their co-citizens. On the other side of the barricade there are the risks associated with immigrants and unemployed persons that are considered to be either defrauding the system or not encouraging activity on the job market (Van Oorschot, 2006).

Another criterion of reference for the citizen concerning the national or European social policy is the ideological orientation and the way in which the individual perceives his relationship with the state and other institutions. The theory of economic individualism states that you will live well only if you work and if you are not sustained by social transfers. But those who accept the redistributive role of the state are those who start from the premise that it is the only actor who can support equality and social solidarity. Overcoming the stage of extreme positions and accepting the fact that the motivations of people carry a complexity of factors, in the cases of an economically aggravated context and difficult conditions, the capacity of the individuals to accept high fiscal and redistributive policies is very low. But in circumstances in which the individuals benefit from constant and high levels of welfare, their openness towards the generosity of the social systems is high (Mareș, 2005). Here a nuanced representation is necessary. The economic criterion is not decisive in formulating these personal options, since it is in most cases correlated to sectorial policies (unemployment, education, pension system etc.), to their institutional implementation, to their efficiency. The motivation is not just an altruistic or egocentric one, but it is often generated by unpleasant experiences with the institutions that are meant to implement sectorial policies, e.g. moments in which the respective individual needed social support facing an imminent risk and never had any help despite his/her social contributions or the state’s inefficiency in administrating funds (Rothstein, 2002).

The Comparative Political Studies magazine published in 2005 the article „Social Protection around the World: External Insecurity, State Capacity and Domestic Political Cleavages” (Mareș, 2005) in which social policy was connected to economic insecurity. If within a state a group that is marked by a series of high risks comes to power, it has the tendency of extending social risks. But if those in power are enjoying a high degree of economic security, social policies are minimal. In other words, a highly distributive welfare state may be valid in the case of developed states. The analysis of the way in which social policies are implemented at European level and their legitimation may constitute the elements of future research. A current debate in the domain of social policies is the crisis of legitimacy of the welfare state. A series of causes weaken the support of the citizen for these extended social services: higher taxes without having an equal correspondent in the received benefits, decrease in the share of workers, the spread of an individualis-
tic conception stating that the individual searches to satisfy his needs etc. On the other hand, the legitimacy of welfare institutions is dependent on and directly proportional to well-structured social policies that are well organized and have public support.

Social policy and welfare state

In many cases the concepts of social policy and welfare state are considered to be equivalent, but often this can be considered a forced equivalence, as will be noted throughout this endeavour†. Social policies are based on two key arguments. One of them points to the social risks theory according to which based on a social contract the state intervenes to meet the needs and to prevent the uncertainty of existence, and the second one is based on social solidarity and social development as the central factor of the welfare state‡. Social policy as a factor in social development is a relatively recent perspective which has appeared especially in the current interdependence and globalization context (Deacon, 1999).

With the advent of the “crisis of the welfare state” in the 1970s a number of arguments against social policies were issued in order to unravel the myth of the concealed support that the state had a duty to provide. The first counterargument appeared amid a dependency of the social system that no longer encourages active participation in the labour market and the second one referred to the social costs which have not increased proportionally with the increase of the available resources (e.g. economic growth). The criticism of social policy continued, the social contract theory itself has been questioned given that the risks which were the basis of this policy have undergone major changes, some have disappeared or got reduced, others have arisen recently. In particular, increased European mobility and the opening of borders sparked major population movements and required the revision of national social policies.

There is now a tendency to find common ground on social policy in all EU countries. A number of international organizations are trying to identify a common European and international language on this issue. In 1975 was created the European Institute of Education and Social Policy based on the initiative of the European Cultural Foundation, in 1991 in the UK was issued for the first time the Journal of European Social Policy, and was

† The premise here is that the welfare state implies the state’s responsibility to ensure a basic level of welfare/well-being of its citizens: healthcare, education, living conditions, social services. The concepts of welfare and social policies are extended to include all the actors involved in ensuring the well-being of citizens such as: the state, family and community, as well as NGOs and international/transnational stakeholders. (Gough, 2004; Briggs, 2006).

‡ Esping-Andersen brings to the discussion the social pressure factor according to which the social policies have as a basis the pressure to ensure well-being based on popular values. (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 34; Taylor-Gooby, 2004).
set up the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) which has been working since 1928 with representatives from over 90 countries and which in 2012 launched a global agenda on Social Work and Social Development. In the social area, as opposed to the economic one, was promoted and emphasized the complementary role of the EU and the accountability of the Member States, hence the subsidiarity principle found an increasingly wider application in this area. Therefore, it is important to determine to what extent the EU’s social dimension is configured, on the one hand, as an effect of the application of the treaties and other documents and programs at EU level and, on the other hand, as a result of the efforts and actions in every Member State. (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2010)

One of the most important moments in the evolution of the EU social model was in 2000, when there was a switch from an approach based on minimizing the negative social consequences of structural change to the modernization of the European social system through investment in human capital. It goes from a quantitative approach (minimizing consequences) to a qualitative one (investing in people) (Borrás and Radaelli, 2011)

The political and scholarly debate on national and supranational regulations in social policy has remained one of the most intensely discussed issues in European integration policy research in recent years. Two main directions have been the major concern for the intellectual efforts to analyse this area: the first is the relation between the liberalized Internal Market and the necessity of keeping a sustainable social protection with national and supranational regulations, and the second one is about how to distribute the specific social policy capacities between the national and supranational organisms.

The development of a global economy brings a number of changes in the formulation and implementation of national social policy. The nation-state begins to concede some of its attributions to transnational bodies and its sectorial powers are in some cases directed towards regional structures, independent organizations or supranational bodies. The book “Globalization and the Welfare State” published in 2000 created a major debate on the fact that globalization limits the ability of the nation-state to work for the welfare of its citizens (Mishra, 1999). On the other hand, the EU was established based on economic and political reasons: the establishment of free economic markets and maintaining peace. Social programs were not a clear objective from the beginning; they have subsequently appeared under the pressure of the economic policy. The concern in the 1970s for the working conditions of workers has brought recognition of the legitimacy of the Europe-
an Community’s involvement in social systems. Once accepted that the EU will have a range of social objectives in addition to economic ones, the social policy of the EU has expanded significantly.

How is social policy divided between the national and the supranational? As pointed out in the introduction, there are a number of debates about the decline of the welfare state. When discussing welfare in ideological terms, we often speak about left wing policies, defined by generous social benefits, and the right wing policies involving reduced social spending. In Europe, the variety of models is much bigger. Differentiating left from right exclusively based on the volume of financial allocations simplifies outrageously the public discussion, knowing that countries such as Germany and Austria have high social expenditure and centre-right policies. The concept of welfare state has many facets and its components have been analysed extensively starting with the Beveridge Report (1942) onwards, yet many authors have concluded that the theory cannot be accurately classified given that it mutates and changes from one period to another (Pierson, 1991: 14). Exploring and analysing historical variations of this concept is not the subject of this endeavour. Shortly, the welfare state can be considered as an instrument of policy and administration which seeks production of beneficial social change into three components: a guaranteed minimum income, reduction of the insecurity factors and offering the best standards for a set number of social services for all citizens.

The states have built their own strategies for planning and implementing social policies often tailored to a specific national context. In 1990, Social Welfare Policy Ethics examined a number of countries with their own social models and concluded that there is no good or less good social policy, but there are ways of achieving the objectives of welfare states by methods appropriate to each situation (Goodin, 1990). Technically, how can we analyse these functional adaptive strategies? How can they be understood in debates at the supranational level? The comparative method is acknowledged in the literature as the basis of any scientific approach studying macro-social aspects (Clarke, 2007; Rueschmeyer and Stephens, 1997). Besides the purpose of placing the social reality in order, the comparative method in social policies may subsume a number of objectives, such as to identify general patterns, to anticipate social phenomena or to interpret cultural and historical events in the context in which they took place.

Beyond all the challenges and limitations that such an approach brings about, the multiplication and accessibility of statistical data caused a major increase in comparative social policy analysis (Øyen, 2004). But transnational comparative research that could form the basis for global and European strategies and report any needs to which social policies should respond is often difficult to achieve in an objective and scientifically correct manner. Far from having embraced a nihilistic approach, the qualitative
versus quantitative dispute imposed a serious debate. When the reference unit is the individual, the quantitative criterion is obvious, but when it is the state – the number of variables exceeds the number of countries analysed and it is virtually impossible to make decisive explanations. The second criticism brought to the qualitative analysis was called “Galton's problem” or the issue of interdependency (Clarke, 2007). With the increasing interdependence between state and non-state actors, it is difficult or even impossible to analyse them as an autonomous, non-influenced and resilient unit, thus deeply affecting the credibility of transnational studies.

On the other hand, the maximum credibility of the quantitative analysis was also impaired by a number of critics. The failure of a probabilistic sampling with the state as a reference unit has been often debated when the intention was to achieve transnational comparative quantitative research. The aggregated indicators presented in many international statistics are historically and economically heavily distorted and often include states that have fair opportunities to collect such data, arbitrarily excluding less developed ones. Then, the issue of the stratified sample showed large differences between countries in terms of size, population, territory and the inability to achieve a higher degree of homogeneity of the social strata. Although this has been suggested prior to dividing these countries and their grouping into categories, but this could mean a distortion of dependent and independent variables. In 2003 and 2005 Ebbinghaus and Manow argued that, given all the limitations and challenges, qualitative analysis is the most appropriate to consider the historical and political contingencies of macro-social units, and suggested analyses conducted in the framework of case-studies (Ebbingaus and Manow, 2001).

Regarding social welfare regimes, Gosta Esping-Andersen’s classification realised in 1991 soon became “classic” in the study of comparative social policy (Esping-Andersen, 1992). This says that there are three major perspectives on welfare: the social-democrat, the conservative and the liberal model. Regardless of the fact that the criteria for classification generated by Esping-Andersen proved imperfect and that these perspectives have been subject over the years to several amendment attempts, they still remain a useful tool for understanding the types of large political and socio-cultural options based on national welfare.

The social-democratic model is best represented by the administrative structure of social policy in countries such as: Sweden, Norway and Denmark, the so-called Scandinavian model (according to Stephan Liebfried’s classification), and embraces a Keynesian view of economic and social policies (Liebfried, 1993). Sweden was a pure form of welfare state during 1960-1970, but in recent years, given the financial crisis, adopted a series of reform measures with a tendency towards liberalism. Denmark, however, seems to overtake Sweden in this regard (Schludi, 2005: 34-38). The social democratic model
requires high levels of social spending, high taxation, an extended public sector and social protection focused on multiple population groups. All this is backed by a massive bureaucracy and costly policies.

The size of the social democratic welfare tax is based on a system of flat and progressive taxation and not on employees’ and employers’ contributions to social security. Consequently, the funding of social services is, in principle, public and is made through the state or local communities, with a strong redistributive and equalizing trend, unlike the situation of the German social insurance, where benefits are proportional to contributions. The social dimension refers to the richness of the “welfare” system provided by public authorities which through the diversity and generous character (inclusive) of the bid covers large segments of population, from children to the elderly. Whilst in other developed European countries, care for elderly family or children is delegated to the family, the voluntary and/or private sector, in the Scandinavian countries the public sector is the one which assumes responsibility for this range of services (Schludi, 2005: 43-45).

The employment strategy is achieved through active labour market policy and a constant concern of the authorities for full employment. This special interest was maintained with good results even during the economic crisis of the 70s and 80s, being one of the strengths of the Scandinavian system (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 47-56). One specific aspect of the Swedish and Danish systems is maintaining incomes or social security as such (according to British terminology) as the central element of the welfare programs in all Scandinavian countries. Similarly, the pension system for the elderly is one of the most generous in the world. Denmark, for example, introduced the old age pension in 1891 (Norldund, 1997). But unlike Germany (the first to introduce this system), where the pensions are paid by the insurance fund, contributions in Denmark have been recognized as social constitutional rights, so they are granted to all Danish citizens who reach a certain age (variable depending on parliamentary decisions), independent of their contributions to the social security system.

Among all types of pensions granted in Denmark, the most famous is the People’s Pension (Esping-Andersen, 1993: 123-134). Public non-contributory pension is based on the principle of universality, solidarity and equality and is given without discrimination to all Danish citizens aged over 67, provided they have been residents of this country in the last 40 years. Age limit and absolute value are variable and may be changed by the government, with the consent of the parliament. Besides the universal state pension, there are occupational and private pensions, which are subject to contributions paid during the active life (Andress and Heien, 2001).

Trying to introduce a pension scheme linked to income, as in most European countries, had different effects in the Scandinavian countries. In 1959, Sweden introduced a
scheme differentiating the first state pension based on the revenues earned during lifetime. In 1960 Denmark tried the same thing, but this experiment failed in 1967 due to lack of political support within the Social Democratic Party and extended public hostility (Anderson, 2005). While in Sweden and Norway the pension policies had a continental direction, gradually approaching the German model, Denmark’s situation remained largely unchanged in terms of public pensions. In compensation, an additional private pension system began to develop in response to the rigidity of the equalizing state system and to the desire of people with over the average income to enjoy differentiated rights when they are old (Andersen, 1997).

For the unemployed, income maintenance works on two levels, a “higher level” which provides benefits to the insured (the funds are administered by trade unions) and a “lower level” for uninsured people still receiving social assistance provided by the state. In order to be qualified at the higher level, an unemployed person must be a member of an insurance fund of employed persons and earn income at least 52 weeks in the last 3 years. In this way, every Danish citizen becoming unemployed is entitled to receive benefits for 5 consecutive years, with the obligation to act in a professional or educational programme for 2 years after becoming unemployed, otherwise the person ends up losing specific rights. Note that although the benefits amount to 90% of the last income earned through work, they may not exceed a pre-established maximum limit. Given these important reasons, some specific issues of social policy are and will be subject to the national social system.

Social policy reform in the last decade has reached Scandinavia as well. In 1994 the labour market reform and the 1998 Welfare Reform measures were introduced to restructure the social security system in Denmark, focused on two main steps (Kvist, 1999). Regarding the unemployed, unskilled or holding sporadic jobs, the overriding concern is to ensure proper preparations for obtaining professional qualifications so that the individual is able to find a stable job. Regarding the employed, the emphasis is on continuous training and professional development in the workplace or on short training courses funded by the employing institution, since the Nordic economy is structured around activities that require high levels of professional qualification.

The conservative, Bismarckian, continental system differs from other models by focusing on the mechanism of social security. Mainly financed by contributions from employers and employees to the insurance funds, the German model of welfare has therefore an occupational basis, is directly participatory and the social benefits are differentiated (proportional to contributions), unlike the social democratic model of universal and egalitarian practice in the Scandinavian countries. This pattern of social welfare has a well-defined concept (“The German Middle Way”) characterised by historical coherence.
and stability, strong economic and political pressures, social efficiency and long-term financial profitability (Fabricant and Burghardt, 1992: 45-49). Over the twentieth century, the German model was the most stable system of social welfare organization in the world and has undergone minimal changes (technical ones, not at the level of principles), withstanding shocks and periods of great historic political transformation (the Weimar Republic National-Socialism and its disastrous implications during and after the wartime, the post-war reconstruction under the aegis of the American Marshall plan, the unification in 1990). Given the philosophy of the social security system in Germany, cited above, it can be inferred that “the main German social policy objective is to maintain the status or – expressed in a positive manner – to protect revenues rather than to reduce or prevent poverty – as in the case of liberal regimes – or to guarantee redistribution, as in the case of social democratic regimes” (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 98-10). Therefore the provisions of welfare programs are directed with priority towards the preservation of the social status owned during the active life and towards maintaining benefits at a level as close as possible to the income earned from labour, also representing a specific subject of national social policy.

Subsidiarity is the second major milestone of the German model arising from the social doctrine of Catholicism and came to be imposed not only in Germany but also in the EU Treaties, being raised to official policy status in the EU. According to this governing principle, “larger social units cannot assume decision-making responsibilities which belong to subordinated smaller units but in exceptional circumstances where small social units are unable to meet their own needs” (Hinrichs, 2005).

The conservative social policy is in fact a continental model, being present (with nuanced variations) in many European countries around Germany: Austria, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and more recently in Central European countries: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia. One of the most important dimensions of German social policy is social security. After 1945, the only viable project for West Germany remained the Bismarck one, based on the principle of social insurance financed by contributions and the principle of subsidiarity. Contributions were dependent on income, as were - as a result - the social benefits, and the state has been given a minimal role in the management of insurance funds. Basically, keeping multiple insurance funds (administered separately) - which provide benefits commensurate with individual economic performance during the active life – has remained the strength of social policy in Germany. It should be known that the specialized insurance schemes which reduce risks have broadened considerably in the last century as follows: a) sickness insurance in 1883; b) accident insurance in 1884; c) old age insurance (pensions) in 1889; d) unemployment insurance in 1920; e) compulsory long-term care since 1995 (Schludi, 2005: 43-45).
The liberal welfare state is centered on the United States and Great Britain. This is the classification of Esping-Andersen (1991); other authors are of the opinion that Britain is a mixed model of welfare (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2004). As for the notion of “liberalism”, the fact remains that the term is used here in the sense of a right-wing policy that promotes the private sector and the free market and individual responsibility, corresponding to American “republicanism” and British “conservatism”. So the meaning of “liberalism” (same as that of neo-liberalism) is the anti-Keynesian one, outlined by Hayek and Friedman and promoted in the 80s by the British Conservative and the US Republican government administrations - Thatcher and Reagan (Clayton and Thompson, 1988). This model is based on the minimal state, selective social and economic demands, fostering individual performance and the acceptance of differences resulting from free competition in the market. The British Labour Party government passed several short key measures in the social security system: the establishment of family allowances in 1945, the establishment of national unemployment insurance and pension in 1946 and the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948, which was intended to provide medical services to all British citizens on the basis of equal access (indiscriminatory) and open (free).

The irrefutable victory of the Conservative Party in the 1979 elections and the advent of Prime Minister M. Thatcher marked the second point of inflexion in the post-war evolution of Great Britain. With the slogan “rolling back the frontiers of the Welfare State”, the new conservative administration started an energetic process to restrain the competences and social-economic attributes of the state, gradually transferring the responsibility of the welfare to the private and non-governmental sectors (Taylor-Gooby, 2005). This transfer (including the budget) was associated with a package of stimulating measures to grow performance in the private sector. For example, the lowering of fiscal pressure allowed recovery of the medium and small private investments, going down to the level of “family” company, of small businesses that grew overnight, contributing to the consolidation of the market offer. This favourable climate in the business sector, added upon the dissolution of the minimum wage, made the unemployment rate go down in a few years from 12% to 3-4% on the basis of what was called “the British Job Miracle” (Robertson, 1986; Healey, 1992).

The social benefit in the case of unemployment, renamed the JSA-Jobseeker’s Allowance was diminished, just for the reason of motivating unemployed people to search and accept job offers regardless of the wage, in the context in which we remind that the minimum wage was liquidated. The duration of this benefit was shortened from 12 to 6 months, with a slightly increased value for persons over 25 years old (Clayton and Thompson, 1988). The policy of social housing suffered major transformations after the advent of the Conservative government. Conceived by the laborists as a domain of activ-
ity financed exclusively from public sources (the budgets of local councils), the policy of homes came into the attention of the Thatcher cabinet since 1980. Actually, the conservatives made out of the housing policy a veritable “flagship” of the reforms carried out under the doctrine of the New Right. “The right of tenants to buy” in special conditions the social homes on which they owned renting contracts, besides the fact that it meant privatizing the whole activity domain (1.5 million social homes were bought between 1979-1997) and an accumulation of substantial resources at the disposal of local councils, brought a large number of votes to the Conservatives, proving to be also an electoral success (Goodchild and Cole, 2001).

The educational policy of the New Right meant a liberalization of the competition between schools, promoting education in the private system and introducing the selection of students conformed to the statute of the respective school. The program and the measures of the policies of the British educational system were put together in the “Education Reform Act” of 1988 (Barber, 1994: 356-357). The schools were given an obvious liberty in the selection of students and teachers, financial autonomy and the right to compete on the resource market for extra-budgetary financing. Once every 5 years each school underwent an audit from an independent commission of experts, and the results of the evaluation were published in special catalogues, put at the disposal of the parents. Schools that lost students due to their depreciation in the public audit catalogues lost in consequence also a part of the budget financing, thus being sanctioned by the Ministry of Education, and those that were well rated and desired obtained additional funding.

The national regimes of social protection were created in a period when nation-state still had control of cross-border economic activities. As European integration progressed in the direction of a common Internal Market, this situation has changed. The decreasing capacity of the national organisms to control the market could potentially be compensated for by supranational social policies establishing a minimum level of social policy or harmonizing national regulations. Given the fact that the political and economic interests vary too much between EU Member States this does not seem to be a viable strategy.

The supranational level: Social Policy in European Union

Taking into consideration the precedent elements representative for the welfare state models in Europe, it is important to see, at a programmatic level, how the European institutions chose to approach European social politics. An analytical instrument frequently used in recent studies is the multilevel governance approach. This method tries to include the intergovernmental and supranational dimensions of the European decision-making
process, as well as transnational interest groups and policy networks, through a multi-
level perspective which aims to analyze the complex interactions between national and
European regulatory systems. Some authors consider this approach still a metaphor (Fer-
rera et al., 2001).

The European social measures are generated by policy, financial and legal instru-
ments. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is one of the most important policy
instruments, based on specific regulations from the Lisbon Agenda and the Social Policy
Agenda, and is facilitated by different forms of dialogue and cooperation: social dialogue,
civil dialogue and international cooperation. The OMC constitutes the regulatory model
for the coordination of employment policies, pensions and health by the EU institutions.
The principles that sustain this method are:

- The principle of subsidiarity, which consists in establishing/dividing the respon-
sibilities between the EU and the national level through establishing objectives
at the EU level and accountability towards Member States with regards to imple-
menting the action measures they adopted, to enforce them at national level;
- The principle of convergence, which consists in following common objectives
through correlated actions;
- Management based on objectives, which refers to monitoring and evaluating
progress through establishment of common indicators for all Member States;
- Country monitoring, which consists in the elaboration of reports which register
the progress and identify possible good practices at Member State level;
- Integrated approach, which presumes the extension of labor market policy guide-
lines in the sphere of other policies (social, educational, entrepreneurial, regional
and taxation) (Blachs, 2007).

The European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Globalization Adjustment Fund
(EGF) represent two of the main financial instruments, which alongside legal instru-
ments (the coordination of social security and mobility of workers, labour law and safety
and security at work, gender equality and anti-discrimination etc.) creates a sum of insti-
tutionalized measures designed to be an active part of the social policy at European level.

The most important document with social relevance (1957-2000) in the framework of
EU social policies is the “European Employment Strategy”. It was adopted alongside with
the introduction in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) of the chapter referring to employ-
ment (Title VIII) (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997: Articles 125-130). The strategy had the
purpose of fighting against unemployment at the EU level and it was conceived as a main
instrument of harmonization and coordination of the EU priorities in this direction, pri-
orities which will be addressed by each Member State.

The role of this strategy is to coordinate, at EU level, the occupation policies of Mem-
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Member States. Initially elaborated as a five year strategy, it underwent an intermediary evaluation in 2000 and an evaluation of the impact it produced in 2002. Taking into consideration the identified priorities, the strategy was structured on four pillars, each one representing a future action domain (European Commission, November 1997):

- Employment prospects – represents a new culture in the sphere of employment and it refers to the ability to be hired, thus contributing to fighting unemployment amongst the youth and unemployment on a long term basis;
- Entrepreneurship – promotes the creation of new jobs by encouraging local development;
- Adaptability – seeks to modernize the organization of work and to promote flexible work contracts;
- Equal opportunities – refers especially to adopting new measures for women, for the purpose of reconciliation between professional and personal lives.

The operation of the strategy is structured on multiple stages: 1) the establishment of certain directions in the employment policy (Employment Guidelines) through a document elaborated annually and based on a proposal of the European Commission, discussed and approved by the European Council (The Council of Ministers) (Council Decision 2010/707/EU); 2) the elaboration of National Action Plans which describe the way in which the elements of the previous document are applied at the level of the respective Member State (European Commission, 2005a); 3) the creation by the Commission and the Council of a Joint Employment Report which is based on the National Action Plans (Council of the European Union, 2013); 4) the issuing of specific recommendations for each Member State (Council recommendations, based on the proposals of the Commission) (European Commission, 2013).

The results of the annual evaluations for 2000 and 2002 showed significant progress in the direction of creating an integrated framework of national policies and a growth in the transparency of occupation policies and the number of involved parties (at the EU level, but also at Member State level) (European Commission, 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003). Therefore, if regarding achievement we can talk about the progress of national policies in this domain and a change in the perception of the occupation concept and its correlation with lifelong learning, about promoting gender equality and the efficiency of the OMC, the identification of priorities and of development directions for the next period was not neglected. The topics identified for the reform of the Employment strategy are: a) establishing clear objectives, b) simplifying the Employment Directions, c) strengthening the role of the social partnership in the implementation of the strategy and d) the increase in coherence and complementarity with other community processes.

A very important element for implementing the European Employment Strategy is...
the ESF which represents the main financial instrument for structural actions in the EU. The ESF finances those actions of Member State which have as purpose the prevention and combat of unemployment, the developing of human resources and integration on the job market, equality of chances for men and women, sustainable development and economic cohesion. In support of these directions, the Agenda for Social Policy (2000-2005) was written as a document establishing the framework and the development priorities of social policy up to the year 2005 (European Commission, 2000). The challenges faced by the Agenda for Social Policy are the unemployment rate, the rise in importance of the informational technology and the reduced number of people with expertise in this domain, the development of a knowledge-based economy, the social environment, EU enlargement and the internationalization of social policy. In this context, the underlying principle of the reformed social model (with a focus on quality) is the consolidation of the role of social policies as a productive factor, meaning the integration of social policies with economic policies and employment policies.

The Lisbon Strategy presented the ten-year objectives (2000-2010) of the EU aimed at transforming the European economy in the most competitive knowledge-based economy. The central objective of the EU for the decade was the increase in economic performance, the creation of more (and better) jobs and to use to a maximum extent the possibilities offered by a knowledge-based society. The Social Policy Agenda (2006-2010) took over these objectives and strategy elements that are related to social policy and converted them into a 5-year action program that is the framework for the present social policy and has as underlying principle the consolidation of the social policy role as a productive factor (European Commission, 2005b). For the entire decades, the Member States have cooperated through a series of economic, political and social initiatives known as “The Lisbon Agenda”. But after a decade, the European economy was in recession, unemployment was blooming and social cohesion was affected by the austerity measures introduced by governments as a response to the global financial crisis. The Lisbon Strategy produced mixed results. Indeed, after a preliminary evaluation, was launched the revised version of the strategy, more focused on policies and with a revised governance architecture aimed at leading towards economic growth and jobs.

The use of European funds to reach a series of social objectives is a powerful expression of European solidarity, but mostly a way to support economic reforms. Prioritizing may vary, but in austerity periods when internal budgets suffer substantial modifications, the absorption of funds is controversial. For this reason, when the new 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework was presented, the European Commission tried to create a balance between, on the one hand, the position of the European Parliament which asked for budgetary increase especially in order to sustain Europe 2020 initiatives and,
on the other hand, the Member States which requested the reduction of the EU expenses. Negotiations were finalized in 2013 and on 28 June 2013, the Permanent Representatives Committee approved, on behalf of the Council, the deal reached with the European Parliament on the draft regulation laying down the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014-2020 and the interinstitutional agreement on budgetary matters (Council of the European Union, 2013b). For the moment, it can point out that the EU budget intends to support an agenda focused on results, but there is a series of tensions between obtaining the objectives of growth and social cohesion policies and the fiscal constraints.

The difficulties associated with using funds in order to reach social goals are illustrated in the proposal of the Commission to extend the operation of the European Globalization Adjustment Fund (EGF). In 2006, this fund was launched to support the restructuring of European industries. Focusing initially on the impact of globalization in enterprises across Europe, the fund gradually became an important instrument in stopping the serious economic and social consequences of the financial crisis. An amendment demanding a temporary derogation and an increase in the level of EU co-financing was introduced (Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006). The derogation proposal of June 2011, based on data concerning development and employment growth taken from the Annual Growth Survey was rejected (European Commission, 2011a). In December 2010, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) rejected the derogation referring to the extension of the fund for the next two years, with a minority of eight Member States. This is not just an illustration of the fiscal prudence of the Member States, but also of an approach reflected in the philosophical tension: is it more efficient to have a budgetary organization based on funds with very large resources, such as the European Social Fund, comprising a vision of reaching long term structural reforms and in compliance with the Europe 2020 objectives, or to grant small and fast funds which can approach the immediate social consequences of the financial crisis?

As far as large scale structural funds are concerned, of particular importance is the relation between the Cohesion Policy and the Europe 2020 Agenda. In October 2011 the European Commission launched proposals for the reform of the Cohesion Policy with the explicit purpose of clearly focusing on the resources on several smaller priorities, directly related to the Europe 2020 Agenda (European Commission, 2011b). The proposal included the reform of the ESF in order to reach to 25% of the total budget for cohesion with the purpose of investing directly in people. Within the ESF, 20% of the budget was proposed to be allocated for social inclusion measures. Both the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion and the emblematic initiatives from the Agenda of New Skills and Jobs have underlined the importance of using ESF objectives to attain their specific goals. It is a sign of progressively tighter bonds between the Cohesion Policy and
the Europe 2020 Agenda which will reflect more explicitly within the National Reform Programs.

From a legislative point of view, the social policy at the EU level does not envisage the explicit creation of a solid legislative EU acquis, but is rather focused on evaluating and revising legal frameworks, such as the controversies concerning the time spent at work and the mobility of workers. Attempts to revise the directive referring to the time spent at the job, which was planned for publishing at the end of 2011, then in February 2012, and eventually in March 2012, have failed due to the lack of political consensus (Monti II Regulation)(European Commission, 2012). These delays in launching these proposals reveal the controversial nature not only of the legislative action in the social domain, but moreover the difficulty of reconciling the social objectives with the economic freedoms. The political and legislative limits of using the community method in the domains of employment, unemployment and salary policies are obvious.

Conclusions

The attempts to implement a social policy at the EU level has given birth to the phrase “Social Europe” aiming at reflecting the whole social dimension of EU integration or at defining the social EU acquis as the sum of EU accumulations at one given moment in the social policy domain. This is not an easy step because as much different and complex are the social models of the European countries, so are the methods. In reality, none of these countries has a purely liberal or a purely conservatory system, and in time there have been many junctions between these models.

Alongside these major differentiations between states ther is also the scepticism of Europeans who consider opportunistic today the reinvention of the European social model, because the current one can barely generate a common voice. The rationalities behind this fact are based firstly on the economic competitiveness of the EU at global level. The rise of states with a high entrepreneurial spirit and more powerful innovation capacity, such as Japan, China or India, determine a part of the social analysts to talk about a need of reorientation in this direction. Many of the reports of the European Commission from the last five years have brought to attention the obvious need for integrated social policies that would stimulate entrepreneurship, productivity and the creation of new jobs and where economic growth alone has proven insufficient.

The year 2010 was called the European year of fighting against poverty and social inclusion, but practically, at the level of the European citizens who are at risk of poverty there was no significant progress. Most of the time, when approaching this problem,
Member States appeal to the principle of subsidiarity and consider this aspect to be one of national competence. What are the factors that influence this decision? The first explanation is a regulatory one, since social policy is by definition a redistributive one, which means that it administrates incomes between generations and between funds etc., as argued earlier. These decisions cannot be taken by a supranational organism, but only in a democratic way and by means of negotiations at a national level. Pensions, unemployment aid, allowances, indemnities that come from the state budget, healthcare and the educational system – all presume income transfers between social categories.

Another dimension is the relation between the employer and the employee regulated by the national legislation of the labor market which establishes the level of contributions to the social insurance, the rights of employees, work conditions. All are thoroughly negotiated at national level between different national social groups. From there derive the major differences between EU Member States regarding contributions and the taxing systems or even management models. In this context, the uniformization of redistributive policies at the European level now seems an impossible endeavor. Social assistance, health and education still remain strong symbols of national sovereignty. Without representing a legal constraint, the OMC was born from an initiative of voluntary coordination of the social policies of Member States, although it has scored less significant results.

Regarding the EU budget, the fiscal policy still remains in the hands of national governments. How can a Social Europe be possible without collecting taxes or spending public money? Alongside the need of saving the Eurozone because of the financial crisis, the reticence of Member States towards collecting some taxes at a European level was revealed. The new Multiannual Financial Framework brings about some taxes on financial transactions, but it is a small effort. In other words, EU Member States still wish to keep intact their own social policy. The advent of other interest groups, such as multinational companies, could speed up the process of a European social policy, considering that they can choose to establish on any national market, thus urging the states to reduce taxing levels in order to attract them to their country.

Social policy in Europe will always be achieved simultaneously on two levels, one national and the other supranational, and it will be subjected to complex interactions between the two, but moreover between the ones derived from the national systems integrated in the market economy of the EU. Therefore, it is important not to determine to what extent the EU is able to act like a big welfare state, but rather to identify the types of policies that emerge at each level from the constraints and opportunities of the institutional framework.
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The European Security Strategy and the global role of the European Union in the 21st century

Ioana ŞTEFĂNUȚ

Abstract

This paper acknowledges the sui generis nature of the EU and the difference it has made in European foreign policy action due to the fact that the EU is and acts as something which cannot be compared with any existing international subject. In order to determine whether the EU is a global actor we intend to establish inferences based on the various interpretations given by researchers and scholars to the external action of the EU in the 21st century in an essay on the conceptualizations of power and actoriness in global politics. In the end, we will analyze the provisions laid down by the European Security Strategy in order to determine how and with what means the EU proposes to address future security challenges in Europe and at global level and to what extent it has managed to fulfill those objectives and respond to the expectations it projected.

Key words: Normative Power Europe, European Union, soft power, European Security Strategy

Introduction

The prospect of the EU acting as a global actor has attracted increased attention from IR scholars in the last decade in the context of the ongoing transformations of the international system marked by a redistribution of power against the background of an emerging environment of global insecurity.

Weighing the little concern of the EU for the defence of European security in the last decade of the 20th century against the expectations of the international community some feared that EU actoriness in world politics lost momentum. And yet, after long negotiations and setbacks, the EU member states managed to define the operational guidelines of the common foreign and security policy. The external context in which these developments took place was a particular one. Right before the EU enlargement to Central and

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1 The European Security and Defence Policy was laid down in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999).

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Eastern Europe there was a dramatic change in the perceptions of global security against the background of the unprecedented terrorist attacks and the surge of new multifaceted threats. These developments prompted Western democracies to rally against a common enemy by rethinking the collective security paradigm under the lead of the United States. The EU seized this opportunity and adopted an extended security agenda for the future (European Security Strategy, 2003) by which it claimed a distinctive place in the international system and a more engaging role in managing the threats coming from its near abroad and beyond. Over the past decade, the EU has tried to affirm a global actor profile by joining the efforts of the international community in the management of international crises in many parts of the world for several reasons: humanitarian causes, the commitments taken towards the US allies, the United Nations and the OSCE, the stakeholders’ expectations for increased EU engagement, or geopolitical reasons. However, the decisional process underpinning the creation of a common foreign and security policy was not always smooth and the enthusiasm of the European leaders was often mismatched by unconvincing actions.

Nowadays, because most of the European nations are key NATO allies in international military operations, the EU collective actions abroad cannot rely on ‘hard power’. Nevertheless, the predominantly civilian interventions of the EU in problem areas around the world provide a certain complementarity that actually makes the EU a distinctive player in conflict management. As the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon set the premises for a more unified EU presence in the world, the EU governments are expected to produce prompter common actions. Using soft tools such as political negotiation, multilateral dialogue and the use of economic incentives, which already proved successful in recovering mutual trust and building security in some conflict-ridden societies, the EU has the potential to be acknowledged as an indispensable global actor.

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**The European Union – actor and power in the 21st century**

The importance of the role played by the EU in world affairs has been under a lot of scrutiny, either due to the more traditionalist conceptions claiming that only nation-states are actors in international politics (Ginsberg, 2001: 12) or because foreign affairs are normally understood in the limits of classical diplomacy and ‘hard power’, areas in which the EU still lags behind other international actors. At least this is why we believe that the EU’s commitment to defend human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and to promote good governance and regional cooperation in other parts of the world, as conspicuous as they may be, are not as visible as the so-called ‘high politics’. But actorness in world af-
fairs may be defined also as the ability to influence others without necessarily bearing the attributes of statehood (Hill, 2007: 4). Unfortunately, the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign and security policy is limiting the chances for the EU to be fully recognised as a collective actor. According to C. Hill, the “capabilities-expectations gap” (Hill, 1993: 318) prevents the EU from being recognized as a unitary and results-oriented player in international politics. In Hill’s opinion, when the expectations of the member states exceed the EU’s capabilities is created an excessive optimism about the external performances of the EU, which drops dramatically in the event of a failure. Reversely, if the EU actions abroad create false hopes, the member states become ultra-realistic and fail to appreciate the actual potential of the EU as a common force.

The EU has been concerned with getting international recognition as a single voice for many years now, but this evolution has been rather unsteady and at times contradictory. From the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) the EU functioned on a three-pillar structure, which partly explains the different degrees of engagement in international politics. On the one hand, the EU proved more successful in influencing global trends in areas where it already developed a common policy (1st pillar), such as the environment, foreign trade, development and humanitarian assistance, and agriculture. On the other hand, its leverage has been significantly lower in the field of security and defence policies (2nd pillar). But the influence of the European Union in global politics can also depend on other factors. If we consider the impact of its actions, although it hardly relies on military instruments, the EU has a comparative advantage in peace-building and conflict prevention due to the success of its civilian missions. However, those who support a more united and integrated Europe see common defence as an indispensable step in gaining more global visibility, although ‘hard power’ may eventually overshadow the virtues of ‘civilian power Europe’ (Hill, 2007: 5).

According to M. Telò, the capability criteria used for assessing the global role of an actor against the nation-state model can be defined as follows: “a community of interests, a decision-making system, an independent system for crisis management, a system of policy implementation, external communication channels and representation, an appropriated amount of common resources” (Telò, 2007: 302). Based on this definition, the incoherencies of EU decision-making in the sphere of CFSP, concerning mainly the opportunity to act and the level of engagement, have had a negative impact on the external image of the EU.

In a more nuanced approach, Bretherton and Vogler conceptualize the role of the EU as a global actor from a socio-constructive perspective based on the notions of ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘capability’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). According to them, EU global actorness is “a function both of external opportunities and internal capabilities”
expressed in the framework of social interaction processes:

“Opportunity denotes factors in the external environment of ideas and events which constrain or enable actoriness […] Presence conceptualizes the ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders […] Capability refers to the internal context of EU external action – the availability of policy instruments and understandings about the Union’s ability to utilize these instruments, in response to opportunity and/or to capitalize on presence” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 24).

Among IR theories constructivism brings a particular interpretation of global politics by analyzing a structure (i.e. the world) based on the meanings and perceptions attached to it by an agent. Applied to the role of the EU in the international system the agent-structure analysis reveals the EU’s “capacity to shape events inside and outside its borders, either by its own will […] or in response to the external actor’s expectations and demands” (Tonra, 2006: 124). Hence, from a socio-constructivist perspective duality is an inherent feature of this peculiar political project named the European Union.

From a Realist perspective, analyzing the EU as a global actor involves taking into account three basic roles played by the EU: 1. An instrument for the collective economic interests of its member states (traditionally, the finality of the former European Economic Community); 2. An instrument for the remodeling of the regional environment (by means of the enlargement policy, external actions, the European Neighborhood Policy etc.); 3. A vehicle for promoting the normative concerns of its member states (human rights protection, the abolition of capital punishment, the spread of democratic values, the protection of the environment, and fighting poverty) (Hyde-Price, 2008: 31-32).

Considering this last point, the EU is, theoretically, an “ethical power” (Hyde-Price, 2007: 107) which acts as a “force for good” in the world by promoting values and principles of universal applicability and by reflecting cosmopolitan norms (Hyde-Price, 2008: 32). However, referring to E.H. Carr’s statement that “theories of morality are the product of dominant nations or groups of nations” who seek to impose their one-sided views on the rest of the world, A. Hyde-Price thinks that universal claims in a pluralist and diverse world often dissipate the national interests of states (Hyde-Price, 2008: 33). Looked at from this angle, the EU seems to conduct its external actions by the motto “what is good for me is good for everyone else”, which proved to be a destructive US foreign policy strategy in the first decade of the 21st century. Even more in the case of the EU, a foreign policy based on ethical concerns is unlikely due to the major differences of opinion among EU member states. This is particularly true if we consider the EU’s inability to draw up a common approach towards the Russian Federation, for example, in spite of the multiple interdependences underpinning regional relations. Although the EU governments have raised concerns about the level of human rights protection and the rule of law in Russia,
the EU is still unable to obtain agreement on sanctioning these abuses. This is even more difficult as leading European nations like France and Germany defend their individual interests at the expense of a more visible presence of the EU as a common voice.

The ethical grounds of EU external action may be disputed, but spreading positive norms and standards has been a real concern for the EU. According to D. W. Lovell, the EU is firmly committed to promoting democratic values abroad due to the success of the EU integration which proved that democracy sharing mitigates security challenges. In the same logic, the efforts to democratize peripheral regions, such as the Mediterranean space, are aimed at countering the threat of illegal immigration in the EU (Lovell, 2007: 109). Yet, sometimes when EU normative concerns are faced with mixed political, strategic and economic calculations, the short-term stability of some regions is preferred at the cost of the tacit support of authoritarian regimes (Lovell, 2007: 124).

In the last few years also the normative nature of EU foreign policy was vividly disputed in the IR literature. ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) is an innovative concept introduced by I. Manners as a middle ground between ‘soft’ and ‘hard power’. The EU global role is analysed in the light that ideas and norms have on international relations (Manners, 2002: 238-239). By defining the normative influence of the EU norms, principles and ideas beyond borders, Manners endorses the sui generis nature of the EU as a post-sovereign and post-Westphalian entity. According to Manners, in spite of its eclectic historical evolution, its hybrid nature and its multi-state architecture, the EU projects an ideational force which shapes conceptions of “normal” in international relations in line with its unique normative basis (Manners, 2002: 239). Referring in particular to the abolition of capital punishment he claims that, unlike more developed states like the US and Japan, the EU not only acts as a normative power, but also militates in favor of norm diffusion at global level (Manners, 2002: 252-253). In a spirit of solidarity triggered by its norm-driven identity, the EU diffuses values and norms by its mere presence in global affairs, thus contributing to the expansion of social justice in the world (Manners, 2002: 239).

Yet, the EU cannot claim to be a normative power unless the others recognize its moral legitimacy. In a critique of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ concept, M. Merlingen (2007: 436) sees it as an obstacle to objective analysis of post-sovereign Europe. Merlingen points out to the fact that the “understanding of power and norms remains partly under the influence of a tradition of political theory at the core of which is the notion of sovereignty” (Merlingen, 2007: 438). Hence, he proposes to analyse “power” and “norms” separately in order to find out what they show and what they hide about norm diffusion in the world and concludes that there is a downside to the post-sovereign EU normative power: “the values it projects abroad do limit the degradation and humiliation of individ-
uals, but they also subject local orders to Europe’s normativizing universalist pretensions. […] [T]he power NPE brings to bear on problems in poor and conflict-ridden societies humanizes and improves the life of populations, but it also creates patterns of arbitrary domination between internationals and locals.” (Merlingen, 2007: 449).

In their own critique of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ other authors seem to agree that EU foreign policy, in the same way as the US foreign policy, is based on strategic calculations and that the EU normative agenda conceals the individual material interests of the member states (Hyde-Price, 2006; Smith, 2001; Youngs, 2004). Moreover, according to Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002) the EU’s self-representation as a “force for good” in global politics reveals a lack of reflexiveness because the EU deliberately overlooks the fact that sometimes even its member states elude the norms they are supposed to endorse and promote in external actions.

The conceptual ambiguity of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ is also raised by H. Sjursen who claims that “it remains unclear how the term ‘power’ which is often seen to allude to ‘coercion’, can be articulated to the term ‘normative’, which is typically taken to allude to ‘legitimacy’” (Sjursen, 2006: 172). According to Sjursen, many foreign policy actors pursue some kind of a normative agenda because norms can be many things, including good and bad influence. Hence, a major problem is “the often implicit link between the pursuit of norms and the idea that the EU is ‘doing good’ in the international system, or between the idea that the EU is a ‘civilian power’ and that such a power is necessarily a good thing” (Sjursen, 2007: 3-4). Therefore, in order to assess the validity of the norms pursued by the EU it is important to decide first “what kind of standard for ‘goodness’ is being used and to clarify its legitimacy basis” (Sjursen, 2007: 4).

A more nuanced assessment of the EU’s normative nature is provided by N. Tocci who claims that the global role of the EU should be considered in relation to its goals, its internal capabilities (means) and the impact of its actions. However, according to Tocci, by trying to maximize its ‘normative power’ role, the EU is faced with a dilemma:

“On the one hand, the EU is more likely to pursue normative means when power relations between the EU and a third state are relatively balanced and relations develop within the confines of mutually negotiated agreements. On the other hand, power and particularly relational power seems to be of critical importance to engendering a normative impact given that even the best of intentions may be an insufficient condition of success (Belarus)” (Tocci, 2008: 71)

Besides, it is even more difficult to assert a normative role when the EU itself does not always abide by the norms proclaimed. This happens because member states, like any other international actors, are driven by material interests, like the urge to acquire greater economic leverage or to build military means. According to Tocci, “[s]trengthening
capabilities in these terms could, by contrast, damage the EU’s normative role by generating internal EU incentives to bend the law in order to pursue foreign policy goals in the interests of the EU or its member state.” (Tocci, 2008: 71). Therefore, a solution could be to “develop further the set of rules and laws that bind EU external behaviour in relation to third states, and link these rules and norms explicitly to the obligations set under international law”, as well as to strengthen internal institutional monitoring mechanisms, preventing the member states from breaching these rule and norms (Tocci, 2008: 71).

The argument that the EU is different in a good way from other international actors is present in IR literature since the days of the European Community (EC). F. Duchêne was the first to introduce the notion of ‘civilian power’ to express the EC’s pursuit of the domestication and ‘normalisation’ of international relations by tackling international problems within the sphere of contractual relations and structures (Duchêne, 1973: 19). He also believed that the lack of common military means, far from being a source of weakness, represented a virtue (Duchêne, 1973: 19). Today, the EU brings a distinctively civilian contribution to the capabilities of the international community in conflict areas around the world. Multi-level governance gives it great leverage in establishing patterns of regional integration and norm diffusion makes it an indispensable ally in the attempt of rebuilding global governance and multilateral cooperation on more solid grounds.

The EU’s ambition to influence international relations in an increasingly globalised world transpires from how it projects the pursuit of interests as a global actor. In a Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council the European interest in the age of globalization is defined as a responsibility triggered by the ability to tackle global issues, such as security, climate change, poverty, international migration, and by the tools developed for supporting human rights and promoting effective multilateralism and sustainable development worldwide (European Commission, 2007: 4). Its view of the world and of security at large reflects an assumed mission to change the world in line with the democratic values of justice, peace and equality through diplomatic tools, multilateral dialogue, communication strategies, financial assistance and even knowledge exchange. The influence it hopes to bear on international relations can be obtained by the force of attraction and by the recognition of European values.

Introduced by J.S. Nye Jr. in his theory of the US world leadership, ‘soft power’ has been a leitmotif in the conception of the EU’s global role in the last decade. Nye talks about three types of resources (culture, political values and foreign policy) which are inherent to understanding ‘soft power’ and are essential policymaking tools in today’s globalised informational society. Considered in the context of the EU’s relations with

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2 This notion was introduced by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in his work *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (1990) and was recently described as the most successful neologism of the last decades (Nexon, 2009).
its close neighbors ‘soft power’ can act as an instrument of reconciliation and dialogue between the different cultures and religions, in this case between Christianism and Islamism (Pușcaș, 2010: 134). From the EU’s viewpoint, the European Neighborhood Policy has a ‘soft power’ dimension because it aims at exporting European values, norms and standards in order to create a more democratic and more secure environment in the immediate neighborhood. However, the legitimacy of ‘soft power’ is not fully acknowledged. According to Hettne and Söderbaum the EU’s ‘soft power’ resembles a kind of “soft imperialism” (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005) in some parts of the world where the EU is seen as imposing a unilateral vision. The economic sanctions it enforces upon states that fail to respect certain standards in exchange for the financial assistance provided by the EU are considered as forms of coercion and sometimes as threats. Nonetheless, this may be just a matter of perception considering that some political regimes apply double standards in order to receive external support without having to give up authoritarian government tactics. On a more positive note, the EU’s ‘soft power’ is, as one EU official described it, a “force to change” due to “the inspiration of [its] model of integration and shared sovereignty, the magnetism of [its] process of integration and of building increasingly close relations with [its] neighbours, the transformational capacity of [its] experiences in conflict resolution and state-building in complex areas” (Hellenic Foundation, 2007: 7). Whether or not the world is ready to embrace all these things that define the EU identity, Europe’s ‘soft power’ capabilities and the need for a more active role on its part in world affairs cannot be disputed.

However crucial the EU external action may prove in different circumstances, it cannot claim to move things in the right direction and change the world by itself. On the contrary, it needs to reconfirm and reinforce cooperation with its traditional allies across the Atlantic (the United States), but also to work harder at building “truly strategic relationships” with rising powers like India, China and Brazil (Hellenic Foundation, 2007: 7). It also needs to develop more flexible and more reliable instruments for tackling the plethora of existential problems confronting our world today.

It was also J. Nye who raised awareness of the need for a ‘smart power’ strategy in the US foreign policy, one which can overcome the multiple challenges faced by our international system in the 21st century. According to Nye, ‘smart power’ is about integrating ‘soft’ tools, such as diplomacy, development assistance, communications and educational exchanges with ‘hard’ ones, like economic and military instruments (Armitage and Nye, 2007: 1). A crucial ingredient of a ‘smart power’ strategy is rebuilding the foundation from which to address global challenges, which is synonym to investing in the “global good”. In Nye’s opinion, “the main institutional architecture absent today is an effective forum for coordinating global strategic thinking on a set of specific practical challenges”
and he urged America to invest in a new multilateralism, “that provides a range of multilateral options for generating new norms and practical solutions to solve global problems.” (Armitage and Nye, 2007: 34). What is needed actually is an institutionalism that is still based on norms and consensus, but not in the form of the so-called “coalitions of the willing”. According to Nye, formal alliances and partnerships that increase legitimacy and burden sharing while facilitating consultation and interoperability are more appropriate to address unforeseen challenges without the start-up costs of coalition building, provided that America can secure cooperation from its allies (Armitage and Nye, 2007: 32).

It seems that the EU leaders reflected upon this scenario by embracing a similar approach in defining the EU’s role in a globalised world. According to Javier Solana, former Secretary General of the Council and EU Foreign Affairs Representative, the EU needs regional and global partnerships, although this may involve “working with others who, by definition, have their own ideas and interests” because sacrificing short-term interests is beneficial for long-term progress (Ditchley Foundation, 2009). Not in the least, the EU should build a foreign policy fit for the problems of the 21st century: “integrated, wide in scope and geared towards mobilising networks” (Ditchley Foundation, 2009). In this positive note, one would say that the common affinities of the two traditional partners across the Atlantic – the EU and the US – will bring them to cooperate even more in the interest of the “global good”.

Building a complete picture of the EU’s external profile involves also mentioning the negative perceptions attached to it. For instance, the “fortress Europe” concept (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 38) has been triggered by some EU practices leading to internal market protectionism, the increased defence of its borders against external threats or the selective eligibility criteria for EU membership. This unflattering image is topped off by a more mythical perception of the “European classical power ‘telling other parts of the world what political, economic and social institutions they should have’” (Telò, 2007: 308).

And yet, with an ability to set strategic goals, to make decisions that bear a real impact on its member states and to influence the international environment by interacting with other actors and creating demand for action, we can conclude that the EU should be recognised as a global actor. Its activism-prone behavior originates in the EU integration history and is based on the intrinsic values which the EU proclaims in all foreign policy actions. Although it lacks the degree of internal unity and political coherence shown by other global players recognised as such, the EU remains unquestionably an original regional polity (Telò, 2007: 304) that disposes of the necessary tools to contribute to the development of a new kind of regionalism and to the emergence of world governance.
The European Security Strategy or how to make Europe more secure and the world a better place

The transformations in the global security paradigm in the 21st century urged the international actors to rethink the agenda of their external action and the means used to achieve it. Adopted at the Brussels European Council in December 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) defined the strategic objectives for addressing future security challenges, including multidimensional threats (including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. But in order to achieve those objectives and to become a global security actor the EU needs to develop a security culture as the foundation of a stronger CFSP (Howorth, 2002: 88). The ESS proposed to develop a “strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Security Strategy, 2003: 11).

Strategic culture can be defined as a set of values, preferences, expectations, ideas and practices which can be merged into coherent patterns of behavior and provide a specific footprint on strategy (Biava, 2006: 55). In a traditional understanding the notion of “strategy” is linked to the conception of national interest which often presumes the use of military force in order to dominate, form alliances and occupy territories (David, 2000: 27). However, the end of the Cold War reclaimed changes in the strategic culture paradigm and more IR theoreticians (Baldwin, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998; Krause and Williams, 1996; Rojas Aruvena, 2002) agree that security needs to be considered at different levels (economic, human, societal, ecological, cyber etc.) against the background of deterritorialized threats and the increasing presence of non-state actors in the international system. Therefore, an efficient security strategy needs to be open-minded and resilient, reaching out to all the resources available in a timely and constructive manner.

By 2003, the EU had already made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and a more effective crisis management, which the ESS fully acknowledged. However, identifying future potential threats and defining Europe's new strategic objectives could not remain without consequences in terms of policy implications for the EU. Hence, the operational guidelines set by the ESS reclaimed more active engagement in pursuing strategic objectives, more capabilities to realize the full potential of the EU and more coherent policies. Last but not least, working with closest partners, particularly the United States, through partnerships and with international institutions through multilateral cooperation was considered the only way to deal with common threats and to make the world safer.

The ESS acknowledged the need for more active and more capable action in external operations and thus urged the EU to take greater responsibility by reinforcing its coop-
eration with the United Nations and by considering supporting preventive engagement as a viable option to avoid serious problems in the future. Also, the EU was encouraged to extend the spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention to include political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. But all these instruments and capabilities have little impact if they lack complementarity and a major challenge is to bring them together and make them serve the same objectives. In this context, the ESS raised awareness of the insufficient coordination of the EU member states in their external activities, pleading for more coherent policies at regional level.

These recommendations made by the ESS were very timely considering that the EU is lacking an integrated approach of its civilian and military capabilities. The long lasting dissensions among member states regarding the creation of a real defence community in Europe have brought major inconveniences to the EU’s image abroad. Suffice to say that R. Kagan described the EU as a “post-modern artificial paradise” which owes its existence to the protection offered by the American military arm. The ESS recognises the transatlantic relationship as an indispensable instrument and “a formidable force for good in the world”, but aims for an effective and balanced partnership to which the EU can contribute with more capabilities and increased coherence (European Security Strategy, 2003: 13). And yet, in spite of the strong historical, cultural and normative links between the two traditional allies, the different perceptions of the EU and the US regarding their individual interests and responsibilities towards specific parts of the world sometimes create conflicting predispositions for external action. As a sign of openness and strategic thinking, the ESS encouraged the EU to foster strategic partnerships with all those actors who share its goals and values, although naming Russia and China could be nothing more but wishful thinking and a recognition of Europe’s economic interests.

In adopting the ESS the EU member states managed to build consensus on ways to achieve a more secure Europe by defining new strategic interests in its external action. Unfortunately, this programmatic document was marked by inconsistencies, reinforced by the EU’s failure to translate commitments into action in the following period. C. Hill (2007: 8) thinks that there are solid reasons for this failure: firstly, the ESS seems to have targeted a foreign audience and not the EU citizens who generally oppose the idea of a common security and defence policy; second, the ESS overestimated the EU’s capacity to achieve the strategic goals, knowing that member states are still divided on several foreign policy issues and lack the political will in sensitive areas like security and defence.

In the Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008), the European Council examined the implementation of the ESS five years on and made suggestions for improvement in the light of future challenges. The report stated that the global financial crisis and the multiplication of intra-state wars altered the way global
politics work today. According to some authors, the transition to multipolarity came with a revigoration of power politics and with increased pressure on the institutional and normative framework built after the Second World War (Toje, 2010: 172).

Drafted and approved in a tense internal and international environment, soon after the rejection by Ireland of the Treaty of Lisbon, in the aftermath of the South Ossetian conflict, and against the backdrop of the most severe global financial crisis, the report on the ESS tacitly admitted the EU’s operational limits in becoming a global strategic actor (Toje, 2010: 178-179). However, in relation to conflict management the report stressed the crucial importance of the civilian instruments which prevail in the EU’s external missions: “[d]rawing on a unique range of instruments, [...] [w]e have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity.”(European Council, 2008: 2). Five years on, the visibility of the European Security and Defence Policy increased significantly due to over 20 missions deployed in response to humanitarian crises in different parts of the world. These low-profile interventions abiding by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and by the OSCE commitments have carved the distinctive profile of the EU foreign and security policy.

Nevertheless, the Council report expressed concerns that the permanence of the so-called “frozen conflicts” the immediate neighborhood poses multiple challenges. Although the EU acknowledges vested security interests in this area, it needs to reinforce efforts to build stability and good governance. It is reassuring that the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (2004) and the subsequent Eastern Partnership (2009) opened up a new stage of the relations between the EU and its periphery whose finality is to build “regional integration” (European Council, 2008: 10). V. Puşcaş (2010: 139) optimistically sees the ENP as an example of ‘smart power’ due to a mix of ‘hard’ resources (coercion through economic and diplomatic sanctions) and ‘soft’ influence (attraction through welfare). However, the Council report stated that the European dependence on energy resources originating in this area must be met with “a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection, particular attention to the most isolated countries and crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.” (European Council, 2008: 5). In such an unstable environment, the report urged for “continued effort by the EU, together with UN, OSCE, the US and Russia” (European Council, 2008: 10). Yet, apart from urging for sustained effort and full engagement, the report fails to identify clearer guidelines for improving EU action in this particularly strategic region.

Last but not least, supporting international order based on a renewed multilateralism is a firm recommendation made by the Council report on the implementation of the ESS. Nevertheless, A. Toje notices inconsistencies between the EU’s self-proclaimed global
actorness ready to share responsibility for global security action (expressed in the 2010 Headline Goal) and the fact that it doesn’t seem to assume any strategic role in the global mechanism of multilateral cooperation (Toje, 2010: 179). Above all, the ESS failed to respond to the expectations that a strategy for “a secure Europe in a better world” normally creates in external stakeholders and risks to remain a mere representation of too big a hat for a so-called “global” actor.

Concluding remarks

The debate around the EU’s ambition to be acknowledged as a single voice in global affairs took place against the background of the major changes affecting the international system in the beginning of the 21st century, involving the redistribution of power and the emergence of uncommon threats to global security in its multiple dimensions, particularly human, societal, ecological, energy and cyber security.

The firm commitments of the EU to defending security in a large sense equals an assumed mission to change the world by fighting poverty, underdevelopment and regional conflicts, in line with the fundamental European values and political culture, through diplomacy and political dialogue, communication strategies, humanitarian and development assistance, and by enforcing international law and multilateral institutions. As the EU external action reached a global level, it lead to a series of arguments among IR scholars and analysts of the European integration struggling to conceptualize as accurately as possible the EU’s potential as a global actor based on empirical observations. Hence, notions like ‘civilian power’, ‘normative power Europe’ ‘ethical power’, ‘force for good’, ‘soft power’ and ‘fortress Europe’ have filled the public discourse in an attempt to determine the real profile of the EU as international subject. As semantically rich and expressive as these concepts may appear, they reveal a lack of consensus regarding the EU’s external identity, a situation worsened by the unwillingness of European nations to pool ‘hard’ resources and capabilities into an EU military arm as their foreign allies would expect them to do. In spite of these setbacks, we agree that the EU’s capacity to set strategic goals, to make decisions which affect its external performance and to create expectations for action in many parts of the world fully endorse the recognition of the EU as a global actor.

The adoption of the European Security Strategy was the cornerstone which provided the EU with the necessary criteria to filter its global role by setting firm strategic goals for common external action: the combat of multidimensional threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime, the resolution of regional conflicts and the development of a strategic culture which facilitates proactive
responses and swift interventions are some of the most significant security challenges for any global actor. Taking note of the weaknesses of the EU common foreign and security policy in a context of great uncertainties for the future of the international system, the ESS pleaded for the transformation of the EU into a more active, more capable and more coherent entity who is more prone to work with other actors in the framework of multilateral institutions. Yet, in spite of its bold objectives, the implementation of the ESS was marked by incoherencies and hesitant decisions in the following period. Due to the fact that the EU struggled for several years in a row to define a common identity on a clearer, more firm and more engaging legal basis in the form of the Treaty of Lisbon, the implementation of the ESS provisions remained work in progress.

The Treaty of Lisbon reinforced the intergovernmental basis of the EU security and defence policy. For this reason, the EU is expected to remain an eclectic presence whose strategic interests will be negotiated by European powers like France and Germany. Some say that the architecture of the EU makes it more prone to arbitrary decisions and, as such, the EU will remain essentially an egocentric power (Laidi, 2008: 137). As for its normative drive, the EU continues to appear ambivalent to the rest of the world: “more attractive”, because it is not a hard power, and “less convincing, and less credible” because it is not a coercive power (Laidi, 2008: 138). In spite of these contradictory identities the EU’s ‘soft power’ can bring further advantages to the international order in the long run, due to its potential to transform the world peacefully. But, in order to preserve its comparative advantages, the EU will have to mobilize more considerable resources and political will than it does today. Moreover, the EU has to discern between its predisposition for engagement and the imperative need to act. These difficult times require strategies which can guarantee productive actions and efficient resource management. Hence, the EU should decide to act globally only if its involvement does not hinder the achievement of the intended goals and provided that it can secure local support and a firm acceptance of the prerequisites for intervention.

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THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY
AND THE GLOBAL ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION


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GLOBALIZATION, AN ABSTRACT word that until a few decades ago had no correspondence in real life, is responsible for almost all complex transformations that modernity has brought to mankind in the last decades of the twentieth century. All links between citizens of the planet, between countries and between different companies are gaining global attributes. Be it the global financial transactions, foreign direct investment or Internet/mobile/satellite communications, Master Card or Visa payments, all are grouped under one corollary: globalization. In this framework, there is more and more talk about international management. Europe has developed a new type of international and intercultural management, specific to this area. Within the European model of management, there are sub-regional and sub-national differences that exist in the form of various European sub-models: Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Latin, Nordic. An important aspect of program management is the governance of the program. At the same time, project management has become a profession in itself, the market displaying a need for training programs in project management.

Keywords: globalization, international management, euro-management, international programs, international projects.

Abstract:
A number of changes in International Relations paradigms occurred through the recent decades: the economy became post-industrial, culture became post-modern and society, post-national. Be it the global financial transactions, foreign direct investment or Internet/mobile/satellite communications, Master Card or Visa payments, all are grouped under one corollary: globalization. In this framework, there is more and more talk about international management. Europe has developed a new type of international and intercultural management, specific to this area. Within the European model of management, there are sub-regional and sub-national differences that exist in the form of various European sub-models: Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Latin, Nordic. An important aspect of program management is the governance of the program. At the same time, project management has become a profession in itself, the market displaying a need for training programs in project management.

Keywords: globalization, international management, euro-management, international programs, international projects.
to a different type of economic, social, cultural and political relations, both between states and individuals and the exit from a bookish modernity are defined as political units and social networking in the world, which is what we call generically globalization (Postelnicu and Postelnicu, 2000: 86).

Globalization is not a new phenomenon attributed exclusively to the twentieth century. Nations/states, economic communities have always been connected to each other through economic relations, political alliances, etc. Thus, we can discuss the manifestations throughout history that have been emphasized and developed by the evolution of society, especially in the second half of the twentieth century (the scientific and technological discoveries, industrial developments, communications etc.). On the one hand there is the process of globalization with the specific problems of local communities, and on the other hand we have the global society (a virtual sphere), towards which modern society seems to be moving inexorably. It is almost inconceivable for individuals today to put aside the advantages of modern progress, made available to everyone through an effective mechanism of globalization.

Globalization leads to a permanent transformation of the use of the efforts, skills and resources in management so that managers, officials and researchers can face new realities. Globalization has put us in front of an interdependent world in which the interests of states, companies and citizens meet on common markets. How will they be managed? We see that the borders have ceased to be an obstacle to economic flows. Markets are continuously expanding and integration is a necessary process to harmonize interests. Globalization through fragmentation and then integration is a process in which actors must adapt to new rules for survival. In this framework, there is increasing talk about international management.

The term management has become important within the language of the social sciences as soon as the management of companies encompassed scientific methods. Management is mainly coordination of the resources of an organization in private or public companies in order to achieve established objectives. A second sense of the term management is the discipline that studies the practice of management and seeks to discover the rules and techniques for improving the efficiency of human action within the organization (Popa and Filip, 1999: 13-14).

The evolution of the concept of management has gone through several stages. Formal managerial structures have existed since ancient times, but those actually developed within the military administration, the church and the civil organizations rather than within the industry (Lock, 2010: 2). Projects completed before 1900 were generally managed by the architects and engineers who created them. Rapid industrialization in the first half of the twentieth century led to industrial management science (scientific man-
management). The person who enshrined the concept was Frederick W. Taylor (1856-1915). In his book published in 1911, the American author stated that “the main objective of management should be ensuring maximum prosperity for the employer, coupled with maximum prosperity of each worker” which meant the exclusion of conflicts between the employer and his employees (Taylor, 1919: 9).

Henry Gantt (1861-1919) studied, in the same period, the work order operations. Diagrams drawn by him (Gantt charts) recorded the sequence and duration of all the tasks within a process. The underlying principle of the Gantt method is that “management is always concerned about the future” (Clark, 1922: 3). In order to apply this method it is necessary to have a plan. The Gantt method is an alignment of objectives, activities and time. This method of overlapping calendars aims to make the activity more efficient in order to maximize results.

At the same time, in Europe arouse the science of management administration which seeks to establish general principles governing any administrative system. Max Weber is the one who developed the general theory of bureaucracy, defining the features of an ideal organization, from this perspective: high degree of specialization, hierarchy, rules and regulations, discipline, skills principle (Weber: 1993: 23-29). The looming administrative management is focusing mainly on improving the efficiency of human resources within staff management.

In the context of the two approaches a new theory is outlined, that of operational management (functional) or operative management science. This type of management is theorized by the French engineer Henry Fayol (1916) with reference to the classification of activities carried out in an industrial firm (technical, commercial, financial, security, management). He defined the functions of management (planning, organization, command, and control) indicating that they are found in almost all organizations.

Based on these types of management approaches and concept, after the Second World War the connotations of this term become more accurate through networking with various societal factors. Thus, we can speak of a situational management which requires that decisions taken by the manager depend on facts and management is done in a changing environment. This causes a relativistic management science and practice, considering the circumstances of the managerial action. Another orientation in management science is developing comparative management that reveals the importance of considering the specific environment in which the organization is developing (American management versus European management). Years 1950-1960 developed new techniques in management, like CPM (Critical Path Method) and PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) that facilitated access to levers of control over complex and advanced projects (space and military projects etc.).
By far, the man who influenced the development of the concept of modern management remains P. Drucker, an Austrian immigrant to the United States in the 1930s. Opponent of totalitarianism, Drucker became a spirited promoter of individualism and individual liberties as preconditions for economic development. He considered essential that hazard be removed from the process of industrialization. The successful and modern organization of an industrial enterprise was, in Drucker’s opinion, General Motors. One of his debut works, *Concept of the Corporation*, played a significant role in introducing the functionalist paradigm in the construction of organization (Jack and Westwood, 2009: 119-122).

Gradually, over several decades, we have witnessed an expansion of the scope of management. Initially identified with industry, management has become familiar with government, human resources, multinational corporations, international institutions. This expansion resulted in the inclusion of new variables in the definition of management: people, institutions, rules, governments, cultures. After all they only ensured a harmonization of interests, a more efficient work and maximized results.

More recent there is talk about intercultural management, in this case having in mind the characteristics of management science when we deal with the communion of several cultures (Bosche, 1993: 19).

### International Management Vs. Euro-management

When talking about international management we mean business practices conducted in more than one country, in an international context. According to Aurel Burciu, the major objective of international management is “to provide corporations with easier access to resources, materials, money and skilled people to support their expansion to foreign markets and their success in the global competition.” (Burciu, 2008: 567).

Regarding international management, this concept postulates initially the leadership of corporate multinationals (Nicolescu, 1997: 31). However, we appreciate that this is not just about the work of those companies, but it refers to the management practice of all the organizations operating internationally.

Therefore, international management can be defined as “the management of organizations involved in international business activities and transactions that are carried across the borders of two or more states” (Kamal, 1997: 17). The fundamental characteristic of this type of management is to maintain organization in a dynamic equilibrium within the global environment (Arvind, 1989: 2-3). International management development is therefore a consequence of the internationalization of the economic sector, which grad-
ually transferred the operation of the organization in a global space. Given these conditions, management practices should include a good and enhanced knowledge of the cultural differences, aiming to increase efficiency of the managerial action. Identifying the values of each nation is relevant in the practice of international management. Thus we can speak of different management models, such as the American model, the Japanese model, the European model etc.

**Euro-management or management in the European Union?**

Europe has developed a new type of international and intercultural management specific to this area. The Euro management concept was developed by Keith Thurley and Hans Wirdenius in 1989 when they launched the question of whether one can speak of a European style of management just as one talks about an American or Japanese style. According to the two authors, Euro management is defined as “distinct structures and behavioral approaches to management decision-making and problem solving at all levels of the organization that define European identity as distinct strategy which focuses specifically on planning, implementing and evaluating changes.” (Thurley and Widernius, 1992).

It is difficult to specify a date when Euro management was first seen in literature. In 1989, the above-mentioned authors emphasized that “European Management ... must be understood as referring not to practice, but to a possible alternative approach.” (Thurley and Widernius, 1989: 4).

Euro management is a concept that, starting with the 90s has emerged as a subject distinct from other types of management (international, intercultural, corporate) and comprises in its research object a concrete reality and well defined zonal specificity: the vision and practice of management in European organizations (EU) and firms in Europe. They all claim a common cultural model that gained greater cohesion (both in terms of legal, administrative, political, financial, social) while was promoted among the 28 EU member states along with the European common policies.

Within the European model of management there are sub-national differences that take the form of various European sub-models: Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Latin, Nordic. These sub-models of European management have interference with other non-European types: namely the Anglo-Saxon has similarities with the U.S. system, thanks to the special relationships cultivated over time between the two nations; the Nordic and the German models are close to the Japanese one while the Latin model has links with the Latin American countries (this prototype being exported by Europe along with other customs.
and traditions and enforced by the close ties with these countries) (Calori and De Wott, 1994: 31-54).

The main features of the European model of management are targeting the individual and his needs, internal negotiations within the organization, the management of cultural diversity, harmonization of the extremes, product orientation and a lower degree of formalism.

Orientation towards the individuals – the European organizations (companies) pay great importance to caring for employees and social responsibility.

Internal negotiations within European companies between different levels of management and employees, between headquarters and subsidiaries in view of specific facilities, the promotion and acceptance of reforms, etc., give the management a flexible style of leadership, one which is open to compromise. An important role here has the European trade union movement, which is an important variable in the management of European companies and organizations.

Management of cultural diversity involves, on the one hand, highlighting the cultural specificity of staff organization and the development of a community intercultural capacity, and, on the other hand, human resource development in a multicultural approach.

Regarding harmonization extremes, the European management model is a middle-way one, compared to the U.S. model and the Japanese that are considered polar patterns. This avoids old attitudes and promotes the harmonization of extremes, seeking a balance between the individual and the collective.

A lower degree of formality of the European management translates into a lower degree of strict procedures, in relation to the U.S. model, for example. By reference to the American model, European management is characterized by a much lower degree of formality and procedures required.

Regarding the orientation feature on the product, it means that what matters with priority for European management is the quality of the product and the lower attention for its marketing, unlike the American management.

Taking into consideration Lessen and Nuebauer information regarding European management features, Ion Manole and Mirela Popa proposed the following representation (Manole and Popa, 2005: 139-140):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporation</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial features</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour/Attitude</td>
<td>Experiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional models</td>
<td>For development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Nordic</th>
<th>Estearn</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comercial</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profesional</td>
<td>Thinking</td>
<td>For development</td>
<td>Convivial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuition</td>
<td>Feeling</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Talking about European management, we return to the diversity that characterizes Europe. It’s not just a cultural difference, but a societal one. Thus, as remarked Manole and Popa, for a hierarchical society it is difficult to adapt to a network system in which there are equal partners and functions are divided in order to ensure better representation of interests, but also because needs must be fairly satisfied. In this case is defined a set of principles which should underpin the governance of European policies and which are found in the logic of European programs. In this logic the specialized literature talks about integration opportunities and the diversity constraint.

In terms of management in the European context and of examples of integration opportunities and types of diversity mentioned in the literature devoted to this topic, Peter F. Boone and Frans AJ van den Bosch offer the tabular representation above (Manole and Popa, 2005: 139-140).
Analyzing the characteristics listed in the table above, the authors emphasize that integration provides opportunities for production that imply maximizing the efficiency and a better access to specific resources. In this logic, a more flexible production system is necessary in order to enable companies to adapt to new ways of doing business in each country, but also to adapt to local market standards of quality and safety.

It is possible to distinguish, in this case, three major types of diversities (Manole and Popa, 2005: 114-114):

- Diversity in negotiations
- Administrative diversity
- Inherited diversity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diversity types</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diversity in the negotiations</td>
<td>Taxations norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grant practices</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Financial reporting requirements</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Quality and production standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative diversity</td>
<td>Internal accounting rules</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Information Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manufacturing systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited diversity</td>
<td>Customs Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Characteristics of employees</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business systems</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, we can say that the projects are undertaken to help states, organizations, companies realize their strategic plans. The strategic planning is essential for the survival of the organization and the projects are generated also by a strategic planning process. And all this is possible because science project management like human mind, as J.P. Sartre said, is a project that decides on its own (Sartre, 1946/1989).

Program Management vs. Project Management

Today, in general, we are trying to distinguish between program management and project management. However, we deal with a general terminological confusion in the public discourse. We may consider two main reasons as to determine this confusion:

a) projects are often approached by beneficiaries who often do not try an exercise to
include the initial logic that led to projects;
b) programs have different but less obvious management than that of projects, which
does not require going through all the stages as in the case of the latter.

The major difference is that programs are generally defining the business logic of an
organization for a certain period of time in order to achieve targets affecting many areas.
Instead, projects envisage specific goals, for which time is well defined.

In a typology of project management, Roberto Evaristo and Paul C. van Fenema define
the program as multiple projects. The same authors argue that “a characteristic of a
single project, although there are subprojects, is that all its parts are closely interrelated
and share the same goals” (Evaristo and van Fenema, 1999: 276).

In 1991, D.C. Ferns proposed the concept of program management when referring to

Program management seeks to promote values and achieve goals. In this regard, it
will develop a strategy. In fact, global strategic management follows a set of some general
tasks that we can identify also in the case of program management:

- creating a mission and a vision;
- set measurable objectives;
- objectives should be both short and long term;
- management strategy for achieving objectives;
- implementing and enforcing the strategy;
- performance evaluation, a review of the situation and new developments, initiating corrective action.

Source: (Evaristo and van Fenema, 1999: 277).
Paula Wagner and Bruce T. Barkley argue that the program involves space and time scales. In terms of space, a program can be expanded or restricted as it may involve more resources, more projects and support from several systems. The programs are generally global in nature if only for the fact that their engage in several countries and markets involved, opening up many opportunities for development. An extensive work program requires coordination within a certain time frame. In fact, no program management means managing individual projects, but managing a larger picture, especially the general benefits. In other words, the benefit program means integrating all efforts into a coordinated system. The purpose of the program is to ensure optimal use of the general resources involved. According to the same authors, in the program, one must manage risks affecting multiple projects or affect the program as a whole (Wagner and Barkley, 2010: 31-32).

An important aspect of program management is governance of the program. Here we enter a logic that presupposes a mechanism that ensures consistency between business strategy and the results of the program. Clearly, aspects of governance refer to the process of program development, communication, implementation and monitoring of policies, procedures, structure and the progress of the program. The success of the program depends largely on compliance with the following indicators:

- efficient structure and effective decision making;
- a consistent method of focusing on results in order to achieve program objectives;
- an approach for program risks and requirements involved.

The effectiveness of a program depends on how the team meets its organizational structure to ensure effective decision making and implementation. An institutional superstructure results in a reduction in the efficiency of the program. In other words, program governance requires that the management team have the right to coordinate a process that focuses on the mission, vision and strategy of the organization without witnessing a doubling of the decision of the organization leadership itself. Such a managing process may be represented as follows:

**Project Management**

Since the 1980s, the increasingly complex business environment prompted the leaders of companies to focus on achieving and sustaining economic performance of their organizations. Putting such emphasis on the determinants of success and failure in business has led to increased interest in the formulation and implementation of corporative strategy (Turner and Simster, 2004: 31).

The 1990s brought new developments in business management: new concepts ap-
peared – flexibility (design and implementation are adapted to customer requirements), speed of delivering the ordered product to the customer, reducing the overall cost of the production system. In the late 1990s and the early twenty-first century appeared electronic commerce, along with the development of the Internet. Summarized, this is the general context in which project management has emerged as a science (Popa and Filip, 1999: 5).

Strategic management, as well as modern forms of project management, became very popular in a short time period. Both types of management were centered on changing organizations – a world in continuous dynamics. A rapid succession of threats and opportunities bore equally on individuals, companies, and economy sectors globally. This overall context has generated profound and irreversible changes to the very nature of managerial work. Many experienced managers, whose competence was based on the highly perfected ability to act within a hierarchy of command and control, witnessed an erosion of the value and relevance of skills at their disposal. Many organizations have realized that the pace of change in the international trading environment makes it impossible to separate planning from implementation. So they began to gain experience in the processes that were running and which later came to be called “project management”. Many of these early methods of project management were designed for use in development projects of internal computer systems, based on practices developed in areas that already had work projects focused on aerospace, petrochemical, weapons. The next step was to expand the existing processes of project management on integration and implementation of all strategic aspects and organizational development stratagem. This was the evolution of the idea of project management, beginning with its origins somewhere in the major reconstruction projects after the Second World War, following the stage of technological systems development projects and currently including planning, coordinating and controlling various and complex activities in all areas and implementation of all forms of organizational change (countries, international institutions, multinational corporations, companies, etc.) (Turner and Simster, 2004: 32-33).

Project management has emerged as a consequence of the globalization processes manifested in all areas, such as economic, social, political, military, cultural and legal. The challenges faced by an increasingly economically integrated system in the global competitiveness urged the development and improvement of new methods and techniques to deal with new issues in a more comprehensive formula. Whether it was the strategy of multinational companies or the socio-political vision of world states, the project essentially defined as a possible solution to a problem has become a universally accepted solution. Performing projects that use resources efficiently and respond in real time to society’s needs has become the concern of specialists (academics and practitioners) who
founded and developed the science of international project management.

Economic and political developments in the history over the last four decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century have transformed the initial perspective of bilateral relations between states in a multilateral world. The plurality of problems that mankind has had to respond to (population growth, interdependence of financial markets, diminishing natural resources, nutrition, conservation issues, underdeveloped areas of the planet) involved integrated solutions for which the involvement of all actors was needed. The determining factor in the development of this holistic approach to common issues for mankind was economics. The extent of international economic cooperation after the Second World War was crucial in terms of the current approaches in international project management. Under these auspices an international partnership was developed, based on several principles such as: attracting external research resources, the international capitalization of national results, integration within organizations at European / international level, the existence of mutual benefits between partners, etc.

Setting various state unions, associations, partnerships between different economic corporations and between countries (EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, etc.) was based on the idea of mutual gains. To maximize their development a strategy was needed to organize these organizations in terms of projects to be managed. The new dimension which assumes the concept of project in this context is international project and its management endorses a new name *international project management*. Such projects require a level of correlation and collaboration within the system of international organizations that were created. Consequently, participation in international projects has become a *sine qua non* condition for the existence of the modern state, its progress and welfare of its citizens. From the beginning there was however, and this aspect prevails, an adaptation and mutual flux between national interest and the international one, so that the various national projects have been integrated to maximize their results in projects / international programs. Thus the global environment in which competition is the key concept printed an international character on national projects, which have been strongly influenced by the interactions within it. So we can say that the management of international projects is an extension of project management.

According to Portney, “project management principles are simple and the most complicated technique requires a maximum of ten minutes to be treated” (Portney, 2001: 2). This assertion can be taken as an encouragement to those who want to make a career in project management, but cannot be treat it as an absolute truth. There are techniques developed within current undergraduate programs (bachelor, master, doctorate) dedicated to training specialists in project management, which therefore requires thorough
training, but the principles of this occupation are indeed logical and consistent. The same author shows that techniques and skills associated with project management should be seen rather as a way of thinking, a way of acting (Portney, 2001: 3). So, the novelty for international project management stems from the fact that the project can be seen as a chain of activities that produces measurable effects; regarding the mode of action, this is performed on the basis of drawing targets for a defined period of time and with a pre-established budget.

The objective of project management is to anticipate as many problems possible and to plan, organize and control activities so that projects are completed successful despite the risks.

The challenge that managers face today, whether they are in the private or in the public area, is the need to make a permanent change in the desired direction, and in a world increasingly unstable. One must find ways to harmonize the flexibility of the structure with the direction chosen, all this while keeping a high level of creativity.

Project management has become a profession in itself, the market displaying the need for training programs in project management, need that, as noted earlier, was addressed by American universities. It stemmed from the need to bring integration and control to highly complex technical projects and organizational systems, especially in construction and technological systems (Turner and Simster, 2004: 40).

On the other hand we must say that in the last three decades, project management, originally developed within large corporations migrated towards the public sector. This trend is mostly visible in the EU, where the need for economic integration under the pressure of new member states made so that project management became a constant.

References


PROJECT MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PROGRAMS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION


Current Diplomacy
Rules and Hofstede’s UAI, a study on the Arabic Muslim and European Christian cultures

Călin-Ştefan GEORGIA*

Abstract

The present paper is aimed at bringing to light some very important aspects of intercultural communication relating to Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index. The focus will be on the European and Arab cultures, consistent with correlative aspects of social life, pointed out by Hofstede and other authors. The result is a study on the UAI concerning the Arab Countries and a brief look into the correlation of the UAI with the way society works, with the image of the self and with linguistic complexity in pronoun use.

Keywords: Intercultural communication, Uncertainty Avoidance Index, Middle East, Europe.

Introduction and acknowledgements

The present study aims at analysing some of the correlative factors that G. Hofstede points out to, using the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) and his correlation of the UAI values with the degree of complexity of a culture’s rules. The UAI score is calculated starting from value 100, designating cultures which are more preoccupied with avoiding uncertainty, down to value 0, assigned to cultures which are less preoccupied with avoiding uncertainty.

G. Hofstede (2001, 2010) includes the Arab Countries in his scales of the four cultural dimensions that he identified. In his study (2001, 2010), “The Arab Countries” are composed of Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Values for these countries have been calculated as an average, which was then entered in the scale. Since the 3rd edition of Hofstede’s study (2010), additional data has been displayed in The Hofstede Centre database (www.geert-hofstede.com) for The Arab Emirates (score 80). We will discuss this aspect later on, in a dedicated chapter of this paper.

We acknowledge that both the “European culture” and the “Arab culture” cannot be treated as monoliths. We are fully aware of the fact that these are just artifices grouping the multiple cultures that make up each of the above mentioned clusters. Our intended
use of these clusters is to compare some of their general characteristics, ones that are shared by all the separate cultures that make up the European culture and all the individual cultures that make up the Arab culture. This artifice is far from being a perfect one but it will be of some help in analysing some of the traits shared by these clusters of cultures, as well as provide a good contrast between the two main clusters analysed.

Within this paper we will probably make fewer references to the European cultures, as portrayed in the following chapters. This approach will allow us to focus on “the other one”, in order to better portray the cultural particularities and correlations analysed.

Table 1 – Uncertainty Avoidance Index, Romania and Arab Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>America C/S</th>
<th>Europe S/E</th>
<th>Europe N/ NW/Anglo World</th>
<th>Europe C/E Ex-Soviet</th>
<th>Muslim World M.E. &amp; Africa</th>
<th>Asia E/SE</th>
<th>INDEX</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Israel</td>
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<td>81</td>
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</table>
Further Acknowledgements Regarding “The Arab Countries”

We believe that the Uncertainty Avoidance Index score of the Arab culture, as portrayed in Hofstede’s study would require further attention because of the grouping of the six countries (Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya and Saudi Arabia) in one conglomerate meant to represent the Arab Muslim world.

We have identified two main issues with this grouping. The first one would be the absence from the group of a great part of the Arab world, countries like Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Syria and Yemen being left out of the group. The second issue is Lebanon’s presence within the group which is a country with a very heterogeneous population especially as religion is concerned.

Looking further into the first issue identified above, the Arab Countries value stated in the last edition of the study (2010) and by the Hofstede Centre database is 68. However, the combined values of Egypt (80), Iraq (85), Kuwait (80), Lebanon (50), Libya (80) and Saudi Arabia (80) have an average of 75. Furthermore, if we add the new United Arab Emirates UAI value (80) which is published on the Hofstede Centre internet site, the average for the group would be 85. More so, if values from the other Arab countries are made available and added (Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Syria and Yemen), then the score would surely vary.

Concerning the second issue, regarding Lebanon's presence within the group, we strongly believe that Lebanon's case is a special one as far as the Arab culture is concerned.
In a country where the population is highly heterogeneous (59.7 Muslim, 39% Christian, 1.3% other religions), religion is one major factor, the country’s political system itself being confessional. According to Moaddel (2008), inter-religious relations exhibit a high degree of insecurity and distrust in the situation in which most of the Lebanese identify with their religion rather than ethnicity (Moaddel, 2008). Furthermore, the study registered significant differences in values, depending on ethnic group. For example, there are significant differences regarding gender equality between Druze and Sunni groups (around 19%) but perhaps the greatest difference recorded is regarding political attitudes, where the difference between the Sunni and Christian groups relating to whether religion and politics should be separated was 27%.

Because of this heterogeneous trait of the Lebanese environment, we strongly believe that if states of the Arab culture would be grouped together, Lebanon should be treated as a special case because the internal value system varies from group to group and the groups also affect one another, resulting in an intricately and heterogeneously woven system of coexisting values and beliefs. Then again, the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese are of Arab ethnicity and Lebanon is not the only Arab state with such a heterogeneous population, so we would have to argue that for the most faithful analysis, the information would have to be interpreted either on a country-by-country basis or within a determined, complete group.

Language complexity and the UAI

Language was one of the important correlative factors that Hofstede (2010:197) pointed to when detailing his findings on the Uncertainty Avoidance Index. Following his study, he has concluded that cultures situated at the high end of the scale are less rigorous about formulas of addressing to one another. Using Kashima & Kashima’s 1998 study on the personal pronoun use in cultural contexts, Hofstede points out to a direct proportionality between the uncertainty avoidance score of a culture and its inclination towards more complex formulas of communication. So, the higher the score on the scale the more complex the formulas of addressing get (i.e. tu, vous etc.). We have to point out that in Kashima and Kashima’s original 1998 work, the main focus was on the use of the singular form of the 1st and 2nd person. Their conclusion was that if the subject of the sentence was a pronoun, a language’s inclination to drop the pronoun would point out to an inclination towards being less individualistic and thus more community-oriented.

In this correlation between the UAI score and this particular linguistic trait we recog-
nise the need to underline some facts ascertaining to the European and Arabic cultures (referring to Standard Arabic as the language of reference).

The European cultures are situated at different positions with scores ranging from 112 to 65. From the linguistic perspective, within Indo-European languages there is no gender assignment in the singular form of the 1st and 2nd persons. More so, verbal forms of the Indo-European languages are not in accord with the pronouns regarding sex assignment. Sexual identification is entirely made by using pronouns (he, her) together with a verb (he walks, she walks) or contextually.

By contrast, the Arabic countries are situated at position No. 40-41, with a score of 68. From the linguistic perspective, the Standard Arabic Semitic formulas of addressing to one another are much more complex by comparison to the European ones, harmonizing the form of the verbs with the pronouns. Furthermore, besides the additional verbal conjugation forms (1st, 2nd and 3rd persons masculine and feminine, in both singular and plural) the Arabic language also features a „dual” form in both the 2nd and 3rd persons.

Comparing these two different linguistic particularities, one belonging to the European cultures which scored from 112 to 65 on the UAI and the other to the Arabic culture, which scored 68 on the UAI, we come to the conclusion that the Arabic language is much more complex than the European languages (except for German, according to the correlation which has a 0.43 variation according to Kashima and Kashima) as far as formulas of addressing to one another are concerned, as detailed in the 1st and 2nd persons, singular comparative verb conjugation chart below. However, most languages have strong inclinations to drop the personal pronoun. The difference in this case would be that in the Arabic language the form of the verb takes on the information on the sex of the person that was contained in the pronoun that was dropped.

Table 2 – Arabic conjugation in 1st and 2nd person, singular form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb-to write</th>
<th>1st person</th>
<th>1st plural</th>
<th>2nd m. sg.</th>
<th>2nd f. sg.</th>
<th>2nd d. sg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KATABA</td>
<td>Ana aktubu</td>
<td>Nahnu</td>
<td>Anta</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Antum</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>narrtubu</td>
<td>taktubu</td>
<td>taktubina</td>
<td>taktubaani</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, Hofstede’s observation based on the 1998 study of Kashima & Kashima establishes a link between discarding the personal pronoun as the subject of the sentence and the UAI score. Basically, the higher the UAI score, the higher the need for more rules and thus a more complex linguistic system, therefore the more use of the pronoun. In the above mentioned analysis, we have pointed out that in the case of comparing the main European languages and Standard Arabic, the latter has a much more complex structure
Concerning the UAI score, modern studies place some of the countries studied by Hofstede in the original study at a higher score (Oshlyansky, Cairns, Thimbleby, 2006; The Hofstede Centre).

### Religion’s importance to the present study

In both Persian and Arabic cultures, Islam (which has appeared within the Arabic cultural environment) has greatly influenced social life through its normative structure, regulating aspects from commerce to family law. Given the fact that Islam is a religion with a very powerful community focus and the Arab States are rated at position No. 42 out of 76 on Hofstede’s Individualism Index (Hofstede 2010:96), well within the collectivist half of the scale, and that Islam is the most widely spread religion within the Arab geopolitical area, we have decided to include cultural traits that are not only affiliated to the Arab culture but also to the Islamic one, being however fully aware that these two terms are not interchangeable, although the first is widely engulfed by the second.

One of the pillars of Islam, the Qur’an, is also referred to as The Constitution of Medina, because of its high normativity trait. Every day aspects of social life, from food to dress code, personal hygiene to family and commercial law are provisioned in norms that are either in the Hadith, Sunna, and the traditions of the Prophet or the Qur’An. In Islam, prayers are performed 5 times per day, occupying a central place in the life of a Muslim. Each prayer has a name and specific conditions that it must be performed in. For instance, the Fajr is performed at least 10-15 minutes before sunrise, Zuhr must be performed after true noon, Asr in the afternoon, when the shadow of an object is twice its size, Maghrib is performed after sunset, until dusk and Isha from dusk until dawn. Also, there is Jumuaa, the day when all the Muslims within an area gather at the local mosque to pray but this does not mean that they cannot do so in the other days of the week, the prayers being one of the 5 pillars of Islam.

By contrast, in the European cultures, like in most Christian countries, secular norms and religious ones are well separated within society. The prayer remains a community event but is only performed on Sundays. By contrast, there is no daily obligation to prayer for the faithful and there are no prerequisites that one must fulfil other than confession before sacrament.

### Purity and the UAI

In a 1965 study (Mary Douglas: 174) cited by Hofstede (2010), the author portrays dirt or impurity as rejected elements. This would also, in turn, imply that the acceptance of dirt or impurity would equal the acceptance of a lower hierarchic position than the
orderly system that rejected it. Dirt which pollutes can thus also be associated with personal hygiene and its symbolic meaning in religious rituals. We understand that there are a lot of variables concerning the multiple aspects of such a subject and we do not claim to adopt an exhaustive approach in this regard. However, we will base our arguments on the assertion that one’s surrounding reality which leads to the constitution of one’s subjective reality plays a key role in the formation of one’s self, shaping one’s cultural identity (Kitayama, 2000). We will further base our present analysis on a very specific trait of the Muslim culture, the institution of the prayer, which takes place 5 times per day. A study of The PEW Research Forum which involved face-to-face interviews with more than 38,000 people has recorded that in Middle Eastern countries with Arab-Muslim majority, Muslims have reported that religion is very important in their lives: Morocco (89%), Jordan (85%), Palestinian territories (85%), Iraq (82%), Tunis (78%), Egypt (75%), and Lebanon (59%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% who say religion is very important in Ages 18-34</th>
<th>% who pray several times a day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian territories</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>74</td>
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</table>


More so, there is also data regarding the percentage of Muslims that pray multiple times per day, indicating a strong system of belief and thus a very high compliance with general religious prescriptions.

Concerning personal purity, the ablution ritual of “Wudhu” must be performed under strict rules (i.e. for each paired part of the body start with the right one) in order for the body of the Muslim to be fit for prayer. A ritual that consumes from 5-10 minutes to half an hour or more, wudhu is also a state of purity that can be broken in certain conditions.
that may vary from scholar to scholar and from sect to sect: passing gas, faeces or urinating, sexual discharge (both male and female), deep sleep that makes a person unaware of his or her surroundings, loss of consciousness, touching the sexual organ with the bare hand. In the situation that the above situations occur, the ritual of wudhu must be performed again in order to obtain the purity needed in order to pray properly (Al-Imâm Ibn Qudámah).

This is just one example out of many concerning personal and collective purity, like eating only with the right hand, always entering the prayer room right foot first and much more. These traits are consistent with Hofstede’s correlation between the UAI and the degree of provisioning or social rules within a society and point out to yet another set of cultural elements that would situate the Arabic culture further up on the UAI scale.

**Rules and leadership legitimacy**

When it comes to norms, the European Christian and Arab Muslim cultures share some values that are, however, interpreted differently in each case. This became even clearer in the case of the recognition of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although most Arab Muslim countries signed the document and apparently supported it diplomatically, many did not ratify it internally. One of the most important reasons for the rejection of the internal ratification of this set of norms was that it was culturally biased, being the projection of Judeo-Christian values. This is not to say that the Arab countries that were not keen on integrating these norms into their internal legal frameworks did not share the values defended by it but some of these values were culturally interpreted in a different way. This apparent cultural clash gave birth to a mirrored initiative to defend human rights which benefitted from the approval and acceptance of its signing entities, The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. The emergence of a parallel document that is practically a source of international law, which contains references to religion, may be puzzling to a European Christian. What do legal norms and rules have to do with religion, which is mostly associated with morality? This is one of the most clash ing aspects when it comes to European Christian – Middle Eastern Islam interactions.

Following the 1996 Arbitration Act in Britain, Muslim Shari’a Courts have emerged and quickly started to function, imparting justice within Britain’s Muslim communities. Seeing that the phenomenon grew wider, some non-Muslims began to fear what would happen to them if they were to come under the Shari’a jurisdiction. The fact was that the Muslim Shari’a Tribunals were arbitration courts that required the express request of a person in order to be able to pass judgement on any aspect concerning that person, so al-
though its decisions were enforceable by law, one would choose whether or not he or she would be tried by such a tribunal, which was in fact functioning exactly like a Commercial Arbitration Tribunal (Georgia, Jucan 2011). The British Muslim Shari’a (Arbitration) Tribunals developed and spread so fast because Muslim communities really needed this institution to set their differences and the vast majority preferred it to the secular, more powerful legal system, and even the women, who basically had a more favourable status within the national legal system, were inclined to use the Shari’a.

As we have argued before, Islam, compared to Christianity, is a system of beliefs with a very pronounced normative character that was preserved over time. Furthermore, in the European Christian states, religion and secular matters are notoriously separated, while in the Arab Muslim states religion and politics are intertwined, sometimes inextricably dependent on one another. As a consequence of this fact, all the Middle Eastern states with Arab Muslim majority have internal legal frameworks that are tributary to Islam and to Shari’a norms. In one way or another, they are imbued within the constitutions of the states and/or function alongside general legal norms. Thus, Islamic Shari’a provisions regulate diverse aspects of social life, ranging from commercial matters to family ones.

In the previous chapter, we have underlined the importance of certain practices related to purity and prayer. While practices are a very important aspect of religion and, in fact, of any system of beliefs, we intend to go beyond this and stress that a system of beliefs moulds one’s personality, playing a crucial part in the development of the ego, super-ego and the way that one perceives and interprets the surrounding reality (Nakata, 2009; Hofstede, 2010). Rules are the expression of encouraged behaviour within a society and whether or not they are followed and respected to the letter by each and every individual matters less than the overall impression of their enforcement. As long as there is a critical mass within a society that upholds and enforces a set of rules, they will produce their effects, even if social conditions impose adaptation or deviation from their original form.

This is where one of the most visible contrast areas between the Arab Islamic civilization and the European Christian occur. In all of the European Christian Cultures, due to the fact that religion and state are profoundly separated, being two entities that exert their power in parallel systems that do not overlap, the rules that directly affect society are the ones derived from state authority, namely the states’ legislative systems. More precisely, parliaments are the main source of law, followed by the judicial systems that generate case law. The interpretation of the law falls within the exclusive competence of the judicial systems of the states. All the rules that can be enforced by the state and thus guaranteed by the state’s monopoly over coercive power are the product of the above mentioned man-made systems. Religion, in this case, is the realm of morality, which is the source of social norms that are optional within a society, open to interpretation and subjectivity. More
so, in most of the European countries, multiculturalism opened the environment up to all religions and thus to all systems of values, some of them conflicting, so that morality would be dependent on the point of view of the observer.

By contrast, in the Arab Muslim world, religion and state are interwoven, even in the states with the most secular tendencies. Even in the dictatorships from before the Arab Spring, although the main spectre of Civil Law was regulated by legal norms of English or French origin, some adapted to the specifics of the area or others taken as they were, there were some aspects of social life which were regulated by Shari'a inspired provisions. Family life was one such matter, with different implications regarding inheritance, marriage, the decomposition of marriage, adoption and so on.

Taking these two separate approaches concerning rules, one might ask oneself what would be the importance of how rules are made and implemented in an environment, why does it matter as long as there are rules and people abide by them? Well, this would be, as we have argued in an argument from one of the previous chapters, one of the greatest contrasts between these two cultures.

**Social norms and the power of the mundane**

Answering the question which ended the previous chapter, the way rules are applied within a social environment is very important in the way rules are made and implemented and especially in what concerns their overall effects within the social environment.

In the European states, the main actors that play key roles as far as rules are concerned are the parliament, the government and the judicial system. These three institutions come together and uphold the State's monopoly on coercive force. The rules take the form of juridical norms, which are then digested by the population and are most widely perceived as social norms. For instance, theft is usually regulated by the Penal Code but it is common knowledge that theft will be punished by the authorities. Juridical norms are in fact social norms that are guaranteed by the state and the community within which they operate is moulded by them and the prescribed behaviours are assimilated by the individuals over time. However, as society changes, so do the juridical norms. This also triggers a change in the social norms and in what is perceived as morality. For example, before 1989, adultery was a punishable crime in Romania. After 1989 it was de-incriminated and nowadays, while adultery is morally undesirable, the social reaction to it is not as powerful as it was back when it was incriminated and correlativey, Romania's divorce rate has been experiencing a rise in the last 20 years. Although, as we have argued, juridical norms are social norms that become part of an individual's preferable behaviour and
of the way she or he relates to the surrounding reality, rules are complicated. Rules need a main body, a methodology of implementation and other details that make these matters more suited for specialized organisms and occupations rather than the general public.

In the Arab states of the Middle East, due to their former colonial status, most of their internal state composition mimics the one of the European states, mainly the existence of a government, a judicial power and a legislative body. Although there are substantial similarities, the core of the Arab Muslim society is very different from the European one. In most of the Arab states, there is a framework of juridical norms similar to in the European one, with one big difference, namely that Shari’a norms are incorporated into the legal framework. However, implementing the rules is different from making them and in this regard, within some matters, conflicts occur between the social norms which are already accepted by the individuals as part of their positively prescribed behaviour and the juridical norms enforced by the state.

In a previous chapter we have argued that Islam is a very normative system of beliefs. Its normative sources regulate a very wide part of the spectrum of social life, from norms regarding personal hygiene to prayer, cooking, dress code, commercial interactions and even proof in litigations. This time, Islam’s normative framework, although it may slightly differ in interpretation from one region to the other and greatly differ in the case of confessional differences (i.e. Sunni-Shia), retains a common frame and a far greater stability over time than the judicial norms which animate the European societies. In this regard, in Islam the only source of law is considered to be God and man-made norms are devoid of authority because man cannot rule man, only God having this attribute. Thus, Islamic norms benefit from both the legitimacy of religion and the stability it offers. Taking the subject of adultery into question once more, even if not all the Arab countries incriminate it, the consequences are far more complex than in the European environment. Even where judicial norms do not stipulate punishments, social norms give birth to phenomena like honour killings or others which are based on morality and the social practices within a given community.

Conclusion

Cultural identity is a very complex aspect of human life. One that is shaped by numerous factors and prone to changes and shifts that mimic the complex world we are living in. Hofstede’s dimensions of culture, including the one that we have analysed in this paper, the Uncertainty Avoidance Index, shed some light into the inner workings of the cultural avatars that we are. However, further studies (Oshlyansky, Cairns, Thim-
bleby, 2006; Nakata 2009) have shown that this paradigm is neither a complete nor an extremely accurate one. Some would argue that due to the complexity of human life, such a paradigm may not be found at all.

We believe that Hofstede’s UAI dimension is a very sturdy base that allows further development to be made on the matter and we find the correlation of the UAI with general norms like purity or rules and with the linguistic complexity of a culture to be very compatible. The way a society works, the image of the self and the complexity of the code used for communication within a culture are aspects of human life that contribute to shaping our realities. We believe that the integration of more variables measuring these human aspects would greatly contribute to a more accurate cultural representation of uncertainty avoidance.

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The message of American pro-Soviet movies during World War II – *The North Star, Song of Russia, Mission to Moscow*

Andrei COJOC

„War has put Hollywood’s traditional conception of the Muscovites through his wringer, and they have comeshaved, washed, sober, good to their families, Rotarians, Brother Elks, and 33rd Degree Mason”
Variety, 28 October 1942

Abstract
The aim of this paper is not only to present the process behind pro-communist Hollywood film-making during the first years of World War II, but also to give notice concerning the nature of the visual message, illustrating how the attitude towards communism evolved in the interwar period. Moreover, this paper will demonstrate that the pro-Soviet attitudes found on the big screens were a mix of several factors: from Roosevelt’s grand design and the use of “soft power”, to the OWI (Office of War Information) directives concerning movie scripts, and the major studios (MGM, Warner Brothers, RKO) intentions to capitalize on the new forced alliance, “giving a pat on the back, to keep them fighting” (Committee of Un-American Activities, 1947: 80). Although some 20 movies with a clear pro-Soviet message were produced between 1942 and 1944, I will direct my attention on three most important ones: “The North Star”, “Song of Russia”, and “Mission to Moscow”.

**Keywords**: OWI, Mission to Moscow, World War II, Roosevelt, Propaganda

The on-screen portrayal of the communist before 1942

**Between 1919 and 1920**, The US witnessed its first Red Scare, ignited by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, and fueled by such events as the “great strikes” (3600 strikes with over 4 million workers), flourishing race riots all over the East coast, and mail bombings of eighteen government officials and industrial leaders. These public unrests were put on the shoulders of “red radicals” by the US General Attorney Mitchell Palmer ordering the rounding-up and deportation of 10000 aliens, in what are now called the “Palmer Raids” (Heale, 1990: 72).

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This, together with a conservatory approach on Hollywood’s movie themes handled by the newly appointed head of the MPPDA (Motion Picture Producers and Distributors), the Presbyterian Church official Will H Hays, offered the perfect context for anti-communist pictures to reach the big screens. Moreover, pictures that dealt with labor unions, corruption, strikes were put aside, considered too dangerous (Shaw, 2007: 13).

It is in this hostile environment that motion pictures like Bolshevism on Trial (1919), The Right to happiness (1919) and Orphans of the Storm (1922) were released. While the first movie dealt with an utopist settlement with a socialist basis that destroys itself, the later compares the French Revolution (which overthrew a bad government) to the Russian one (which has no chance of overthrowing the American government, due to its good nature).

Another group of films (Virtuous Men, The Great Shadow and Dangerous Hours) portrayed the strikes of 1919-1920 as being ignited by the works of well-trained Bolsheviks, and not as a consequence of postwar inflation and low wages: crowds of workers were being choreographed to seem more like an angry and violent mob. Volcano (1919) showed the mail bombings as the work of Bolsheviks and Undercurrent explains that the US steel strike was ignited by Trotskyists.

The irony is, as Steven Ross points out, that the labor unions were seen as strong organizations of either communist, Bolsheviks or socialists. In fact, these radical groups in the US were disintegrating either by government harassment, or by internal division: The Socialist Party had 40000 members, and the feared Communist Party 118.000, less than 1% of the adult population of America (Ross, 1999: 141).

As for governmental endorsements, many anti-radical films were accustomed to them. Senators, Governors and state legislators gave their support for the creation and distribution of such material (Ross, 1999: 141).

Although the Red Scare had its prewar climax in the early 1920s, the danger of a worldwide revolution seemed unrealistic, considering that leftist movements failed to succeed in countries like Germany and Hungary, an. In addition, the prosperity of the 1920s diminished the Soviet critique of the capitalist system until 1929, when the stock market crashed. What changed after that is the portrayal of the nature of evil: Before Wall Street crashed, poverty and injustice were portrayed a consequence of foreign threats. Now, the villain stereotype has a more individualistic characteristic: Bankers and managers were identified as responsible for the mismanagement that led to the crash.

Moreover, the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) as president in 1933, and the breakthrough recognition of the Soviet Union seemed to put the bilateral relations on a steady zone. The membership of the communist party was at its highest peak, and the
anti-communist seen before seemed to be transforming into anti-fascism, once the Civil Spanish War started.

Nevertheless, even with all that, the portrayal of the communist continued to be a caricaturist; Ernst Lubitsch's Trouble in Paradise (1932) depicts the communist as criticizing the lead character for her foolish and irresponsible way of spending money on jewelry and cosmetics Ninotchka (1939) illustrates the whole cumulated anti-communism of the interwar period. It's the love story between the Soviet-style new woman, tough, cold and work-obsessed, (Greta Garbo) and the witty, capitalist lawyer, Leon (Melvin Douglas). After he converts her to capitalism, Ninotchka is deported to the Soviet Union, which is portrayed as a place where outside information is censored, food is rationed. The plot states that an average Soviet citizen, far from being an ideologist, given the chance, will be turned around by capitalist virtue (McLaughlin and Parry, 2006: 149). Despite all these, the movie sets itself apart from other anti-communist flicks, by giving the communist a human face. Normally reluctant of praising political movies, due to the political context of late 1939 (the Nazi-communist pact and the Red Army invasion of Poland), the film got excellent reviews from New York Times (a humoristic view of the humor-sided folk who read Marx but never the funny papers) and New York Tribune (Greta Garbo has done more in one line to debunk the Soviet Union than we have been able to do in hundreds of editorials) (Shaw, 2007: 23).

The war and OWI

The United States' attitude towards the Soviet Union shifted on 22nd of June 1941, when Hitler began sending his Panzers towards Moscow, and after December '41 the alliance between the two opposite systems was a necessity. So, the American's perceptions of the Soviet Union had to be shaped overnight so that FDR could receive popular support for entering the war on the Soviet Union's side. The responsibility for such a task was put on the back of the OWI (Office of War Information). Understanding the relationship between this agency and Hollywood can help shed light the objectives of pro-Soviet films released between 1942 and 1945.

The OWI was formed by an executive order on 12th of June 1942 consolidating several prewar information agencies. The BMP (Bureau of Motion Pictures) headed by a liberal New-Dealer, Lowell Mellet, was in charge of advising Hollywood about the means to support the war effort. Mellet established a Hollywood office ran by Nelson Poynter, who was in charge of overseeing the message of the wartime movies (Koppes and Black, 1977:...
89). To help the Hollywood raise awareness of the nature of WWII, Poynter wrote a set of guidelines united in “Manual for the Motion Picture Industry”.

In a comprehensive third chapter of the handbook, called “Who are our allies”, “Tinsel Town” is advised to learn more about the their former enemy, The Soviet Union: We must fight the unity lies about Russia (.), emphasize the might and heroism, the victory of the Russians. In a most surprising manner we find out that ‘we Americans reject communism, but we do not reject our Russian ally’ (United States, 1942).

Although OWI clashed several times with the heads of the Big Studios, MGM, Warner Brothers, RKO, Paramount, it found a way to capitalize on war, by simply denying reality. They would announce BMP of the themes of the productions, so that the international bureau could direct the distribution of the films into areas where Louis B Mayer, Harry Warner, or Samuel Goldstein could capitalize.

It is in this context that every major studio (except Paramount) submitted its share of pro-Soviet movies: Samuel Goldwin's North Star (1943), MGM’s Song of Russia (1943), United Artist's Three Russian Girls (1943), Warner's Mission to Moscow (1943), RKO's Days of Glory (1944), Columbia's Boy from Stalingrad (1943) and Counter Attack (1945). The three most important pillars of pro-Soviet propaganda emerged in 1943: The North Star, Song of Russia and Mission to Moscow.

### The North Star

In 1942, screenwriter Lillian Hellman and director Wyler met with the Soviet ambassador, Maxim Litvinov, in order to get approval for a shooting a documentary in the Soviet Union (Westbrook, 1990: 168). The other side of the pre-production, according to Hellman’s official biographer, William Wright was that officials from the White House solicited Hellman to write a pro-Soviet movie. As film historians Clayton Koppes and Gregory Black claim, Hellman was approached by a protégée of Roosevelt’s, Harry Hopkins for doing an on-scene documentary, and that the production was given a green light by none-other that Viaceslav Molotov (Koppes and Black, 2000: 209). But after director Wyler was drafted in the army, Samuel Goldstein hired Ukrainian born Lewis Milestone to direct the film, and transformed it into a pure-blood Hollywood piece. The story is simple: A small collective farm (which Hellman locates somewhere on the Bessarabia-Russian border), shaped as an American village, is being under attacked by the brutal Germans in June 1941 who, besides wanting to erase the village, have been draining children of blood to provide plasma for their wounded. The highlight of the movie is the resistance fight of the heroic villagers, portrayed by an all American cast: Walter Houston, Dana...
Andrews, Anne Baxter, and Walter Brennan. As Bernard K Dick puts it, it’s a historical inaccuracy to portray the Ukrainians (who suffered the worst famine ever in the winter of 32-33) as resistance fighters, especially when there are photos depicting Ukrainian peasants welcoming German troops (Dick, 1996: 160).

The movie intends to provide an explanation as to why the Unites States should fight next to the Soviet Union. Just like in her previous project, The Negro Soldier, Hellman’s script emphasizes the fact that, by diminishing differences between the two cultures, one can see that both are fighting for the same goals.

To build up sympathy for the Soviet drama the common notion that the Soviets were faceless, shallow, godless men would have to disappear. In order to do that, the film portrays the regular soviet family just like classic American ones: the little Ukrainian town, in times of peace resembles a paradise, with dances, picnics. The wives are affectionate and the children are all proper brought-up; except for the icon in the dining room, and the picturesque rooftops, this could be Iowa or Oklahoma (Koppes and Black, 2000).

The propaganda behind the movies is seen in the ability of the peasants to organize themselves into guerillas and without a trace of military or governmental help to protect their homeland (resembling the ad-hoc assemblies that governed themselves in American westerns). Nothing is mentioned of the communist regime, or of any local government, shedding a feudalistic light on the whole village. Moreover, it doesn’t seem likely that any Russian authority would accept their men giving loaded weapons to the Ukrainian people, after decades of oppression.

After the village is seized again by the villagers-turned-guerilla fighters, the final lines pronounce judgment of days to come: ‘We’ll make a free world for all men. The Earth belongs to us. If we fight for it. And we will fight for it’. In a strange way the line would be accurate in view of the future planned by Stalin for the world.

Even though Lillian Hellman, the screenwriter, stated that she was inspired by her visits to the Soviet Union, as it turns out, she didn’t know anything at all about the common Russian people, not to mention about villages. Whenever she visited Moscow, Hellman stayed at Soviet officials’ houses, benefiting from an NKVD escort.

The film ended up being nominated for six Oscars, including best musical score, which was composed by Aaron Copland, and supposed to be Ukrainian folk, but ended up inspiring itself from Russian popular music (Pollack, 2000: 381).

As for the reviews, Bosley Crowther, the New York Times critic (a vehement opponent of anti-communist propaganda in the early 1950s), called the movie “a picture (..) without any political pondering at all (..) lyric and savage” (Crowther, 1943a). In the same tone, Life magazine called it “an eloquent tone poem (..) a document showing how the people fight and die” (Life Magazine 1943: 119).
Opposite, the Hearst Press condemned it as communist propaganda, The Sunday Times admitting that the film could not have been worse if Stalin directed it (Shindler, 1979: 63).

The North Star proved itself a success even in Russia, the Soviet embassy in Washington reporting that the film played with a full house in Tomsk, Novosibirsk and Stalinsk.

### Song of Russia

The 1943 MGM movie stars Robert Taylor as John Meredith, a famous American symphony conductor who is touring Soviet Russia before the war. He falls in love with Russian Nadya Stepanova (Susan Peters), who charms him with her typical American girl conviviality. The two marry, but their honeymoon is interrupted by the brutal German invasion. Nadya joins the resistance, throwing Molotov cocktails all over the place and transforming (as the villagers in The North Star) into a virtuous fighter. The attitude of the peasants in Nadya's village resembles the North Star villager, who, aware of the imminent danger decides to burn down their houses and lands. John returns from his tour and decides to fight next to his wife against the Nazis, but the villagers wisely advise them to spread the word of the Russian resistance back in America. The wartime message is summarized by John when he tells his countrymen that “we are all soldiers side by side in the fight for all humanity” (Whitfield, 1996: 128).

Before the movie reached the audiences, its script was several times cut and renewed with elements coming either from OWI advices, or from The Hays Office. Even though both the producer, Louis B Mayer and the leading man Richard Taylor, testified in 1947 in front of the Committee of Un-American Activities, they both denied the fact that the Office of War Information approached them. Meyer testified that his people came with the idea and that OWI only accepted it, and from Taylor’s deposition we find out that Mellet, head of the BMP, was a common presence at the studio (Committee of Un-American Activities, 1947).

In his extensive studies of the movie, Robert Meyhew reveals from what remains of the archives OWI, that even though the Bureau didn't interfere directly it set a number of guidelines for the film, and also asked the opinion of Vladimir Bazikin, the First Secretary of the Embassy, who in return made a list of 8 points: from including Russian intelligentsia, the lead role driving a car, not a wagon, the use of “more Russian names” (Frumkin became Petrov), to an explanation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, that Nadya had to offer to John.
Of course Russia signed a non-aggression pact with Germany, that Russia would sign a non-aggression pact with any country, that Russia is opposed to aggression by any other country and is willing to give guarantee not to be aggressor against other country. This rather than the explanation given in the present script. (Letter from Lowell Mellett to Warren Pierce (deputy to Nelson Poynter), 9 January 1943, in Mayhew, 2004: 346).

In the final script no mention of the Nazi-Soviet Pact ever exists. Even OWI reviewers were concerned that the Nazi-Soviet Pact could prove to the audiences that the Soviet Union is unreliable. Concerning Russia’s preparedness for the imminent war, the same reviewer, speaking almost like a Soviet official says:

Here again is an opportunity to show that Russia had felt that it was almost inevitable that some day she would be attacked by Germany. This fixation on the part of Russia explains so many things about Russia that are not well understood, such as her war against Finland and extending her frontiers soon after Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939]. (Film analysis of Jarrico-Collins’ script (MHL f.2928–29). Reviewer’s name not given, 28 December 1942 in Mayhew, 2004: 345).

Even though not all recommendations were met in the final version of the script, the fact that the studio would at least consider the opinion of the government or a Soviet official reveals the intent of the picture.

Like in The North Star, the idea is to reveal that Russians have in fact many of the qualities and habits of an “average Joe”. When seeing the atmosphere in a Moscow nightclub (!), John is surprised of the cheerfulness of the Russian people. Moreover, a piece from an American composer is heard playing. Cold War film critic, Nora Sayre, points out that the portrayal of the Russians is almost identical with the portrayal of Afro-Americans: a cheerful race, dependent on music and laughter, with music in their souls (Sayre, 1979: 217).

Many movie scenes are filled with historical inaccuracies: John is conducting the American orchestra playing the American anthem, “The Star Spangled Banner”, under the Soviet flag; when John goes to Nadya’s village, collectivization by the happy comm unity resembles more a hay raising in the United States; the freedom of religion is also present: the two lovers are married by the local orthodox priest (Mayhew, 2002).

The New York Times turns a blind eye on the movies obvious pro-Soviet message and Crowther sees in it only ‘a topical musical film, filled with rare good humor, rich vitality and a prosper respect of the Russians’ fight in the war’ (Crowther, 1944).
**Mission to Moscow**

The Warner Brothers’ contribution to the war effort was the portrayal of former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E Davies, and his visit to Moscow, on which he decided to write a book in 1942.

The movie relies on Davies’ own experiences and beliefs about the Soviets following his visit, and meeting the Soviet officials.

Mission to Moscow starts with the real former ambassador, telling the viewer that the authenticity of the information cannot be put under question, since it's part of his experience. ‘No leaders of a nation have been so misunderstood as those in the Soviet Government during those critical years between the world wars’ (Mission to Moscow, 1943). After his meeting with President Roosevelt (close friends since World War I), he is proposed to go to Moscow and improve bilateral ties between the two countries. Even though that didn’t happen, he succeeded in establishing a rapport between him and the communist counterparts.

The plot is full of historical distortions in order to put the Soviet Union in a favorable light. After leaving the United States, Davies travels first to Nazi Germany where, even though he is denied a meeting with Hitler he tries to persuade the head of the National Bank of the benefits of a disbarment plan guaranteed by FDR. He then goes to the Soviet Union, remaining astounded by the people’s cheerfulness and their progress. After meeting Litvinov, he visits the factories of several high points of Soviet Union industry (from the tractor factories of Kharkov, to the oil fields of Baku), and is amazed of the development of the Russian society. Moreover, he is also informed that 1/3 of the workers are women, and that most head engineers have worked before in the United States. The preparedness of war also comes into discussion, when Davies finds out that most tractors built by the Russians can be transformed into fighting tanks.

Russian women, we are told, are not so different from American women. Molotov’s wife, Polina, is the manager of a Cosmetic Factory in Moscow, and when confronted with Margaret Davies’ doubt that the Russians were fond of cosmetics, she replies: “We discovered that feminine beauty is not a luxury (...) we have so much in common” (Mission to Moscow, 1943).

The plot thickens when Davies is invited to an official banquet held at a Russian Dacha, where officials from England, France, Italy, Japan and Germany are invited. It is here that he meets Bukharin (chief editor of Pravda, and the Izvestia), Radek and Marshall Tukhachevski (former leader of the Red Army between 1925 and 1928). Over the next days the three men and others are brought by the NKVD in front of a Moscow court, on suspicion of trying to subvert the government (history tells us that in fact, Marshall...
Tukhachevki was shot in the head without a public trial a year before). The movie insists on the guiltiness of the accused, when each one of them admitting that they carefully followed orders from Leon Trotsky, in a conspiracy which also included German and Japanese officials (for their help the Japanese were to be given territories in the Pacific Ocean, and Germany received Ukraine).

After a talk with Litvinov, Davies is informed that war is inevitable, and if the collective security fails, the Soviet Union will do whatever it takes to protect its boarders (it is obvious that this is an attempt to explain to the American people the future Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939). Assisting at the 1st of May parade in 1938, Davies is stunned by the innovative military techniques of the Russian Army, but hours later he is informed of the atrocities committed in Shanghai and other Chinese cities, by the Japanese soldiers. Davies is convinced of the necessity of an alliance with the Soviet Union and China against the common enemy.

Last but not least, he is privileged to meet Stalin, who informs him that the current situation is only France's and England's fault. Reactionary forces there have permitted Germany to arm itself again. “In my opinion, the governments of France and England don't represent the people”, says Stalin (Mission to Moscow, 1943). Although admitting that he would not ally with Germany, if Czechoslovakia is conquered, he maintains his distrust of the collective security system. Nevertheless he speaks kind about the American people: We want you to realize that we feel friendlier toward the government of the United States than toward any other nation.

Talking to Churchill about an alliance with the Soviet Union, he informs him of their immense progress in the industry, the military, and of the bravery of the common Russian soldier. If not, he informs Churchill, Russia will sign a pact with Germany (again, the Nazi-Soviet pact is pun on the shoulders of Western democracies' passiveness).

Returning home, Davies tries to convince the senators of the immanency of war, and of the necessity of an alliance with Russia, but is confronted by their non-interventionist policy. After 1st of September 1939 Davies was the promoter of a lend-lease pact, and after the German Barbarossa operation the film portrays him taking delivering speeches all over American. He also tries to explain the 1940 invasion of Finland: Russia tried to occupy defensive positions on the territory of Finland, but when the fascist government of Mannheim refused, Stalin didn't have any other choice.

Like the other two examples, and even more than that, the picture is an example of how Roosevelt, the OWI and the studios worked together in producing a wartime pro-Soviet motion picture.

From his extensive study of governmental involvement in Mission to Moscow, Todd Bennett reveals that Roosevelt met Davies three times in 1942 to be informed on the
Andrei CojoC

film’s progress. “By reviewing scripts and prints, OWI propagandists exercised authority over Mission to Moscow, ensuring that it promotes the “united nations” theme.” (Bennet, 2001: 495).

After seeing the final script the Office of War Information was thrilled; the effort to show that no major differences existed between the two people worked: both leaders desired peace, both people are well fed and have a high living standard, and the American people is told that the Soviet Union would prove itself a good neighbor in case of fire (Bennet, 2001: 495).

The New York Times praised the film for showing sharply and frankly the point of view of Russia, and emphasizing the fact that the Soviets were able to identify the danger in Europe, when no one else could (Crowther, 1943b). Fortunately, most reviewers criticized the flick: James Agee, in The Nation, refers to it as a “shameful rot”, and Commonweal finds it dull and pedantic. The New Republic notices the sudden change from red-baiting to red-praising, both turning out ignorant. Life notes that the only purpose of the movie, besides entertainment, is to sell the USSR to American citizens (Life Magazine, 1943). John Dewey, who led the commission for the investigations of Soviet purges, wrote a letter to The New York Times [Moscow Film Again Attacked], in which he defines the movie as the first “totalitarian propaganda for mass consumption” (Dewey, 2008: 353).

The spring of 1943 saw American-Soviet relations slowly deteriorating following the failure of opening a second front in Western Europe. Roosevelt maintained the belief that if he could talk face to face to Stalin, then all these misunderstandings would be cleared off. Because he thought that not social thinking, but the state on international insecurity motivated the Soviets, FDR felt that a state of trust had to be built between the leaders. It was up to Davies again to smooth the path for cooperation. A “second mission to Moscow” found the former ambassador trying to explain to Stalin that no differences should divide the Allies. It is in this context that the 1943 movie became part of the cultural diplomacy, as a means of “soft power”. The Soviet film historian, Peter Kenez, notes that before being distributed, every film of the late 1930’s was watched by the members of the Politburo and by V.I.Stalin (Kenez, 1995: 157).

So, on the 20th of May 1943, Stalin, Molotov (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Litvinov (Ambassador to the United States), Beria (Head of NKVD), Mikoyan (Special Representative of the State Defense Committee) and Marshall Voroshilov, together with Davies and the US ambassador at the time, Standley (although he had presented his resignation 4 weeks before), viewed “Mission to Moscow” in the private cinema at the Kremlin Palace.

Although the movie didn’t manage to get a positive reaction from of Stalin, except a grunt or two, he approved the movie's release in the Soviet Union, being one of the first
American movies to receive distribution rights in more than a decade, being praised by the Soviet’s press. Pravda and Izvestia noted that the intention of the film was to promote mutual understanding between the two powers (Bennet, 2001: 509). And although Davies’ “second mission to Moscow” wasn’t a success (Stalin promising FDR a meeting in Alaska, only to keep putting off the meeting, and eventually meeting FDR and Churchill in Teheran), the movie was considered as a token of good will, and managed to buy more time before the United States would give their approval for a second front. Moreover, as a result of the visit, America’s distribution power grew, delivering approximately 150 newsreel and 70 motion pictures to the Soviet Union, numbers that, towards the end of the war, began to worry Soviet officials.

### The Aftermath

The so-called on-screen friendship between America and Russia was deeply criticized in Washington, in the wake of the Cold War. Such governmental organization, as HUAC (House of Un-American Affairs Committee), The Catholic League for Decency, The Motion Picture Alliance, the Alliance for Preservation American Values, put up together the infamous blacklists of people presumed to be members of the Communist Party, or have communist beliefs. The Hearings Regarding Communist Infiltration of The Motion Pictures were held by HUAC in 1947, and the main targets were the contributors to wartime pro-Soviet pictures.

Robert Taylor (the lead role in Song of Russia) testified that he was persuaded by the White House to appear in the film, although he retracted it later. Louis B Mayer, the head of MGM said in front of Parnell Thomas, the head of the committee that he intended to do a musical, than a realistic portrait of the Soviet Union, reminding that he also made movies like Ninotchka and Comrade X, which portray Russians as a joke. Also testifying about the film was famous novelist, Russian-born Ayd Rand, who declared that ‘the presentation of that kind of happy existence in a country of slavery and horror is terrible because it is propaganda.’

Jack Warner, the producer of Mission to Moscow, being terrified of the hearings, ‘behave like a cornered villain from one of the studios’ gangster movies’ (Ceplair and En glutng, 1979: 259). He named as a communist almost every left-wing believer and liberal in the studio (that practically meant everyone who worked there, most of them being New Dealers), although, as he states, ‘I have never seen a communist, and I wouldn’t know one if I saw one’ (Committee of Un-American Activities, 1947: 11).

Director Lewis Milestone (The North Star) was part of the group of the Hollywood
Nineteen (the group of unfriendly witnesses, who invoked the first amendment) to be summoned by the Commission for their involvement with the Communist Party. He together with other seven directors and screenwriters finally managed to avoid testifying. As for the rest of the Hollywood Ten, they remained the main victims of the Hollywood Purges, each of them being tried and sentenced for contempt of the Court.

Screenwriter Howard Koch (Mission to Moscow) was himself blacklisted in 1951, after being subsequently fired from the Warner Brothers Studios, after the war.

Lillian Hellman, the screenwriter of The North Star, was summoned in 1952 by the committee, and although in a letter sent to HUAC she declared not invoking the fifth amendment, if the all the questions were concerning herself and no one else (I cannot and will not cut my conscience to fit this year’s fashion – Hellman, 1952), the questions of the chairmen forced her into doing so. As a result, she was blacklisted as well by Hollywood’s major studios.

The Pro-Soviet attitude turned again into Soviet demonization; in the same way in which the OWI’s pressures convinced the studios to blindfold the differences between the two superpowers, in response to HUAC’s inquiries, most studios produced a number of anti-communist, anti-Soviet pictures that would emphasize the startling mismatch between the two. But if the cost of the wartime propaganda could be considered low and without great prejudice, and should be looked at as a necessity in time of war, the witch-hunt that followed and the continuum state of paranoia and uncertainty left a great scar on the history of the American society of the 1950’s.

### Conclusions

Hollywood’s attitude towards political issues was, and is nowadays a sensitive subject. Regarding communism, the first Red Scare lighted up the imagination of Hollywood producers and political figures alike. If one could find a balance between capitalizing on public fear, and in the same time acting like the voice of the government, then both sides would have found the perfect formula. The image of the communism menace was one of the first images of a foreign enemy ever to be portrayed on the big screen, and its transformation evolved for over 70 years.

But no mutation has been so abrupt and ironical than in the films produced shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack. From vicious beasts that sought to destroy capitalism by infiltrating every branch of the economy, the communist image was put in a wringer and transformed into a misunderstood brother. Trying to sell a new alliance to the American public meant trying to sell a new lost friend: communism was misunderstood, the Soviet
Union was misunderstood, and it was up to Hollywood to set the balance straight.

Mission to Moscow, The North Star, Song of Russia and some other twenty films share the same pattern and motivation: the Soviet counterpart was in fact no different from the US. Communism after all was just another side of the same coin. Last but not least, the Russians talked, dressed, plowed the earth, spoke and thought similar to Americans. They were to be presented as a heroic people that fought a defensive war to the end against Nazism. Full of historical inexactitudes, the films were the product of a fruitful collaboration between Roosevelt's political established agencies, like the Office of War Information and the Bureau of Motion Pictures and Hollywood producers, seeking to capitalize again on public fear.

The analysis above sought to demonstrate the particular process of transforming an enemy into a friend. Every line, trait of character, action was put under a magnifier and analyzed by special commissions until communists came out clean. It is a piece of history that for many Americans remains a black page, and a piece of history that was forgotten during the Cold War; it was the task of other men to shape public opinion afterwards and to shift the balance once again; After all, the United States has always been better in portraying enemies than friends.

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Research on conflict in contemporary security studies has been following the path opened by the emergence of the ‘new wars’ debate in the aftermath of the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War. Martin van Creveld, John Mueller, Kalevi Holti, Mary Kaldor, and more recently Thomas Hammes and Rupert Smith have argued that there has been an increasing tendency to abandon major war in favour of new and different conflict patterns. For these authors, contemporary war has lost its rigidity. It has moved away from the recourse of battle and has become a clear reflection of the changes in the political and socio-economic structures of the world. And this distinct way of understanding and explaining conflict is premised on the notion that asymmetric wars, cyber wars and proxy wars capture the plurimorphous, flexible and increasingly intricate structure of contemporary forms of conflict.

Against this background, a particular case is represented by the phenomena of proxy wars, concept that has always been engaged in determining dichotomic paths of understanding. Complex and dominated by an overlapping relation between its signifier and the signified, the term points to a constant academic struggle to capture the meanings of the word in a comprehensive definition. However, Andrew Mumford’s recently published book, Proxy Warfare, breaks away with this research direction as it firstly conceptualizes the proxy conflict pattern, while secondly constructing a comprehensive explanation of its historical appeal and of how it has manifested throughout history.

So what is then a proxy war? In the book Proxy Warfare, Andrew Mumford defines proxy wars as “the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome” (2013: 1). The most comprehensive definition of the proxy conflict hitherto is organised around three core elements: ‘indirect engagement’, ‘third parties’ and ‘strategic outcome’. All of these units correspond to different questions, which Mumford examines in detail by making use of diachronically chosen case studies that offer not only a systematic understanding of proxy wars, but also a historical view of their evolution.
At the centre of the definition of proxy wars is the question of ‘Who engages in proxy wars?’ corresponding to the ‘third party’ segment of the definition. However, in order to assess this issue, the normative definition of a proxy war is completed by a constitutive one which explains the unique structure of a proxy war: “a relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and their chosen proxies who are the conduit for weapons, training and funding from the benefactor” (Mumford, 2013: 11). The ‘third party’, thus, becomes the proxy actor of a benefactor which cannot pursue its strategic interests by directly engaging in conflict. The terminology used to capture this form of conflict behaviour makes use of the labels of Beneficiary and Proxy Agent, which makes a significant step forward in the research on proxy wars and proxy warfare as the label gives an account of one of the functions or roles of the party.

The second point in Mumford’s definition refers to the “indirect engagement” or to ‘How do states engage in proxy warfare?’ The main mechanism that explains proxy wars is the process of substitution. Anticipated by the discussion on the terminological aspects, substitution implies a role transfer between the parties of the war. The particularity of wars by proxy is that they are indirect. As Mumford points out “any definition of proxy war that includes direct military intervention misinterprets what should arguably be seen as the fundamental cornerstone of our understanding of proxy war: indirect interference” (2013: 22-23). This is fundamentally connected to the low intensity and regional character of the conflict. These features impact directly the process of understanding how proxy wars are fought, and Mumford rightly states that “there is no one uniform way in which proxy wars are fought” (2013: 61).

Mumford organises the reasons for involving in proxy wars following the logic of consequentialism and it includes not only the purpose but the legitimisation for that particular scope. For example, the discussion on the role of ideology brings novelty to the research on proxy conflicts in the Cold War because it integrates interest and power capabilities in a more comprehensive manner. Another example is the section on risk and proxy war which is strategically relevant and theoretically forming. Mumford argues that a proxy “circumvents, […], risks to a large, but by no means total, degree” (2013: 41) and bring to the scholarly debate the important aspect of conflict escalation by managing risk. Ending in a discussion on the future of proxy warfare, the book engages with the contemporary developments of proxy wars by touching upon the uses of private military corporations in conflict, cyberwarfare as well as the role of China in the present security environment. With these additions, Mumford moves the discussion on proxy warfare in a wider context and addresses current and real security concerns that shape the realm of policy making.

Remarkable for its theoretical depth, Mumford’s book stands out also from the point
of view of the geographical and historical breadth. Using the civil war in Angola as a proxy war prototype that the book always returns to, the study walks the reader through an impressive array of cases that cover diachronically the evolution of modern warfare from the 30 Years War to the 21st century. These are treated comparatively and the analysis is coined in the intellectual framework of international relations theory. In this respect, Mumford plays the advantages of both neo-realist and neo-liberal theories and integrates them in an articulated study that is inquisitive, incisive and intellectually refreshing.

Vladimir RAUTA*

Masha Gessen is a journalist and the author of several previous books, most recently *Perfect Rigor*. Editor of the Russian-language Snob magazine, she has contributed to Vanity Fair, The New Republic, Granta, and Slate, among other publications.

“If it wasn’t so sad, it would be quite funny” is the idea I can’t get out of my head ever since I’ve closed the book. We can say the same thing about the path Russia took since 1991 to the present day, especially since Vladimir Putin was elected president.

The book was published in March 2012, at the very time Vladimir Putin was reelected president of the Russian Federation, after Dmitri Medvedev’s four-year mandate. Did Masha Gessen know that this would happen when she wrote this book on Putin? We can only assume the answer to this question, relying on the last pages of the book, the epilogue, where Gessen writes about the protests that took place in December 2011 and about the hope that things will change for the better.

This book is an irrefutable proof of courage on behalf of the author, as she tries to walk us through Putin’s entire life, writing about his friends and parents. Testifying for the risk taken by writing such a book is also the fact that Masha Gessen wasn’t present in the United States of America when it came out, hiding in Russia for her own safety as the book wasn’t even translated in Russian. Her work comes to tell us, the whole world, that Russia wasn’t and isn’t a democratic state. The process of democratization was stopped for good once Putin rose to power.

Gessen brings serious accusations against Putin, not referring to the presidential administration, the Government or the Parliament (Duma), but to the direct orders given by the president, orders most often unknown even to the Prime Minister. Thus, Gessen explains the resignation, in 2004, of Prime Minister Kasyanov before Putin’s second mandate. Kasyanov learns from Putin, personally, that the richest man in Russia, Mikhail Khodorkovsky has been arrested, dispossessed and has lost his private company Yukos.
for having financed other political parties, particularly the Communist Party, and not due to tax evasion, as it had been officially stated.

Special attention was given to Putin’s relation to the Russian billionaire, exiled in London, Boris Berezovsky. A few days after Berezovsky passed away on the 23rd of March 2013, Masha Gessen published the entire interview she had taken a few years back. In Gessen’s opinion, Berezovsky was exaggerating his influence in Putin’s rise to power, as he continued to believe himself a „kingmaker” and tried to maintain this impression, making use of his actions against Putin, financing his opponents, hoping he would succeed in making another king. And all this after Berezovsky was forced to flee the country three months after Putin’s inauguration as president.

The worst accusation Gessen brings against the president of the Russian Federation is terrorism, a theory supported by other authors too. Gessen feels that the terrorist bomb attacks in various buildings across several Russian cities that took place in 1999 where in fact organized by the FSB, with the direct involvement of president Putin, and not by the Chechen terrorist as the official story reported. These attacks served as a reason for the restart of the war with the Chechen Republic and led directly to Putin’s election as president, especially after his speech following the attacks, speech given when he was Prime Minister during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. These were then followed by the hostage takeover in the Moscow theatre and the Beslan school, during which over 430 people lost their lives, following the actions of the Special Forces who then valued, above everything else, the taking out of the terrorists instead of the lives of the hostages.

Another obsession of Putin’s is, as Gessen puts it, a „personal vendetta”, this being the main reason why those who stood up against the president or his methods lost their lives. Among them, we only know a few names, namely those who became known outside Russia as opponents of the regime, such as political activists, journalists, businessmen etc. Among them are Alexander Litvinenko, Anna Politkovskaia, Anatoly Sobchak, Galina Starovoitova and many others.

In the meantime, one of Putin’s most praised qualities was honesty. Berezovsky claimed he had been impressed by Putin because he had been the only bureaucrat who didn’t ask for bribe. Yet Marina Salye accuses him of money laundering, tens of millions of dollars from the budget of the city of Sankt Petersburg when Sobchak was mayor, leaving an entire city to starve. Also, no one can say for sure what were Putin’s concerns during the years 1991-1999, until he became Prime Minister, what were his duties while working for Sobchak, while working in the administration of President Boris Yeltsin, except for the period when he was in charge of the FSB.

Who is Mr. Putin? was the question put by the moderator of the Russian Panel at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland to Chubais on the 26th of January
2000, question to which he was unable to answer, question that remains unanswered even today. The reason is simple. Putin was a solution to a crisis for Yeltsin and his entourage. Their situation can be described in the following words: “Imagine you have a country and no one to run it. This was the predicament that Boris Yeltsin and his inner circle thought they face in 1999.” This is the reason why at the beginning no one cared who Putin was, as long as they were sure he would remain loyal. The few things we know with certainty about Vladimir Putin were revealed due to an initiative by Berezovsky in 2000, when several journalists were tasked with writing his biography. Of course, only the details that were wanted to be known were published. However, one thing is certain. Even as a young man, Vladimir Putin exhibited violent tendencies which were not easily tempered. Due to his aggressive behaviour in childhood he was dismissed from the Pioneers, and was later involved in numerous incidents. However, this began to change as soon as he started to take up Sambo, the result being a control over his impulses rather than a complete renunciation of an aggressive behaviour.

Speaking about Putin, Masha Gessen brings up a new issue, mainly a mental disease, pleonexia: “the insatiable desire to have what rightfully belongs to others”, one illustrative incident being an event in 2005 when Putin tried on a 124-diamond Super Bowl ring belonging to New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft and then literally pocketed it.

Masha Gessen began her investigation, whose results we see in this book, in 1998, together with her friend and mentor, Galina Starovoitova. The results were accompanied by a string of investigations on other events and assassinations from the period 1998-2011. It all started with the publishing of some articles that detailed Gessen’s investigation, which would later turn into the book: The man without a face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin.

This book brings forth new details on Putin's way of action, on those we suffered because they believed they could change something. Some succeeded to leave Russia, while others are still in prisons, not knowing whether they will ever come out (definitely not during the actual regime). Still, what Gessen tells us is that a change, however much needed, is also possible, maybe not now, but in 5 years, when Putin's mandate expires.

This was clear during the protests of December 2011, when tens of thousands of people came out to the street to express their disagreement with the election results and Putin's policy. Also, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev urges for change and reform, having declared to RIA Novosti on the 30th of March, that: „The authorities have managed to beat down the protest wave but the problems remain. If nothing changes, they will escalate, which means that Russian society will make a new attempt to move to real democracy.”

Ana GNATIUC*
American films were doing too good a job of telling the story of freedom to people everywhere… American films have been called ambassadors for democracy” (Nilsen, 2011: 52). While this can be considered the best paragraph in comprising Nilsen’s ideas on the subject, it is also the unfolding beginning of an exquisite journey into the intricate American cultural diplomacy during the unstable era of the Cold War. Such a journey is perfectly delineated in her book, Projecting America, 1958. Film and cultural diplomacy at the Brussels World’s Fair.

Sarah Nielsen is currently an Associate Professor, teaching at the University of Vermont, United States of America. She is giving classes in areas such as: “history of film and television, on issues of race, class and gender in the media, the theories of popular culture, and critical race theory”. Although fairly unknown in the world of authors, it is important to note her interest in cultural diplomacy and the popular culture during the Cold War, which can be easily traced in her astonishing book. Furthermore, her other noteworthy presentations in this area (which will be later summarized in her book) include: “Popular Culture and the Cold War” (University of Wisconsin, 2001), “America’s Salesman: Walt Disney’s USA in Circarama” (McFarland, 2010).

As Nilsen put it, “this book examines the efficacy of film as an element of political persuasion in a free and democratic society” (8). Nilsen’s book revolves around the event of 1958, Brussels World’s Fair, a moment in the consciousness of the American psychological warfare, fighting to overcome the negative effects of the Soviet propaganda and the influence of the Hollywood cinema on the European viewers (quite contradicting, since it came from the core of the American society). In addition, Nilsen’s book largely presents the mentality of a nation, striving to win on every battlefront, and thus make use of the American culture as a form of diplomacy.
Nilsen’s aim in the above mentioned book is closely linked to the argument of the American manifestation in the Europeans’ perception through the import of carefully prepared propagandistic motion pictures, mainly focused to portray the success of the democratic and capitalist American way of life. She is set to explain why certain films were chosen and what implications they had on an ideological level. Nilsen’s work is the answer to the question she poses in the Introduction: “What was the impact of the USIA (United States Information Agency) films on shaping and changing people’s perceptions of America and its role in the global community?” (Nilsen, 2011: 25).

Projecting America, 1958. Film and cultural diplomacy at the Brussels World’s Fair is a kaleidoscope of culture, society, history and the psychology of the Cold War. Since such an amalgam might create confusion, Nilsen’s study on the subject prepares the reader a great surprise. Not only is she structuring her book to give an insight on every method of soft power used by the Americans during the World’s Fair and the reaction of the European participants, but every chapter is also accompanied by a historical summary of the events prior to the Fair. Accordingly, the author achieves a well-rounded effect in conceptualising her ideas, avoiding any misunderstandings. Her arguments are clearly constructed and testified by a vast amount of research, an element that can be very well observed in the bibliography at the end of the book. This does not strain the reader’s attention in pursuing the extremely detailed book; on the contrary – it tempts him to turn on the pages breathlessly.

Many may wonder about the issues behind American motion pictures and the need to conceive others. The problem with the Hollywood is that the average European viewer is firstly acquainted with the American lifestyle through those films, and the common view is that Americans are inherently violent, sexually promiscuous and indebted to the culture of materialism. Reinhold Wagnleitner (Austrian Professor from the Department of History at the University of Salzburg) argues in an article that: “all the accusations [were] against the civilization of the United States [as a] thin veil for crass materialism and general lack of culture” (Wagnleitner, 1992: 10). Hence has come to life U.S. Information Agency (USIA), a propaganda instrument meant to re-educate the general public into knowing the other sides of America, mainly the best ones, and to counterattack its malicious Soviet opponent – “Hollywood, per definition, also became one of the most powerful weapons of the anticommunist propaganda offensive” (Wagnleitner, 1992: 11).

Nilsen gives a very comprehensive description about this aspect, especially in the Preface and Introduction. She gives arguments extensively on the great discrepancy between the films before the birth of the USIA and the censored motion pictures resulted for the Brussels World’s Fair (information beautifully exposed in Chapter 1).

The American pavilion has been, without any doubt, spectacular in its own mag-
nitude. Contrary to the USSR pavilion – which had chosen the theme of technology and power, the Americans presented the domestic universe of the nuclear family. Their choice, certainly, produced a far better impression in the eyes of the European visitors.

However, the Associate Professor evokes in her book the influence of the films, music and design, rather than the impression of the pavilion. Therefore, her next chapters are filled with depictions of the main attractions, followed by their in-depth understanding. For instance, her second chapter deals with “The USA in Circarama”, a Walt Disney production. Probably her most vivid chapter throughout the book, as a reader, you are easily transported back in April 1958 to witness Disney’s “recreation of the emigrant journey into the Promised Land of American bounty and leisure” (Nilsen, 2011: 76). This would have been a plain adventure, have it not been exposed on an immense 360-degree screen, surrounding the viewer with the sheer feel of America! Needless to say, Disney’s film has been a hit.

Likewise, in Chapter 3, related to the film “South Pacific”, Nilsen provides awareness into the bizarre fascination of the Nuclear explosions (at some point, even oozing erotic charges). The Nuclear mushroom is sharply illustrated in the beginning of the film: “the island of Balai Hai, which serves as the edenic core of the film, looms ominously on the ocean horizon, enveloped in both a polychromatic spectacle of Technicolor and a mushroom cloud halo of deep reds, oranges, and pinks” (Nilsen, 2011: 101). This perspective is absolutely linked to the common fear of the possible Nuclear war, yet it has inflicted a general “negative pleasure” (as Kant describes the sublime) into the viewer.

Chapter 4 certifies the European tendency towards the typical American film, since the film “The Touch of Evil” has been nothing but the representation of an uncensored Hollywood type film, which actually proved to be another great success. The reason lies in the European audience preconceptions for perceiving Americans as materialistic and violent and the film reinforced their opinions.

In chapter 5, the author is concerned about the Avant-garde cinema, promoted by Shirley Clarke. She exhibits a handful of loops of short films. While the chapter is intertwined with the influence of Jazz music in Europe, it is also dedicated to the issues of racial discrimination, which remained unsolved in the United States in that particular moment.

Lastly, chapter 6 mentions designers’ products, associating art with pragmatism, as the pavilion’s theme has had most to do with domestic life. Nilsen informs us that: “the most important entry and overwhelming winner of the show were the molded plywood chairs developed by Charles Eames and Eero Saarinen, who were teaching art at the Cranbook Academy of Art” (Nilsen, 2011:158). Moreover, Charles Eames and his brother have had their own film contribution: “Information Machine: Creative Man and the Data
Processor”, appointed to change the common perception that computers would control the human; rather, the computer would be just a tool.

In my view, Sarah Nilsen’s book is extraordinary in her own style and her appreciation of the Cold War’s American Cultural Diplomacy. It creates such visuals of the details that you are completely drawn into the event, overwhelmed by the American lifestyle, mentality and capitalism. The American family eventually becomes your family in the uncertain world of the Communist threat. Nonetheless, the only drawback that can be found is that her work is short. At 200 pages, one might wish to know more about other European nations’ opinions on the event, since she mentions the Germans and French.

All in all, Projecting America, 1958. Film and cultural diplomacy at the Brussels World’s Fair by Sarah Nilsen is possibly among one of the most wonderful demonstrations of cultural diplomacy in the history of Cold War. Her research can be easily recommended for anyone who is interested into the dynamics behind culture as public diplomacy, as well as the contact between two different characters in history, namely the Americans and the Europeans, in the name of freedom and democracy.

References


Sarah Nilsen’s public profile at the University of Vermont’s site.


Ioana ONIŞOR*
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION are central research subjects for many scholars, especially since Samuel Huntington coined the term Third Wave Democracy in his article published in Journal of Democracy, and later in his 1991 book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century. Much more, in contemporary political science trends, it is easy to identify impressive work on this phenomenon, especially because increasingly more areas, after different instances of conflictuality, can be or are suitable for democratization. Thereby we must consider and appreciate the work of the authors as Georg Sorensen, Renke Doorenspleet, Larry Diamond and others who have argued that democratization is a trend of exceptional seasonableness, fact proved by Freedom House which rated as free just 29% twenty-nine percent of 151 countries in 1973, comparing with 45% forty five percent of 195 countries, by the end of 2011.

In recent years, the Arab Spring has given rise to a new area on which researchers on democratization have stopped and focused their work. In the given context many challenges arise for those countries where revolutions have upended longstanding authoritarian regimes. The swath of unexpected events created new uncertainties in an already troubled region. This being given, aside the trend mentioned above, based on the two aspects, a high quality work was conducted by RAND Corporation through its continuing program of self-initiated independent research, completed by the monograph Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe published in 2012.
The authors started their work by addressing three questions: What are the main challenges to democratization that Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries experiencing political change are likely to face in the coming years? How have other countries around the world that emerged from authoritarianism overcome or failed to overcome similar challenges? What can the United Nations and the broader international communities do to help transitioning countries overcome these challenges and strengthen their fledgling democracies? (2012: xvi) For finding relevant answers, the authors structured the volume in four parts and eleven chapters, using throughout the entire process comparative analysis methods. Much more, they were aware that by answering questions would not be able to provide a solid road map for a potential democratization process, mainly because of manifoldness and complexity of circumstances. Howbeit, they succeeded to analyze transition experiences in all the world regions where relevant political changes have occurred since the mid-1970s and more.

So what about democratizing the Arab World? The authors focused on seven structural conditions and policy choices: the mode of regime change, the country’s past experience with political pluralism, critical policy choices, state and social cohesion, economic characteristics, the external environment and the external policy choices and assistance. By considering these aspects, through the analysis named From the Arab Winter to Arab Spring, it is concluded and emphasized that turbulence alone does not derail democratization (2012: 299) and real democracy will not take hold in the Arab World without systemic change (2012: 301). Otherwise stated, the involvement of the international community in a direct or indirect manner is needed, this because revolutionary regime changes do not necessarily lead to transformational changes (2012: 303).

The analysis on past transition experiences reveals that particular factors that tend to contribute to or to undermine democratization rarely if ever determine outcomes (2012: xiv), while the commitment of elites always emerged as a crucial factor in any democratization demarche. For this, a good example and a reason for external implication in the Arab World stands the European experience, where the international integration offered unmatched incentives and support for successful democratization of Southern and Eastern Europe. Much more, the adoption of democracy in the Arab states is possible, the past demonstrating that democratization can occur even with low levels of institutional developments (2012: 330). Also, the potential for a stable evolution of Arab democracies increases in the same way and time with the integration of new political groups in the democratic process. Form a social perspective, the development of civil society accountability and a new and improved social cohesion, will facilitate every step towards democracy. As shown by other experiences, the threat to democratization and social cohesion comes less from the problems themselves than from how governments
respond to them (2012: 321). In this regard, international expertise and counseling will stand as a catalyst, especially when it comes to find consensus on the nature of the state or other sensitive aspects.

From the response to external environment perspective, the research leads to two major conclusions. First, it claims that a democratic neighborhood may help countries move toward democracy and being in a nondemocratic neighborhood does not necessarily imperil political change. And second, it asserts that the success of democratization in any single Arab state does not depend on the success of the Arab Spring more broadly. Furthermore, as far as the democratization process in the Arab Spring Area is concerned, any policies should take into account the long-term nature of democratization (2012: 337) aside with assuming that outside influence on transition process has its limits (2012: 337). Much more, the authors conclude that the international community should encourage creation of mutually reinforcing and supporting structures (2012: 340), including here any form of association between states or social actors to facilitate institution building assistance and moral suasion for democratization.

Overall the work was conducted on three ways. First, the exploration of conditions and decisions that are more likely to influence the success of democratization in countries undergoing political transitions. Second, the identification of the main challenges for democratization in the Arab World, aside an exhaustive analysis on how other countries transitioned from autocracies with or without failing to overcome similar challenges. And third, throughout it is suggested what the United States and the wider international community should do to help Arab countries strengthen their so called democracies. By fulfilling the research objectives the authors provided a work of real utility for policymakers in order to understand the challenges ahead, form well-founded expectations and shape diplomatic approaches along with practical steps in fostering positive changes.

Moreover the analysis on how countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa have dealt with democratization challenges in the past provides a good working basis for further scholars and their work on democratization and post-conflict reconstruction.

Marius Nicolae GRAD*
IN THE PERIOD February - November 2012, the city of Cluj-Napoca was the focus point of the international research project “Cluj-Napoca between 1939 and 1960. Diversity of Remembrances”, part of the Geschichtswerkstatt Europa programme of the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” foundation (EVZ). The foundation was established in the year 2000 and its initial objective was to provide financial compensation to victims of the National Socialist period such as forced labourers or people who were deported to concentration camps. According to the description which can be found on their web page states, “Geschichtswerkstatt Europa is a programme which supports international projects addressing the issue of the culture of memory and remembrance in Europe, which aims at strengthening the dialogue between young Europeans by comparing the differences and similarities in historical perceptions of the collective experience of oppression in the 20th century at a national, regional and local level”. The project collaborates with the Institute for Applied History within the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt Oder as well as with the Global and European Studies Institute at the University of Leipzig. In 2012 Geschichtswerkstatt Europa (GWE) offered grants for projects related with the war, post war and cold war period in order to contribute to the understanding of the formative years of the European cultures of remembrance. The project “Cluj-Napoca 1936-1960, Diversity of Remembrances” was one of the 28 projects chosen to be financed out of 93 applications from various states. Since this was a 3 person project independent of any institution it was provided a 2500 euro grant per person in order to cover travel costs, accommodation, project coordination and other project related expenses. Projects with more than 4 members, supported by institutions were eligible for an up to 15000 euro grant. The international research team which undertook the project “Cluj-Napoca 1936-1960, Diversity of Remembrances” presented mixed scientific backgrounds consisting of Yulia Gordeeva – historian, cultural anthropologist and sociologist from the Russian Federation, Diana Dranca – historian from Cluj and Flaviu Orastean – philologist and cultural anthropologist from Cluj. The research was tutored by Dr. Sławomir Kapralski, professor at the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Since there is no common remembrance of World War II and of the events which followed between European countries, European memory is seen by Geschichtswerk-
statt Europa as the sum of different perspectives. Cluj-Napoca seemed to provide a good example in terms of how these different perspectives can coexist and interact with one another. Throughout its history the city was inhabited by various nations each of which contributed to its development in its own way and were in conflict with one another at some moment in time. However, unlike other borderline Central-Eastern-European cities which witnessed the displacement of entire populations as an effect of World War II and completely changed their ethnical composition, post-war Cluj maintained more or less the same ethnical structure as before, though Romanians gradually became the majority. By the beginning of World War II, Hungarians constituted the majority, followed by Romanians, Jews, Germans and Roma. Each of these nations left their print on the city's development and each of them survived the World War II trauma in their own way. Between 1939 and 1960 the city changed borders twice: from Romania to Hungary and then from Hungary to Romania. Depending on their nationality, the citizens of Cluj were affected by this border shifts to a higher or to a lesser extent. As Cluj became part of the Hungarian state, the Hungarians living in the city experienced a moment of joy, the Romanians faced all the disadvantages of a national minority, whereas for the Jews it meant deportation to concentration camps. After the war, the city found itself within the borders of Romania once again. Those border changes as well as the war constituted traumatic events in the lives of Cluj’s citizens, leaving their mark on their remembrances, because both the Romanian and the Hungarian states attempted to emphasize the city’s belonging to their own national community while disregarding the role of the other.

In the first years after the war the new authorities tried to adjust the city to the new political reality by changing its landscape and symbols, by changing the meaning of the “places of remembrance”. The changing of street names, of institution names (schools, factories etc.), the building of new monuments or changing the significance of others, urban planning, all this served to adjust the city to the new realities of a socialist Romanian state.

The main hypothesis behind the project funded by GWE was that people belonging to different ethnic and national groups will remember the events that occurred within the city in a different manner. The main goal of the project was to take an attempt at transforming the mutual negative stereotypes which occur among the different nationalities living in Cluj by means of dialogue and by finding common memories which could help eliminate the prejudices and misunderstandings that occurred in the past. The research results were to be published as a brochure in Romanian and Hungarian, as well as in an international language like English. Unfortunately due to time limits and limited funding, only the English version was published in the end. The team’s plan was to research the way in which the processes that took place in the city during the war and the first
after war decade are seen through the eyes of the people affected by them, the way in which they affected their lives and the influence they had on the creation of modern day Cluj-Napoca.

The research consisted of a number of interviews conducted in the city of Cluj-Napoca with people who lived there or moved there in the years 1945 – 1960. During those interviews the team focused on the personal memories of those people, in order to see which events had the most important place in their remembrance, what shocked one nation most and which events went unnoticed by the others.

The research concentrated on two basic aspects. At first, memories of the everyday life in the after war Cluj and of the changes that took place in the urban landscape were collected by using methods of oral history and by interviewing people who lived through those changes. Having accomplished this, the team identified the main trends in the memories of that period of history. In order to do so, a comparative analysis of the interviews was made in order to find some general and particular tendencies which could show which events brought reasons for joy or pride and which ones were perceived as traumatizing.

Therefore methods of oral history combined with other qualitative sociological methods were applied. The basic method of collecting information consisted of semi-structured in-depth interviews with open questions aimed to attract the respondents into a free continuous talk and give them the possibility to express themselves openly. In addition the team planned to use the method of active observation and analysis of personal photos, images from old postcards, books or museum exhibitions. Oral history, active observation, in-depth interview and visual media analysis helped reconstruct a picture of what urban life looked like in Cluj in the first 15 years after the war as it was lived by different nations.

From the beginning the team’s main challenge was to find subjects for the interview. It was very difficult to find people who were adults during World War II and who are still alive today. Another challenge consisted of the fact that not all the potential subjects were willing to share their experiences and memories. In order to find subjects, different organizations such as the Romanian Jewish Association from Cluj, the German Forum in Cluj, a Roma student association and a retirement home were contacted. Another method used was the “snow ball method”: interviewees were encouraged to ask their friends about potential interviewees so that each person led to another. In the end the team found 9 Romanians, 4 Hungarians, 6 Jews, one Roma and one German participant. The oldest interviewee was born in 1923 and the youngest in 1950. Most of the persons interviewed were either born and raised in Cluj, or came to Cluj right after the war and were children in the period under research. Voice recorders for the interviews were used,
and a brochure with texts and photographs was published in an attempt to illustrate the diversity of remembrances about after war Cluj-Napoca hoping this will allow the present generation to get a glimpse of the city through the eyes of the different nations that formed or still form the city’s soul.

Contrary to what the team had expected, the field research conducted in Cluj-Napoca proved that ordinary people didn’t really take part in the battle of symbols which the authorities of the time were leading. The “ideological garment” implemented by urban planning, by monuments and street names went in most cases unnoticed by the very people it was aimed at, and in most cases it was seen as progress especially by the generation born immediately after the war. All the interviewees, regardless of their age or nationality seem to agree on the fact that the relations between ethnic groups were much tighter than they are now. They emphasize the fact that regardless of their nationality and to which country the city belonged at the moment, people helped each other and remained good neighbours. It is worth mentioning on the other hand that both Hungarians and Romanians who lived in Cluj did not see the new neighbourhoods which were built after the war as part of the city, and there were some prejudices regarding their inhabitants. However those prejudices seemed to fade in time as more and more people moved there from the centre of the city and realized the living conditions were much better than in their old houses.

It is also worth emphasizing the fact that in spite of various attempts to shift the meaning or the symbolic places in the urban landscape of Cluj-Napoca, those symbolic places remained the same until nowadays: the central point of the city is still considered to include both the Catholic and the Orthodox cathedrals, and the main walking and meeting places are still more or less the same. The main free time activities depended on social status and financial condition, however cultural life was seen by most to be more accessible and better promoted in the period after the war. As stated in the brochure in conclusion, if, as Rogers Brubaker points out, the city’s urban space became a battlefield of memory and symbols between the two major ethnic groups (Hungarians and Romanians), this conflict was created from above by the authorities and ordinary citizens did not take part in it and often didn’t pay attention to the ideological changes in the city’s landscape. However, the most important change that occurred between 1939 and 1960 was that Cluj-Napoca’s Jewish inheritance was almost entirely forgotten, in spite of a temporary flourishing period after the war when it appeared the Jewish community was recovering after the great tragedy of the Holocaust.

All the events that occurred in Cluj at the time, and from which the city emerged as we see it today left their mark on the people who lived through them. The research team believe that with the help of oral history the young generation can understand better
both the present and the past by establishing an emotional connection with those events through the unique personal remembrance of each of the persons who experienced them. On the one hand, oral history allows the interviewees to make incursions into their past and present without feeling constrained or interrupted. They are not confined to a strict question pattern but encouraged to allow for their remembrances to naturally flow and for one memory to lead to another. This not only produces a more detailed mental image of the events but also generates an open dialogue and paves the path to a better understanding of intercultural realities. It also allows a better insight into the way these realities work both on the individual and community level by reaching not only beyond the official version of the events, which is often manipulated to serve political reasons, but also beyond the prejudices which already exist between different cultures. The person who remembers has the chance to re-evaluate their attitude towards the events and those with whom those remembrances are shared form a closer connection with those remembrances and have the chance to re-evaluate the way they perceive those events and eliminate the prejudices created by the “official version” of the authorities. By using oral history our team attempted to facilitate this type of intercultural understanding not only between the ethnic communities living in Cluj-Napoca but also to present an example for other cities which faced or face the same inter-ethnic or intercultural challenges. We also attempted to point out that Cluj-Napoca is an interesting city not only because of its cosmopolitan atmosphere and cultural institutions but also because it can provide useful research material for any historian, anthropologist or sociologist who is interested in European borderline cities.

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