

NO: 7, ISSUE: 1, 2019

Journal
of Global Politics
and Current Diplomacy

 [Center for
European Dialog
and Cultural Diplomacy]
DEDiC

Journal of Global Politics and Current Diplomacy

GLOBAL POLITICS AND CURRENT DIPLOMACY (JGPCD)

JGPCD is a project of the Center for European Dialogue and Cultural Diplomacy from Cluj-Napoca, Romania.

JGPCD is a biannual (June and December), peer-reviewed academic journal. The issues of the journal will include multi and interdisciplinary papers. Occasionally, individual issues may focus on a particular theme.

ISSN 2344 – 6293 ISSN–L 2344 – 6293

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chief:

Mihai Alexandrescu, PhD

Deputy Editor-in-Chief:

Marcela Salagean, PhD

Editorial Board:

Editors: Ioana Ștefănuț, PhD

Indexing and Abstracting: Flaviu Orăștean

Design Editor: Mihai-Vlad Guță

PUBLISHER

Centrul pentru Dialog European și Diplomație Culturală/Center for European Dialogue and Cultural Diplomacy (DEDIC)

The objectives of JGPCD are to develop, promote and coordinate research and practice in current diplomacy and its interconnection with International Relations, European studies, economy, and sociology. The JGPCD aims to help professionals working in the fields of economic diplomacy, financial diplomacy, commercial and corporate diplomacy, intercultural studies, European Union decision-making, international communication and policy makers. The Journal

aims to establish an effective channel of communication between policy-makers, diplomats, experts, government agencies, academic and research institutions and persons concerned with the complex role of diplomacy, International Relations and European Union decision-making process.

READERSHIP

The JGPCD's readership primarily consists of universities and think tanks, in particular researchers, teachers and graduate students of International Relations, together with educators and trainers on programmes in Diplomatic Studies, Cultural Diplomacy, International Relations, European Studies, and Economic Sciences. Secondly, the JGPCD is a journal for everyone with an interest or stake in first-rate and accessible articles on all aspects of diplomacy, not least the world's foreign ministries and diplomatic academies.

COPYRIGHT RULES

JGPCD will give priority to the publication of original papers which were not previously published or submitted for reviewing to other journals. Still, a new version of the original work already published, updated and improved, may be accepted if this does not raise exclusive licence matters. This issue should nevertheless be mentioned in a footnote. The DEDIC shall not be held legally responsible and shall not pay royalties in case of demands for financial compensations from third parties. In case of acceptance for publishing, JGPCD does not impose the exclusive right to publish and disseminate the paper. The article may be republished, provided the author makes reference to the first publication by JGPCD.

Content

<i>Romania's National Culture in Hofstede's dimensions through the Eurobarometer Standard 90 (2018)</i> Larisa MALEA	5
<i>Turkey's Leadership: a model for Arab states in transition between 2011-2013</i> Raluca FĂRCAȘ	21
<i>Euroscepticism. Contemporary trends and manifestations</i> Emilia Adriana GANEA	31
Book Review: Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (edited by), <i>The CSE and the End of the Cold War. Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights. 1972-1990</i> . New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2019. Paul POPA	40

Romania's National Culture in Hofstede's dimensions through the Eurobarometer Standard 90 (2018)

Larisa MALEA*

Abstract: This article focuses on the relationship between the results achieved by Hofstede four decades ago and the Standard Eurobarometer 90 of 2018 (EB.90). The case study of my study is Romania. For this purpose, I selected a series of questions from the EB.90, which I considered relevant to analyse each of the four Hofstede cultural dimensions. By relating the data collected by Hofstede and the results obtained to the contemporary reality, it can be observed that his study is still current even though the manifestations of the national culture have changed over time.

Keywords: Romania, Standard Eurobarometer 90, Hofstede, national culture, European Union

Introduction

ONE OF THE FIRST ANTHROPOLOGISTS who have studied national culture, E.B. Tylor, defined this term as "an entire complex comprising knowledge, beliefs, art, morality, rights, habits, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society." (Stocking 1963). Based on this definition, different approaches were developed subsequently of the subject, but one of the most notable researchers in the field remained Geert Hofstede, who became famous through his study of cultural dimensions.

The study of national culture is fundamental to understanding the political behaviour of a state, but the lack of recent data questions the accuracy of Hofstede's theories. For this reason, the data achieved about four decades

* Larisa MALEA has a Master Degree in leadership and Communication in International Organisations at Babes-Bolyai University. Email:

ago need to be re-evaluated and translated into a more current framework, challenging them by the Standard Eurobarometer 90. This is an impartial tool to measure the society's opinions, generally, accepted by institutions and population as an efficient means of collecting and comparing data at European level. The purpose of this paper is to contribute new information to a controversial topic and to check whether there is indeed evidence to support criticisms directed at the possible inaccuracy of Hofstede's results. For this purpose, I chose Romania as a case study.

This article focuses on the relationship between the results achieved by Hofstede four decades ago and the Standard Eurobarometer 90 of 2018. Due to the legitimacy of the Eurobarometers, their objectivity and transparency, they represent a solid reference point in formulating arguments. The questions addressed to the citizens of the member states of the European Union can be subscribed to the cultural dimensions of Hofstede by the presence of key concepts or ideas described in the theoretical framework of the Dutch researcher.

Regarding the research methodology, I used primary and secondary sources, mainly national and European surveys and reports. They had the role of providing specific and up-to-date data, as well as having at least two reference points in the study. Similar data obtained between the national and European surveys reinforce the results, while a difference between the two plans indicates a margin of error for the conclusions obtained, thus limiting their legitimacy. For the case study I relied on a comparative analysis method, comparing the data from the most recent Eurobarometer to the results obtained by Hofstede in his study on culture. The key concepts defined by it for each dimension are still found in national cultures, but in different forms. In order to be able to verify to what extent the culture of a state has changed, it was necessary to analyse the latest data and to correlate them with the existing ones.

If we analyse the contemporary global political and economic situation, we can see that there is no doubt that there are numerous changes from one day to another. The 46 years since the data collection for the study by Hofstede is a very long time, if we consider the speed with which innovations are developed, and changes in the companies. Although it seems that the temporal dimension is capable of altering the national cultures rooted so far, the changes produced are rather superficial. The ways of manifestation and the means of affirming the ideas are no longer the same, but, in the substrate, the cultures have remained unchanged. There are, however, a few factors that have contributed to the adoption of new ways of reacting or behaving to current situations.

Firstly, globalisation has a substantial impact both economically, politically and socially. The need to be in permanent contact with people, communities or companies hundreds or thousands of kilometres away, even

involuntarily, influences national cultures. The same result applies also to multinational corporations, which often manage to spread internal values over new employees or markets to which they are addressed. An example of this would be the American fast-food chains, which have brought about a change in lifestyle in both Europe and Asia or Australia. Fast food has become a defining part of many people's lives, representing, in a sense, an adaptation of American culture.

Secondly, access to the Internet and information is a crucial factor in the evolution of national culture. At the level of the European Union, in 2017, 87 percent of all households had Internet access, of which 72% use this daily service. In addition, approximately 57 percent used it for online services such as training courses or purchases of goods (Eurostat 2019). These statistics reveal both the importance of globalisation, and the level of addiction that people have at the moment to the digital dimension. This is not only a convenient way to access any information, but also a means of having the various services that people would need. Constant contact with the virtual world, with people in different states or with news from the other end of the globe inevitably determines changes in societal perceptions.

Finally, the young generations today are considerably different than those of three or four decades ago, closer to the time of Hofstede's study. The education system conversion and the changes in the mentality caused a domino effect in society. The most relevant example is Swedish educational model, which is regarded as a measure of success due to the emphasis on skills and development. It encourages independence and entrepreneurship, in the long term, resulting in a society focused on innovation and development (Hoppe, Westerberg and Leffler 2017).

Hofstede's purpose was never to analyse all forms of manifestation of a particular pattern, but to pursue theorizing and defining the dimensions of a national culture. As a result, in order to ascertain to what extent the aforementioned factors have produced a change in the collective mind, a more detailed analysis of it is required. Consequently, Romania will serve as the basis for the detailed observations in this article, because of the significantly different values resulting from Hofstede's study.

Methodology

To analyse the level of constancy or change in the Romanian society, I selected a series of questions from the Standard Eurobarometer (EB.90) of 2018, which I considered relevant for each of the four dimensions stated by Hofstede. From their point of view, I aim to demonstrate the level of actuality that Hofstede's indexes in contemporary society still have. Also, in the last part of

this article I focused on the changes produced by European mobility and the influence of the Romanian diaspora on the national culture.

EB.90 is published twice a year, and in the present paper I used as a basis the study from December 2018, for which the data were collected in November 2018 ([European Commission 2018](#)). Due to its current status, as well as to the European level it reaches, this is the closest form of Hofstede's method of collecting data.

Questions included in EB.90 are designed to keep the EU closer to citizens, by measuring their attitudes towards issues such as democracy, access to information or opinions on the future of the EU. Comprising a wide range of questions and answers, I thought this would be the ideal base to compare national cultures defined in Hofstede's dimensions and contemporary national culture.

In order to correlate the two studies, I selected from the Eurobarometer some questions that I considered relevant for each of Hofstede's dimensions. The methodology used in their selection was based on the concepts and explanations put by the Dutch researcher for each of the four dimensions.

First, for PDI, I followed a series of questions relevant to the perception that people have towards power and to civic involvement. The first topic addressed, trust in national and European institutions, is defining for this dimension, as it also expresses the way citizens feel represented in these institutions. The importance of personal input in political decision making is major in a society with low PDI, but in Romania, for example, this aspect is much neglected. This fact is highlighted in the results obtained at the second question I selected, focusing on the effect that the voice of the citizen has at national level.

Secondly, in terms of size PDI, I chose to focus on the role of groups in society and differentiation is made between them and the economic component. The questions chosen refer to the key elements defined by Hofstede for this dimension and the results are analysed to define the relevance of the current opinions to the individualist or collectivist sphere.

For the dimension of masculinity, I selected two questions, relevant due to the possibility of framing the answers in the sphere of femininity or masculinity. The first topic addressed focuses on people's priorities on topics of interest to the EU in the near future and in election campaigns. The areas of interest can be categorized as characteristic of a male society (economic progress, security and defence or the fight against terrorism) or a female society (social protection, climate change or human rights promotion). For this reason, it is important to follow and analyse the answers given by citizens and their

Romania's National Culture

analysis in relation to the current political-economic context. The second selected question emphasizes a feminine trait, namely cooperation, which is why the percentage of respondents who agree with it is important for the national culture. If the answers are predominantly positive, then it can be estimated that in society there are predominantly feminine traits or vice versa.

Finally, in order to define the actuality of the size of the UAI, I have extracted three important questions for different reasons. The first one refers to the perception of citizens about the near future and not only measures the degree of comfort in the face of uncertainty, but also the pessimism or optimism that defines an unknown period. This is particularly relevant for estimating people's ability to deal with uncertainty. The following two questions are intended to highlight the extent to which the perception of citizens defines the conception of personal as well as European problems. These two results are especially important in relation to the PDI, because it details the differences between the opinions regarding the personal / national plan and the European one.

Cultural Dimension	Selected items of EB.90
PDI	For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. <i>Political parties</i>
	For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. <i>The Romanian Government</i>
	For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. <i>The European Union</i>
	Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. My voice counts in Romania
IDV	Please tell me to what extent do you personally agree or disagree with the following statements: In Romania, the political decisions are applied consistently to all citizens.
	In Romania everyone has a chance to succeed in life.
	Could you please tell me for each of the following, whether the term brings to mind something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative? Protectionism
	Could you please tell me for each of the following, whether the term brings to mind something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative? Competition

MAS	What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?
	And on which of the following would you like EU budget to be spent? <i>Development and humanitarian aid</i>
UAI	At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, <i>In Romania</i>
	At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, <i>in The European Union</i>
	And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment?

Source: [European Commission 2018](#)

In conclusion, the questions discussed in this article have been selected because of their particular relevance to each of the dimensions defined by Hofstede. They were chosen in such a way that they could be correlated with the basic principles for each index, eventually demonstrating whether the Hofstede theory still has a real basis in society, despite the many changes that have occurred in recent decades.

Romania's National Culture by EB.90

Distance from power

Romania recorded a value of 90 on the PDI dimension, in Hofstede's study. In order to verify whether this value still reflects the current national culture, I have chosen two main topics that underline the relationship between citizens and power.

- *Confidence in political parties and national governments*

The European average of positive response to the confidence in the political parties is 19 percent, compared to the distrust asserted by 77 percent of Europeans. Romania is one of the states where scepticism prevails in politics, which is also visible in this statistic. The positive response rate is only 17 percent, while 81 percent of the respondents say they do not trust the political parties ([European Commission 2018](#)).

The main problem regarding this subject is the social dichotomy between politicians and citizens. In Romanian society, these two classes seem

to be rather opposed than to interlock, or as long as the political elite does not make an effort to approach the citizens, the rate of mistrust will not be able to decrease. The differences in economic terms or in terms of the benefits granted by the position are very important in the society and have a reflection also at the level of the national culture. Some examples in this regard would be the special pensions of local elected officials and parliamentarians (Cioroabă 2016) or the immunity of politicians to justice (DIGI24 2016). In addition, the high level of corruption further widens the distance between the population and the authorities. According to Transparency International, Romania ranks 61st out of 180 in terms of corruption, with an index of 47/100, with 0 being "very corrupt" and 100 meaning "very transparent" (Transparency International 2019).

In terms of people's perception of the government, the rate of mistrust remains high, at 76 percent. Romania is the sixth state in the European Union to this chapter according to EB.90 (European Commission 2018), a statistic that is also reflected in the numerous protests against the government in recent years. These events only echoed in May 2019, in the European Parliamentary elections, where 51.07 percent of Romanians expressed their opinion on the reforms desired by the government, granting a "penalty" vote for the leading Social Democratic Party (PSD) (European Parliament 2019). The results of the European Parliamentary elections were a direct consequence of the distance from power, namely the fact that citizens do not feel represented in politics, and their views are not considered by the representatives of power.

- *Confidence in the European Union*

Paradoxically, in the case of Romania is the difference in attitude towards the institutions that should be close to the citizens, such as the government or the national parties, and the European ones. Asked about the level of confidence they have in the EU, 52 percent of Romanians said they trusted this, which puts Romania above the European average of 42 percent in this regard (European Commission 2018).

The main reason behind this statistic is just the disappointment of citizens to national institutions. Accustomed to the idea that political parties are anyway corrupt and that their opinion does not matter, most people see in the EU a kind of salvation, an ideal of democracy. Asked what the reasons would be why they would vote in the European Parliamentary elections, 45% of Romanians said it was their duty as citizens, which may be associated with reinforcing the feeling that they are Europeans. The next two common responses were to express dissatisfaction with their lives (29 percent) and to express dissatisfaction with the national government (27 percent). These two answers intersect at the national level and serve as an explanation for the distrust expressed towards the Romanian institutions or parties.

From these statistics it is surprising that Romanians perceive the EU closer to them than their own elected representatives, which is reflected in an increasing Europeanism at national level.

- *My voice matters in the country*

Asked to what extent they consider that their voice matters in making political decisions in the state, only 41 percent of Romanians have responded positively, while the rest have stated that personal choices or priorities are not considered by political elites ([European Commission 2018](#)). This statistic reveals both the distance from power and the level of dissatisfaction of the people with the disinterest expressed by politicians regarding the representation of the interests of the citizens who voted for them.

The protests in recent years against the Government and the emergency ordinances adopted without consulting public opinion are the most concrete manifestation of the high PDI index. The moment "Colectiv" represented a marking moment with visible results, namely the resignation of Prime Minister Victor Ponta and the change of Government ([Citre 2016](#)). This event symbolized a trace of hope in the Romanian mentality regarding the respect of citizens' wishes, but the effects were not sustainable. The period of peace and prosperity provided by the technocratic government of Dacian Cioloş also established a comfort in the perception of the people, a situation that left its mark at the time of the parliamentary elections of 2016.

At the next general election, with a turnout of only 39.49 percent ([BEC 2016](#)), PSD has secured the leadership for another four years, which brought the population in a state of continuous alert due to rapid changes in legislation, justice and economy. Despite the ongoing protests, the results were not the same as before. Public opinions were no longer taken into account, being considered illegitimate as long as they were not expressed in the most democratic way, namely the vote. This sequence of events culminated in the massive turnout at the May 2019 European Parliament vote, which I mentioned earlier.

Due to the distance between politicians and citizens, legal problems also arise. Elected local officials sometimes tend to commit abuse in office only to secure their positions, a fact also reflected in the "New People in Politics" initiative. Even though the civil society has expressed its desire by signing a petition, some mayors have invalidated the signatures without having a legal basis. This action resulted in the rejection of the initiative at national level and the confirmation, once again, that the voice of the people does not matter for some politicians ([Citre 2019](#)).

Individualism

In Hofstede's study, Romania registered an index of 30, which indicates a predominantly collectivist society. Manifestations of this index should, according to the theory, be found in a domination of the state in the economy, as well as in a different application of the laws depending on the group. The next two topics addressed are precisely these defining factors for a collectivist culture.

- *In your country, political decisions apply equally to all citizens.*

According to Hofstede's theory, rules in a collectivist society differ from group to group. Faced with the above statement, only 21 percent of respondents to the Eurobarometer agreed with it, while 56 percent believe that laws are applied differently. At European level, 32 percent of people confirm the statement, while 48 percent disagree with it, which places Romania below the European average at this point ([European Commission 2018](#)).

Collectivist societies place a strong emphasis on cooperation and harmony, but there is also a strong discrepancy between groups, especially between citizens and politicians. This is due to the correlation between IDV and PDI, as a large distance from power requires a larger group to draw attention to a problem. In the case of Romania, however, sometimes the large protests did not manage to fill the distance until the authorities, but these events managed to strengthen the collectivist mentality.

The differentiation between groups is also illustrated in people's answers when asked if, in their country, they seem to have the same chances of advancing as anyone else. While 58% of respondents at European level think so, only 38 percent of Romanians share the same opinion. This is due both to the level of corruption in the state and to the economic impossibilities of some disadvantaged groups. According to the National Institute of Statistics, in July 2017, only 56.4 percent of the country's population lived in urban areas, and the rest in rural areas ([INS 2017](#)). The access to facilities differs considerably between the two scenarios, so this is a possible explanation for the citizens' conception of the personal future and the individual chances of success.

- *The connotations of the terms 'protectionism' and 'competition'*

In a collectivist national culture, the involvement of the state in the economy is more often encountered than in an individualistic culture. In order to understand how citizens perceive this aspect, we have selected two questions that concern terms that fall within the domain of state domination in the economy, namely "protectionism" and "competition".

When asked about the connotation of the term "protectionism", 59 percent of Romanians consider it a positive thing, well above the European average of 37 percent ([European Commission 2018](#)). This statistic can be associated both with the need for state involvement in the economy in order to defend and support the citizens' opinion, as well as with the specific patriotism of the collectivist national culture.

Cooperation and harmony are some of the basic objectives in countries with low IDV. However, economic competition does not necessarily affect wellbeing, but may even amplify it by creating a prosperous environment for citizens. As a result, the term "competition" has a positive connotation in the case of 70 percent of Romanians, a percentage equal to the European average.

Looking at the sphere of IDV and the answers given by Romanians to Eurobarometer questions, collectivism is still very much present in the national culture.

Masculinity

Romania registered an index of 42 in Hofstede's study on the dominance of the masculine or feminine traits in the national culture. In order to correlate this value with the actuality level of the results, we have chosen two topics included in the 2018 Eurobarometer, relevant for this dimension. The first topic focuses on national priorities, if they are focused on female or male goals, and the second topic concerns the attitude of the population and the state towards helping people from developing states.

- *What topics should be discussed at European level as a priority?*

In March 2019, 59 percent of Romanians considered that the economy and development should be the main concern at European level. This objective is catalogued as a masculine one in Hofstede's conception, but it does not define the entire national culture of Romania as a masculine one. The current economic problems have turned the attention of citizens to this sector, but the following three priorities defined by the Romanians fall within the sphere of femininity. As a result, 51 percent of Romanians consider it important to fight unemployment among young people, 45 percent want to promote human rights and democracy, and 44 percent opt for consumer and food protection ([European Commission 2018](#)). Consequently, although the first theme mentioned by the Romanian citizens is a masculine one, it is counterbalanced with the following objectives which are strongly feminine, due to their inclusion in the sphere of well-being and cooperation.

The Romanian Institute of Evaluation and Statistics (IRES) conducted a national survey that included questions about how Romanians see the future. It is important to mention the similarity with the results obtained in the Eurobarometer, as these statistics strengthen the legitimacy of the data collected at European level. In the IRES study, when asked about what plan is prioritized in the near future, 83 percent of Romanians think, first of all, about family issues (IRES 2017). This answer also falls within the sphere of femininity, approximating the actual results obtained in surveys from those analysed by Hofstede.

- *How important is it to help people in developing countries?*

Cooperation and support are considered feminine traits, so the answers received are relevant to the description of the Romanian national culture. At European level 87 percent of the respondents consider this aspect to be very important (42 percent) or important (47 percent), which places Romania below the European average, with 84% of the citizens who consider this area a priority (European Commission 2018).

The statistics measured in the Eurobarometer are also illustrated globally, as the EU is the largest donor in development assistance. With a total of € 75.7 million directed to this area in 2017, the amounts collected by EU Member States represent 57 percent of Official Development Assistance. More precisely, 0.50% of the gross national income (GNI) of the EU was allocated to this sector (ICD 2018), Romania contributing, in the same year, with 0.11% of the GNI to the total amount (MFA 2019).

Although Romania does not occupy the first places in terms of the perception regarding the granting of aid for the developing states, the national average that considers this subject important is nevertheless a high one. In addition, this conception is also reflected in the state policies, Romania becoming, starting with 2018, a participant in the Assistance and Development Committee (OECD 2018).

Uncertainty Avoidance

The very high index, of 90, recorded by Romania in Hofstede's study, can be verified at the present moment by analysing the answers given to three of the questions in the Eurobarometer in 2018. These are relevant because they measure the degree of comfort in relation to the uncertainty in the perception of people, both at the personal level, as well as at European level.

- *At present, do you consider that, in the country, things are going in the right or wrong direction?*

This question not only measures the degree of optimism of the society, but also the way in which an uncertain situation is perceived. If in the case of consolidated democracies such as Luxembourg, Austria or Finland people are predominantly optimistic about the future, although they have no certainty in the end, Romania is at the opposite pole. It ranks 4th in the EU, with 69 percent of citizens considering that the country is led in the wrong direction, compared to the European average of 49 percent who share the same opinion ([European Commission 2018](#)).

If we analyse the national political and economic situation from the perspective of the last 2-3 years, the uncertainty often gets negative valences. This is mainly due to the political class and major changes, in the form of laws, adopted without prior warning or consultation. Although condemned by public opinion, the president and the EU ([Presidency of Romania 2019](#)), the Government continued legislating without taking into account the criticisms. This behaviour has brought the citizens into a state of constant alert, in which any unexpected change represents a threat.

In areas such as entrepreneurship or investment, the state of instability is especially dangerous because there can be provided a clear result. People's perception that things would go in the wrong direction adds to this problem, resulting in decreased foreign investment, as well as relocation of companies or giving up on opening new businesses.

- *At present, do you think that, in the EU, things are going in the right or wrong direction?*

Despite the fact that at the national level most Romanians are considerably more pessimistic about the future, as far as the European plan is concerned, things change a little. 63 percent of the people surveyed believe that things are going well and are optimistic about the future of the EU. From this point of view, Romanians exceed the European average of 58 percent ([European Commission 2018](#)).

There is an obvious correlation between this side of the UAI and the PDI, both intersecting in a strong Europeanism. The dichotomy manifested between the perception of the national and the European plan is, however, paradoxical. At least in the case of the UAI, there is no factor that would create more stability at European level than at the national level, so that it can influence people's opinion. As a result, the only logical deduction is that Romanians have more confidence in the EU than in their own government.

- *Personally, what are the two biggest problems you face?*

Sudden political changes in recent years have created an uncertain situation regarding the national currency. The Romanian leu has devalued from 4,562, the value of one euro on June 9, 2017, to 4,721 on the same date, two years later (European Central Bank 2019). For this reason, the main fear of citizens is represented by rising prices and inflation (31 percent). Given that about 60% of Romanians have financial obligation, this inflation affects the national level much more than would be normal. In addition, according to the same study from 2018, 37 percent of Romanian citizens live from day to day and cannot afford to save (KRUK 2018).

In an economic situation that is so difficult for most of the population, the fear of a health problem or the uncertainty that they will benefit from social aid increases proportionally. As a result, the second biggest problem Romanians are facing is health and social security (22 percent). The state allocates only 4.9 percent of GDP for health, while the European average is at 9.9 percent (European Commission 2019b). In these circumstances, the possibility of each citizen to receive proper treatment from the state budget is very small, often reaching bribery for priority treatment or private clinics, if personal income allows.

Overall, the political problems at national level also create a strong state of uncertainty at the population level. This is reflected in people's fears about the future and the precariousness of their situations. In the absence of long-term stability, the UAI index would not be able to fall, as it lacks the necessary basis, namely security.

Final Remarks

Analysing the results obtained from the 2018 Eurobarometer in terms of cultural dimensions of Hofstede, it is interesting to look at two things: the actuality of the theory and the Europeanism manifested by the Romanians.

First of all, the changes brought about by globalization and technological innovations should be a decisive factor for national cultures. If we refer to the Romanian society from the 70s-80s, when the data for Hofstede's study were collected and published, the transformation is obvious, but this fact is due to the change of generations rather than the reformation of the mentalities of that time. Even so, we can speak of a superficial change, in the sense that the manifestations of the indices calculated for each dimension have altered and adapted to the contemporary reality, but the essence of the thought has remained very similar. In the case of IDPs, for example, we can now talk about

petitions, protests or direct debates with elected officials, which should contribute to reducing the distance to power, but in reality, according to the results obtained in the Eurobarometer, people do not yet feel represented, listened to or relevant to the political classes. The same scenario applies to the other dimensions, but under other manifestations, according to the defining factors stated by Hofstede.

Secondly, the most surprising finding from the analysis of the results obtained in the Eurobarometer is the difference in the perception of Romanians between the national authorities and the future of their country and the European ones. The emergence of a strong Europeanism in the culture is clearly visible in the answers related to the dimensions of the PDI and the UAI. Despite the distance between the Romanian citizens and the EU, they seem to feel more represented by this than by the government or national parties. In a sense, this paradox is quite logical, as people perceive the EU as a salvation, a beacon of democracy and fairness, attributes they do not find in the national system. Also, migration plays a crucial role in defining opinions and culture against the European dimension. Most of the Romanians living abroad have changed and adapted their mentality to a different national culture, which, inevitably, also influences the Romanian culture.

In conclusion, by relating the data collected by Hofstede and the results obtained to the contemporary reality, it can be observed that his study is still current. Of course, the manifestations of the national culture have changed and, as far as IDPs are concerned, at least a positive change is expected to reduce the distance from power. However, in order to be able to establish with certainty if there is really any difference in the collective mind, a longer period of stability is needed, in which the new culture will be established and maintained.

References

BEC (2016) Biroul Electoral Central , Rezultate finale la Alegeri pentru Senat și Camera Deputaților, *Biroul Electoral Central*, 12 decembrie, <http://parlamentare2016.bec.ro/rezultate/index.html>, [accessed on 8/6/2019].

Cioroabă, Corina (2016) Legea privind pensiile speciale ale parlamentarilor, *Juridice* <https://www.juridice.ro/418220/legea-privind-pensiile-speciale-ale-parlamentarilor.html>, January 5, [accessed 7/6/2019].

Citre Cristian (2016) #Colectiv: Politicieni intangibili dați la o parte și primul Guvern tehnocrat al României, *Mediafax.ro*, 28 October, <https://www.mediafax.ro/politic/colectiv-politicieni-intangibili-dati-la-o-parte-si-primul-guvern-tehnocrat-al-romaniei-15873190>, [accessed on 8/6/2019].

Romania's National Culture

Citre Cristian (2019) CCR a respins inițiativa cetățenească "Oameni noi în politică", de modificare a legilor electorale în sensul revenirii la alegerea primarilor în două tururi, pentru că nu îndeplinește condițiile prevăzute de Constituție, *G4Media.ro*, <https://www.g4media.ro/ccr-a-respins-iniatiava-cetateneasca-oameni-noi-in-politica-de-modificare-a-legilor-electorale-in-sensul-revenirii-la-alegerea-primarilor-in-doua-tururi-pentru-nu-indeplineste-con.html>, [accessed on 8/6/2017].

DIGI24 (2016) 2016 | Bătălia pentru imunitatea politicianilor, *DIGI24*, 28 December, <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/justitie/2016-batalia-pentru-imunitatea-politicienilor-639715>, [accessed on 7/6/2019].

European Central Bank (2019) *ECB euro reference exchange rate: Romanian leu (RON)*, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-ron.en.html, [accessed on 9/6/2019].

European Commission (2018), , *Public opinion in the European Union: report*. Directorate-General Communication http://publications.europa.eu/publication/manifestation_identifier/PUB_NA0418423ENN, [accessed on 26/6/2019].

European Commission (2019b) Country Health Profiles, *Public Health*, https://ec.europa.eu/health/state/country_profiles_en, [accessed on 9/6/2019].

European Parliament (2019) „National results Romania | 2019 Election results | 2019 European election results | European Parliament”, <https://election-results.eu/>, <https://election-results.eu/national-results/romania/2019-2024/>, [accessed on 8/6/2019].

Eurostat (2019) *Digital economy and society statistics - households and individuals - Statistics Explained*, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Digital_economy_and_society_statistics_-_households_and_individuals, June, [accessed on 6/6/2019].

Hoppe Magnus, Mats Westerberg, Eva Leffler (2017) Educational approaches to entrepreneurship in higher education: A view from the Swedish horizon, *Education + Training*, vol. 59, nr. 7/8, 3 July.

ICD (2018) EU remains the world's leading donor of development assistance: €75.7 billion in 2017, *International Cooperation and Development - European Commission*, 10 April, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-remains-worlds-leading-donor-development-assistance-eu757-billion-2017_en, [accessed on 8/6/2019].

INS (2017) *Statistica oficială din România, Institutul Național de Statistică*, <http://www.insse.ro/cms/ro/content/statistici-teritoriale>, [accessed on 19/6/2019].

IRES (2017) *Percepții publice asupra viitorului*. STUDIU realizat în perioada 8-12 iunie 2017, prin metoda CATI, https://www.academia.edu/33678371/Perceptii_asupra_viitorului?auto=download [accessed on 7/6/2019].

KRUK (2018) *37% dintre români trăiesc de pe o zi pe alta*, KRUK Romania 15 November <https://ro.kruk.eu/pentru-pres%C4%83/comunicate-de-presa/37-dintre-romani-traiesc-de-pe-o-zi-pe-alta>, [accessed on 9/6/2019].

MFA (2019), *Raportul național privind asistența oficială pentru dezvoltare acordată de România în anul 2017*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 February, <https://www.mae.ro/node/48089>, [accessed on 8/6/2019].

OECD (2018) *Romania becomes Participant in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, <https://www.oecd.org/countries/romania/romania-participant-dac.htm>, [accessed on 8/6/2019].

Presidency of Romania (2019) Primirea de către Președintele României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, a delegației Comisiei de la Veneția, 24 April <https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/comunicate-de-presa/primirea-delegatiei-comisiei-de-la-venetia>, [accessed on 8/6/2019].

Stocking Jr., George W. (1963) Matthew Arnold, E. B. Tylor, and the Uses of Invention, *American Anthropologist*, vol. 65, nr. 4, August.

Transparency International (2019), „Corruption Perceptions Index 2018”, www.transparency.org, <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>, [accessed on 7/6/2019].

Turkey's leadership: a model for Arab states in transition between 2011-2013

Raluca FĂRCAȘ *

***Abstract:** The purpose of this paper is to analyse the leadership of Turkey in the Arab Spring events and to determine whether it was an inspiration and a model for the Arab republics in transition. Turkey's model was brought to the attention in the context of the Arab Spring, with the possibility of it being implemented in the states of the region, which have undergone numerous transformations. In this regard, it is important to consider whether the Turkish model can be replicated in other states in the region, but also whether Turkey can export this model. Here, I followed the applicability of the Turkish model in the Arab states, the elements of neo-Ottomanism, but also the decisions taken by Turkey when the situation in the Middle East worsened, observing a transfer from a passive policy (zero problems with neighbours), to an active policy, in particular because of NATO membership. Also, the internal situation of Turkey was analysed, highlighting the paradoxes of the Turkish model, referring to the internal situation, which was in contradiction with the democracy promoted by Turkey on the external level.*

***Keywords:** Leadership, Turkey, Arab Spring, Neo-Ottomanism, Zero problems with neighbours, Middle East*

Turkey's leadership in the Arab Spring

TURKEY'S MODEL WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION in the context of the Arab Spring, with the possibility of it being implemented in the states of the region, which have undergone numerous transformations. Aspiring to join the EU, Turkey has a close relationship with the West, but at the same time, there is an affinity in the relations between the Justice and

* Raluca FĂRCAȘ, MA student at the Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, E-mail: raluca.farcas22@gmail.com.

Development Party (AKP- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) and the Muslim Brotherhood (Lindenstrauß 2012: 13). Turkey's model constitutes "a mixture of Islam, democracy and market economy", referring to the role of the army in maintaining the secularity of Turkish politics, later moving away from this model (Lindenstrauß 2012: 13). The concept of the Turkish model, that is, the modern secular Muslim state, was seen by the West as an alternative to the radical Iranian model (Sajjad and Javaid 2016: 71), whose influence has grown in the region. Turkey was seen in the Arab world as a secular, westernized militant state, rejecting its Ottoman Islamic heritage under Kemalism, but since the coming of power A.K.P. (2002), one can observe an approximation to the Muslim identity, a process that has been encountered since the 1980s, under the influence of the Turkish President, Turgut Özal. It also changed its foreign policy, which focused on "zero problems" with its neighbours, according to Ahmet Davutoğlu (Erdoğan's former chief adviser between 2003 and 2009; Turkey's former prime minister between 2014 and 2016), who argued that Turkey is "a great power, which has neglected its historical ties and diplomatic, economic and political relations with the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans and Eurasia, dating from the Ottoman era" (Taşpınar 2011: 9). Until 2011, Turkey's leadership was geared towards mutual gain (economic relations and political alliances related to the Muslim Brotherhood), but subsequently, A.K.P. has changed its anti-Western and anti-secular stance (Sajjad and Javaid 2016: 75). Ziya Öniş (2012: 46), in *Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest*, considered A.K.P. was not meant to promote democracy, but to respect the independence of nation states and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. Despite Turkey's economic policies, with the emergence of the Arab Spring, Turkey's increasingly pragmatic approach to the Middle East has already turned it into a model for Arab countries, because of the inefficiency of the financial system, high unemployment, and social injustice were the main reasons for the demonstrations. Thus, out of this desire to emancipate and acquire freedom, justice, equity, dignity and prosperity, the A.K.P. in Turkey has begun to symbolize the fulfilment of these requirements in many Islamic societies (Atasoy 2011).

The Arab Spring represented a process of profound political change in the Arab world (where authoritarianism persisted over time), which began in Tunisia, triggering a revolutionary wave of demonstrations in some countries in early 2011 in this area.* Called the Jasmine Revolution, it was the basis of the process known as the Arab Spring (Wagner 2012: 6). Due to mass demonstrations, authorities in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen were pressured to give up power. The transition stage of the revolution was represented by the

* Syria, Bahrain, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen.


following political elections, to bring about political and socio-economic changes, Tunisia being the only state that succeeded in this respect, instead the situation of Libya, Yemen and Syria, degenerating into civil wars ([Amour 2018: 210](#)). The following table shows the authoritarian leaders of the Arab states, who, following the riots and the pressure of the population, were removed from power after a long period of time in which these regimes resisted ([Chalcraft 2015: 7](#)).

Table 1: Longevity of authoritarian regimes

<i>Authoritarian Arab states, in which leaders were removed</i>	<i>Leaders of authoritarian regimes</i>	<i>The period of resistance of these regimes</i>
Tunisia	Bin Ali	24 year
Egypt	Hosni Mubarak	30 years
Libya	Muamar Gadhafi	42 years
Yemen	Ali Abdullah Saleh	21 years

The leadership of the Middle East, in the last decades, has been dominated by the authoritarian or autocratic style, which allows the rapid decision making, because one person decides for the whole group ([Alnassan and Sharma 2016: 22](#)). The following figure shows some characteristics of the authoritarian style, as mentioned in the work *Authoritarian Leadership VS. Participative Leadership In organizations*.

Figure 1: Characteristics of authoritarian leadership



(Zylfijaj, et.al., 2014:4-5)

The applicability of the Turkish model in the Arab states in transition

The applicability of the Turkish model in the Arab states in transition has been debated from the pros and cons, as shown in the following table:

Table 2: Perceptions of the Turkish model in the Arab states

Pro arguments	Against arguments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - reducing the role of the army in the political sphere, the mix of Islam and democracy, the economic development (Nafaa 2011: 39). - democracy is possible in a majority Muslim state, and conservative Muslims could become promoters of democratic values and economic growth. - economic growth through the middle class (Dede 2011: 27-29). - the capitalist economic system. - a strong economic, liberal and tolerant interpretation of Islam (Kaya 2012: 27). - Multiparty and the development of civil-military relations (Dala and Erşena 2014: 269). - A.K.P. had a moderate and pragmatic agenda, not an Islamist militant one (Taşpınar 2011: 12-14). - It is not an attempt to Islamize the state, but to liberalize it. - the compatibility of Islam with democracy is not rejected (Dede 2011: 27-29). - through elaborated strategies it can be integrated globally, but it can have an independent position, opposing the West (Öniş 2012: 55). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the deficiencies in promoting the rights of women, minorities and free expression, contradict the struggle for the acquisition of these rights in the Arab countries. (Sajjad and Javaid 2016: 80). - the evolution of moderate Islam in Turkey has been achieved over a long period of time, through "conflicting forces, including military guardianship of secularism" (Sajjad and Javaid 2016: 80). - the unique historical context and different from that of the Arab states. - secularism is deeply rooted in the history of Turkey (Sajjad and Javaid 2016: 80). - Turkey's external relations with the West and Israel. - Turkey has never been colonized, so it lacks the post-colonial syndrome, which the Arab countries have. - Turkey's reform process began during the first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, since the first half of the 20th century, and the Arab states have undergone a rapid process of change (Kaya 2012: 28).

Zero policy dilemma problems with neighbouring states

If up to the time of the Arab Spring uprisings Turkey's leadership in the region was operating under the Zero problems policy, then a contradiction in its behaviour can be observed. In this regard, with the outbreak of riots in Egypt, Tayyip Erdoğan, demanded the resignation of Hosni Mubarak (in a televised speech on al-Jazeera), being the first Western leader to take this position. He also supported democracy in Egypt and Tunisia, and in Libya opposed NATO's intervention to impose a no-fly zone. However, he participated in this intervention due to his obligations under NATO membership. Moreover, he made diplomatic efforts for a ceasefire between Muammar Gaddafi and the rebels (Taşpınar 2011: 11-12). It is important to note that Turkey took into account Turkish investments from Libya (worth \$ 15 billion) and Turkish citizens to be repatriated (Kaya 2012: 30). On the other hand, in the case of Syria, Turkey had a pro-status quo-wait-and-see approach, due to the sectarian uprisings in Syria, especially with regard to the Kurdish issue, so the reaction to Syria was a timid one, related to the reaction to Egypt or Libya. However, relations between them deteriorated after Bashar al-Assad refused to implement real reforms on society, which prompted Erdogan to demand his resignation. (Lindenstraus 2012: 15)

The following table will present the leadership of Turkey in Egypt, Libya and Syria, by revealing the initial reactions and the manner of influence.

Table 3: Turkey's Leadership in Egypt, Libya and Syria

	Initial reactions	Mode of influence
Egypt	Turkey has supported reforms in Egypt (active reaction)	Turkey promoted secularism and respect for free elections, however, avoiding confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Libya	Turkey did not face the Gaddafi regime at the beginning of the riots. (passive reaction)	After Gadaffi's ousting, Turkey supported the reform, but was not actively involved in rebuilding the regime.
Syria	Turkey did not want to change the regime, but to reform the existing political system. (active reaction-passive)	"Gaining recognition that the pressure for reform on the Assad regime has worked; confrontation of the regime and registration of

		human rights; the implementation of sanctions in the last stage of the regime's construction.”
--	--	--

(Öniş, 2012: 54-55)

Neo-Ottomanism

Turkey's foreign and domestic policy was defined by a new concept, Neo-Ottomanism, and this paradigm shift has transformed Turkey into an attractive model for Arab reformers, through the trends shown in the following table:

Table 4: Turkey's neo-Ottoman tendencies

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Understanding of Ottoman and Muslim heritage.• There are no claims for the creation of Turkish imperialism.• An Islamic legal system is not desired.• Moderate version of secularism.• Multiculturalism, to the detriment of ethnicity.• Great feeling about the role of Turkey in the world.• Active foreign policy in mediating conflicts in the region.• Soft power, political, economic, diplomatic and cultural influence, in the former Ottoman territories, as well as in other regions of strategic interest.• Turkey is seen as a regional superpower.• Capitalizing on multiple Muslim and multinational identities.• Orientation towards the West, equal to the Muslim world.
--

(Taşpınar 2011:9-10).

The paradoxes of the Turkish model

Although the Turkish model is considered a positive example, for Arab Spring states, it failed to promote democracy internally, although measures were initially taken to improve democratic rights and freedoms, as violations of freedom of expression, repression the opposition by force and the problems of corruption at the highest level came in contradiction with the efforts to accredit the Turkish model (Sajjad and Javaid 2016: 83). Taşpınar (2014) argues that Erdoğan was a case in which “the leader is nominated after the electoral vote but is not concerned with respecting civil rights and freedoms, but considers democracy as a simple election win”, turning the system into a “tyranny of the majority”. Thus, the borders of Turkey in the region are constituted by the nature of the regime, which is increasingly moving away from the ideas of democracy. This became visible with the arrest of the regime's opponents, such as journalists, intellectuals and students, who were accused of terrorist-related crimes. Moreover, the problem of the Kurdish minority persists, and the process of writing a new democratic constitution has been blocked (Dala and Erşena 2014: 271).

Final Remarks

The Turkish model represents an important achievement in the Middle East region, dominated only by authoritarian regimes, thus becoming an inspiration for Arab countries. With the outbreak of Arab Spring protests and their worsening, there was the dilemma of Turkey's policy, zero problems with its neighbours, because, although initially it had a passive attitude towards the situation in Libya and Syria, establishing good relations with authoritarian governments, later to adopt a firm position, supporting the resignation of the dictators, from Hosni Mubarak to Bashar al-Assad.

Following the debates on the applicability of Turkey's model of states in transition after 2011, we concluded that during the period analysed, the Turkish model proved relevant to Arab states in transition, where some progress was made in the democratic plan, asserting itself. opinion polls, which argued that authoritarian regimes in the Arab world were impossible to adapt to the social,

economic and political demands of the population. Thus, the Turkish model in the region, played an important role in triggering the Arab Spring, and Turkish leadership was an inspiration for Arab reformers.

However, it is difficult for the Arab states to follow the Turkish model, which is a unique country, which has not been colonized and has undergone a long evolutionary process, while in the countries of the Arab Spring there have been rapid changes, radical. Also, Turkey is not an oil-holding country, so it needs real economic growth, being the most capitalist country in the Islamic world. The European Union market and the agreement with the EU, in the Turkish customs field, allow the Turkish capital to prosper and to impose an open society (Kaya 2012: 28-29), elements that we do not find in the case of the Arab Spring countries. In the analysis of the leadership of this country, the external influence of N.A.T.O., U.S.A. must also be taken into account. and the U.E. (which most states in the region do not benefit from), a perspective from which Turkish leadership should be considered a success. Turkey has created a link between the West and the East, with no need to export its leadership model to the Arab states in the region, which would otherwise be impossible as previously argued, but should be tailored to the historical, political and economic context of for each state, to successfully carry out economic and democratic reforms.

The paradox of the Turkish model is that the government has presented, on an external level, an attitude that supports democratization, but, internally, the attempt to apply democratic principles has failed. Taksim Gezi Park protests have weakened Turkey's model, its leadership has worsened, and President Erdoğan, initially perceived as a reformer, has created an authoritarian image, the electoral autocracy he has encouraged by acting in favour of liberalism and pluralism, not permitting. freedom of expression and separation of powers.

References

Alnassan AR and Sharma CB (2016) Leadership Styles: Political Leadership of Syria. *International Journal of Business and Management Invention* 5(4): 21-27.

Amour PO (2018) The Arab Spring Movement: The Failed Revolution. Preliminary Theoretical and Empirical Deliberation. In: *The Middle East reloaded revolutionary changes, power dynamics and regional rivalries since the Arab Spring*. Washington: Academica Press, pp.199-224.

Atasoy S (2011) The Turkish Example: A Model for Change In the Middle East?. *Middle East Policy Council* 18(3): 86-100.

Chalcraft J (2015) The Arab uprisings of 2011 in historical perspective. In: Ghazal, Amal and Hanssen, Jens, (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Middle-Eastern and North African History*. Oxford University Press.

Dala EP and Emre Erşena (2014) Reassessing the “Turkish Model” in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective. *Turkish Studies*, 5(2): 258-282.

Dede AY (2011) The Arab Uprisings: Debating the Turkish Model. *Insight Turkey*, 13(2): 23-32.

Kaya K (2012), Turkey and the Arab Spring. *Military Review*: 26-32.

Lindenstrauss G (2012) Turkey and the Arab Spring: Embracing “People’s Power”. Barcelona: *European Institute of the Mediterranean*.

Nafaa H (2011) The “Turkish Model” in the Mirror of the Arab Spring. In: *Turkey and the Arab Spring implications for Turkish foreign policy from a transatlantic perspective*. Washington: German Marshall Fund of the United States, pp. 37-44.

Öniş Z (2012) Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest. *Insight Turkey* 14(3): 45-63.

Sajjad F and Javaid U (2016) AKP and the Idea of the Turkish Model (2002-14). A Longitudinal Analysis. *IPRI Journal* 16(2): 70-88.

Taşpınar Ö (2014) *New Turkey and Its Paradox*. Brookings, 13 April. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/new-turkey-and-its-paradox>.

Taşpınar Ö (2011) The Turkish Model and its Applicability. In: *Turkey and the Arab Spring implications for Turkish foreign policy from a transatlantic perspective*. Washington: German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Taşpınar Ö (2011) Turkish Foreign Policy in Light of the Arab Spring. In: *Turkey and the Arab Spring implications for Turkish foreign policy from a transatlantic perspective*. Washington: German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Wagner B (2012) *After the Arab Spring: new paths for human rights and the internet in European foreign policy*. Brussels: European Union. Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN>.

Zylfijaj K, et. al (2014) Authoritarian Leadership VS. Participative Leadership In organizations. In: *In Beyond the horizon of tempus projects: theory and practice of project management*. Bologna: Società Editrice «Il Ponte Vecchio, pp. 447-454.

Euroscepticism. Contemporary Trends and Manifestations

Emilia Adriana GANEA*

Abstract: *The European Union is one of the most important global players to be found at the present time. What initially seemed to be a purely economic organization, transformed over time and became a political entity of particular importance. Over time the union has faced many problems, but every crisis has made the EU stronger and more integrated. The article aims to build a comprehensive image of the Eurosceptic phenomenon and its manifestations in contemporary society. The objectives of the research consist in the more comprehensive conceptualization of the term by collecting a large number of definitions. We are also proposing to pursue how its historical evolution at key times of European integration, in various regions of Europe. Euroscepticism is a central theme in European studies, the subject being of interest by nature, which uncontrolled can lead to negative effects on the EU. The Research methodology used is based both on the analysis of texts and literature and on the analysis of empirical data obtained from various studies.*

Key words: *Euroscepticism, Euro-European Union, Europe, political parties, evolution, manifestations.*

Introduction

IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE EUROSCEPTICISM, we have identified a number of authors who have varied approaches and opinions on this phenomenon. According to Ogden Richard, Euroscepticism is a concept, that is, a mixture of a term, a meaning and certain referent (Alibert 2015: 1). The term can be divided into euros, scepticism and the suffix -ism. According to (Euractiv 2013) the word sceptic came from the old Greek schools of philosophy, especially from the Prior of Elis, who claims that it is impossible to know the true reality of things. Thus, scepticism can be described as doubt, suggesting an attitude and a doubtful situation regarding an object. When used with the prefix euro, the term is clearly linked to the European Union

* Ganea Emilia Adriana, MA student at Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca E-mail: adrianaganea98@yahoo.com.

(EU), and the suffix *ism*, generally used for ideologies, gives the word the connotation of ideology and political problem (Ultan and Ornek 2015: 50). In 1998, Paul Taggart suggests a definition of the concept of Euroscepticism that is used later in most of the political discourses that covered this topic (Taggart 1998) "He determines Euroscepticism as a comprehensive term that expresses the idea of a contingent or qualified opposition," as well as the incorporation of an absolute and unmatched opposition to the process of European integration"(Taggart 1998: 366).

From the beginning it is necessary to distinguish between Euroscepticism and other related terms such as: Eurocriticism, Europhobia, and Anti-Europeanism. Eurocriticism or Eurocritics "knows what it is talking about" (Wilde 2010: 2). He is informed about the EU, but he simply doesn't like everything, even though he can recognize its qualities. This is in contrast to the Europhobe, which, unlike the Eurosceptic, has an "irrational fear of the EU." Anti-Europeanism is similar to the first term mentioned but is a much more "radical" form (Wilde 2010: 2). Anyone who declares himself an anti-Europeanist does not like anything about Europe at all (Wilde 2010: 2). French historian Christophe Le Dréau (2011: 11) points out in the Introduction to the European identity of the Europeans: *l'énigme* Philippe Chalamont that Euroscepticism is therefore a term issued by the media and not a lexicon of political science and that it should not be to be understood as a direct opposition to the feeling of Euro-optimism, but as a movement of opposition to the European construction.

The evolution of Euroscepticism

Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde propose an alternative definition to the term which is in relation to other European political positions: "In our scheme, Euroscepticism is defined less including, but more precisely, than in the definitions mentioned above." (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 299). David Easton made a distinction between support for European integration, thus talking about diffuse and specific support. The *diffuse* means the support given to the general ideas related to the European integration underlying the EU. Through *specific support* we perceive sustenance for the general practice of European integration, "that is, the EU, as it is and how it develops." (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 229) The first dimension separates Europhiles from Europhobes. Europhiles believe in the key ideas of European integration, "institutionalized cooperation based on common sovereignty (the political element) and a liberal

integrated market economy." (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 300-301) Thus, the Europhilic attitude may include those who "see European integration as a project for the creation of a new supranational state (for example, the federalists), but also for those who see European integration exclusively from an economic point of view (for example, the creation of a free trade area)." (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 301).

Euroscepticism appeared for the first time in "November 11, 1985, in the British newspaper *The Times*" (ESO 2015: 2), where its significance was explained as "opposition to European Union policies. Another moment, recently, this time, which has given rise to a new wave of Euroscepticism, is identified with the parliamentary elections of 2014. Then, elections took place in all the member states of the Union, in order to set up the European Parliament, but which culminated in an increase. of Eurosceptic political parties. About 25% of the available seats were allocated to MEPs with Eurosceptic inclinations. Moreover, national elections in some European countries have also been won by Eurosceptic parties: UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom (for the first time in history), the People's Party in Denmark and the Radical Left Coalition (Syriza) in Greece. "Another situation in which the states of the Union were found is, for example, that of Italy. Here the 5-star Movement of Beppe Grillo, although he did not get the majority of votes 21.16% of the votes shocked by the fact that he ranked in second place 21.16% of the votes." (Blându Andreea).

Over time, the phenomenon of Euroscepticism has undergone a periodization, thus adapting its content and intensity, diversifying its supporters and promoters in the same way. There are three major phases in the history of the phenomenon. The first is the period between the first moments of debate until the first moments of integration took place. "Now the main actors are the elites, and the message focuses on different visions of integration" (Vasilopoulou 2013: 6). The second is between the Maastricht Treaty's enter into force and the debates related to the Lisbon Treaty when the actors diversify, newly emerged political parties gain electoral visibility at national and European level, and public opinion sanctions the delegation of sovereignty at national level, at European level (for example, the Danish referendum). Third, it coincides with the recent financial crisis in which public opinion protests unite with the critical reactions of elites, and the national interest becomes central in European debates (Gherghina et.al 2016: 15).

If we analyse the definitions, we can extract four essential tools of Euroscepticism: democracy, national sovereignty, liberalism, austerity and identity (Bertocini and Koenig 2014: 1). However, it is important to make a distinction between the sources of the phenomenon and outline sources either

of ideological domination or of strategic nature. They cannot be strictly separated, because they are interdependent. In this respect, Gherghina and Soare emphasise that "Euroscepticism, ideologically fuelled, represents the manifestation of Eurosceptical political positions and is the result of the application of dogmatic principles, the actors promoting Euroscepticism considering, explicitly or implicitly, that the opposition towards European integration is consonant with their ideological belonging to families such as the nationalism or the sovereignty." (Gherghina et.al 2016a: 22). This perception feeds on the idea that Europeanization is an intense and rapid form of globalization on a regional scale, which will mainly result in diminishing the importance of nation-states and the forced dilution of national identities "(Gherghina et.al, 2016a: 22) European Union it is interpreted according to a set of pre-existing beliefs in the light of which a certain set of beliefs or values may be considered benign or evil.

Typologies

A first distinction between the types of Euroscepticism is based on the extremism with which it manifests itself. In this sense, two forms are distinguished: soft Euroscepticism and hard Euroscepticism. The first type does not reject European integration, "*per se*, but it criticizes the EU integration process and institutional policies." At the opposite pole, the other type implies the complete rejection of the whole project of European and economic integration, plus the opposition to joining the EU or even support the exit from the Union. These attitudes come from the belief that the EU is against certain values or is too capitalist, liberal or socialist. (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001: 10). Paul Taggart states that there are three positions of Euroscepticism reported to the European Union: the first is of those who are anti-European integration in general, in the second category are those who "do not oppose integration, but are sceptical that EU is the best form of integration, because it is too inclusive. In other words the EU is trying to force together elements that are too diverse to be compatible" (Taggart 1998a: 365-366). In this class, those who see European integration as an opportunity for mass immigration can fit. The last category is those who do not oppose integration but are sceptical considering that the EU is too exclusive, both geographically and socially. In the latter grouping are those who oppose the EU for reasons relating to the exclusion by the EU of the poorer regions of the world or the disadvantage of the working class (Taggart, 1998b: 366). Sofia Vasilopoulou (2011: 224) argues that radical

right-wing parties can be grouped into three models of opposition to integration and the European Union. As follows: rejection, conditioning and compromise.

Szczerbiak and Taggart (2001: 239) issue several assumptions regarding Euroscepticism based on political parties:

- The position of a party on a left-right scale is not decisive when determining whether a party is Eurosceptic or not;
- Usually the foreign parties manifest Eurosceptic behaviour;
- Euroscepticism manifested at the level of political parties is different from that expressed among the population;
- It is especially pronounced in the states that are to join the EU;
- Euroscepticism varies from country to country, both in terms of form and intensity.

Another type of Euroscepticism is the so-called *Atlantic*, referring to a contradictory feeling between pro-Americanism and pro-Europeanism. Another form of Euroscepticism is policy-based, that is, it opposes certain common policies such as common currency or the agricultural policies required by the EU.

Current manifestations of Euroscepticism

Eurosceptic parties in Europe are not of central importance, but they are part of the spectrum of European parties and extend across the continent, whether we are EU member states, candidates or non-EU states (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001: 24). Similarly, Eurosceptic parties often, though "protest parties may use their position on the EU as one means of differentiating themselves from the established parties" to gain electoral attention (Taggart 1998: 382). Since the European Parliamentary elections in 2014, there has been a considerable increase in Eurosceptic parties on the EU political scene (European Parliament 2014). Following 2014, the European Parliamentary parties won 135 seats out of 751, that is, 18 percent of the total number of seats in the European Parliament, increasing the presence in Parliament by 63 seats compared to the 2009 elections. Moreover, the number of parties that received more than 15 percent of the votes doubled from previous elections (Emanuele et.al 2016: 700). In Western Europe, several aspects need to be considered when discussing Euroscepticism and its approach of manifestation. It unites several ideologies, which do not seem to have any common ground. If we only refer to the states of Western Europe, then we notice that Euroscepticism is a contingent idea, and their supporter lost the connection they had with the right because it began to limit the electors' scope (Taggart 1998: 384). Instead, when it comes

to Central and Eastern Europe, it is extremism and nationalism that have taken root in this part of Europe. Some of the extremist groups developed as anti-communist movements but continued their activity after the collapse of the communist bloc, addressing contemporary issues and issues. They were divided into two categories: some chose to operate independently, while others remained under the aegis of larger parties with anti-communist programs. After the first elections that took place after the fall of the Soviet dictatorial regime in the Czech Republic, many new parties have appeared, some even extremist. In other states, such as Hungary, umbrella parties have resisted, but they have lost their rightful connection because they have begun to limit their electoral space (Mudde 2005: 162- 164).

In 1991 the Visegrad Group (V4) was established from the desire of the Central European countries to cooperate in several areas of common interest within the framework of European integration. The member states of this organisation are: Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. They are not only linked by geographical location, but also by the fact that they share values and a common culture (Trulli 2017: 1). An essential feature of the Euroscepticism manifested by the Višegrad group is the support of the relationship with Russia. V4 supports cooperation with Russia, both economically and because the EU needs its resources. They also state that the EU needs the Kremlin to solve its problems in the neighbourhood, especially the problem in the East, where Russia's involvement is indispensable. V4 believes that these two have to make exchanges between them, and that is why "the Union needs to solve its problems with Russia, as Donald Trump did, for example, and if some states see Russia as a threat, politicians from there they should work to change their mind (Tereszkiewicz 2018: 150). Also, V4 opposes any development of Common Defence policies (ESDP, PSAC), they consider this to be the first step towards a European federal state (Tereszkiewicz 2018: 150).

We note that Euroscepticism is widespread throughout the European continent, and there is no rule after which it acts. From founding countries like France, which have impressive and essential implications for the evolution of the Union to what it has become today, to countries in Eastern Europe, which have recently joined the Union, such as Poland. A country that has only gained from accession, both through the funds they have accessed and because it has offered Polish citizens all the benefits of gaining a place in the EU. We also find that theorists' statements about the complexity of the Eurosceptic phenomenon are also found in the manifestations of the countries we have considered in our analysis. If in France the increased level of Euroscepticism is due to economic problems, in the Netherlands it has a political basis, and in Austria a national one. In the east there is a common feature of the states, because they are also grouped in the V4 form, which ideologically shapes them. The trend in countries

such as Poland, the Czech Republic is heading towards nationalism and xenophobia, even if immigrants do not directly affect them.

Countering Euroscepticism can often be considered a work of skill. Since the first election of the Parliament, there have been Eurosceptics. It is hard to prohibit it, you are practically violating the right to free expression, and the Union is the living expression of democracy. However, solutions need to be found, as this can be a real problem for the EU. In the next chapter we will try to look at the ideas proposed by some European institutions or various leaders or actors, whether political. We will also refer to non-governmental organizations that have addressed this topic. Through our analysis we will analyse what are the main causes of the increase of the rate of Euroscepticism among the citizens of the Union, then what potential risks generated by Euroscepticism have found these strategies and not lastly if they have presented efficiency in time.

Final Remarks

Eurosceptic speech is generally based on an emotional language and brings to the attention of the general public obvious issues, which are very disturbing by their nature. For example, immigration or economic crisis are well known topics that they use to get what they want. Most of the time, they are liked by the media and then exposed in a variant that may not convey the real information. The general arguments they bring are linked to the threat of sovereignty and democracy and only the nation state can defend its citizens, an argument characteristic of the right-wing parties. The left wing focuses more on the fact that the EU is the "engine of capitalism and competition, destroying solidarity" (Oomsel: 4), and their policy is one of withdrawal within the nation state, because there is true solidarity.

Like any instigating phenomenon, Euroscepticism is firstly grounded among the less informed, or even misinformed, population, where political elites know how to shape their discourse. Speech, which creates its arguments using real problems and which greatly disturbs society. Most of the time I expose them only in half, and they bring possible unattainable solutions. The EU's competent authorities have begun to develop various strategies and reports to focus on citizens and their relationship with the Union. Great emphasis is placed on correct information and on strengthening their relationship with them, but also with the EU institutions, which are often seen as too bureaucratic.

References

- Alibert Juliette (2015) „Euroscepticism: the root causes”, October, https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/euroscepticism_the_root_causes_and_how_to_address_them.pdf, [accessed on 6/3/2019].
- Bârgăoanu Alina, Loredana Radu, Elena Negrea+Busuioc (2014) The Rise of Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis. Evidence from the 2008–2013 Eurobarometers. *Revista română de comunicare și relații publice*, Volume 16, no. 1 (31).
- Bertoncini Yves, Nicole Koenig (2014) Euroscepticism or Europhobia? Voice vs. Exit?. *Notre Europe* - Institut Jacques Delors.
- Blându Andreea, *Ascensiunea Euroscepticismului*, Institutul pentru Democrație Participativă Euro Qvorum, <http://qvorum.ro/ascensiunea-euroscepticismului/>, [accessed on 21/3/2019].
- ESO (2015) *Information Guide - Euroscepticism*, European Source Online, Cardiff University Press, <https://orca.cf.ac.uk/77359/1/Euroscepticism.pdf>. [accessed on 14/05/2019].
- Euractiv (2013) Euroscepticism: More than a British phenomenon, *Euractiv*, 25 January, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/med-south/linksdossier/euroscepticism-more-than-a-british-phenomenon/>, [accessed on 6/3/2019].
- Gherghina Sergiu, Sorina Soare, Sergiu Mișcoiu (2016) Combaterea euroscepticismului, extremismului/radicalizării și consolidare încrederii în valorile europene. *Studii Strategice și Politici*, No 1, Institutul European din România.
- Le Dréau Christophe (2009) Introduction L'identité Européenne des Eurosceptiques: L'Énigme Philippe Chalamont. *Les cahiers Irice* No 2.
- Magnus Kaunas Vytautas (2016) Expressions of Euroscepticism in Political Parties of Greece. *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, vol. 4.
- Oomsels Peter, *Best Practice Guide on Countering Eurosceptics. Fighting the Rise of the Eurosceptics*, https://www.jef.eu/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/Countering_euroscepticism_01.pdf, [accessed on 11/06/2019].
- Petr Kopecky, Cas Mudde (2002) The Two Sides of Euroscepticism Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe European Union Politics 2002. In *European Union Politics, Volume 3*, SAGE Publications, London.
- Szczerbiak Aleks and Paul Taggart (2008) Theorizing Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality. In *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Taggart Paul (1998), A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. *European Journal of political research*, vol 33, Ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Euroscepticism. Contemporary trends and manifestations

Taggart Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak (2002) Crossing Europe: Patterns of Contemporary Party-Based Euroscepticism. In *EU Member States and the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe*”, Paper prepared for presentation at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Workshops, March 21-27.

Topaloff Liubomir K. (2012) *Political Parties and Euroscepticism*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Torreblanca Jose Ignacio and Mark Leonard (2013) *The Continentwide Rise of Euroscepticism*, The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), London.

Ultan, Mehlika Ozlem; Ornek Serdar (2015) Euroscepticism as an Ideology. *International Journal of Social Sciences* Vol. IV, No. 2.

Vasilopoulou, Sofia (2013) Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?. *Journal of Common Market Studies*.

Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola Maggini, Bruno Marino (2016) Gaining Votes in Europe against Europe? How National Contexts Shaped the Results of Eurosceptic Parties in the 2014 European Parliament Elections. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, vol. 12.

Wilde Pieter de (2010) *Under what conditions does Euroscepticism flourish? An evaluation of different approaches and empirical findings*, Trial Lecture, Oslo.

Book Review: Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (edited by), *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War. Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights. 1972-1990.* New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2019.

Paul POPA*

IN THIS 2019 EDITION coordinated by Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, the authors are presenting aspects on human rights policies evolved through diplomatic techniques in some key events of the Cold War and how these human rights were approached, by communists and by Western Countries. The negotiation of the Final Act from Helsinki once again underlined the major differences in approach, determined by the liberal way in which Western European society evolved, but also by the interests of Eastern European states. A major goal was for human rights to overcome national interests, so that they represent the point of negotiation in every inter-state relation.

In this regard, the role of the CSCE has proved crucial. What was projected as a possible failure turned out into a major project that changed European societies. According to the authors, the success of the CSCE was due to the bilateral and multilateral diplomacy of the Western diplomats, but also the “long term logic” of the CSCE, fully supported by the following meetings in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna. The architecture created by the CSCE has allowed continuous negotiations in many fields and implementations through different instruments, today the CSCE retaining a major role in cooperation and European security. The volume presents numerous aspects regarding the diplomatic and negotiation instruments between the West and the East, and especially their effects on the post-Cold War European development, which are found today in the form of NGOs manifestations, intellectual elite, media, institutions, etc.

From my point of view, updating some information on events of the way in which human rights have developed is extremely important, considering the

* Paul POPA, PhD, Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Babes-Bolyai University, paul.p.popa@gmail.com

nationalist and populist movements that are found in Europe nowadays, an anchor in the past of European construction and a continuous reference to the democratization process is vital, precisely to remind us constantly of the efforts that have been made to have the rights and freedoms today. For a better understanding of the events, the volume is divided into three parts: the first part focuses on the experience of the diplomats at the meetings, the strategies, the topics discussed and their consequences; the second section reviews the "transnational movements that defended the human rights" and focuses on the European efforts brought together to seek, establish and implement new human rights visions; and finally, the third part analyses cases of some states on both sides of the Iron Curtain regarding the approach of the policies debated during the meetings and how they subsequently influenced the respective states.

Part I, Diplomats, Diplomacies and the Making of the CSCE, begins with an article by Andrei Zagorski, which presents ***The Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1975–1990***, as a new debate on the agenda of the communists and Western Countries and explains how the two major analysis and debate groups faced numerous mutual reservations, but also how the civil society was majorly involved in making these decisions. From a historical perspective, the author presents the evolution of human rights protection, which led to the creation of international initiatives and mechanisms that developed over time and were specific to Western Countries. Thus, the obligation of respect for human rights and freedoms has been made in the consideration of numerous interests. The follow-up meetings reinforced the need for these meetings to be regular and the development of policies represents a continuous process of their implementation. One condition imposed by the Soviets was *Non-intervention in Internal Affairs*, so *Human Dimension Mechanism* was successful only after 1989 when interaction between the CSCE and NGO's could be strengthened.

The second chapter, *Executors or creative deal-makers? The role of the diplomats in the making of the Helsinki CSCE* (Martin D. Brown and Angela Romano), shows how over six hundred diplomats have done a tremendous job. In the first phase, the chapter sets out the need to create a jargon for diplomats, 'in order to reconcile the goals of some delegations'. This has allowed many rules of negotiation and debate to be changed repeatedly. There has always been a need for consensus, which has led to ad-hoc alliances in informal meetings. Although supposedly non-military meetings, NATO, Warsaw Pact and NNA delegates monopolized the talks, always marginalizing important issues. A special case is that of the UK whose diplomats have proven extremely creative, but also that of France whose diplomats have always created opportunities for negotiation in informal meetings.

Nicolas Badalassi presents in the third chapter, *From Talleyrand To Sakharov - French Diplomacy in Search of a 'Helsinki Effect'*, the European projection of this conference as one of the biggest contemporary diplomatic events, as well as the political statements according to which the Act from Helsinki represents "an essential human step". The chapter focuses on the social effects that these diplomatic meetings had a vision on human relations, considering the ideas of different delegations. For example, the French were more cunning, always creating the projection of a continuous process, so as to win over the Soviets, who only wanted to draw a few general lines.

'*Human Rights, Peace and Security Has Inseparable*' Max Kampelman and the Helsinki Process' written by Stephan Kieninger presents the role played by US Ambassador Max Kampelman. Following a biographical presentation, the author focuses on presenting his soft power approach by having the capacity "to combine public diplomacy and top-secret backchannel talks with the Soviets". It also played an important role in the next stages both in Belgrade in relation to the communist bloc, but also in Madrid where gun control was analysed especially in relation to NATO.

Part II, *The transnational promotion of human rights and the role of dissidence*, is structured in five chapters. The first of these, *The committee of concerned scientists and the Helsinki Final Act 'refusenik' scientists, détente and human rights* (Elisabetta Vezzosi) evaluates the role played by scientific internationalism in the consolidation of human rights in the Cold War. This chapter focuses on the role played by scholars and scientists in stressing the need for possible changes in research activity, but also protection against intellectual theft.

Christian P. Peterson, in chapter 6, *Seeing the value of the Helsinki Accords - Human Rights, peace and transnational debates about détente, 1981–1988*, focuses on the public perception of these meetings, but especially the communication between the two blocs on strengthening human rights. The limitations of some negotiations, the implications of Western activists, but especially the activity of support groups are presented. Many of the decisions adopted in the Helsinki Final Act were as a result of the involvement of private citizens to strengthen European democracies.

The importance of the Helsinki process for the opposition in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western peace movements in the 1980s (Jacek Czaputowicz) is a chapter dedicated to the changes produced by the Helsinki Final Act regarding the states of the Eastern Bloc, since by signing it, the European communist states committed themselves to monitoring the

fundamental human rights and freedoms. It is also underlined how the transnational relations were strengthened and the development of the democratic mechanisms of association and union solidarity, which subsequently led to the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum, which aimed to unite the two blocs in public policies through seminars organized in different capitals of Europe.

Chapter 8, *The limits of repression soviet bloc security services vs. transnational Helsinki networks, 1976–1986* (Douglas Selvage) is a chapter dedicated to how the effects of the Helsinki Final Act were felt both in the communist states of Eastern Europe and especially in the Soviet Union. One of the major effects, at least encountered in East Germany, was the desire of citizens to emigrate to West Germany, and in the other states there were many manifestations of awareness that became increasingly difficult over time to be managed by political repression. All of these led to an economic and military weakening of communism, which subsequently manifested itself through the fall of the communist regimes.

Carl J. Bon Tempo *Helsinki at home NGOs, the Helsinki Final Act and politics in the united states, 1975–1985* is dedicated to explaining the effect of Helsinki meetings has had on the policies and agendas of the United States of America. The chapter focuses in particular on how the rights and freedoms as they were developed in the Final Act of Helsinki have influenced the agenda for the rights of African Americans as well as immigrants. Certain groups that supported these rights, in particular the *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)*, were majorly involved in the entire process of the Helsinki Act. So did immigrant rights organizations, which invoked the Helsinki Act to liberalize US policies.

Part III, The politics of the CSCE in Europe has four chapters describing situations of some European states, and how the Final Act from Helsinki has influenced national policies and the relationship with other states. For example, Maximilian Graf in Chapter 10, *European Détente and the CSCE: Austria and the East-Central European Theater in the 1970s and 1980s*, presents how the Helsinki Final Act did not affect Austro-Hungarian relations because they were already tight, the creation of a tandem of Austria with Poland for cultural heritage, but also the proximity of Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In Chapter 11, Matthias Peter talks about *Saving détente the Federal Republic of Germany and the CSCE in the 1980s*, which opened the vision for East agenda as well as gun control policy of FRG. The volume continues with *Transformation by linkage?* written by Oliver Bange, which has perspectives on East Germany and gun control policy in relations with the Soviet Union. *CSCE Albania, the outsider*

in European political life (Hamit Kaba) evaluates a special case in the Helsinki Final Act meetings, as Albania is the only state that refused to participate or sign the CSCE, as its leader had a different vision and ideology about European security, considering the two major participants, the USA and the USSR, together with the German states as the main factors of European insecurity. Also, the Albanian leader's closeness to the People's republic of China determined Albania's reservation regarding the CSCE.

The conclusions written by Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder highlight the crucial role of the CSCE in Europe, and why it is important to reassess certain positions and strategies considered by the conference participants. The CSCE has had a major impact in opening discussions between East and West and how human rights and fundamental freedoms have been significantly encouraged and evaluated. I personally appreciate the volume as one of the highest importance, which manages to encompass some of the most significant positions and strategies, compared to the respective political context, which explains very well the evolution and political context of today.