

Frequency For the People And Frequency By the People

Radio Free Europe and Radio Kossuth during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956

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Abstract

The present research looks at the way information was broadcast over radio frequencies of Radio Free Europe and Radio Kossuth, during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. It is an attempt to show the influence of this information and the opinions that go along with it, on the revolutionaries and, implicitly, on the unfolding events of the revolution itself. In order to do so, it relies heavily on the transcripts of broadcast of the two aforementioned radio stations. The research also aims to highlight how this particular branch of the media could affect not only the events of the revolution, but the perception of it as well, especially in Transylvania.

Keywords: Radio Free Europe, Radio Kossuth, revolution, crisis of communism, western help/aid

“**R**ADIO FREE EUROPE: bloody Europe radio” (HU-OSA 1956: 300/40/10). This is the title of a newspaper article, published in Hungary one month after the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The author reported on the opinions conveyed in the German press of the time relating to the possibility of blaming those who created the content of Radio Free Europe (RFE) – a radio station funded by America – broadcasts, for inciting the Hungarian people to revolt. Even if this was the most popular radio station of that time, due to the fact that it was not controlled by the state nor by the Party, Radio Kossuth¹ also had a significant audience rate. During the Revolution, however, the latter will undergo a period in which it will be able to practice freedom of speech.

The information and opinions broadcast through the aforementioned radio stations have influenced the unfolding of the Revolution, the supporting movements and protests in Transylvania and the continuing of the resistance in November.

¹ Radio Kossuth was a radio station controlled by the Working Party of Hungary. However, during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 it underwent a period of freedom. During this period, the station's name was changed to “Szabad Kossuth”, that is Free Kossuth. The liberation from under the strict control of the Party and the name change were announced on air, on 30 October 1956, at 20:03 PM (HU OSA, 300/40-8, Box 41: 1527).

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In order to review the transcripts of RFE and Radio Kossuth broadcasts, I consulted the Open Society Archives, in Budapest. The fundamental objective of my research was to achieve personal clarification on the subject matter at hand. The present paper wishes to be an analysis of the information and opinions relevant to the unfolding of events in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, broadcast by these two stations and also, of the influence they had on the unfolding of the Revolution, the supporting movements and protests in Transylvania and the continuing of the resistance in November.

Dr. Csaba Békés is considered to be a top researcher on the matter of the 1956 revolution. Taking advantage of the declassification of archives, he has brought to light the principal reactions of Occidental states with regard to the revolution. He underlines the fact that, contrary to some researchers' opinion, the events in Hungary had nothing to do with the moment chosen for attacking Egypt at the secret discussions held at Sévres. (Békés 1992). At the same time, he writes that in respect of the American help, in which many Hungarians put their faith, it was never formulated as a concrete policy of the USA, the liberation propaganda of the Eisenhower administration being nothing more than simple rhetoric, which had entered Hungary especially through RFE. (Békés 2002: 341-342). All this can clearly be established, Csaba Békés claims, if we keep in mind the situation of a bipolar world, based on the stability of the status-quo, due to which there was never a real possibility of suppressing the communist regimes in the countries under the USSR's influence (Békés 1996: 40). For this reason, Gábor Szakács condemns the information broadcast by RFE in his paper, accusing the station and the USA – the financier of the radio station – of crass misinformation (Szakács 2008: 632). He has neglected, however, to take into account the work of Irén Simándi, in which the author – through the analysis of several newspaper articles, documents and reference works – reaches the conclusion that in the case of the 1956 revolution, the broadcast of RFE on this subject was not governed by the American leadership. This was due to the sudden manner in which the revolution erupted (Simándi 2005: 304). Another paper that tends to overturn Gábor Szakács's conviction is that of György Vámos. In his work, the author draws attention to the fact that some aspects were omitted from the speech held by the American foreign minister J. F. Dulles (broadcast by Emil Csonka, member of the Hungarian Section of RFE, on 28th of October 1956), that would have conveyed the essence of the speech, Dulles stating only that America did not tie its offered support to political conditioning and did not search to form allies of the states emerging from under the sphere of influence of the USSR (Vámos 2010: 62). That is why, according to György Vámos, even if help was not concretely promised to the revolutionaries in Hungary, the impression that they could rely on the said help remained (Vámos 2010: 62).

Stefano Bottoni, referring to the supporting movements taking place in Romania,

mentions the role of the radio. He claims that these solidarity protests were initiated thanks mainly to the Kossuth, RFE, and Voice of America radio stations, due to the fact that these were the main sources of information available to the citizens of Romania (Bottoni 2006: 24).

The aforementioned authors' works represent the main directions of research pertaining to the role of RFE in the unfolding of events during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The primary sources, in this case, are the transcripts of RFE broadcasts. Through research based on these sources, the present paper will have its own place among the aforementioned works, following the direction offered especially by the works of Dr. Csaba Békés and György Vámos.

Furthermore, I will also analyse the broadcast of Radio Kossuth (later Free Kossuth), comparing the information and opinions offered, in order to facilitate an overview of the role played by each radio station with regard to the subject at hand.

I. General considerations

1956 was a critical year on a global scale, taking into consideration the crises of Central-Eastern Europe and the crisis in the Orient. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 is one of the crises of the Cold War era.

The speech of Nikita Sergeevichi Khrushchev, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, through which he condemned Stalin and his regime, brought about a recalibration of the perception on communism.²¹ Due to the speech, the negative perception of the aforementioned regime was accentuated, discrediting it further. This is known as the speech of “de-Stalinization”.

Due to this primary détente, the relationship between Moscow and its satellites changed, allowing acute differences to be observable between the Stalinist and the post-Stalinist period (Retegan 1996: 18-20). The Titoist threat to the USSR had proven to be more than a figment of Stalin's paranoia. Khrushchev's words and actions offered hope to the people of these countries that Moscow will come to accept the fact that each party will follow its own path to communism (Judt 2005: 311). Thus, in order to obtain public approval, they had to manifest themselves in a nationalistic manner. The said approval was not, however, given to those who were thought of as being marionettes controlled by Kremlin (Kissinger 2007: 482). Viewed from this perspective, the return to power of Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary, after the period in which Imre Nagy had been head of the Government, brought about the rise of tensions in this country. The news of Khrush-

2 February 1956.

chev's speech reached Hungary in March 1956 and tensions soon raised to a critical level (Brown 2007: 237). The event that would destabilize the country and lead to revolution would be the last drop in a glass that began to be filled long ago.

I.1. The Revolution

In the summer of 1956 a Soviet initiative led to a reshuffling of Government in Hungary. Rákosi, a Stalinist, was perceived as representing a constant reminder of the old regime. This was not to Khrushchev's liking. Thus, in July, he was replaced by Ernő Gerő, who was somewhat less despised by the Hungarian public opinion. Once this change occurred, the internal situation of the country worsened, discrepancies were beginning to appear. The Petőfi Circle was allowed to reinstate its activities as of 19th September 1956, having been banned beforehand by Rákosi at the beginning of the summer (Litván 1996: 37-41). This group, composed of students and intellectuals, continued where they had left off, criticizing the regime, targeting Ernő Gerő. They were asking for Ernő Gerő to be replaced by Imre Nagy.

On the 6th of October 1956, the Hungarian Government allowed the reburial of László Rajk, who had been executed in the Stalinist period, during the stage known as the purge, to which many communist leaders from the Eastern bloc fell victim. Rajk had been rehabilitated in February of the same year, as an effect of de-Stalinization. The reburial ceremony, as well as having made way for student protests, is considered by some historians to have represented the spark of the revolution (Judt 2005: 314).

That same evening, in Szeged, at the premiere of a play by George Bernard Shaw, the auditorium protested against the regime (Farkas 2006: 31). Weeks of protests followed throughout the country. On the 16th of October the Students of Hungarian Universities Association was re-established in Szeged, an association that had no political affiliation (Judt 2005: 314-315). As a response to the anti-Soviet protests held in Polish cities on the 19th of October, the next day, on the 20th of October, the students brought to the public's attention their own claims, formulated in 16 points. Thus, they demanded reforms, freedoms, the replacement of Gerő with Nagy as prime minister and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from within Hungary (Békés 2002b: XXXVI).

Two days later, on the 22nd of October, the students sent their representatives to the Technical University in Budapest to participate at a general meeting. There they reformulated their demands into 12 points, after which they requested the Government's approval to organize an assembly for the next day (Borhi 2004: 243). Initially, their request was denied, only to be approved some hours later, with the mentioning of the

fact that the assembly was to be unfolded under the control of the Party (Ripp 1997: 171). Gerő decided to revoke his decision after the events had gotten out of control, denouncing the protest in a speech broadcast by Radio Kossuth, claiming that it was “chauvinistic, nationalist and anti-Semitic” in nature (Judt 2005: 315).

The date of the start of the revolution is the 23rd of October 1956. The students’ protest, one of solidarity with events unfolding in Poland, started at 3 P.M. In Budapest, the protesters made their way from the statue of the Hungarian poet Sándor Petőfi, to that of General József Bem, of Polish origin (Békés 2002b: XXXVII). A part of the demonstrators gathered in Kossuth Square, others started gathering in ever-growing numbers in front of the Radio Building. The said building was heavily guarded by troops of the ÁVH. However, at that time there was no threat of gunfire, such as there will be a couple of hours later. The protest grew so much in proportion that in the evening the statue of Stalin was demolished by protesters.

The first armed confrontation between the demonstrators and the law enforcement authorities broke out in Debrecen. The following outbreaks of armed violence grew into one, unitary revolution. At that time, Gerő decided to phone Khrushchev for help, asking him to authorize the intervention of Soviet troops (Békés 2002b: XXXVII).

The demands of the crowds made references to the political spectrum and to the economic spectrum as well. The repositioning of Nagy – reformed communist, prime minister of Hungary between 1953 and 1955 – at the front of the Government was a primary claim, this being viewed as an eventual guarantee of obtaining all of their claims (Retegan 1996: 21). Nagy made an appearance in front of the crowds and held a speech in which he asked protesters to return to their homes and to have faith in the Party, promising them the initiation of reformist measures. His promises, however, did not manage to tame the revolution. Due to his reformist ways of thinking, Nagy became a symbol of beneficial change in the eyes of the Hungarian people (Kissinger 2007: 485).

The Radio Building fell under siege after Nagy’s speech, the protesters benefiting from the help of officers, who had decided to join the cause. They managed to occupy the building. The night between the 23rd and the 24th of October, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working Party held an emergency meeting to discuss the revolutionary events that were unfolding throughout the country (Judt 2005: 315). In an attempt to calm the spirits, they decided to reinstate Nagy as prime minister, who was appointed by Mikoian and Suslov, members of the Politburo (Békés 1996: 43; Kissinger 2007: 485). The change in the country’s leadership was announced on air, on the morning of the 24th October, at 8:13 A.M. (Békés 2002b: XXXVII). The continuous broadcast of information coming from the Government and the opinions pertaining

to its point of view was made possible due to the fact that after the siege of the Radio Building in Budapest the broadcasting station was relocated to the Parliament Building (Békés 2002b: XXXVII).

Imre Nagy tried to convince the members of the Politburo who had appointed him as head of the Government that he will be able to consolidate the situation in Hungary, with adequate support from them. Nagy was aware of the fact that the success or the failure of the revolution rested exclusively on the opinion and path of action decided upon by the USSR (Békés 1996: 44). He declared curfew and taking measures in accordance with the state of siege. At the dawn of the same day, Soviet troops entered the capital of Hungary. During this time, the revolutionaries armed themselves, seizing multiple weapon and ammunition depositories, as was the one in Bem Square (Békés 2002b: XXXVII).

The next day, with Soviet help, the Radio Building was occupied again by the Government. Through a broadcast, the population was told that the protest had been crushed. As an effect of that statement, many protesters put down their weapons and gathered in Kossuth Square, in front of the Parliament Building. Once a significant crowd gathered, Soviet and Hungarian troops opened fire on the people in the square (Borhi 2004: 245). After the massacre in Kossuth Square, the decision was made to replace Ernő Gerő with János Kádár, as prime secretary of the Party (Judt 2005: 315). Imre Nagy did not remain silent and expressed his opinion with regard to the aftermath of the Soviet intervention. The prime minister considered that a grave error had been made. He claimed that the holding of talks between the Hungarian Government and the Soviet Government should be announced, for the withdrawal of troops from within the Hungarian borders (Békés 1996: 44). Despite Soviet opposition, Nagy announced the initiation of such talks in a radio broadcasted speech (Borhi 2004: 246).

The revolution was expanding and consolidating. The people began forming multiple organizations, such as student organizations, worker's councils or national revolutionary committees (Judt 2005: 315).

The unfolding of events was initially considered by the Government to be a "counter-revolution". However, this perception changed officially on the 28th of October, when Imre Nagy repudiated such a conception, admitting the legitimacy and revolutionary character of the protests, announcing that there will not be any punitive measure taken against the insurgents and promising to hold talks with regard to the reinstatement, on new bases, of the Hungarian-USSR bilateral relations (Decaux 1982: 228; Borhi 2004: 246; Judt 2005: 315). The Soviets seemed to accept the idea of a Titoist Hungary (Kissinger 2007: 484-486).

The talks for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops ensued. The declaration of the

Soviet Government, from the 30th of October, even contained the promise of the reinstatement on new bases of the relations between the USSR and the Socialist countries, taking into account the idea of equality and no interference in the internal matters of states; with regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from within the Hungarian borders, only an analysis of the matter at hand was stipulated (Békés 1996: 45). That same day, Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced the abolition of the power of a single Party and the establishment of the multi-party system (Judt 2005: 316; Kissinger 2007: 486). Two days later, on the 1st of November, Nagy proclaimed Hungary's neutrality, asking for the recognition and the guarantee of the United Nations (Retegan 1996: 22). He declared the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact as well. The prime minister made these decisions as a result of the reentering of Soviet troops into the country and the occupation of major strategic points (Békés 1996: 45).

In order to determine the world's communist leaders to support an intervention, Khrushchev travelled to the satellite countries to discuss the matter with party leaders. He met with Poland's representatives in Brest, in Bucharest he sat down with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and with the Prime Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Novotny, and in Sofia he discussed the matter with the Bulgarians (Retegan 1996: 22). In addition to consulting with the aforementioned leaders, he also sought the opinion of the Chinese communists. On the 30th of October, the Chinese expressed their opinion, which was that Panch Sila³ should be extended onto relations between Socialist countries. Afterwards they retracted, maintaining that the Soviet troops should remain in Hungary (Borhi 2004: 249). Each of the consulted parties was of the opinion that the events in Hungary were consistent with a "counter-revolution" and as such, intervention was necessary in order to restore Socialist order (Retegan 1996: 22).

Once the decision was made to defeat what the Soviet defined as a "counter-revolution", there was no turning back. At the break of dawn on the 4th of November, Soviet troops entered Budapest. A short while later, the decision to reshuffle the Government was announced. Imre Nagy, together with some of his colleagues, found refuge in the Yugoslavian Embassy, receiving asylum (Judt 2005: 317). The bloody confrontations continued, but the fate of the revolution had already been decided. Imre Nagy and his group were arrested the moment they stepped out of the Embassy. The next day, they were transported aboard Soviet military planes to Snagov, in Romania, the itinerary and the destination being an enigma to them (Ioanid 2004: 56).

3 Accordig to Péter Vámos, Pancha Shila represents five fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence. These were drafted in 1954. Based on these, the Chinese and the Indian prime minister have revisited the issue of relations between the two states which have different social systems. (See Vámos 2006 : 14).

I.2. International relations during the revolution and the reaction manifested by different states

The revolution had been defeated; however, its echoes were just starting to be heard around the world. The non-existence of western help was brought into question in the specialized literature. Resolving the issue is the more important, seeing as, on more or less official channels, help was promised to the revolutionary people of Hungary. The people hoped that, in any second, western help would arrive; “The Americans are coming!” they used to say. Thus, the issue of international relations during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 warrants a closer look.

In Czechoslovakia the communists feared an eventual rally of the ethnic Hungarian population from within its boundaries with the revolution taking place on the other side of the border. For the purpose of maintaining control on the situation, the government offered positions to different Hungarian-speaking politicians and sent them to the bordering regions with Hungary. Their purpose was to keep the peace and to ensure that no one will become an ally of the “counter-revolution”. At the same time and for the same reasons, the border patrol forces were consolidated, beginning with the 25th of October (McDemott and Sommet 2013: 29). Around the time of the Hungarian Revolution, a powerful anti-communist rhetoric can be observed in Czechoslovakia. The people wanted changes, but at the same time, condemned the violent way in which these changes would be ensured. Solidarity was announced, remaining at that level in the overwhelming majority of cases (mockery, threats made against communists etc.). (McDemott and Sommet 2013: 31-37).

It is also necessary to present the situation of Yugoslavia, citing the fact that Imre Nagy and his group received asylum at this state’s Embassy. In trying to obtain the approval of communist states for invading Hungary and crushing the “counter-revolution”, Khrushchev met with Yugoslavian leaders on the night of the 2nd of November, at Josip Broz Tito’s residence, in Brioni (Gibianskii 2011: 140). The Yugoslav leadership agreed on the necessity of the intervention (Retegan 1996: 23). However, they highlighted the fact that utilizing armed force would not suffice, political measures being needed for re-establishing peace in Hungary, such as condemning the Rákosi-Gerő regime and adopting reform programs, based on the newly created workers’ councils (Gibianskii 2011: 140). Upon Nagy receiving asylum, the Soviet government initiated an ample persuasion campaign of the Yugoslav leadership, to surrender him to them. These efforts did not yield results. After Nagy and his group were arrested, the Yugoslav Government manifested its disagreement with regards to what had happened, accusing the USSR of taking action without taking into consideration the prestige and interests of Yugoslavia (Gibianskii 2011: 143).

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 presented a good opportunity for Gheorghiu-Dej and his acolytes to prove their fidelity to the USSR (Deletant and Ionescu 2004: 10). The revolutionary atmosphere in Hungary boiled over onto Romanian soil. The Government had to deal with students' protests in every University-centre in the country. The people of Romania heard about the events unfolding in Budapest through radio broadcasts, listening to Radio Kossuth, RFE, Voice of America (Bottoni 2006: 24). In Cluj, on the 24th of October, there was an unofficial meeting held by the students, at the Institute of Fine Arts. The meeting's initiators were arrested the next day (Boca 2011: 39). In this city, the county's leaders managed to prevent a common protest of the Hungarian and the Romanian students, planned to take place on the 27th of October, taking advantage of the latent ethnic tensions between the two groups (Bottoni 2006: 25). The Romanian Government proceeded similarly to the Czechoslovak Government, by sending ethnic Hungarian political personalities to the areas supposed to be vulnerable to the spreading of armed rebellion, especially in Transylvania (Bottoni 2006: 25-28).

The next crucial moment regarding the events in Transylvania was the approximately 3000 students' meeting in Timișoara, on the 30th of October 1956, followed the next day by a street protest, quickly repressed by the security forces (Sitariu 2004: 9-10). In the case of this city, the rally of Romanian, Hungarian and Swabian students was a reality (Bottoni 2006: 28).

Gheorghiu-Dej agreed with Khrushchev on the idea of massive military intervention in Hungary to stop the "counter-revolution". After it had been crushed, according to a Romanian-Hungarian agreement, signed with János Kádár, after Nagy's group left the Yugoslav Embassy's Building, the group were arrested and transported to Romania (Deletant and Ionescu 2004: 11-12).

In respect of the states from the Western Bloc, their reaction and lack of intervention on behalf of the cause of the revolution have been largely debated in the specialized literature. The governments of these states applied policies dictated by the principle of the balance of power (Göncz 2002: XIV). In this case, this meant preserving the status-quo from 1945, something that to the Hungarian people was a mere temporary state. To them, the revolution was an opportunity of the Great Powers to change the statute of Hungary (Békés 2002: 340). The idea of help arriving from the USA was upheld through the liberation propaganda and rhetoric of the Eisenhower administration, fed to the people through RFE broadcasts (Békés 1992). However, this propaganda was also believed and understood to be a direction in US foreign policy by the citizens of western states. Once the revolution had been crushed, it was noticeable that the foreign policy of democratic states does not necessarily follow the democratic principles upheld internally.⁴

4 Csaba Békés claims that interest in foreign affairs, set by Realpolitik, often does not conform with

Western support had been limited to RFE broadcasts and strong media coverage of the revolution. In the USA, 1956 was an electoral year, so no candidate would risk taking a stand that could prove to be against the electorate's will (Retegan 1996: 24). László Borhi, historian, compares the USA Government's attitude with Janus bifrons, a god in Roman mythology (Borhi 2004: 269), implying the duality between rhetoric and assumed direction in foreign policy. The sudden eruption of the revolution contributed to the confusion created at international level, including in the USA. This is evident in the speeches held by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and those of John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State. Because of this confusion, the messages (or parts of it) that they wanted to convey to the public often got lost in translation. The President had asked Dulles to notify the public and the USSR that the USA agreed to take into consideration the defensive aspects of the USSR, through a speech. Dulles, however, did not formulate so clearly, stating only that the USA did not consider the Eastern European states as potential allies (Borhi 2010: 127).

On the other hand, he added that the USA would like to see that Eastern European states regain their freedom and independence (Borhi 2010: 127).

It is also important to underline the possible role as mediator of the United Nations. The said perception had been fuelled by the possibility of perceiving this organization as neutral by each of the military blocs and, as such, a forum of international conflict resolution. At the same time, knowing that the USA had turned successfully to this forum before, during the war in Korea in order to prevent the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence, had also contributed to the fuelling of (false) hope (Békés 1996: 41).

Great Britain and France were involved in the unfolding of another crisis, that of the Suez Canal, which started on the 30th of October. Taking this into account, the reason why these two states wanted the Hungarian problem to be discussed during the Extraordinary Session of the United Nations, called to start on the 31st of October, where officials were to discuss the matters of the Middle East, is revealed (Békés 2002: 343).

The Hungarian Revolution, even though it was crushed, would be known as the herald of the inadequacy of the communist system, which would eventually bring about its fall (Kissinger 2007: 494). After it had been crushed, the search for the guilty parties ensued. The bulk of the blame was attributed to RFE. It was considered that its broadcasts were instigative. At the same time, ex-revolutionaries and the families of the victims blamed this radio station because of the fact that it had transmitted clear messages about military help from the USA, which proved to be false.

the liberal principal of freedom (Békés 2002a: 340).

II. Radio Free Europe

Radio Free Europe is a radio station sustained by the democratic states – especially the USA – during the Cold War era. Although the purpose of the station was in accordance with the direction of the US foreign policy of that time (Simándi 2005: 22-23), i.e. isolation policy, among its secondary purposes are ideas such as the unification of Europe and freeing the states and people trapped behind the “Iron Curtain”.

RFE has always accentuated the difference between itself and another American radio station catering to the communist states, Voice of America. The difference, according to the RFE, was that it declared itself as the representative of the people and society, as opposed to Voice of America, which represented the American government (Simándi 2005: 10).

This radio station transmitted to the Soviet Bloc. The communist governments tried to block its access. Often its transmissions were scrambled, the editors having to change frequencies multiple times a day. No matter how hard the Soviet satellites’ governments tried, the station proved to have a large following.

The Hungarian Section of RFE had been created in New York, in 1950 (Vámos 2010: 59). In 1951, the station moved to Munich, broadcasting until the 31st of October 1993 (Simándi 2005: 10). At the time of its conception, a tri-dimensionality of the duty of the Hungarian Section of the RFE was taken into account: the fight against the communist regime, the propagation of principles essential for the free western societies and preparing the Hungarian people for the period after their freeing from underneath communism (Révész 1996: 38).

In the days of the revolution, a series of Extraordinary Reports were broadcast. Through these, information was transmitted with regard to the reactions of different states on the events unfolding in Hungary. On the 24th of October 1956, at 14:10, information pertaining to the perception of these events in Paris, France, aired. Parisian officials condemned the intervention of Soviet troops in Budapest. They held a press conference, during which a statement had been made. The reporter specified:

“Finally, the declaration underlines that the intervention of Soviet troops in the internal issues of Hungary represents scandalous and unacceptable turnaround. Among the western reporters present at this press conference, the idea has formulated that the issue of military intervention should be brought to the forefront of the United Nation’s Security Council, because it represents the grave and open violation of the principles established by the peace treaty.” (*Rendkívüli riport, 24 October 1956*).

Thus, the reaction of a western state is presented. The reactions of other Occidental states are similar; however, it is important to present France’s opinion because this is one

of the states that supported the necessity of discussing the issue within the Extraordinary Session of the United Nations, which would be held approximately a week later. Only what could be understood by the Hungarian revolutionaries who were listening to RFE will be extracted out of this communiqué. Analysing the fragment from this perspective, the categorical condemning of the Soviets' action can be observed and, implicitly, the Hungarian people understood the support of this state, at least regarding the idea of the revolution. The program broadcast on the 26th of October, at 10:40 AM, under the title „Az utolsó 24 óra története” [The story of the last 24 hours], surely left the same impression. In this program, the discussion revolved around the reaction of certain states and also the reaction of some personalities and political parties, such as Nehru, Adenauer, the Socialist Party of France, etc. (*Az utolsó 24 óra története, 26 October 1956*).

The implicit message understood by the people of Hungary was that the western states vehemently condemned the Soviet intervention. American officials have pledged to support and to help the liberalization of the Hungarian state. At the same time, the message conferred by the fact that this help must be expected only within “the limits of peaceful possibility” (*Az utolsó 24 óra története, 26 October 1956*) might have been easily overlooked. In the event that the latter was understood, even in the ranks of the intellectuals the issue of trust arises, trusting the USA and the liberation doctrine, a trust that permitted the emergence of hope that the Americans will intervene in case they will be needed, especially since they had done so before in Korea.

The program mentioned in the first few pages of this paper, broadcast on the 28th of October 1956, also offers a commentary on the perspective of receiving help from the USA (*Kommentár az amerikai segítségről, 29 October 1956*). The herald of the said program recounted some aspects of the meeting of the United Nations' Security Council, in which the Hungarian issue had been raised. He also presented Dulles' speech, of which he stated: “[The speech] in all fairness, in a general manner, presents the point of view of America in the long run, to which it is very important that we pay attention to” (*Kommentár az amerikai segítségről, 29 October 1956*). He continued with a detailed presentation, mentioning repeatedly the economic aid offered by the USA to European states. In this presentation of the speech of the American minister of foreign affairs the confusion is evident. The necessity that every free state should do all in its power to help the subjugated states is presented, after which the fragment of the speech in which there is reference to the “friendly help” of the USA, given only after the liberalization of the people, was highlighted. These statements are followed by condemning the Soviet intervention. The confusion caused by this program is amplified by the last sentence, which refers to another statement of Dulles. Thus, it was argued that America was sympathetic to the Hungarian issue and was preparing to carry out vigorous steps in terms of practical

help. The possibility of providing military aid was not mentioned, but in the eyes of people facing revolution, practical help implied it and since it had not been outright denied, the possibility of misinterpretation proved to be a real issue.

The most prominent program of the Hungarian Section of RFE was “Reflektor”. In this program, the herald followed and commented on the important events in world politics, tackling Hungarian foreign affairs and internal politics at the same time. During the events of 1956, the RFE broadcasts were drafted taking into account the members of the urban working class (HU-OSA 300/60-1, Box 464). The herald of this program, Imre Mikes, presented himself under the assumed name: Gallicus. He followed Imre Nagy’s activity, thoroughly commenting every decision Nagy made.

On the 25th of October, the chief-editor of the station, Andor Gellért, stated on air that Imre Nagy was much more responsible in triggering the revolution, compared to many other members of his party, because he would have had the opportunity to rely on the non-communist layer of the population, in order to mitigate the economic and political crisis in Hungary (*Kommentár Nagy Imre felelősségéről, 25 October 1956*).

Gallicus proceeded in the same manner on the 26th of October 1956 (Beszélő 1981). He claimed that Nagy was not a solution and that he could not bring about the resolution the Hungarian people wanted, because he had set himself against the people and not in front of them. Referring to Nagy’s speech (HU-OSA 300/40-8, Box 41: 10073), Gallicus analysed semantically some of the phrases. The main idea of the commentary was the condemning by Nagy – on multiple occasions – of the revolt. Thus, Nagy was criticized due to the fact that in his speech he promised changes in the Hungarian society and state-structure, as well as the initiation of discussions with Moscow relating to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from within Hungary, all of this, however, “after suppressing the riot” (Beszélő 1981). In all fairness, Nagy’s speech was not out of line. Its purpose, as it is clear from the prime minister’s own words, was to stop the bloody confrontations. Because of the turbulent internal situation, which he wanted tamed, his rhetoric could not have been anything but defensive towards Socialism. Today it is a known fact that Imre Nagy at that time was growing further and further apart from the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist ideology. He expressed his opinion on the two during his detention at Snagov (Nagy 2004: 133-134).

Those days it was a widespread opinion that Nagy was the one who called in the Soviet troops. Even on the 30th of October, Gallicus stated as follows: “The Imre Nagy government is a pacifying government, which has slaughtered the nation’s flower through the bandits of the ÁVH.” (Révész 1996: 54). The next day, the moment in which doubt was cast on the previous opinion, Gallicus retracted, but remaining defensive:

“Is it possible that Imre Nagy wasn’t the one to call the Soviet troops? If I was wrong,

Imre Nagy himself misled me, together with those young people, those proletarians whose bodies are now covered by mother-earth.” (Révész 1996: 54).

Gallicus’ and the other RFE editors’ opinion on Nagy changed in a positive way only during the last days of the revolution, but especially after the revolution had been crushed (Vámos 2006: 61; Simándi 2005: 295). Imre Mikes apologized repeatedly, claiming that he was misled in his impression of Nagy. Yet, he underlined the fact that however wrong he might have been, keeping in mind the information and the facts he based his opinion on, it was impossible for him to reach a different conclusion.

From the messages conveyed by Imre Mikes (Vámos 2006: 52), the mobilizing nature of his words can be deduced. However, it is unlikely that the revolutionaries would have listened to him with such admiration, as to act because of him. What is much more likely is that his words gave the revolutionaries some degree of confidence in their own abilities.

Mobilizing messages and discourses dot the entire activity of the Hungarian Section of RFE. Throughout the days of the revolution, the heralds of this radio station transmitted messages received from emigrants, addressed to their families in Hungary and vice versa. For some people from Transylvania, this was the only way to keep in touch with their family members and close friends in Hungary, the only way to find out if they are still healthy, alive. During the days of 4th-9th of November, in the majority of cases, RFE broadcasts meant solely the transmission of such messages that seemed to flow through the newsroom non-stop. In this chaotic and confusing swap of information, there was simply no possibility to verify the information (due to the short time span available) and as such, the editorial staff ended up stating on air information that was void of all veracity (Révész 1996: 53).

After the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution, many accusations were brought to Radio Free Europe, regarding its role in the unfolding of events. The propaganda against RFE intensified throughout the communist countries, but some accusations originated from western states. A large number of articles appeared in the press discussing the influence of the information transmitted through the RFE station, during the revolution. In order to resolve the matter, not only the Soviet Union, but many organizations started their own investigation, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the United Nations.^{5*}

The mistake of the editors of the RFE was, firstly, the failure to clarify its role as an instrument of propaganda. Also, those working in the newsroom did not strain themselves to get to know the intentions of the President of the United States, Eisenhower,

5 * For an analysis of these investigations and the charges brought to Radio Free Europe see: Johnson 2011, *passim*; Simándi 2005; Révész 1996.

and that of the State Department, nor did they inquire into the true directions assumed by the American foreign policy. Thus, they had no way of knowing that the American government was quietly retreating from its duties and promises that were declared and assumed through the liberation doctrine. RFE did not realize at the time, but it had lost the basis which had offered veracity to the transmitted statements. This is where the difference between RFE and Voice of America comes in. This difference had been declared and sustained in the years of the foundation of RFE, but it wasn't even mentioned during the events in Hungary, in the months of October-November 1956. They did not give the people the chance to distinguish between propaganda and a plan assumed by the USA. Thus, the promise of help that was supposed to arrive in any moment was interpreted and perceived as insurance.

III. Radio Kossuth

This radio station was initially a part of Radio Moscow, broadcasting in Hungarian. From the year 1943, it was an illegitimate 'national station'. During this period, the editor of this section of Radio Moscow was Mátyás Rákosi, who will go on to become the General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. Even Imre Nagy worked at this station, as chief-editor ([Simándi 2005: 8-10](#)). After the seizure of power by the communists, this station became the official station of the state, acting as 'spokesman' of the Party.

Beginning with the outbreak of the revolution, this radio station went through a gradual liberalization. Approximately a week later, on the 30th of October 1956, at 20:30, the changing of the station's name to 'Szabad Kossuth' [Free Kossuth] was announced. At that moment the freedom of speech was proclaimed, along with the changing of the editorial staff, as well as that of some heralds ([HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1527](#)). This reform lasted for four days.

On the 23rd of October 1956, the said radio station still represented the voice of the Party and of the Government. The issue is: what kind of information was broadcast through the airwaves, on the frequency of Radio Kossuth?

On the first day of the revolution, the station seems to be broadcasting the unfolding events in an exact manner. Thus, at 10:00 AM the gathering of the youth of Budapest, with the purpose of manifesting their solidarity with the Polish events was announced ([HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 925](#)). At 12:53 PM the ban on the gathering was announced ([HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 928](#)), only for it to be permitted again an hour and a half later, at 14:23 ([HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 931](#)). Throughout the day

there were declarations regarding the decisions of state leaders and the unfolding of the events.

At 20:00 the on air intervention of Ernő Gerő was announced. He held a speech with the purpose of condemning that day's events as "nationalist, chauvinistic and antidemocratic manifestations". As such, these manifestations and provocations had to be stopped (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 949-953). If up until that moment, the people (especially the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania) had not realized what was actually going on, the rhetoric of the speech left no room for error.

On the morning of the 24th of October, at 04:30 AM, the general population from outside of Hungary was given a possibility to understand the gravity of the situation. The words that follow ended up being broadcast on the station:

"Fascist and reactionary elements have attacked our institutions and have attacked the law enforcement. In the interest of re-establishing order until further measures are taken all gatherings, groupings and processions are forbidden. Law enforcement has been ordered to intervene with the greatest strictness of the law against those who violate this decree." (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 959).

The gravity of the situation could not be denied from that moment on. The fact that such a decree was issued meant that the situation implicated a large number of demonstrators, set on bringing about change. Rebelling against the system and not obeying law enforcement were considered extremely grave deeds, which were punishable by jail time, forced labor or – depending on the magnitude of the deeds and their consequences – even death. On the frequency of the said radio station the usual programs were not broadcast and there were many instances of 'dead-air' that morning. The events unfolding in Hungary were not considered simple demonstrations of solidarity anymore.

At 9:00 AM of the same day the Hungarian Government's call for the help of the Soviet troops stationed in the country is broadcast (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 963). Three hours later, at 12:10 PM, Imre Nagy's speech, addressed to the residents of Budapest is aired, in order for them to stop the hostilities (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 967). On that day, as follows, the events are presented in their succession.

An important moment of the next day, the 25th of October, was the replacing of Ernő Gerő with János Kádár. That moment left its mark on the station: János Kádár and Imre Nagy each held a speech in which they asked the citizens and the young revolutionaries to stop fighting and to surrender, bringing their firearms with them to the nearest police precinct. At the same time, they assured the audience that those who surrendered would be pardoned (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1069-1073). The speeches did not have the desired effect. The fighting did not cease, nor did the citizens stop resisting law enforcement. The speeches did however have an effect on the population

outside Budapest and that of Transylvania, because it had been confirmed to them that the revolution had not yet been defeated. More so, the revolution was actually growing in influence and there was a danger – recognized by Kádár and Nagy –, that it could grow even more, hence the proposal to surrender under the promise of pardon.

The next evening an extension of the deadline for the surrendering of weapons was announced, launching another plea to the revolutionaries. This time, the appeal was formulated in a sympathetic manner, as follows:

„Members of the armed forces, fighters, armed workers, comrades! The Party and the Government owes you respect for the fight that you have been fighting for four days now, for the popular democracy. We are proud of your heroic steadfastness. Now, a different heroic duty falls upon you, that of taking the necessary steps in order to stop the bloodshed, together with everyone to whom Hungarian blood is precious.” (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1125).

The revolutionaries could not be stopped or discouraged through such rhetoric. They proved to be immune to tough words, that imply a command and compulsoriness, and also to kind sentimentalisms and fake sympathies. The continuing of resistance is proven by other statements, broadcast the same day. Reports were brought to the public's attention, through which the surrender of resistance groups was announced. The message conveyed through these reports was that these demonstrators decided to take advantage of the amnesty declared by the Government. However, at 21:42, a new appeal was launched, underlining the fact that only 18 minutes had remained until the expiration of the amnesty offer (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1132). After these statements, a threat followed:

“Although we are not adepts of threat and we do not agree with intimidation policies, we must mention that those who cannot be persuaded with kind words, to whom amnesty is not enough, will be faced with the power that is concentrated in the hands of the Government.” (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1133).

After these threatening words, a new urge to renounce the weapons and to take advantage of the amnesty followed. The mentioning (again) of the temporal frame the protesters left to the benefit of the amnesty, had a precise purpose: to amplify the pressure. Among the attempts to influence public opinion, there is the case of some young men who, after surrendering their weapons, were placed in front of Radio Kossuth microphones, in order to consolidate the appeals launched before by the editors (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1139-1140).

The appeal to emotions was used in RFE broadcasts in order to maintain the revolutionary spirits. In the case of the Radio Kossuth station, the use of this was intended to have the reverse effect. Thus, on the 27th of October, the editors of the station stated

as follows: “We would like to know if those close to us, our children are alive, we would like to see our families reunited.” (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1147). These words were included in a speech meant to argue the necessity of halting the hostilities. The importance of family was implied. Paradoxically, though, communism had tried beforehand to rid this concept of its meaning, one of the fundamental characteristics of this ideology being the atomization of society. However, family did remain an important part of the lives of the people. Thus, through this speech they wished to appeal to the fundamental values of mankind, values which, despite the regime, remained important. After this statement, however, the most representative aspect of communist ideology was inserted into the speech: work. This attempt at balancing between moral human values and the so-called ‘values’ vulgarized by communism is characteristic of the speeches broadcast on this station, during the Hungarian Revolution.

The next evening, at 22:48, a commentary was broadcast, regarding the new program that the Nagy government had adopted in the course of that day. A change can be noticed in the commentary. An interesting opinion was enounced, one that is not like any of the other opinions broadcast until then: “In the fire of the youth’s and of the people’s revolutionary fight, national unity was born.” (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1319). This radio station represented the voice of the government. The fact that such an opinion was enounced on air was the proof of the change in direction within the government. What initially the intellectuals and afterwards the whole of the revolutionary people sought through the return of Nagy to the helm of the country, seemed to be taking shape. The reform of the system had begun. This was the message of the speech. Approximately an hour later another message was broadcast, which highlighted a new step forward with regard to the promised reform:

“We are calling the attention of former students, members of the Petőfi Circle, of the Association of Hungarian Writers, of the Association of Musicians, of the Association of Craftsmen, of the National Association of Hungarian Journalists, those who wish to be a part of the new popular police forces, are to gather tomorrow, starting with 9 AM, in the building of the Faculty of Law, Eötvös Lóránd University, in University Square.” (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1321).

Thus, another claim of the revolutionaries came to life, that of forming popular troops of law enforcement. The change in discourse of the editors was so radical and sudden that if someone were to turn off their radio on the 27th of October, and turned it back on only the next evening, they would have remained with the impression that they were listening to a different station.

Being in this liberalization period, the programs and the opinions of the editors and of the heralds had a strong influence on the public opinion. One such example

proves that not only the people from within Hungary's borders were influenced. This information is not surprising, keeping in mind that the ethnic Hungarian population of Transylvania got their information about what was going on in Hungary mainly by listening to Radio Kossuth (Bottoni 2006: 24).

On the 29th of October, at 16:41, poems written about the unfolding events at that time were broadcast (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1389-1390). One of these poems was that of Lajos Tamási, „Piros a vér a pesti utcán” [Blood runs red on the streets of Pest]. According to a sentence, given by the Military Court of Cluj, on the 11th of October 1961, this poem signified jail time for a woman. One of the acts committed for which she stood trial was as follows:

“The defendant (...) during the counter-revolutionary events in P.R. Hungary (...) copied the poem entitled “Blood runs red on the streets of Pest”, which had been broadcast on the Budapest radio stations temporarily occupied by counter-revolutionary rebels, a poem instigative in nature, counter-revolutionary, which (...) she gave to read to her family members and to some youth, who had come to visit Cluj from P.R. Hungary.” (C.N.S.A.S. 1961: 499).

The interpretation given by the Military Court of Cluj is interesting. The said poem does have mobilizing elements within its lines. That cannot be contested. Something else is truly interesting, however. Firstly, the Radio Building had already been reoccupied and was not under the revolutionaries' occupation at that time. Secondly, Radio Kossuth was the voice of the Hungarian Government, of which Kádár was still a member at that time, the same man who will take over the Government after the defeat of the revolution, with the accord of the Soviets.

The day that Imre Nagy announced the abolition of the single party system and the instauration of the multiple party system, as an almost immediate effect, at 20:30, the liberalization of the radio station was announced, along with its name change, to ‘Szabad Kossuth’ (Free Kossuth). Freedom of speech was proclaimed in the newsroom and the following announcements were made:

“Esteemed audience, you are listening to a new program of Radio Free Kossuth. Esteemed audience is it not that you were glad to hear the new name of the Hungarian radio, RADIO FREE KOSSUTH BUDAPEST? After announcing our beautiful new name, let us fulfil our dear duty. We salute with brotherly ardour and are proud of the radio stations that have stepped before us on the road of the revolution and have preceded us by a couple of days in respect of free broadcasting.” (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1527).

With regard to the instauration of the multi-party system, the public opinion received the news with joy. One day later, on the 31st of October, in the program entitled „Reggeltől estig” [From morning to evening] the following opinion was expressed, re-

ferring to the reestablishment of the Independent Small Owners' Party:

“In my opinion, no one should dream about the old world. The world of Counts, of bankers and of capitalists has come to an end permanently. Who thinks in terms of the years 1939 and 1945 is not a real small owner. The last ten years have been a sad lesson, but one that is useful for this party and, utilizing all we have learned, we must reformulate the program of the party and we must transform our way of thinking.” (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1634).

After announcing the change in party systems, the process of creating or recreating the parties was started. The aforementioned issue did not represent a problem only in the case of that party. The experience of the communist world produced irreversible changes in the way people think. The programs of the parties could not be resumed as they were in the interwar. Sadly, these parties did not have enough time to consolidate themselves. After the defeat of the revolution, the return to a singular party was inevitable.

During this period of liberalization, changes can be observed not only in the quality of the information, but also in the quantity of it. News segments – especially those referring to international events – became much more vast, the commentaries became longer. Also, due to this liberalization, the possibility emerged of discussing issues which in other circumstances could not have been discussed on air. One such example is the issue of jamming other Hungarian broadcasts (such as those of the Hungarian Section of RFE). The editors of Radio Free Kossuth revealed the fact that all of the jamming stations on the Hungarian territory had been stopped, and that the jamming of broadcasts was due to jamming stations outside of the country (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 1656).

The revolutionary committees that formed all over the country, in every association, organization or institute, brought their claims to the attention of the public through Radio Free Kossuth. At least one claim was common to all of the lists: that Hungary proclaimed its neutrality. This claim of the people was realized on the 1st of November 1956.

The joy of the Hungarian people, the liberalization of the radio station and the democratization that started, beginning with the 30th of October, proved to be a fleeting moment. The changes were to last four days. On the 4th of November Soviet troops re-entered the capital of Hungary. At dawn, on that same day, at 5:20 AM, Imre Nagy's declaration, addressed to the Hungarian people and to global public opinion, was broadcast:

“This is Imre Nagy speaking, the president of the Popular Republic of Hungary. Today, at dawn, Soviet troops launched an attack on the capital, with the clear intent to

overthrow the legal, democratic Hungarian government. Our troops are fighting! The government is in its rightful place!” (HU-OSA 300/40-8 Box 41: 313).

Kádár betrayed his country. From that moment on the revolution had no hope of success. Suddenly, on the afternoon of the 4th of November, on the frequency of Radio Kossuth profoundly ideological speeches and commentaries reappeared. From that moment on, the Radio Kossuth station became the official voice of the Hungarian Government led by Kádár and the unique Party.

Conclusions

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a grave crisis of the Soviet Bloc. Without armed external help, however, the revolution did not stand a chance to win. The issue of this external help has more valences. Hungary did not represent an important objective from a geopolitical standpoint, which reduced the chances of a military intervention of the western states on behalf of the revolutionaries. Also, remaining at the geographical perspective, the approach of possible troops sent from the west would have caused many political and diplomatic problems, the only viable point of entry at that time being Austria, thus violating its neutrality.

Sending in help was also prevented by the international situation, on the one hand, and the internal situation of the United States, on the other hand. From an international perspective, Great Britain and France were involved in the Suez Crisis, another systemic crisis of the Cold War era, which was unfolding in the Middle East. On the other side of the world, in the USA 1956 was an electoral year. No candidate would have allowed himself to do something that could possibly be against the will of the voters, or something which would have had consequences such as plunging the country into war. The liberation doctrine of the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, remained at a rhetorical level, that of propaganda. This propaganda was mainly supported through RFE broadcasts.

Although the editors of the Hungarian Section of RFE broadcast information and opinions equivalent to the American propaganda during the revolution, they did not clarify the role that this station was set to play, that of an instrument of propaganda. Pertaining to this role, the station's broadcasts had the purpose of maintaining the revolutionary spirit in the Hungarian people. The opinions enounced in RFE broadcasts, mobilizing in nature, as well as the interpretation or lack thereof when it came to official information (such as Dulles' declarations) created the perfect environment for confusion to ensue. The revolutionary Hungarian people understood that the USA would send

military aid. They did not offer the possibility to the people of Hungary to distinguish between propaganda and action plan assumed by the USA. Thus, the promise of help that was supposed to arrive in any moment was understood and perceived as an assurance.

In the matter of the concrete presentation of the unfolding events in the news segment, both RFE and Radio Kossuth proved to have a factual approach. The difference between the two radio stations lays in the nature of the events broadcast. Information about the occurrences reached the RFE newsroom later, because of the fact that its headquarters was located in a foreign country, on the other side of the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, this station's access to information such as the international reactions with regard to the Hungarian revolution was much more facilitated by the same aspect. In the case of Radio Kossuth, the situation was reversed. It had facile access to internal events, far less so to the international aspects. In the period of liberalization though, much more information pertaining to international aspects was broadcast, as compared to the station's previous period.

Radio Kossuth represented the voice of the Hungarian Government in the first few days of the revolution. The opinions enounced and the commentaries offered backed this role of the station. In trying to influence revolutionaries to surrender and stop the hostilities, the editors of the station relied on two kinds of rhetoric. The first was a condemning and forcing voice, while the other one was more sympathetic, but undeterred. Both were utilized but neither led to the wished result. In the free period of the station, some changes were apparent that offered the editors the possibility to finally fulfil their journalistic roles and purposes. After the Soviet intervention on the 4th of November and the changes it caused in the Government, the station was forced to return to its initial role, that of being a channel of expression of the opinion and the information considered to be relevant by the unique Party.

Radio Kossuth also fulfilled another role, as important as the aforementioned one. Through this station the ethnic Hungarian communities of Transylvania found out information regarding the revolution and its unfolding. Thus, the information broadcast through this station had an influence on the actions of the Transylvanian people, who organized sympathy protests with regard to the revolution in Hungary.

Hungary did not get out of communist control through revolution; however, this country passed through the experience of anti-communist revolution long before the fall of the Soviet Union.

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