

# An Analysis of the Results from the 2016 US Presidential Election

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**Abstract.** This paper presents a model for state-level presidential outcomes for the popular vote and the Electoral College votes for the 2016 Presidential election in the United States of America. The input for the statistical model in this paper used a variety of polls from each state to estimate the winner of each state by the popular vote and the Electoral College votes. The first part of the paper presents an overview of a variety of models used to predict outcomes in past Presidential elections as well as the 2016 election. The final results of the 2016 election revealed that the polls were not accurate. But is that true? We carefully investigate those polls and compare our results to other results. Then, the final part of the paper explores the plausible reasons for the unexpected results and how these results may translate into the results of future Presidential elections.

**Keywords.** Presidential elections, state polls, behavioural differences in voters

## Introduction

FOR MOST OF THE HISTORY OF POLLING, pollsters have had great success predicting the outcomes of American Presidential elections. However, there have been notable and infamous exceptions. When John Dewey's lead grew so large in 1948, Gallup stopped updating their polls and thus missed the most significant come-from-behind victory of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Harry Truman's eventual presidential election victory. In 2000, which was perhaps the tightest race for the presidency of the polling era, the popular vote winner lost the Electoral College, and the event

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ushered in an era of greater scrutiny to state-level results. The 2016 Presidential election joined 1948 and 2000 as one of the greatest surprise elections in recent American history. Political pundits and election forecasters were nearly unanimous in their expectations that Hillary Clinton would not only win, but in some cases comfortably win, the Electoral and popular vote majorities and become the 45<sup>th</sup> President of the United States. Her opponent, Donald J. Trump, defied campaign norms consistently throughout, and the election results proved to be no different. Trump lost the popular vote but won the Electoral College just as George W. Bush had in 2000. As ever more sophisticated data collection and analysis techniques entered both political campaigning and political science, so increasing methodological sophistication followed in the predictive models used by pundits and political scientists alike. Increasing sophistication noted during the 2008 and 2012 elections suggested that polling was more accurate than it had ever been before. However, as noted in 2016 and in 2000, the unexpected outcomes of the Presidential elections caused journalistic analysts and scholars alike to question their predictive models. Thus, a new opportunity to examine the forecasting models and refine existing predictive practices is presented.

Forecasting elections has become a tradition among political scientists and often with great success. Many election-forecasting models detailed in this manuscript have proven successful over multiple election cycles. In fact, several of the election models discussed can claim to have been “mostly correct” in their predictions of the 2016 election. Several notable models predicted the popular presidential vote to within half of a percentage point of the actual vote total. The more sophisticated state-level predictive models that focused on electoral votes were generally less accurate.

In this paper, we apply an approach to the aggregation of Presidential state polls from various publications using statistical methods to estimate the winner of the 2016 Presidential election. The input data for this analysis are publicly available and compiled for statistical analysis. We will describe this method and tell a story about the meaning of these results. Indeed, the premise of this manuscript challenges the idea that “mostly correct” is an adequate standard by which to evaluate predictive models. Do election-forecasting academics truly want to laud “scientifically close” accomplishments? When one considers the binary choice involved in an American election (functionally only between Democrats and Republicans even with the presence of other minor parties), predictors need only choose between two options. With such a small sample of potential victory from which to draw, should anyone who in fact got the prediction wrong be considered mostly correct and the contribution of their model valuable or in some cases be the subject of praise and adulation? If our election forecasting science had been accurate, we would be in the middle of the United

States' second-consecutive historically significant presidential term as the first female President, Hillary Rodham Clinton, would be in office.

In contrast, we advocate an approach that evaluates predictive models from a dichotomous perspective to which a wider readership would subscribe, and we begin from the fundamental acceptance that while some predictions may have been close to the eventual outcome, it does not matter if those predictions are in fact wrong. Put another way, what is the value of a model that comes second in the race to predict? When predictive methods fail in their intended tasks, they should either be improved upon or abandoned. We must first determine whether the methods are robust enough to continue using, and if so, we must determine what improvements to the models must be made.

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## The 2016 Presidential Election Forecasts

In the 2016 Presidential election, most forecasting models produced by political scientists predicted Hillary Clinton to be the eventual victor. Notably, while Donald Trump won the Electoral College vote, Hillary Clinton did, in fact, win the two-party popular vote with a 51.1 percent tally. Evaluating predictive models in the two-tiered system of the Electoral College provides a complication that we must consider from the very beginning. Some models may predict a winner of either the popular vote or the electoral vote, and since a split popular-electoral vote has occurred twice in the last five elections, a complete model will separately predict both the popular and electoral winners. Donald Trump, the winning 2016 candidate, received 48.9 percent of the two-party percentage of the popular vote. However, Donald Trump won the presidency in spite of the popular vote disadvantage with a somewhat comfortable Electoral College margin of 306-232.

In his recap of the 2016 presidential election forecasts put forward by political scientists, James Campbell states that “with few exceptions, the accuracy of presidential vote forecasts ranged from impressive to extraordinary” (Campbell et al. 2017). Campbell goes on to note in his evaluation of ten forecasting models that “three missed Clinton’s national vote share by less than a half of one percentage point,” and seven others were within a percentage point or less of the two-party national vote share (Campbell et al. 2017). Finally, in noting several models that were further from the true two-party popular vote tally, Campbell notes that Abramowitz’s “Time for a Change” model underpredicted the Clinton vote share by 2.5 percentage points, a total which sets Abramowitz’s model apart among the election forecast models Campbell summarizes for being one of the least accurate.

Campbell’s summary, however, is problematic: Abramowitz’s “Time for a Change” model was one of the two election forecast models Campbell summarized which actually predicted a Trump victory. The other exception belongs to Norpoth’s primary model that forecasted a 52.5 percent share of the two-party popular vote for Donald Trump. The two political science election forecast models that correctly predicted the 2016 presidential election winner were also the most incorrect according to the accepted practices of election forecasters. Thus, [Campbell et al. \(2017\)](#) lauded the accuracy of the models that were wrong while describing the two models that correctly predicted the winner to be the least accurate. However, with regards to Campbell’s model, it should be noted that it did so by underestimating Clinton’s electoral vote which is a legitimate issue with the model as [Abramowitz \(2012\)](#) argues, forecasting elections based on the popular vote has become a hazard for political scientists in a deeply divided partisan era. The closely divided partisanship currently observed in American politics tends to create narrowly divided elections, where the normal results will be extremely close. Indeed, since 1992 only two elections have seen popular vote victory margins larger than five percent: 1996 and 2012. Presidential elections are exceptionally close as a default in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Due to the close elections associated with such partisan divisions, a previously rare split between the popular vote winner and the Electoral College winner is much more likely. Two of the last five Presidential elections produced split popular and electoral votes (2016 and 2000). Specifically, 2000 was the first election since 1888 to see a split popular and electoral vote when Republican George W. Bush won the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote to Democrat Al Gore.

The fundamental philosophical question this raises is whether or not we really want to be the discipline that makes a habit of taking second place victory laps? Not even in motorsports such as NASCAR does second place and the associated reward in the point system prompt such a trip to Victory Lane.

## The Models That Were Close...But Wrong

**Table I:** Summary of the Academic Models in the 2016 Presidential Election

Author	Model Type	Clinton Popular Vote Prediction	Clinton Electoral Vote Prediction	Trump Popular Vote Prediction	Trump Electoral Vote Prediction
<a href="#">Lewis-Beck &amp; Tien</a>	Political Economy	51%	N/A	49%	N/A
<a href="#">Campbell</a>	Convention Bump	51.2%	N/A	48.8%	N/A

<a href="#">Campbell</a>	Trial Heat	50.7%	N/A	49.3%	N/A
<a href="#">Lockerbie</a>	Economic Pessimism	50.4%	N/A	49.6%	N/A
<a href="#">Erickson &amp; Wlezien</a>	LEIs and Polls	52%	N/A	48%	N/A
<a href="#">Jerome &amp; Jerome</a>	State-by-State Political Economy	50.15%	319	49.85%	219
<a href="#">Holbrook</a>	National Conditions	52.5%	N/A	47.5%	N/A
<a href="#">Abramowitz</a>	Time For Change	48.6%	N/A	51.4%	N/A
<a href="#">Norpoth</a>	Primary Model	48.6%	N/A	51.4%	N/A

Among the forecasting models that predicted a Hillary Clinton victory, the closest model to an accurate forecast of the two-party percentage vote was the Political Economy Model constructed by Lewis-Beck and Tien (PEM) ([Campbell et al. 2017](#)). The PEM has predicted the percentage of popular votes in presidential elections with impressive accuracy since the early 1980s while using time-series methodology to base the model in historical election results. The percentage share of the two-party popular vote is modelled as a function of political popularity and economic growth. Political popularity is derived from the incumbent president's job approval rating in the July Gallup poll, while economic growth is measured by the growth in the Gross National Product (GNP) in the first two quarters of the election year ([Lewis-Beck & Tien 2016](#)). Using the 51 percent job approval rating in July 2016 of incumbent Democratic President Barack Obama and the .20 percent GNP growth during the first two quarters of 2016, the PEM predicted that Hillary Clinton (the same party candidate as the incumbent president) would receive 51 percent of the two party vote for president in 2016. The model was only off by 0.1 percent of the two-party popular vote share, which is indeed an impressively accurate result as Campbell notes in his review of the models.

James [Campbell's \(2016\)](#) Convention Bump model was similarly close. Specifically, Campbell's model accounted for both post-convention bumps for both of the two major party candidates as well as the economy. In this model, Campbell's forecast predicted a 51.2 percent victory in the two-party vote share for Hillary Clinton. The model weighed the unfavourable climate for Democrats, but it also accounted for the rare occasion in which both of the major party candidates were so significantly unpopular with Hillary Clinton considered the "lesser of two evils." Two weeks following the conventions, [Campbell \(2016\)](#) also issued his Trial Heat model, which predicted Clinton would receive 50.7 percent share of the two-party vote. While only a one-half-of-one-percent decline from the post-convention prediction, the 50.7 percent share was not only remarkably close to flipping in Trump's favour, it also exposes a downward trend for the Clinton vote share throughout the election cycle. In summarizing the 2016 election cycle for his forecast models, Campbell (2016) maintained that his forecasts "could hardly have been more accurate" ([2016: 334](#)).

Brad Lockerbie's Economic Pessimism Model forecast a victory for the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton to receive 50.4 percent of the two-party vote share, 0.7 percent off of the actual two-party vote share of 51.1 percent. Lockerbie's model has the advantage of being simple yet reasonably accurate at predicting the two-party vote share. The model only accounts for prospective views of voters regarding the economy and the length of time the incumbent party has held control of the White House (Lockerbie 2012). Lockerbie notes that many pundits predicted a landslide victory for Hillary Clinton, and in his retrospective view on the success of his model in forecasting the 2016 election, he commends political scientists for sticking to electoral fundamentals for more accurate forecasts in spite of the unconventional candidacy of Donald Trump (Lockerbie 2016).

Erickson and Wlezien's (2016) Leading Economic Indicators and Polls Model predicted a 52 percent share of the two-party vote for incumbent-party candidate Clinton. The Erickson and Wlezien forecast models the incumbent's two-party vote share as a function of prospective economic indicators, specifically the Conference Board's Index of Leading Economic Indicators (LEI) from quarter 13 of the incumbent president's term, and trial heat polls from quarter 15. Erickson and Wlezien present another political science model that predicted the two-party vote share for the incumbent candidate within a percentage point of the actual vote. Erickson and Wlezien (2016b) note, similar to Lockerbie (2016) above, that the election fundamentals used in political science forecasts won out over the pundit predictions of a doomed Trump candidacy because of his unconventional style.

Jerome and Jerome-Spezari's (2016) State-By-State Political Economy Model is the first of the predictive methods under review here to take a state-centred approach and account for the Electoral College. The model predicted a Clinton victory in both the popular vote (50.15 percent) and the Electoral College (319 votes). Clinton won the popular vote with 51.1 percent but lost the Electoral College vote with 232 electoral votes. The model was incorrect in the key states that swung the election in President Trump's favour, including Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Among those states, the authors note stemming from simulated revision models that the inclusion of state level popularity and party identification of voters would have only helped in correctly predicting Iowa and Pennsylvania. However, the key states of Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin remained less predictable in Jerome and Jerome-Spezari's model. One idea the authors advance for model improvement, innovative in the forecasting literature, is the inclusion in the model of the primary performance of the incumbent candidate's main rival (in this case, Bernie Sanders) for each state. Bernie Sanders did perform well and in fact over-performed compared to the national average in Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. While the inclusion of this variable offers some innovative progress, the question remains

whether this would improve the overall forecasting model for all election cycles or better capture the peculiarities of the 2016 election only (Jerome & Jerome-Spezari 2016).

Finally, Holbrook's (2016) National Conditions and Trial Heat Model predicted a two-party vote share of 52.5 percent for Hillary Clinton. The model with Clinton's highest reported two-party vote share represented a +1.4 percent deviation from the actual two-party vote total Clinton earned. The Holbrook Model incorporates a variety of national conditions throughout the summer of the election year and trial heat polls in early September of the election year. In his assessment of the model, Holbrook notes that even when accounting for the election results of 2016, the fit of the model from 1952-2016 does not change. He concedes appropriately, however, that forecasts are based on predicting the popular vote winner rather than the winner of the presidential election due to the Electoral College.

## State-Level Electoral Vote Predictive Models

**Table 2:** Electoral Vote—The State-Level Predictive Models

Model Title	Primary Author	Summary	Trump EV <sup>1</sup> Prediction	Clinton EV Prediction	Trump PV <sup>2</sup> Prediction	Clinton PV Prediction
538.com	Silver, Nate	meta-analysis of state-level polling data	235	302	44.9	48.5
New York Times	Katz, Josh	vote estimates for each electoral subdivision	216	322	50.2	48.8
Princeton	Wang, Sam	Proprietary	215	323	48	52
Cook Political Report	Staff	Proprietary	214	278	N/a	N/a
VA Center for Politics	Sabato, Larry	Proprietary	216	322	N/a	N/a
PredictWise	Rothschild, David	Proprietary	216	322	49.8	50.1
Actual Results			306	232	46.1	48.2

<sup>1</sup>EV= the Electoral College votes; <sup>2</sup>PV= the popular vote

The academic models presented so far are all products of academics and have one other notable connection: every model predicts the popular vote for president only. While the popular vote for the president is significant, the final predictor of the election winner comes in the state-by-state accounting of the Electoral College

vote. Numerous models exist to predict the electoral winner, though most come from commercial entities with two exceptions.

The 'gold standard' of electoral predictions prior to 2016 was undoubtedly FiveThirtyEight.com, a website started by and still run by Nate Silver. While sites such as RealClearPolitics pioneered state-by-state polling data to predict electoral vote outcomes, Silver was the first to advance the methodology publicly to weight the individual state-by-state polls. Notably, Silver is not a political scientist but trained in the analysis of baseball statistics with Bill James, a pioneer himself in data analysis of major league baseball.

In 2008, Silver's predictive model correctly selected the winner between John McCain and Barack Obama in forty-nine of the fifty states, creating a reputation that Silver had determined a better way to conduct election polls. In 2012, Silver improved on the accuracy of the 2008 model and predicted the winner of all fifty states in the electoral contest between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney.

The election of 2016 would not continue Silver's streak. For the Trump-Clinton election of 2016, Silver actually reversed the electoral numbers. 538.com predicted that Hillary Clinton would win both the popular and electoral votes, with 48.5 of the popular votes and 302 electoral votes going to the Democratic nominee, while Donald Trump would receive 44.9 percent of the popular vote and 235 electoral votes. Once the votes were tallied, Trump took in 306 electoral votes and Clinton earned 232, while Clinton did win the popular vote as predicted by Silver but with 48.2 percent compared with Trump's 46.1 percent. All percentages of vote are of total votes cast, not the two-party vote.<sup>1</sup>

In the 2016 election, Nate Silver's prediction failed to correctly predict the winner in five battleground states that led to Trump's victory: Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Florida, and North Carolina. After only getting one state wrong in the 2008 and 2012 elections, being off by five states with a combined electoral vote of ninety was enough to make Silver look off the mark for his 2016 prediction. It may appear that Silver's model was wrong based on the outcomes from the election, but it was not wrong. That is, his model was highly accurate because his final model included a 10 percent probability that there would be an Electoral College/popular vote split that would give the election to candidate Trump. Silver relies on a post he issued via the 538 blogs about a week out from the election noting that the probability for Clinton to win the popular vote was 85 percent but only 75 percent for the Electoral College. Consequently, the latter presented a widening gap that people should be aware of creating a 10 percent chance of a split. Therefore, according to Silver, his predictive model continued its winning streak because despite calling the winner of both the popular vote and the Electoral College for Clinton., his model reports probabilities, and the proba-

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<sup>1</sup> All percentages of vote are of total votes cast, not two-party vote.



bility of a Trump popular vote win was 15 percent and an Electoral College win as 25 percent. In turn, on technical grounds, he called the election correctly.

*The New York Times'* Josh Katz predicted an even larger Clinton victory, with 322 electoral votes to Trump's 216. Katz also predicted that Trump would win the popular vote with 50.2% of the two-party vote to Clinton's 48.8 percent. Katz' model predicted even larger likelihoods of victory in the states Clinton was projected to win, and the Times/Katz model is also proprietary to that provider.

PredictWise<sup>2</sup>, another site with its own proprietary model, made an identical prediction to the Times: Clinton 322 to Trump 216. Cook Political Report ([Cook 2016](#)) predicted the electoral vote only with a 278-214 advantage for Clinton with a few states excluded for being too close to call but still adequate to predict a Clinton victory should all of the excluded states fall to Trump.

Academic state-by-state models fared no better. Larry Sabato's Crystal Ball ([Sabato et al. 2016](#)) predicted the same as Cook Political and the Times, while the Princeton Elections Project ([Wang 2016](#)) called one additional electoral vote to Clinton for a 323-215 advantage.

**Table 3:** State-by-State Predictions by Predictor

State	Electoral Votes	NYT	538	PW	PEC	Cook	Sabato	Actual Result
D.C.	3	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
California	55	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Maryland	10	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Hawaii	4	>99% Dem.	99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Vermont	3	>99% Dem.	98% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
New York	29	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Rhode Island	4	>99% Dem.	93% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Illinois	20	>99% Dem.	98% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Washington	12	>99% Dem.	98% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
New Jersey	14	>99% Dem.	97% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem

<sup>2</sup> Predictwise. 2016. "Election Day." Retrieved from <https://blog.predictwise.com/2016/11/election-day-2016/>

State	Electoral Votes	NYT	538	PW	PEC	Cook	Sabato	Actual Result
Connecticut	7	>99% Dem.	97% Dem.	>99% Dem.	99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Maine (CD 1)*	1	>99% Dem.	92% Dem.	98% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Delaware	3	>99% Dem.	91% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Massachusetts	11	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Oregon	7	98% Dem.	94% Dem.	>99% Dem.	>99% Dem.	Solid Dem.	Solid Dem.	Dem
Virginia	13	96% Dem.	86% Dem.	98% Dem.	98% Dem.	Likely Dem.	Likely Dem.	Dem
New Mexico	5	95% Dem.	83% Dem.	98% Dem.	91% Dem.	Likely Dem.	Likely Dem.	Dem
Michigan	16	94% Dem.	79% Dem.	95% Dem.	79% Dem.	Lean Dem.	Lean Dem.	Rep
Minnesota	10	94% Dem.	85% Dem.	99% Dem.	98% Dem.	Likely Dem.	Likely Dem.	Dem
Wisconsin	10	93% Dem.	84% Dem.	98% Dem.	98% Dem.	Lean Dem.	Likely Dem.	Rep
Maine	2	91% Dem.	83% Dem.	98% Dem.	98% Dem.	Likely Dem.	Likely Dem.	Dem
Pennsylvania	20	89% Dem.	77% Dem.	93% Dem.	79% Dem.	Lean Dem.	Lean Dem.	Rep
Colorado	9	89% Dem.	78% Dem.	95% Dem.	96% Dem.	Lean Dem.	Likely Dem.	Dem
New Hampshire	4	79% Dem.	70% Dem.	84% Dem.	63% Dem.	Lean Dem.	Lean Dem.	Dem
Nevada	6	68% Dem.	58% Dem.	91% Dem.	84% Dem.	Lean Dem.	Lean Dem.	Dem
Florida	29	67% Dem.	55% Dem.	77% Dem.	69% Dem.	Tossup	Lean Dem.	Rep
North Carolina	15	64% Dem.	56% Dem.	66% Dem.	67% Dem.	Tossup	Lean Dem.	Rep
Ohio	18	54% Rep.	65% Rep.	67% Rep.	63% Rep.	Lean Rep.	Lean Rep.	Rep
Iowa	6	62% Rep.	70% Rep.	79% Rep.	74% Rep.	Lean Rep.	Lean Rep.	Rep
Maine (CD 2)*	1	64% Rep.	51% Dem.	52% Rep.	60% Dem.	Tossup	Lean Rep.	Rep
Utah	6	73% Rep.	83% Rep.	86% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Lean Rep.	Lean Rep.	Rep
Nebraska (CD 2)*	1	80% Rep.	56% Rep.	75% Rep.	92% Rep.	Tossup	Lean Rep.	Rep
Alaska	3	83% Rep.	76% Rep.	94% Rep.	96% Rep.	Likely Rep.	Likely Rep.	Rep
Georgia	16	83% Rep.	79% Rep.	91% Rep.	88% Rep.	Lean Rep.	Likely Rep.	Rep
Arizona	11	84% Rep.	67% Rep.	82% Rep.	91% Rep.	Lean Rep.	Lean Rep.	Rep

State	Electoral Votes	NYT	538	PW	PEC	Cook	Sabato	Actual Result
Mississippi	6	86% Rep.	98% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
South Carolina	9	90% Rep.	90% Rep.	99% Rep.	99% Rep.	Likely Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Texas	38	96% Rep.	94% Rep.	99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Likely Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Indiana	11	97% Rep.	97% Rep.	99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Likely Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Missouri	10	98% Rep.	96% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Likely Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Louisiana	8	98% Rep.	99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Montana	3	99% Rep.	96% Rep.	93% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Nebraska (CD 1)*	1	99% Rep.	89% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
West Virginia	5	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Tennessee	11	>99% Rep.	97% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
North Dakota	3	>99% Rep.	98% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Kansas	6	>99% Rep.	97% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Alabama	9	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Arkansas	6	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Nebraska	2	>99% Rep.	98% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
South Dakota	3	>99% Rep.	94% Rep.	99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Idaho	4	>99% Rep.	99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Kentucky	8	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Oklahoma	7	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Wyoming	3	>99% Rep.	99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep
Nebraska (CD 3)*	1	>99% Rep.	99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	>99% Rep.	Solid Rep.	Solid Rep.	Rep

**Note:** Those designated with a \* are in Maine and Nebraska. These states use a “congressional district method” that allows the allocation of two electoral votes to the state popular vote winner, and then one electoral vote to the popular vote winner in each Congressional district (CD-2 in Maine, and CD-3 in Nebraska). The latter creates multiple popular vote contests in these states leading to a possible split in the electoral vote.

## The Models That Were Right But Not Close

Two leading political science forecasting models actually “correctly” predicted a victory for President Trump in the 2016 election. However, the two models share the uncommon distinction of being both correct in predicting the winner of the 2016 election and being the furthest from the actual vote. We discuss these two models below.

First, Alan [Abramowitz’s \(2016\)](#) “Time for Change Model” predicted Donald Trump would win the 2016 presidential election with 51.4 percent of the two-party vote share. As Abramowitz predicted, the unconventional nature of the Trump candidacy led to Trump’s popular vote underperformance compared to the model, which would have allowed Hillary Clinton a narrow victory. The Time for Change Model ultimately predicted Donald Trump would receive 2.5 percent more of the popular vote than he actually received, which is a margin much greater than the other academic popular vote models discussed above. However, it also has the peculiar distinction of being one of the two models to correctly forecast the winner of the election. The model itself uses three variables: the incumbent president’s approval rating in the middle of the year according to the Gallup poll, the real GDP growth in the second quarter of the election year, and whether the incumbent party has held the presidency for one term or more than one term. The approval rating and economic growth measures have a positive impact on the incumbent party candidate, and the number of terms in office have a more significant and substantive negative impact on the incumbent party vote share. In this case, the two-term presidency of Barack Obama was a sufficient negative in the model, which successfully modelled 17 presidential elections, to outweigh the positive impacts of economic growth and incumbent popularity vis-à-vis their impact on Hillary Clinton’s share of the two-party vote.

The other model which accurately predicted Trump’s victory, while still being far off of the intended measure of the two-party presidential vote, was Helmut Norpoth’s Primary Model. The Primary Model predicted a Trump victory with 51.4 percent of the two-party vote share, and it asserted with 87 percent certainty that Donald Trump, not Hillary Clinton, would be the 45<sup>th</sup> President of the United States ([Norpoth 2016](#)). However, while the model correctly predicted the next president within the binary choice set, it was the least accurate of the political science forecasting models. The model overestimated President Trump’s share of the two-party vote by 3.6 percent of the vote. The model relies on two variables as predictors of the incumbent party’s share of the two-party vote. First, the model includes the performance of the major party nominees in the party primary elections. Second, similarly to Abramowitz, the model also includes a variable measuring electoral swings,

where the incumbent party is generally more successful after one term in the White House but far more likely to lose after two terms in control. As Norpoth notes, the strength of the model compared to competitors is that the model is based on what voters have actually done rather than polls on what they prospectively *will* do or indicators that predict voting behaviour.

In the next section, we discuss as a statistical model as presented by (Putcha 2010; Putcha and Doti 2012). Like many models and their counterparts outside of academic circles, the model predicted Hillary Clinton to be victorious.

## The Statistical Model for the 2016 Presidential Election

### *Data Sources*

In this research, method statistical approach is developed for predicting the 2016 American Presidential elections which was also applied to the Presidential Elections of 2008 and 2012 accurately (Putcha 2010; Putcha and Doti 2012). The data used are essentially the polling data from many well-known sources (e.g., the Rasmussen Reports and Survey USA). A complete list of polling sources used in the construction of our model is listed in the Appendix, Table A-1, while the polling data used in the forecasting model are shown in the Appendix, Table A-2.

The proposed model's assumption is predicated on the premise that the polls will capture the pulse of the people as to how they are planning to vote in the actual Presidential election, and hence, if the polling information is correct, the model that uses this information should correctly predict the outcome of the Presidential elections. Noteworthy here is that ambivalence exists about the accuracy of the source polls in 2016. The shift to mobile phones as a replacement for land lines, use of extensive weighting for small sample sizes, and use of web-based polling all may contribute to a longer-term derogation of polling accuracy (Valentino, King and Hill 2017: 110-115). For the time being, one data point suggesting reduced predictability for polls will be set aside.

This model used is a dynamic model as the result of polls vary depending upon the timing of the poll and the political events occurring in the country at that time. American elections consist of two parts: the Electoral College and the popular vote. The winner of the American Presidential elections must have the majority in the Electoral College and win the popular vote if possible.

## The Statistical Methodology

First, the polling data collected will be compiled. Once the data are compiled, a histogram will be prepared to determine the probability density function of the polling data. The probability density function could be a normal distribution log-normal distribution or the beta distribution or any distribution.

The adequacy of the chosen distribution is based on the chi-square test and Kolomogrov-Smirnov test. Both these tests will be performed on the collected data. After that, a threshold value will be established to determine the winner of the election. This threshold value is used in the calculations of the model as follows. The probability of a candidate obtaining greater than or equal to the threshold value is calculated using the information of the chosen probability distribution. For example, normal distribution is a two-parameter distribution ( $\mu$  and  $\sigma$ ) where  $\mu$  is the mean value and  $\sigma$  is the standard deviation of the collected data. Similarly, if it is a lognormal distribution, which is also a two-parameter distribution, the parameters are:  $\sigma$  (the standard deviation of the log distribution) and  $\xi$  (the location parameter). On the other hand, if the data follow a uniform distribution, which has two parameters, the bounds are defined by the parameters,  $a$  and  $b$ , which are the minimum and maximum values for the distribution.

This information based on the probability distribution will also assign the electoral votes for each of the two contesting candidates in the elections. Thus, the information about the popular vote as well as the Electoral Votes is collected. These two essential pieces of information will then be judiciously combined to determine the winner of the election. Tables 4-6 show the polls and the results.

**Table 4:** Statistical Analysis of State-wide Polling Data for Popular Vote of 2016 American Presidential Elections

State	Presidential Candidate			
	Clinton		Trump	
	Mean ( $\mu$ )	Standard Deviation ( $\sigma$ )	Mean ( $\mu$ )	Standard Deviation ( $\sigma$ )
Alabama	35.00	2.64	52.67	5.03
Alaska	35.67	6.50	40.67	4.72
Arizona	41.50	2.645	45.50	2.88
Arkansas	32.00	2.64	56.00	1
California	57.00	4.47	32.60	1.51
Colorado	49.00	2.82	43.50	2.88
Connecticut	51.67	2.88	37.67	3.78
Delaware	53	2.64	35.33	6.11

State	Presidential Candidate			
	Clinton		Trump	
	Mean ( $\mu$ )	Standard Deviation ( $\sigma$ )	Mean ( $\mu$ )	Standard Deviation ( $\sigma$ )
District of Columbia	66.00	0	20.00	0
Florida	48	2.30	45.00	1
Georgia	43.75	1.70	47.75	2.87
Hawaii	52.00	2.82	30.25	1.06
Idaho	25	4.04	45.33	6.11
Illinois	51	1.52	32.00	4
Indiana	38.67	2.08	45.67	3.05
Iowa	42.23	3.35	42.00	1
Kansas	36.00	0	47.50	0.70
Kentucky	35	0	53.00	0
Louisiana	35.67	2.08	48.00	5.19
Maine	49.00	0	39.50	0.70
Maryland	60.00	3.60	28.67	2.88
Massachusetts	59.50	7.77	29.00	1.41
Michigan	49.25	3.30	38.75	4.34
Minnesota	47.10	1.85	41.00	2
Mississippi	42.25	0.35	52.50	2.12
Missouri	40.67	1.52	46.67	0.57
Montana	31.50	6.36	44.50	2.12
Nebraska	33.33	4.50	55.33	3.05
Nevada	46	1.70	43.25	2.62
New Hampshire	45	1.15	39.67	3.21
New Jersey	49	2.51	38.33	2.88
New Mexico	45.00	1.41	35.00	1.41
New York	57.00	2.64	33.00	4.35
North Carolina	49	0.81	45.25	2.98
North Dakota	33.33	3.21	49.33	6.50
Ohio	45	2.36	47.25	2.21
Oklahoma	32	2	59.67	3.51
Oregon	45.67	2.51	36.67	1.15
Pennsylvania	48.00	3.46	42.50	1.73
Rhode Island	53	4.58	36.00	3.60
South Carolina	42.50	0.71	49.00	5.65
South Dakota	37	0	46.00	2.82
Tennessee	37	2.64	49.67	6.02
Texas	40.50	2.08	47.00	5.35

State	Presidential Candidate			
	Clinton		Trump	
	Mean ( $\mu$ )	Standard Deviation ( $\sigma$ )	Mean ( $\mu$ )	Standard Deviation ( $\sigma$ )
Utah	25	3.82	31.50	4.20
Vermont	54	9	24.67	8.62
Virginia	46.67	1.15	40.00	5.19
West Virginia	32.50	4.94	60.00	1.41
Washington	50.67	2.51	36.00	6.24
Wisconsin	48.00	2	41.00	2.64
Wyoming	26.50	4.94	62.00	4.24

**Table 5:** Forecasting of 2016 Presidential Elections- Winning Probability (estimated last week before the election)

State	Winning Candidate	Winning (Probability in %)	Electoral College Votes	
			Clinton	Trump
Alabama	Trump	86.13%	0	9
Alaska	Trump	8.34%	0	3
Arizona	Trump	27.80%	0	11
Arkansas	Trump	100.00%	0	6
California	Clinton	98.58%	55	0
Colorado	Clinton	73.77%	9	0
Connecticut	Clinton	93.91%	7	0
Delaware	Clinton	98.58%	3	0
District of Columbia	Clinton	100.00%	3	0
Florida	Clinton	58.01%	29	0
Georgia	Trump	57.59%	0	16
Hawaii	Clinton	95.52%	4	0
Idaho	Trump	38.00%	0	4
Illinois	Clinton	99.66%	20	0
Indiana	Trump	30.79%	0	11
Iowa	Clinton	6.95%	6	0
Kansas	Trump	66.43%	0	6
Kentucky	Trump	100.00%	0	8
Louisiana	Trump	56.12%	0	8
Maine	Clinton	100.00%	4	0
Maryland	Clinton	99.98%	10	0
Massachusetts	Clinton	94.31%	11	0



State	Winning Candidate	Winning (Probability in %)	Electoral College Votes	
			Clinton	Trump
Michigan	Clinton	73.25%	16	0
Minnesota	Clinton	47.85%	10	0
Mississippi	Trump	99.38%	0	6
Missouri	Trump	17.78%	0	10
Montana	Trump	10.15%	0	3
Nebraska	Trump	99.61%	0	5
Nevada	Clinton	28.90%	6	0
New Hampshire	Clinton	5.30%	4	0
New Jersey	Clinton	72.00%	14	0
New Mexico	Clinton	5.99%	5	0
New York	Clinton	99.99%	29	0
North Carolina	Clinton	98.63%	15	0
North Dakota	Trump	62.85%	0	3
Ohio	Trump	50.90%	0	18
Oklahoma	Trump	99.98%	0	7
Oregon	Clinton	27.12%	7	0
Pennsylvania	Clinton	59.13%	20	0
Rhode Island	Clinton	89.72%	4	0
South Carolina	Trump	62.48%	0	9
South Dakota	Trump	33.57%	0	3
Tennessee	Trump	65.88%	0	11
Texas	Trump	48.51%	0	38
Utah	Trump	0.01%	0	6
Vermont	Clinton	77.50%	3	0
Virginia	Clinton	32.21%	13	0
West Virginia	Trump	100.00%	0	5
Washington	Clinton	91.58%	12	0
Wisconsin	Clinton	65.54%	10	0
Wyoming	Trump	99.98%	0	3
<b>Total Electoral College Votes</b>			<b>329</b>	<b>209</b>
<b>Popular Vote (in percent)</b>			<b>43.7</b>	<b>42.5</b>

**Table 6:** Forecasting of 2016 Presidential Elections II- Popular Vote (estimated on October 26, 2016)

State	Winning Candidate	Popular Vote (in %)		Electoral College Votes	
		Clinton	Trump	Clinton	Trump
Alabama	Trump	35.00	52.67	0	9
Alaska	Trump	35.67	40.67	0	3
Arizona	Trump	41.50	45.50	0	11
Arkansas	Trump	32.00	56.00	0	6
California	Clinton	57.00	32.60	55	0
Colorado	Clinton	49.00	43.50	9	0
Connecticut	Clinton	51.67	37.67	7	0
Delaware	Clinton	53	35.33	3	0
District of Columbia	Clinton	66.00	20.00	3	0
Florida	Clinton	48	45.00	29	0
Georgia	Trump	43.75	47.75	0	16
Hawaii	Clinton	52.00	30.25	4	0
Idaho	Trump	25	45.33	0	4
Illinois	Clinton	51	32.00	20	0
Indiana	Trump	38.67	45.67	0	11
Iowa	Clinton	42.23	42.00	6	0
Kansas	Trump	36.00	47.50	0	6
Kentucky	Trump	35	53.00	0	8
Louisiana	Trump	35.67	48.00	0	8
Maine	Clinton	49.00	39.50	4	0
Maryland	Clinton	60.00	28.67	10	0
Massachusetts	Clinton	59.50	29.00	11	0
Michigan	Clinton	49.25	38.75	16	0
Minnesota	Clinton	47.10	41.00	10	0
Mississippi	Trump	42.25	52.50	0	6
Missouri	Trump	40.67	46.67	0	10
Montana	Trump	31.50	44.50	0	3
Nebraska	Trump	33.33	55.33	0	5
Nevada	Clinton	46	43.25	6	0
New Hampshire	Clinton	45	39.67	4	0
New Jersey	Clinton	49	38.33	14	0
New Mexico	Clinton	45.00	35.00	5	0
New York	Clinton	57.00	33.00	29	0
North Carolina	Clinton	49	45.25	15	0
North Dakota	Trump	33.33	49.33	0	3
Ohio	Trump	45	47.25	0	18
Oklahoma	Trump	32	59.67	0	7
Oregon	Clinton	45.67	36.67	7	0
Pennsylvania	Clinton	48.00	42.50	20	0
Rhode Island	Clinton	53	36.00	4	0
South Carolina	Trump	42.50	49.00	0	9

State	Winning Candidate	Popular Vote (in %)		Electoral College Votes	
		Clinton	Trump	Clinton	Trump
South Dakota	Trump	37	46.00	0	3
Tennessee	Trump	37	49.67	0	11
Texas	Trump	40.50	47.00	0	38
Utah	Trump	25	31.50	0	6
Vermont	Clinton	54	24.67	3	0
Virginia	Clinton	46.67	40.00	13	0
West Virginia	Trump	32.50	60.00	0	5
Washington	Clinton	50.67	36.00	12	0
Wisconsin	Clinton	48.00	41.00	10	0
Wyoming	Trump	26.50	62.00	0	3
<b>Total Electoral College Votes</b>				<b>329</b>	<b>209</b>
<b>Popular Vote (in percent)</b>				<b>43.7</b>	<b>42.5</b>

From the analysis presented in Tables 5 and 6, our model predicted that Clinton would receive more popular and Electoral votes than Trump. After the election, Clinton received more popular votes than Trump, while Trump received more Electoral College votes than Clinton. Our results mimic somewhat with the results from Nate Silver's 538.com model that the model on the surface was not correct, but it was technically correct. The next section will delve into the reasons why the popular vote and Electoral College vote mismatched in such an outstanding way. Would this be the permanent feature of our Presidential elections perhaps for the next decade or longer, and how can forecasters deal with this new reality that the popular vote may not predict the winner in a Presidential election?

### *Some Explanations for the Trump Victory*

Unfortunately, the political science literature regarding the 2016 general election for the presidency has been too busy lauding the self-proclaimed pinpoint accuracy for any critical analysis of the causes for the unexpected Trump victory. Fortunately, the primary election victory was just as surprising as his general election victory with far less personal aggrandizement regarding forecasting models at stake. To understand the support of Trump and begin to move towards an explanation of the Trump victory in the general election, we must turn to some critical analysis of the primary election victory that helps explain the base of support, which carried him to victory in both.

Patrick Fisher (2016) explains the unexpected Trump victory in the Republican primary using political culture. He argues that Donald Trump's campaign appealed to a portion of the Republican electorate that had been dormant in recent elections. Notably, Trump outperformed other recent Republican candidates for president among white voters without a high school education, those who live in

mobile homes, and in areas where the transition from a manufacturing economy to a more globalized economy has not occurred as quickly (Fisher 2016). Additionally, Irwin and Katz (2016) note that President Trump performed considerably better than recent Republican presidential candidates in areas where support was high for George Wallace in the 1968 presidential election. Unsurprisingly, there is a significant correlation between identity politics, particularly white identity politics, and support for Trump.

Adding to the identity politics explanation, however, Fisher conducts an analysis of the political cultural explanations of support for the Trump candidacy. Using Ira Sharkansky's (1969) operationalization of Daniel Elezar's typology, Fisher found that Trump performed better in states with individualistic political cultures and fared rather poorly in states with a moralistic subculture. Trump's self-proclaimed ideological flexibility fits better with individualistic states than it does moralistic states. Notably, the culture variables in Fisher's model outperformed the demographic characteristics of voters, indicating that cultural explanations may be a better fit for Trump support than identity politics.

MacWilliams (2016) characterizes support for Trump in the Republican nomination contest as a rise of authoritarian voters who decided the nomination in place of the party. Authoritarianism, as conceptualized by Hetherington and Suhay (2011), is one of only two variables in the MacWilliams multivariate analysis that significantly impact support for Trump among likely Republican primary voters. The only other significant variable is the fear voters held regarding the personal threat from terrorism. Notably, authoritarianism had no statistically significant impact on support for other leading Republican candidates. The MacWilliams analysis of the Republican primary indicates that Trump's support came from his populist, strongman message that activated fear among the Republican base.

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## Discussion and Conclusions

The premise of this paper opens with a discussion of the importance of models getting the call right as evidenced by the forecasting literature. The results from this election showed that there is a mismatch calling the winner based on the popular vote and the Electoral College vote given that the forecasting models had identified Clinton as the winner in the popular vote and the Electoral College vote. However, the basic tenet that was obtained from our analysis of our paper that getting the popular vote share right may hardly matter when a forecasting model predicts the Electoral College vote winner wrong. Given the latter, could this set a new trend in future Presidential elections in 2020 and beyond? Bitecofer (2017) provides a possible reason for this mismatch. During the Re-

publican primary season, there was growing dissatisfaction with Trump as the Republican nominee, and some disaffected Republicans became part of the group “Never Trump.” The Clinton campaign aimed vigorously to attract the “Never Trump” members and selected Tim Kaine as her vice president because he is a moderate that could attract independents and “Never Trump” members after she had been tarnished by the Benghazi investigations and the email server problem while Secretary of State. As pointed out by [Bitecofer \(2017\)](#), we are in polarizing times, and there are not as many persuadable voters left to attempt to attract. On the other hand, the Democratic primary was a bitter struggle between Clinton and Sanders, a progressive populist, that alienated the progressive voters of the Democratic party as Clinton continued her quest to attract independents. The latter resulted in progressive voters defecting from the Democratic ticket by either staying home or even voting for another candidate (either a third-party candidate or Trump). As pointed by [Bitecofer \(2017\)](#), in Wisconsin, a state that was decided by less than 1 percent, the defection rate was five times higher than normal with 6.32 percent of voters casting votes for a third-party candidate or write-in ballots. In fact, Clinton performed just as well as Obama did among independents.

Since Trump entered the political world after climbing down the escalator in Trump Tower in 2015, media pundits as well as many political pundits viewed him as an exceptional, if not unique, figure in American politics. But is he? [Grossman and Hopkins \(2016\)](#) do not agree with the latter description of Trump. They do, however, make it clear that the two parties are different: The Democratic Party is focused on producing concrete solutions for citizens, whereas the Republican Party is obsessed with conservative ideological purity. From their perspective, Trump is the unintended product of a Republican Party purification process. So, no doubt there is a disconnect between the two parties, but there is also a disconnect within the thinking of the American people. They explained that the “American electorate consistently holds collectively left-of-centre views on most policy issues even as it leans to the right on more general measures of ideology.” [Grossman and Hopkins \(2016\)](#) focus more on the party-focused ideological differences.

Now [Abramowitz \(2018\)](#) provides a different analysis from [Grossman and Hopkins \(2016\)](#) by focusing on the voters, not the party-focused approaches. However, despite these differences in the motif of these books, their works are complementary regarding the longer-term perspectives of the political differences.

In fact, [Bitecofer \(2017\)](#) and [Abramowitz \(2018\)](#) also share the perspective that the polarized thermonuclear partisan environment is the product of long-term historical processes that have persisted for quite some time and may persist. The latter could also result in the mismatch of the popular vote winner

and the winner in the Electoral College votes. More specifically, [Abramowitz \(2018\)](#) writes that “while Trump won the election by exploiting the deep divisions in American society, he did not create those divisions,” and he asserts that these divisions will not even go away even after the Trump presidency.

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## Appendix

**Table A-I: Polling Sources**

SurveyMonkey	SurveyUSA/KSN News
UPI/CVOTER	Mason-Dixon
News-5/Strategy Research	JMC Analytics
Alaska Survey Research	Maine People's Resource Center
Lake Research Partners	University of New Hampshire
Moore Information	Washington Post/University of Maryland
Ipsos/Reuters	WBUR/MassINC
NBC News/Wall Street Journal/Marist	Western New England University
CBS News/YouGov	Fox 2 Detroit/Mitchell Poll
Data Orbital	EPIC-MRA
Talk Business/Hendrix College	Detroit News
Emerson College	Star Tribune/Mason-Dixon
KABC/SurveyUSA	Montana State University Billings
USC Dornsife/Los Angeles Times	Las Vegas Review-Journal/Bendixen & Amandi International
Insights West	InsideSources/NH Journal
Field Research	Fairleigh Dickinson University
Remington Research/Axiom Strategies	Stockton College
Quinnipiac University	Zia Poll
Public Policy Polling	DFM Research
University of Delaware	CNN/ORC
Electoral Vote	SoonerPoll
New York Times Upshot/Siena College	Riley Research/KGW
Landmark Communications	DHM Research
Opinion Savvy/Fox 5 Atlanta	Morning Call/Muhlenberg College
WXIA-TV/SurveyUSA	Citizen
Election Projection	University of Houston
Dan Jones & Associates	Rasmussen Reports
Victory Research	Castleton University/Vermont Public Radio
Illinois Public Opinion Strategies	Hampton University
Southern Illinois University	Elway Poll
Gravis Marketing	McLaughlin & Associates
WISH-TV/Ball State University	
Monmouth University	
Des Moines Register/Selzer & Co.	



**Table A-2: Polling Data**

State	Winning Candidate	Winning	Electoral College Votes	
		(probability in %)	Clinton	Trump
Alabama	Trump	86.13%	0	9
Alaska	Trump	8.34%	0	3
Arizona	Trump	0.42%	0	11
Arkansas	Trump	100.00%	0	6
California	Clinton	98.58%	55	0
Colorado	Clinton	59.13%	9	0
Connecticut	Clinton	93.91%	7	0
Delaware	Clinton	98.58%	3	0
District of Columbia	Clinton	100.00%	3	0
Florida	<u>Trump</u>	28.52%	0	29
Georgia	Trump	66.94%	0	16
Hawaii	Clinton	95.52%	4	0
Idaho	Trump	38.00%	0	4
Illinois	Clinton	99.66%	20	0
Indiana	Trump	30.79%	0	11
Iowa	Trump	10.72%	0	6
Kansas	Trump	66.43%	0	6
Kentucky	Trump	100.00%	0	8
Louisiana	Trump	56.12%	0	8
Maine	Clinton	100.00%	4	0
Maryland	Clinton	99.98%	10	0
Massachusetts	Clinton	94.31%	11	0
Michigan	Clinton	64.85%	16	0
Minnesota	Clinton	61.98%	10	0
Mississippi	Trump	99.38%	0	6
Missouri	Trump	17.78%	0	10
Montana	Trump	10.15%	0	3
Nebraska	Trump	99.61%	0	5
Nevada	Trump	26.44%	0	6
New Hampshire	Trump	12.53%	0	4
New Jersey	Clinton	72.00%	14	0
New Mexico	Clinton	5.99%	5	0
New York	Clinton	99.99%	29	0

State	Winning Candidate	Winning	Electoral College Votes	
		(probability in %)	Clinton	Trump
North Carolina	Clinton	68.21%	15	0
North Dakota	Trump	62.85%	0	3
Ohio	Trump	50.90%	0	18
Oklahoma	Trump	99.98%	0	7
Oregon	Clinton	27.12%	7	0
Pennsylvania	Clinton	43.78%	20	0
Rhode Island	Clinton	89.72%	4	0
South Carolina	Trump	62.48%	0	9
South Dakota	Trump	33.57%	0	3
Tennessee	Trump	65.88%	0	11
Texas	Trump	48.51%	0	38
Utah	Trump	0.01%	0	6
Vermont	Clinton	77.50%	3	0
Virginia	Clinton	69.12%	13	0
W. Virginia	Trump	100.00%	0	5
Washington	Clinton	91.58%	12	0
Wisconsin	Clinton	65.54%	10	0
Wyoming	Trump	99.98%	0	3
<b>Total Electoral College Votes</b>			<b>284</b>	<b>254</b>
<b>Popular Vote (in percent)</b>			<b>43.63</b>	<b>42.52</b>