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Organizational Culture and Leadership of the European Union*

Mihai ALEXANDRESCU**

Abstract: *My paper aims to observe to what extent the leadership of Jean-Claude Juncker matches the organizational culture of the European Union (EU). In this sense, I consider answering a few questions: what kind of organizational culture is the European Union?; What kind of leadership does Juncker practice?; Juncker's leadership is right for the EU organisational culture?*

Starting from the Hofstede's cultural dimensions, I consider that the cultural diversity of the states that make up the European Union determines, on certain dimensions, the difficulty of defining an appropriate leadership model as the integration project to remain effective. I believe that Juncker has understood which elements can harmonize the differences between national cultures within the EU and he has tried to impose an adequate leadership in this direction.

Methodologically, I took over the Hofstede model and I compared Juncker's leadership model with the national culture patterns identified for the EU Member States. In this respect, I have analysed Juncker's speech on the State of the European Union, and I paid my attention on the main elements of his discourse.

Key words: *European Union, leadership, organisational culture, Jean Claude Juncker*

Introduction

To discuss about the European Union leadership in other terms than institutional or procedural determines a high challenge for every scholar. The most challenging seems this attempt when we intend to create an association with the culture and organisational culture. Even after six decades from the creation of the first European communities, it is quite

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difficult to talk about an integrated culture of the European Union, and this difficulty will remain present some generations now on.

In this paper I will attempt to decrypt which kind of leadership has been practiced by Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission and which type of leadership would be appropriate for the EU.

Some conceptual and theoretical definitions are needed in this respect for a better understanding of this topic. The core theoretical approaches on which I build my argumentation are that of Geert Hofstede and his colleagues regarding the culture's dimensions and that of Bernard M. Bass concerning the leadership definition. The case study of this paper is Juncker's speech in front of the European Parliament, on 13th of September 2017, presenting the State of the European Union.

Defining culture and organisational culture

Culture has many definitions, and in this paper we will mention a few of these. Since the first half of the last century, it has been differentiated from *civilisation*. Initially, it was a social concept for groups that were geographically different, and later it became an anthropological concept.

In 1952, Alfred Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, gathering no less than 164 definitions of culture, defined it by standardized patterns of thought, feeling and reaction, accumulated and transmitted by symbols, so that the essence of culture contains traditional ideas and some values attached to them.

Culture is not created for humans, but by people through *interaction*. Seemingly, it is a dynamic process, being always reinvented, and the meanings provide patterns, expectations and norms that are negotiated and renegotiated as many times as people enter and exit a social structure (Keyton 2004: 17-18). In other words, culture is, at the same time, a process and a product. It bounds, but also facilitates. It bounds as it provides *meanings* of what we see through certain patterns. It facilitates - because it also gives us the chance to interpret what we see. This represents just an interpretation of what culture means. In the late 1930s, Margaret Mead defined culture as:

> "the whole complex of traditional behaviour which has been developed by the human race and is successively learned by each generation. A culture is less precise. It can mean the forms of traditional behaviour which are

> characteristic of a certain society, or of a group of societies, or of a certain race, or of a certain area, or of a certain period of time." (Mead 1937: 17-18)

In 1972, the American researcher H. Triandis defined culture as:

> "shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, expectations, norms, roles, self-definitions, values, and other such elements of subjective culture found among individuals whose interactions were facilitated by shared language, historical period, and geographic region." (Triandis 1972: 3)

Christopher W. Moore and his colleagues (2010: 5) added some additional nuances. For them, culture is revealed through language, behaviour, process activities, roles and social structures, and provides models and norms for acceptable daily communication, social interaction, and the fulfilment of affective and objective goals across a wide range of activities and spaces.

As we have noticed, *culture* has been defined by its superficial elements, conveyed by *interaction* (beliefs, expectations, language, behaviour, roles, norms, structure). These create a dynamic image of what culture means.

In the early 1980s, the Dutch anthropologist Geert Hofstede became known by his seminal book "Culture's Consequences". He admits that culture "manifests itself not only in values, but in more superficial ways: in symbols, heroes, and rituals." (Hofstede 2001: 1) At the same time he developed his own model of analysis of what culture and organisational culture mean, but also how these could be measured. In Hofstede's interpretation, culture is a *mental programming*. The sources of such a mental program are found in the social environment in which someone grew up and experienced life:

> „The programming starts within the family, it continues within neighbourhood, at school, in young groups, at the workplace, and in the living community." (Hofstede et al. 2010: 3)

As such, mental programs differ according to the environments in which they were created. A common term for such mental software is culture. Hofstede tells us that it is a collective phenomenon that includes "the unwritten rules of the social game." Thus, culture is learned, it is not inherited. Here is the difference between culture and human nature. The latter belongs to all human beings; it is the common element of mental software. "Culture is to a human collectivity what personality is to an individual", Hofstede writes (2001: 10). It is part of human nature that a man feels fear, anger, love, joy,

sadness and shame. The human nature also has the need to associate with others, as well as the desire for independence.

Beyond the culture, built on the human nature of an individual living in a certain environment, it is the personality. This is the third element of mental programming. This element gives the individual the uniqueness that consists of both inherited and learned traits. The three elements were represented by Hofstede as three levels of the uniqueness of mental programming.

Having defined the three elements of the mental programming (human nature, culture, and personality), the Dutch anthropologist emphasises that cultural differences are manifested in many ways. All of them are determined mostly by the environment where cultures coexist. The elements composing the *culture* are: values, rituals, heroes, symbols, and practices. As any other process, culture need to be taught and learnt. Particularly vulnerable at birth, people learn in early life values; and family and school are the main sources of their learning. As man enters adult life, values are accompanied by practices that are learned through school and then more and more through active social life. Hofstede says that in early life, people learn symbols, heroes, and rituals. At this stage, they learn the fundamental values. This represents the unconscious stage, followed by the stage of conscious learning when it is focused on learning new practices. In such an evolution, individual is born in a certain environment whose values, rituals, symbols and practices are taught to him with the aim of survival, because human nature contains an important dose of the need to associate with a group. Their emotions and manifestations are part of the same lesson that individual learns in his early life. (Hofstede 1980, 2001; Hofstede et al. 2010).

Another significant aspect in this puzzle of behaviour is given by the relationship between values and *the moral circle*, which is another variable introduced by Hofstede. He tells us that "our mental programs are adapted to life in a moral circle." (Hofstede et al. 2010: 13). In this respect it is worth noting here a study published, in 1981, by Peter Singer who wrote that "every human society has some code of behaviour for its members. [...] Ethics is part of the natural human condition." (Singer 1981: 23) The author gives us two extreme interpretations of human nature: (a) that of Thomas Hobbes, in *Leviathan*, saying that men lived without a superior common power which kept them in a state of war, and thus “the notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place.” (quoted by Singer 1981: 3) and (b) that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (*Social Contract)* who said that „In the state of nature human beings had no fixed home, no need of one another; they met perhaps twice in their lives, without knowing each other and without speaking”. (quoted by Singer 1981: 23-24).

The two extremes (*homo homini lupus* and *homo solitarius*) exclude, from different perspectives, the ethical act. Thus, the need for a state as a Common Power and an ethical code became mandatory for social survival, removing man from the state of nature, no matter how it was defined. Human / social ethics has long been justified on several biological theories defining human nature. About *Good* and *Wrong* there is a whole philosophical, spiritual and religious literature. The quintessence of this dichotomization seems to be found in the Golden Rule: "Do to others as you would them to do to you!" This is a moral rule that has an egotistical substance, but which is the simplified translation of many philosophical and religious systems that came to create and define moral circles. The barriers or boundaries of these moral circles have always been redefined either by extension or by narrowing.

Social conventions and rules, as representation of moral norms / systems, are also those that place individuals in different circles: *we* versus *them* (in-group v. out-group). These rules tell us who is good or bad in a group. From a social and political point of view, leaders can influence moral circles.

As it is obvious, values are the most rigid element of a culture, and also the toughest to notice by outsiders. Instead, practices are the visible part of culture. They can be learned relatively easily. Values change slowly, generations are needed. The consequence is a difference of values between grandparents and grandchildren.

Changing practices is part of what is called social game. Learning new practices helps people to achieve their own needs. This is part of the social game. Adapting new practices is not about cultural changes, but about fashioning the lifestyle.

An important part in Hofstede argumentation is the national culture's meaning. Nations are recent inventions that do not overlap impeccably with societies. The latter are forms of social organisation that have developed organically. Hofstede suggests that there are three sources of differentiation between countries: identity, values and institutions. All of them have historical roots. In this logic, identity is explicit or visible, while values are implicit or invisible.

In the last century, American anthropologists, such as Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, thought that all societies had the same problems but had different answers. Several researches highlighted the main areas where common issues fall, but there are different solutions:

- Social inequality, including relationship with authority.
- The relationship between the individual and the group.

- The concepts of masculinity and femininity: the social and emotional implications of being born a boy or girl.
- Ways to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity.

Starting from these empirical observations, some dimensions of culture has been developed by Hofstede since 1980. I mention here the first four: (a) power distance (PDI); (b) collectivism v. individualism (IDV); (c) femininity v. masculinity (MAS); (d) uncertainty avoidance (UAI). These dimensions reflect some aspects of culture, and it is also worth mentioning here that the logic of the society is not the same as the logic of individuals. Creating and defending his model of culture's dimensions to interpret social behaviour, Hofstede has developed some indexes to measure them. The values obtained mirrored some general patterns of interpretation.

Power distance dimension exposes the relation of dependency in certain country. In societies with a short distance from power, the degree of dependency of subordinates towards the superiors is limited and so there is a preference for consultation. This shows a little emotional distance giving subordinates the opportunity to address and contradict easier leadership. On the other side, in countries with a greater distance from power, the dependence of the subordinates on the bosses is higher. The attitudes are different: either the subordinates accept/prefer dependency within an autocratic or paternalistic structure, or they deny entirely that authority creating counter-dependency manifested even by protests or riots. When one tries to understand this dimension, it is expected to consider many other aspects related to social, education and employability, but also to the historical roots or geographical features. For example, an important aspect is the family environment. In a society with a long distance from power, the family imposes on the child the values creating his/her mental programming. It is crucial to observe how "respect" is defined in the relationship between a child and an adult, because this is what defines later the "authority".

The second dimension of national cultures is the opposition between collectivism and individualism. An interpretation of this dimension highlights the fact that within the collectivist national cultures, the in-group v. out-group distinction is an essential element. The collectivist societies exhibit a higher degree of exclusivity. Instead, individualist societies are more open to out-group members and a high degree of universality, which translates into greater respect for other cultures. Triandis (1993: 159) considers that the most cultures embrace a fusion of individualistic and collectivist features. A deeper analysis made by Triandis on this dimension highlights the explanation offered by Emile Durkheim. The famous sociologist talked about two kind of *solidarity*: (a) mechanical and (b) organic. The former characterises the homogeneous

cultures where the people know and agree about the rules, norms, roles, values, and their main virtue is modesty. The latter is specific for the heterogeneous and competitive cultures, being more rational, where people seek to establish interdependences based on rational choices. Their core virtue is tolerance.

The differences in mental programming among societies related to the third dimension are social but are even more emotional. Social roles can be imposed by external factors, but what people feel while playing them comes from inside. Hofstede suggests that "masculine culture countries strive for a performance society; feminine countries for a welfare society." (Hofstede et al. 2010: 171). Another example of two opposing views is about the way of handling immigrants. A masculine society tends to defend a politics of *assimilation* while a feminine community if concern about the *integration*. (*Ibidem*: 172)

The uncertainty of the future is what determines, in varying degrees, the anxiety of the individual. Society has developed various ways of diminishing it through technology, law and religion. Hofstede noticed that in countries with weak uncertainty avoidance if some laws don't work, they are changed or withdrawn. Instead, in the countries with a strong uncertainty avoidance the laws should be maintained even they are not followed. An important aspect emphasised by Hofstede is that "citizens from strong uncertainty avoidance countries were less optimistic about their possibilities to influence decisions made by authorities than were citizens of weak uncertainty avoidance societies." (Hofstede et al. 2010: 219). This dimension shows in what extent societies feels danger from others, mostly from minorities and migrants. The countries with strong uncertainty avoidance tend to be more intolerant to deviants and more xenophobic than those with weak uncertainty avoidance.

We could have in mind this model of interpretation created by Hofstede, along with some other alternatives or critics when we try to understand better to mosaic of the national cultures within the EU.

I propose to consider also the explanation of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) build on the two axes: (a) traditional vs. secular-rational and (b) survival vs. self-expression. In their understanding, the first dimension echoes the difference between societies relating to their attitude towards religion. A traditional society appreciates a close relationship between parent and child, and the respect to the authority. This kind of society has a nationalistic attitude in many issues. The second dimension reflects an economic polarisation between states in different stages of their development from industrial to post-industrial societies.

A European Union culture?

Talking about an integrated European Union culture is quite difficult, even after six decades since the creation of the first European communities. When I referred to the fact that this difficulty of establishing an integrated European culture would continue for several generations, I took into consideration the dimensions of analysis that Inglehart and Welzel (2005) explained starting from the European surveys realized by their team.

My argumentation is based on data and interpretations offered by Hofstede (2010) and by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) which are correlated with some data provided by the Eurobarometer No 88 (November 2017) (European Commission 2017). Of the questions that have been formulated in the Eurobarometer, I selected a number of 30 that I grouped thematically: (a) politics and trust in political authorities; (b) identity; (c) citizenship, and (d) future. These are, in my view, the questions that are the closest to the definitions that Hofstede has formulated for his first four culture's dimensions. The selection of these questions was based on the interpretations that Hofstede et al. (2010) gave every dimension from the perspective of organisational culture.

I chose Eurobarometer as the source of data collection just to be as close as possible to the perception of Europeans about the European Union and their own countries. I interpreted these data from the perspective of Hofstede's dimensions.

If we were to do an overview, from the perspective of culture's dimensions defined by Geert Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2010), we notice that the European Union has an average score in terms of power distance (52), index of individuality (59) and degree of masculinity (46), but a high score in terms of uncertainty avoidance (72). This picture is only apparently balanced. A closer look will reveal that of the 28 Member States, 10 are at a large distance from power, 6 have largely collectivist communities, 20 have a strong uncertainty avoidance, of which 11 are with a score over 80 points, and masculinity is predominant in 9 of these societies.

Roughly, Hofstede included these countries into three major groups:

(a) South and South-Eastern Europe: France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain.

(b) North and North-West Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden.
(c) Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

Taken into account the two above-mentioned axes, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) identified four European clusters:

(a) Protestant Europe: Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark
(b) English Speaking: United Kingdom, Ireland
(c) Catholic Europe: Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Belgium, France, Spain, Croatia, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal
(d) Orthodox Europe: Bulgaria, Greece, Romania.

Is it possible to change the characteristics of a culture? What are the factors that can transform a culture? In 1977, Inglehart (see also Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 97-99) hypothesized the theory of intergenerational value change based on two hypotheses:

(a) A scarcity hypothesis

> „Virtually everyone wants freedom and autonomy, but people's priorities reflect their socioeconomic conditions, placing the highest subjective value on the most pressing needs. Material sustenance and physical security are the first requirements for survival. Thus, under conditions of scarcity, people give top priority to materialistic goals, whereas under conditions of prosperity, they become more likely to emphasize postmaterialistic goals"

(b) A socialization hypothesis

> „The relationship between material scarcity and value priorities is not primarily one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved because, to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years. They change mainly through intergenerational population replacement. Moreover, the older generations in each society tend to transmit their values to their children; this cultural heritage is not easily dispelled, but if it is inconsistent with one's firsthand experience, it can gradually erode."

In this interpretation, material factors determine both direction and strength of cultural change. In fact, every culture manifests preference for patterning and integration as main ways to ensure survival and internal integration. The former means adaptation in the environment, the latter permit 'daily functioning and the ability to adapt and learn' (Schein 2010: 18). If the last decades taught the societies with the benefits of interdependencies and globalisation, they revealed also that "the nation remains a key unit of shared experience and its educational and cultural institutions shape the values of almost everyone in that society" (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 37).

Every cultural change could be predictable looking at the specific factors of the modernisation, but there are also some other vectors affecting a modernisation pattern: war, nation-specific events, political parties and leaders. (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 77).

Based on this assertion, we can assume that national and European leadership could have an impact on cultural change of the Member States. However, I think leaders can only have a temporary impact on national culture, no matter how big or small it is. The impact is rather on the level of politics, of an economic direction, so on a material level.

But at the level of values this impact is absorbed in time by the amorphous mass of society, which has its mechanisms to alter all practices that have been imported from other cultures, keeping only the temporary interest. It is precisely in this logic that we must read Hofstede's interpretation pointing out that democracy was an invention of Western societies that had been taken up by other societies, but without being culturally assumed. However, according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), there is a difference between short-term and long-term cultural changes.

To better define the 28 national cultures of the European Union, it is worthwhile to look at two correlations made by Hofstede using his own dimensions: (a) between PDI and IDV, and (b) between PDI and UAI.

The first correlation (between IDP and IDV) shows that most countries with a high index of distance to power also have a low degree of individualism. In this interpretation we observe, from the Hofstede plot, the existence of three groups of countries:

> (a) Spain, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, France, and Belgium
>
> (b) Austria, Estonia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Hungary, and Italy

(c) Portugal, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Greece.

This correlation talks about the degree of social stratification, the hierarchy of power and the position the individual has in relation to the group. Hofstede cites the exceptional case of France and Belgium where two contrasts are recorded: a high degree of individualism and a relatively large distance from power. According to Philippe d'Iribarne, it would represent "rational of honour" or a stratified form of individualism. (Hofstede et al., 2010, 104).

Job mobility is reduced in collectivist societies, where professions are inherited from father to son. In this kind of society an individual has a small number of jobs in his life. The way of engagement is different in an individualist country where the professional and individual criteria are more strongly argued than in a collectivist country where the group in which the person originates and the opinion of the group in which he wants to engage is considered.

The relationship between boss and subordinate is more moral in a collectivist society and the individual remains anonymous, as opposed to an individualistic society where professional relationship is often impersonal and the individual assumes responsibility for his actions and decisions.

At the level of social, political and economic practices, after the collapse of communism, collectivist societies in Central and Eastern Europe took over institutions specific to Western individualist states. This is the example:

(a) Joint-stock companies, with shareholders;
(b) Democracy, an invention of the individualist societies;
(c) Ombudsman, a Swedish invention.

Even though these collectivist states have liberated their economy from the planned government control, their economies were strongly marked by "collective interest", the competition for a free market being lately accepted but accompanied by numerous protectionist policies.

Freedom of the press, a principle of Western individualism, means that interest groups have their own ways to spread their opinions out of the political power control. This has gotten a radical interpretation in the new Central Eastern European democracies, which blamed the control of interest groups on media trusts as an obstruction of press freedom.

Therefore, the way in which the level of democracy is interpreted within the States and within the European Union, as well as the degree of freedom of the press, can be vitiated exactly by the way it is defined. It is equally difficult to interpret data on the degree of confidence a society has

towards the media. These are accompanied by the level of individualism as well as the distance to power.

In Hofstede's logic, in societies with a great distance from power people tend to not read the press. This information appears to be partially confirmed by the Eurobarometer No 88 of November 2017. There is a correlation coefficient of -0.70** between the PDI and the percentage of Europeans who read (almost) daily the written press. Which means that the greater the distance to power, the lower the interest in the written press. Also, a negative correlation coefficient (-0.61) exists between the PDI and the political interest index, using data provided by Eurobarometer No 88 of November 2017.

Concerning the second correlation proposed by Hofstede between PDI and UAI, this reveals four "implicit models of organisations". Plotting the two dimensions one against the other has tried to demonstrate there are four types of societies (Hofstede et al. 2010: 303):

- Machine: small power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance: Austria, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Italy, Hungary
- Family: large power distance and weak uncertainty avoidance, more specific to Asian societies;
- Market: small power distance and weak uncertainty avoidance: Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Finland, Estonia, Latvia;
- Pyramid: large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance: Czech Republic, Croatia, Bulgaria, Spain, France, Slovenia, Belgium, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Portugal, Greece, Malta, Poland

The four types are tailored by answering to two questions: (1) who has the power to decide what? and (2) what rules or procedures will be followed to attain the desired ends? Thus, taking only the cases of the European models, we notice that people coming from pyramid model of society "advocated measures to concentrate the authority *and* structure the activities." Supposing people coming from a country with strong uncertainty avoidance but small power distance, which means a machine organisation, they required to "structure the activities *without* concentrating the power". Citizens with a "market" model, belonging a national culture characterised by small power distance and weak uncertainty avoidance, promoted neither concentrating authority nor structuring activities. (Hofstede et al. 2010: 305).

The following are some of the ways in which national power distances and avoidance uncertainty affect planning and control processes in organizations:

- Larger PDI supports political rather than strategic thinking.
- Larger PDI supports personal planning and control, rather than impersonal systems. The higher the hierarchy, the less formal planning and control.
- Smaller PDI control systems place more trust in subordinates; in larger PDI cultures there is no such confidence.
- Stronger UAI makes strategic planning activities less likely to be practiced, as these activities may call into question today's certitudes.
- Stronger UAI supports the need for more detail in planning and shorter feedback in the short term.
- Stronger UAI requires planning to be left to specialists.
- Stronger UAI involves a more limited view of relevant information. (*Ibidem*: 316).

In the same logic, Hofstede supposes that vertical relationships within organizations are based on common values of superiors and subordinates. Beliefs about leadership reflect the dominant culture of a country.

Which kind of leadership?

Edgar Schein (2010: 3) emphasises that between *culture* and *leadership* is a close link in organisational cultures and macro cultures. The founder has an important role in shaping the culture of an organisation. In other words, culture and leadership are the two faces of the same coin. The same author mentions two distinct major sets of issues `that all groups, no matter what their seize, must deal with: (a) survival, growth, and adaptation in their environment, and (b) internal integration that permits daily functioning and the ability to adapt and learn.` (Schein 2010: 18).

Referring to the relationship between culture and leadership, Bass and Avolio (1994) consider that "the culture affects leadership as much as leadership affects culture." (1994: 544) Nevertheless there are two important vectors determining the development of an organisation: transformationalism[1] and transactionalism[2]:

[1] The four factors of a transformational leadership are the 4 Is: Intellectual stimulation; Idealised influence; Inspirational motivation; individual consideration.
[2] The two main factors of a transformational leadership are: contingent reward and management by exception.

> "Our argument is that organizations should move in the direction of more transformational qualities in their culture while also maintaining a base of effective transactional qualities." (Bass and Avolio 1994: 547)

That means a close relationship between transformational and transactional is expected in order to support the organisational development. The former gives the *direction*, by long-term commitments; the latter provides the *base*, by a contractual relationship and setting a price for everything.

In this respect, it is obvious that in a masculine, collectivist and highly uncertainty avoidant society leaders should have control and a weak consultation on their decision-making. In this kind of cultures, democratic leadership is viewed as a weak leadership.

Bass and Avolio warn that leaders need to understand the conservative nature of beliefs, values, ceremonies, rites, and assumptions that define a culture. A transformational leader must understand and respect the past. He needs it in order to introduce new symbols and mechanisms that underlie a new culture. Considering that the European Union fits more into the typology of a "predominantly moderated contractual" organization, I note here the meaning provided by Bass and Avolio:

> "These organizations are characterized as highly transactional in orientation and lacking in much transformational leadership.
>
> "Self-interest is more important than the interest of the group. Each person watches out for his/her interests, and short-term goals prevail. There is much attention to controls, directions and standard operating procedures. The organization tends to be an internal market where much is negotiated according to the "rules of the game." The organization's structure is likely to be stable, centralized, tight, and tall with a clear top-down chain of command. Employees have little discretion and are watched, driven, and controlled. The organization tends to be rigid and mechanistic." (Bass and Avolio 1994: 552).

I consider also another type of organisational culture mentioned by the above-quoted authors: "a high-contrast organisational culture" characterised by high level of transactional leadership coupled by a similar level of transformational leadership. There is a competition between

management and leadership activity "over the best ways to proceed". (*Ibidem* 551).

We need to observe which of these types of organisational culture explains better the character of the European Union. For that we consider mostly the organisational framework enhanced by the Treaty of Lisbon. *Mutatis mutandi*, by using the words of Bass and Avolio, this Treaty represents a strong outcome of a "trade-off between short-term gain and individual rewards for the long-term benefit of the group and organization." (1994: 551).

Defining Jean-Claude Juncker's leadership

Considering that culture is based on interaction and socialisation, the European Union have to insist on communication and intensification of freedom of movement, especially among young people, in order to ensure a long-term cultural change; but also to ensure the development of (economic) materials for the maintenance of short-term cultural changes.

The question remains the same: who can do this? Economic conditions are related to transactional leadership (either directive or participatory). Encouraging and motivating young people is a transformational leadership (through all the Is) Juncker defined democracy as a compromise, and that means for the President of the European Commission that even the European Union should be seen as a compromise.

> "Democracy is about compromise. And the right compromise makes winners out of everyone in the long run. A more united Union should see compromise, not as something negative, but as the art of bridging differences. Democracy cannot function without compromise. Europe cannot function without compromise." (Juncker 2017)

In negotiation terms, *compromise* is the worst solution and just a short-term solution. (see Thompson). Why I don't think that the idea of an egalitarian policy is the best way in achieving the European Union goals? Equality should be only in the right and chance, but not in policy.

A multi-speed Union is better than a one-speed Union frustrating the progress of others. The European Union is a mixture of 28 national cultures with quite different cultural features. An individualist culture sees the

economic competition in different terms from a collectivist culture. A high-distant of power society perceives differently the social rights and democracy and freedom of movement than a short-distant of power culture. The EU leadership needs to consider all these differences and do not fight against them. They need to play with to kind of cultural changes: long-term and short term. Therefore, they should develop, improve and maintain those tools which are useful to create a new EU culture. This is a generational mission.

Reading and interpreting the Juncker's speech one could notice his struggle to keep appearances of a democratic leader beyond his transactional style.

The speech of the President of the European Commission is that of an authoritarian leader who combines the transformational with transactional leadership, and the central metaphor of the speech presents Juncker as a ship commander who has the wind aft ("The wind is back in Europe's sails"). From the first words Juncker stresses that "We only had two choices. Either come together around a positive European agenda or each retreat into our own corners."

The organisation was in a context where decisions had to be made between divergent options. In front of them, Juncker tried to provide a plan and find the elements that motivated Member States to follow him. The position of President of the European Commission is an executive one, not a decisional one. The EU institutional framework leaves the decision to the European Parliament and the Council. However, we notice that Juncker have tried to play the role of an expert rather than a President of the Commission, giving the other two decision-making bodies advice in their decision-making. Juncker's entire discourse is one that seeks to highlight the elements that recommend him as an advisor leader:

- speaks to the first person, not on behalf of the College of Commissioners: "for me, Europe is more than just a single market…"; "this is why, in my sixth scenario…"; "I am only interested in institutional reforms…"; "I want our Union to be stronger…"; "This is why I call for setting up a European intelligence unit…"; "I want our Union to have a stronger focus on things that matter…"; "I would like to see European political parties start campaigning for the next European elections much earlier…";
- provides institutional reform directions: "Having a single President would simply better reflect the true nature of our European Union as both a Union of States and a Union of citizens." "Today I would like to present you my view: my own 'sixth scenario', if you will."

- speaks in terms of his experience: “this scenario is rooted in decades of first-hand experience. I have lived, fought and worked for the European project my entirely life. I have seen and lived through good times and bad. I have sat on many different sides of the table: as a Minister, a Prime Minister, as President of the Eurogroup, and now as President of the Commission. I was there in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon as our Union evolved and enlarged.”

These are the three elements that portray Juncker as a leader of the European Union rather than a leader of the European Commission, in the context in which the institution he presides over does not have a constitutional supremacy over the other EU institutions.

However, Juncker's mandate has overlapped with some major crises: refugee waves, terrorist attacks in several Western countries, the endless process of Britain's withdrawal from the EU, the management of the post-2008 economic crisis of the EU. On the cultural profile in which many states fall within the pyramid-type organizational culture, the approach of a forward-looking leader seems to be the one agreed, and Juncker's metaphor seems to best describe the context:

> *“So let’s throw off the bowlines. Sail away from the harbour. And catch the trade winds in our sails.”*

Final Remarks

Geert Hofstede's studies represent a starting point in analysing the political behaviour of the European Union. Knowing the national cultures of the 28 Member States and trying to describe an aggregated European culture helps us to better understand the type of leadership that best suits the European Union. The major difficulty lies in defining the European Union itself as an international organization.

The 28 Member States belong to three different organisational cultures: 14 of them are in the pyramid culture, 6 are in the machine culture, and 8 of them are in the market-type culture. It can be noticed that at the moment of the establishment of the first European communities, two of the six founding states were in the pyramid culture, other two in the machine culture, and one in the market culture, while Italy was at the edge between machine culture and

pyramid type. This explains how the European construction evolved. Legislative rigor overlapped on the need for a hierarchical structure, where the construction of a supranational sovereignty seemed to be a natural evolution.

As it concerns Jean Claude Juncker, he comes from a machine culture, which explains part of his leadership speech, while awareness of the EU's cultural context determined him to develop a counselling and coordination speech, rather than one of the executors of the decisions taken by the European Parliament and the Council.

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European Union's Democratic deficit and post-Lisbon Treaty citizenship

Paul POPA*

Abstract: *The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) has made numerous changes and new developments in the European Union's mechanisms. If some of them refer to its institutions, others are related to the international legitimacy of the European Union, so that it has acquired its legal personality. Another aspect refers to the possibility of leaving the states in the Union, which had not been foreseen so far, with only the entry procedure being regulated, offering by this possibility a truly democratic character that the Union needed.*

Key words: Lisbon Treaty, democratic deficit, European Union citizenship, initiative

New perspectives of the Treaty of Lisbon

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS of the Treaty of Lisbon is that it confers legal personality on the European Union. Article 15 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) set up the office of President of the European Council. Article 18 TEU has resized the Foreign Policy and Common Security. The simplification of the decision-making process is another regulation that is part of the innovative features of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty also clarifies the competencies of the European Union (Articles 4 and 5 of the TEU and Articles 3 to 6 of the TFEU**) as exclusive, shared and supportive, but also the statehood of states (Article 222 TFEU). Another regulation of the Treaty of Lisbon establishes, through Article 6 TEU, the jurisprudence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but also the relationship it has in adopting the provisions of the

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** TFEU = Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.

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European Convention on Human Rights. The Neighbourhood Policy falls within the European Union's obligations, but Member States keep the right to decide (Article 8 of the TEU). The disappearance of the pillar structure of the European Union determines the Communitarisation of police and judicial cooperation.

The following provisions relate to combating the democratic deficit in the European Union and provide for the necessary measures to eliminate criticism of the transparent representativeness of citizens in the framework of the Union mechanism: Article 14 of the TEU provides the European Parliament with increased powers in the legislative, budgetary and international. Article 12 TEU envisages an increase in the role of the National Parliaments, on which we shall summarize the fact that they enjoy the possibility of close cooperation with the European Parliament and with other national parliaments of the Member States. In terms of attributions, they are obviously more numerous, because national parliaments can work directly with the European institutions, not just through the executive, verify compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in the drafting of normative acts, have direct implications in the revision of the treaties. It is envisaged that according to Article 49 TEU, national parliaments should be notified by States wishing to join the European Union.

The right of Member States to withdraw from the European Union as set out in Article 50 TEU expressly provides that Member States may decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with their own constitutional rules and after notification to the European Council. Withdrawal is formally achieved through a negotiated and concluded agreement between the requesting Member State and the European Union. Decisions in the Council shall be taken by a qualified majority after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The Treaties cease to apply to the State concerned from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, in the absence of such an agreement, two years after such notification unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to break this deadline. Even after the withdrawal, the Treaty provides the State with the opportunity to return to the Union by submitting the application and following the specific procedures required (under Article 49 of the TEU).

The Citizens' Initiative is another novelty under the Treaty of Lisbon, which regulates the possibility for one million European citizens from different countries to propose a problem to be debated or adopted in the European Union's decision-making mechanisms. It also envisages the possibility for States or the Commission to submit to the Council proposals to amend certain provisions of the Treaties adopted. As a result, the Council, through its President, paved the way for an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), in which,

with the unanimity of the States and the national parliaments, the treaty could be amended before its entry into force.

Increased power for local actors

The Constitutional Treaty provided explicit reference to regional and local levels, introducing a series of safeguard measures aimed at guaranteeing regional competences and even constitutionalizing their participation in the decision-making process. All these provisions also appear in the Treaty of Lisbon, without any change, being in fact a recognition and explanation of the multi-level political system of the European Union and its federal character, the power being shared between different decision-making and managerial levels (Luzarraga, Llorente 2011: 110).

The Treaty explicitly recognizes - for the first time - the principle of local and regional autonomy within the EU Member States. It also gives greater importance to the local and regional level in checking of the principle of subsidiarity. The Treaty guarantees that the process of drafting new EU legislation begins with a detailed analysis of the local and regional impact of all proposals. The Treaty also gives the Committee of the Regions several prerogatives to track the legislative draft at all stages of the legislative process. The Treaty provides the European body with several legal and policy instruments. Authorities at all levels across Europe will have to collaborate much more than they have done so far. The Committee of the Regions anticipates these new challenges and is ready to contribute to the increased capacity of local and regional authorities (CoR). The stage where the actors have performed is completely changed since the political and economic decisions were further fragmented.

The Treaty of Lisbon changed the relationship between the Committee of the Regions and the other EU institutions. The Committee gained a stronger presence at all levels of the EU decision-making process - in the preparation, modification and monitoring of legislation affecting local and regional authorities. It ensures a greater contribution by the authorities closest to citizens to EU policies at all levels and encourages greater involvement of the general public in the process of European integration. All three institutions adopting EU legislation - the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council – should consult the CoR when drafting legislation in any area that could have a regional impact. The Committee's opinions cover several policy areas, including energy and climate change. Services of general interest,

namely social services, public services and infrastructures, as well as their importance to local and regional authorities, are covered by a protocol annexed to the Treaty. In addition, the Committee now has legal instruments to protect its right to be consulted at the European Court of Justice. Thus, they can protect their prerogatives if they feel that they are not respected by the other EU institutions and can attack EU legislation that does not respect the principle of subsidiarity by violating local and regional competences (CoR).

As elected representatives of European citizens, both Members of the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions enhance the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon established a closer and clearer relationship between the two institutions. This should allow for greater public relations with the European Union and greater confidence in its democratic nature. The most important change to the Treaty is that Parliament - in addition to the Commission and the Council - has an obligation to consult the Committee on the proposals in all policy areas where the Commission and the Council should have done so far. Having the opportunity to review its opinions as a result of changes made by the EU institutions, the Committee is able to follow political debates in Parliament, to advise rapporteurs and to react promptly to political developments. Through this process, the relationship between the Committee and Parliament will become more concrete and more political in character. Under the new "early warning" procedure, the European Parliament can block legislative proposals by a simple majority vote if most national parliaments raise objections to subsidiarity. In situations where the Committee shares the concerns of national parliaments, it will ensure that the European Parliament follows suit. The Council has a similar prerogative to reject proposals. Relations between the Member States and the Union can be found in the first articles of the TEU, which also clarify the mutual obligations of cooperation, loyalty and solidarity. In addition, at the level of the general principle, the political limits of the Union's action vis-à-vis the Member States are identical, which is the guarantee of the Constitution of the Union of some of the essential components of the states, regions and local entities, them (CoR)

Article 1 (TEU) states that: "This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken with full respect of the principle of transparency and as close as possible to citizens ". The illusory character of this Community consecration is based in practice on the major democratic deficit in the European Union, the distance between the Union institutions and the European citizen, the administrative bureaucracy brought to the highest level, the Community corruption accused of national corruption, especially in Central

European states and Eastern countries that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007 (Marin 2009: 9).

Fighting the democratic deficit

For the European citizens, it must be made clear that the Treaty of Lisbon increasingly transferred great powers from the citizen to bureaucracy, transforming the European Union from an association of states and democratic governments, with common values and goals, into a federation led by a bureaucratic and foreign values with the majority of the member states. The tools of transformation are the same in all local communities and in the Member States: ignorance and temporary indifference of the public, cooperation of political elites, especially in elections, the cultivation of myths, such as "Europeanism" and "European culture" (Marin 2009: 10).

With the new Treaty, we noticed the reconsideration of the role of citizens in the European Union. Thus, on the one hand, they are considered to be subjects of law in the face of the European public power, and on the other hand they are political actors, legitimising the public power at European level, which in turn is exercised in their name and with their participation. The Title II of the Treaty, entitled "Provisions on democratic principles", consists of four articles: the first three include the principles of democratic equality, representative democracy and participatory democracy (Luzarraga, Llorente 2011: 113). One of the fundamental objectives of this Title was to bring the European Union closer to its citizens, explaining and clarifying the European political model. This article had a twofold purpose: to expose and explain the bases and rules of play specific to the European political system and, on the other hand, to introduce provisions on its democratic functioning by linking citizens' participation in the democratic life of the European Union (Luzarraga, Llorente 2011: 114).

Part of the specialized literature on governance is dedicated to proposals to increase democratic accountability and the EU's governance capacity. In the literature, three distinct directions of reform can be identified: constitutionality, parliamentary activity and deliberation. The first concerns the growth of overall rules and procedural controls that would ensure minimum levels of transparency and public participation in the development of EU policies. Parliamentary involvement would entail increasing EP legislative and budgetary powers, strengthening parliamentary groups, subordinating the Commission (Wallace et al. 2015: 32-33). A deliberative

democracy would be the solution by involving citizens and their representatives through a joint deliberation.

The main question related to this type of democracy is that democracy must be as representative as possible. This means that the positions expressed by the representatives in Parliament should be as close as possible to the preferences of the electoral body. From this perspective, it is possible to solve how elected representatives cannot deviate or deviate as little as possible from the preferences of the electoral body. From the perspective of citizen-delegated democracy, parties and their formation are two suspicious things. Parties are seen as a conspiratorial way of producing a distance between voters and their representatives (Hix 2010, 74-76).

The European Parliament is the only European institution elected by direct vote. The Treaty of Lisbon provides a legal basis for the need to have a coherent institutional framework capable of achieving the objectives for which the Union was created, through the transfer of powers of the democratic states (Timofte 2010: 85-91).

Citizens' involvement in decision-making

The *Citizens Initiative* (Article 11 (4) TEU) introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, allows one million citizens, nationals of a significant number of Member States, to directly request the European Commission to submit an initiative of interest for them in a field of competence of the Union. For the first time in the history of the European Union, the citizens of the Member States benefit from the direct right of Community legislative initiative similar to the national constitutional systems at the request of a number of citizens, the European Commission initiates a legislative project. Thus, this initiative is the first formal manifestation of citizens' right to take part in the EU decision-making process, emphasizing the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The conditions and procedures for exercising citizens' initiative lay down in a regulation adopted by the European Parliament and the Council based on a proposal from the European Commission.

It is for the first time that citizens can participate actively in the exercise of the sovereign authority of the European Union, being directly involved in the European legislative process, which transforms European citizenship into an effective exercise of the resulting rights. The legislative initiative has a symbolic value. It proves the existence of a European people representing

more than the sum of the national citizens, the chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs said. The proposal sets out how many signatures to be collected for each country and suggests that the Commission analyse, after collecting 300 000 signatures from three Member States, whether the initiative can be considered. It sets a one-year deadline for collecting signatures and gives the Commission four months to examine the initiative and how to proceed with it. With the aim of bringing citizens closer to the European Union's decision-making process, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the role of the social partners by recognizing the Tripartite Social Summit - social partners (private employers, small businesses, public employers, etc.). The Treaty recognizes the importance of dialogue between citizens, civil society structures and the institutions of the European Union, the first two mentioned structures now being able to take part in European decisions (Pop 2010: 90-91).

Kristine Kruma (2014) has noticed that although there were changes caused by the Lisbon Treaty provisions on citizenship have not changed. In essence, what is observed is the replacement of the formula "citizenship is complementary" with a new formulation "is additional to the national citizenship." Beyond the debate on the economic and social substance of citizenship, its political valency can be recognized in the individual's relationship with the EU institutions. This relationship is no longer one brokered by the Member State to which it belongs citizen but became a direct one. The first step was through direct suffrage for the European Parliament, and then by the right to petition the EU institutions (Kruma 2014).

The role of citizens increases with the Treaty of Lisbon, and they can be directly involved in the formation of regulations, on a joint proposal by several citizens, members of the European Union. They are given the right to petition, having the opportunity to raise debated and regulated issues at Union level (Jiglău 2010: 80-82).

Article 24 (TFEU) is the legal basis on which the framework for guaranteeing and enforcing the right of citizens' initiative, petitioning and writing to the EU institutions is being built. This article is supported by the provisions of Articles 11 (TEU), 227 (TEU), 228 (TEU), 13 (TEU), and 55 (TEU). The petition may be individual or collective and may take the form of a request, a complaint, a complaint concerning the application of Community law or an appeal to Parliament to take a position on a particular matter. Petitions may be sent by post or by filling in a form on Parliament's website in any of the official languages of the EU. Within Parliament, there is a petitions committee which, as a first step, examines the admissibility of petitions. However, requests for information and general comments on EU policies are not

considered as petitions. Petitions seeking the revocation of a court judgment in a Member State are also inadmissible, and problems relating to bad administration in EU institutions or bodies must be addressed to the European Ombudsman. If the petition is considered to be admissible, the Petitions Committee may ask the European Commission for documents or information. The petition may be referred to other committees of the European Parliament for information or for them to take appropriate action. In some exceptional cases, the Committee on Petitions may submit an EP report to be submitted to plenary approval or make an on-the-spot finding (Bărbulescu 2009: 167).

This novelty of increasing the influence of civil society, through the initiative of a million citizens coming from several Member States, is a freshness, and actively involves citizens with legislative proposals, and is also an interesting mechanism of direct democracy, whose procedure was to be further developed by the institutions by drafting a regulation (Luzarraga, Llorente: 2011: 116). It has also strengthened the collective identity of the citizens of the European Union by making a firm commitment to strengthening the power of community, alongside the efforts of the European institutions. Knowledge of the rights that the European Union citizen attributes to them must be supplemented by their use as instruments of civic contestation, active participation in political institutions, voting, associative life. A citizen of the future must be able to involve in engagement and integration to actively participate in the consolidation of all European projects. By the Treaty of Lisbon, by establishing the citizens' initiative and other innovations, European citizens cease to be a mere depositary of rights, but become a form of association and communication between citizens of the Member States who decide to use rights as influential instruments with a view to achieving a joint project (Pop 2010: 92-93).

Final remarks

As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, the role of the citizens of the European Union has felt a better, exploited one that is giving the European Union a transparent decision-making process. This decision on the citizen's proximity to the European Union institutions and its regulation in the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as a new principle of the European Union, also had the effect of referendums rejecting the Constitutional Treaty. It drew attention to the low confidence that European citizens have in the EU institutions. It needed a transparent, and

serious involvement of the EU decision-making mechanisms to gain its respect and legitimacy.

After almost a decade since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the European Union citizenship is a clearer reality conceived by the citizens of the Member States. The debate on the democratic deficit has left more land to analyse the efficiency of the citizenship. In this regard, the European Commission's Eurobarometers have measured every year the citizens perception about the European Union, and the main question whereby this is checked is: "You feel you are a citizen of the EU? (QD2.1)", but also a package of questions measuring their perception about "the most positive results of the European Union". The first two most positive results are: (a) the free movement of people, goods and services within the EU and peace among the Member States of the EU (European Commission 2018).

I state that the major difficulty in assuming completely this citizenship by the national citizens of the 28 Member States resides in the misunderstanding of this new status. I would emphasise here what Patricia Mindus stressed recently (2017): European citizenship differs from the traditional meaning as it is not a nationality, nor a dual citizenship found in federal systems. Keeping the framework of an international organisation, the European Union has a legislation that differs from the international law "in allowing direct individual access to the justice system". In addition, all the previsions concerning the EU citizenship are based on a common principle: freedom from discrimination on grounds of nationality. (Mindus 2017).

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Book Reviews

Sebastian Balfour, Alejandro Quiroga, *The invention of Spain. Nation and Identity since Democracy*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2007, 239 pp.

Marina Trufan*

AFTER THE DEATH OF FRANCO and up until the present-day politicians, journalists, teachers and historians have attempted to offer explanations on how the Spanish political system works. If the transition was an ambitious plan that counted on ample support both within and outside of Spain, why does it still have repercussions on current policy in Spain contemporary society?

Historians, Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga are both specialists in Contemporary Spanish policies. Balfouris Emeritus Professor of Contemporary Spanish Studies in the LSE's Department of Government. His major works are *The Polities of Contemporary Spain* which was edited by him in 2004 and *The invention of Spain. Nation and Identity since Democracy* is one of his important works which has with Alejandro Quiroga.

Quiroga is a Spanish historian, who is currently Lecturer in Spanish and European History at Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Newcastle University. His research field covers topics such as nationalism and ethnic conflict, Fascism and conservative political thought or the power of sports in contemporary Spain. The present book represents his major work, but he is also the author of several articles on Spanish nationalism.

Their book is based on a deconstructivist perspective which reveals how the text is always internally conflicted and is far from any definite meaning. They try to show how concepts of nationalism or identity clash and how this can generate multiple interpretations. It all starts with the question *Is Spain a Nation?.* And from here, they deconstruct the intricacies of concepts like nation, nationalism and identity. They agree on the idea that the unipolar identity imposed by Franco regime eroded the legitimacy of Spanish nationalism, because such a regime was full of totalitarian symbolism regarding the concept of nation.

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Hence, the result is that Spanish nationalism has had to undergo an implicit removal and to disguise itself in different forms.

The invention of Spain represents an important contribution on the Spanish national question from the transition to the present moment (which is 2007) and analyses conceptions about nation and identity in Spain and their use in everyday discourse since the end of Franco's regime in 1975. What makes this book even more appealing is the fact that it reunites a spectrum of contemporary Spanish politics from Franco's regime through conservative, left-wing parties and governments, to regional nationalists. The political system in Spain has become polarized over an array of issues, but none more so than the question of nation and identity. Therefore, these two concepts have been viewed through different lenses during the transition to democracy. Quiroga and Balfour argue that Franco's regime had profoundly discredited the concept of the Spanish nation by the mid-1970s and many in the left had embraced the cause of peripheral nationalism. Consequently, in 1975, the Communist Party of Spain's (PCE) manifesto defined the right of self-determination of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia as *inalienable* (p.83). Both authors point out the representations of the nation concept from the past to its impact on the present, because in 1976 , a year later, the (PSOE) went a step further and declared that *all nationalities and regions had the right to break free from the Spanish state (p. 84)* .

Meanwhile, a crisis of identity and governance in present-day Spain should be treated with scepticism because there are real problems relating to social cohesion and the role of the state in many situations. Balfour and Quiroga also argue that the issues of the Spanish politics have foundations in the Constitution of 1978. The debate over the concepts of the nation and identity is also framed by the Constitution, who is called *the touchstone of Spanish democracy* (p.56).

The book shows how Spain is now claimed by many to be a nation of nations and regions, a post-traditional nation state or a post-national state. For the peripheral nationalists, meaning Basque, Catalan, and Galician nationalists in particular, it is merely a state of nations and regions (p.139). The authors point out that in Catalonia, for example, nationalism is the most pronounced and this region represents as a nation by virtue of its linguistic and historic distinctiveness. Catalan identity was constructed in opposition to Castile, a region considered responsible for hampering the progress of Catalonia. (p. 140).

These being said, it is here that we can observe the deconstructivist approach challenging the argument of the writers and which casts doubt on most of the principles sustaining political parties. For the writers, the emergence of Catalan and Basque nationalism changed everything because these

movements created national identities that were not only alternative but, especially in the Basque case, antagonistic to the various Spanish national identities, while never defining them.

The shortfalls of such a work are precisely in its deconstructive perspective, because the authors do not assume any clear conclusion at the end of this approach, thus leaving all interpretations open to further debate.

The book under review here shares similarities in methodology with Gregorio Alonso's *The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition*(2011)and Bonnie Field's *Politics and Society in Contemporary Spain* (2013), and all of them have established themselves with writing focusing on the relationship between the politics and the concepts of nation and identity. Even if it appeared before those other two, in 2007, Balfour and Quiroga's book is more complex , in terms of sources used, which includes references of a wide range of primary and secondary literature from Constitution, and different reports, to memoirs and letters of various politicians.

Written in an away which makes it easy to read, this book looks at these problems both as part of historical debate and as a contemporary political problem. During and since the transition, Spanish nationalist discourse has evolved to meet the challenge of new concepts of nation and identity, so this work represent an extremely important way to read the problems of Spanish contemporary society to find out the causes which triggered the effects of today's situation in Spain politics and society.

Vasile Pușcaș. *Philip E. Mosely despre Transilvania și Basarabia*, [Philip E. Mosely on Transylvania and Bessarabia] Cluj-Napoca, Editura Școala Ardeleană, 2017, 303p.

Doru Cristian TODORESCU*

PHILIP E. MOSELY WAS AN AMERICAN HISTORIAN, graduated from the Harvard University, who was involved in sociological research in rural areas in the Balkans and Romania. He also has been involved in international negotiations during the Second World War, being employed by the United States government. In a volume published not long ago, Vasile Pușcaș focused on the Philip E. Mosely's personality. This book based on the research that the author has done in the United States libraries and archives, within the Fulbright program.

Like professor Vasile Pușcaș mention in the preface that he wrote, by publishing this book, he wanted to realize a historiographical reconstruction of several aspects of Philip E. Mosely's activity that had a direct connection with Romania, little known in Romanian literature. Because Pușcaș wanted to be more eloquent, any reader of this book can easily notice that the author did not distribute the material in several chapters, even if the volume has more than 300 pages. After a brief *Preface*, Vasile Pușcaș, chose a simpler solution, with a first part of evocation and analysis, followed, under the title *Annex,* to publish some studies and articles from the four and five decades of the twentieth century, all related to the Philip E. Mosely personality.

The first part, titled "Philip E. Mosely about Transylvania and Bessarabia", has 13 subdivisions, which can also be grouped according to the themes and topics addressed. As expected in an approach of this kind, the reader receives firstly some bibliographical information about Philip E. Mosely: the context in which he came to do sociological research in Romania; the collaboration with sociologist Dimitrie Gusti; the campaigns led in rural areas; describing in detail the research that took place in Transylvania, especially in the village Șanț, situated in the present county Bistrița-Năsăud.

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Subsequently, Vasile Pușcaș focuses on the evocation of the role played by Philip E. Mosely in supporting the Romanian cause during the Second World War, especially in the problem of Transylvania. Under the titles „Philip E. Mosely și problemele majore ale României în anii '40" ["Philip E. Mosely and the major problems of Romania in the 1940's"]; "La Departamentul de Stat cu temele românești" ["At the State Department with the Romanian themes"]; "Lobby și influență" ["Lobby and influence"]; "Târguieli și negocieri" ["Bargains and negotiations"], Vasile Pușcaș highlights the role played by the „hero" of his book in international debates and negotiations that involved the Great Powers of the time, regarding territorial conflicts that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe; namely the use of those conflicts in the establishment of the spheres of interest. And in that context, the question of the future status of Transylvania has been a concern for Allied diplomatic circles since 1940, but has gained greater importance since 1942-1943, when the certainty of victory over the power of the Axis began to take shape. Taking into account all possible alternatives – the division of this province; its complete *restoratio* to one of the states that claimed it; its autonomy or its independence as part of a largest confederation – various structures and representatives of the European Great Powers, but also of Romania and Hungary, tried to identify solutions regarding the Romanian-Hungarian border. Of course, the United States could not have stayed away. Thus, in February 1942, in addition to the State Department of the United States, an Advisory Committee started its activity (placed under the nominal leadership of the State Secretary). The new Committee had two structures: political and territorial, that had the mission to draw, among other things, the necessary recommendations regarding the settlement of the Transylvanian problem. Readers of this book will find Philip E. Mosely active in disputes and negotiations of territorial issues, working in the State Department during the War (under the leadership of his Harvard professor John C. Campbell), but then as a member of the American delegation to the various sessions held during the Peace Conference.

Then, this book evoked the activity of Philip E. Mosely during the Cold War, including, among many others, the continuation of research regarding Romania. We learn that Mosely, like many other American intellectuals who activated during the War in governmental structures, returned in the academic environment. Columbia University was the institution were Philip E. Mosely surrounded and made research contributing to the gathering of important Soviet and East European space data that were also used by various United States security agencies. Regarding Romania, it remained in the centre of his research. He kept in touch with a number of personalities from the country, having links with the Romanian diaspora in the United States and being aware

of the event that took place in the country after the communist regime was established.

At the end of this part, Vasile Pușcaș, in a few pages, presents his conclusions about the activity and the role played by Philip E. Mosely. And Annexes are complementary to the evocation and analysis of the first part of the volume. There are documents in Romanian and English, followed by a short summary in English and an Index.

There are just some issues raised by me, readers being those who will discover more interesting and unknow events. Last but not least, I note the exceptional graphic design.